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ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses the implications of financial liberalisation programme for international 
remittance inflows with regard to the macroeconomic determinants and also the implications of 
remittances for economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) between 1980 
and 2009. The methodological approach to the analytical framework of this study is based on 
the hypothesis that financial liberalisation causes higher inflows of international migrant 
remittances through official channels to augment the scarce domestic financial resources, and 
to stimulate economic growth for sustainable development in capital-constrained SSA.  
 
Prior to the macroeconometric analyses, the study addressed definitional and measurement 
issues on international remittances and financial liberalisation, and provided an overview of the 
macroeconomic policy environment in post-independent SSA, as well as the magnitude and the 
trends in remittances received by SSA relative to other developing economies. First, the 
system Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) for dynamic panel-data estimation was used to 
determine the macroeconomic factors responsible for the changing trends in remittance 
inflows. Then an inquiry into the impact and causal effects of financial liberalisation on 
international remittance inflows in SSA following the static panel-data modelling and panel 
Granger non-causality estimation procedures was undertaken. Following this, the system GMM 
was further employed to examine the impact of remittances on long-run economic growth, and 
the effects of remittance inflows on economic development in SSA. Essentially, the economic 
development indicators considered in this study are poverty, income inequality, labour market 
outcomes, human capital development, and financial development. 
 
It is revealed in this study that the most appropriate measure of international migrant 
remittances is the sum of “workers‟ remittances” and “compensation of employees” excluding 
“migrant transfers”. Using remittances per capita, which the study found to be the best proxy for 
remittances per migrant rather than the commonly used remittances as a percentage of GDP, it 
is shown that SSA is the least recipient of official migrant remittances in the world, with no SSA 
country receiving remittances worth US$1 per day. This study further establishes that the 
macroeconomic factors that influence remittance inflows in SSA have varying rather than static 
impact in response to changing macroeconomic policy environment. Also, macroeconomic 
factors have different influences on attracting remittances from abroad in relation to migrant 
duration status – permanent or temporary. Although financial liberalisation Granger-causes 
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international remittances, not sufficient evidence exists that a significant proportion of the 
official remittances received in SSA passes through the banking system. Besides, the extent to 
which financial liberalisation can Granger-cause and/or positively impact on international 
remittance inflows in SSA is directly and ultimately conditional to the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of the remittance-receiving SSA country. 
 
It was also found out that generally, international migrant remittances propel higher economic 
growth in SSA, with greater impact on SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates. 
International remittance inflows have significant positive developmental impact, with no 
sufficient evidence of moral hazard effects. Overall, international remittances contribute to 
reducing poverty and unemployment but not necessarily income inequality and, at worse, 
remittances have no significant impact on labour productivity and participation in SSA. Higher 
remittance inflows promote human welfare, educational attainment, life expectancy, and 
financial development in SSA. With the exception of educational attainment, the developmental 
effects of remittances vary across countries, depending upon the level of economic 
development. 
 
KEYWORDS:  
Financial Liberalisation, Financial Development, International Remittances, Economic Growth, 
Economic Development, Migrants, Panel Data Analysis, Developing Countries, System GMM, 
Panel Fixed Effects, Panel Random Effects, sub-Saharan Africa 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a broad insight into the nucleus and the outline of this dissertation. In 
particular, the background of the study, the research problem, the research questions, the 
motivation for the study and the research objectives are discussed. The chapter also presents 
the research hypotheses, the scope of the study, as well as the structure of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The search for rapid growth and sustainable development for the underdeveloped economies, 
particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), has been continuing for a long time. This has led to the 
adoption of economic reform policies such as the liberalisation of the financial sector in an 
apparent recognition of the widely held view that the financial sector can play a crucial role in 
accelerated economic growth and sustainable development. For instance, as far back as the 
1870s, Bagehot (1873) recognised and consequently emphasised the critical role of the 
financial sector in resource mobilisation to finance economic growth and development. Later, a 
new generation of prominent economists, notably Schumpeter (1912), Cameron (1967), 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), re-emphasised the relevance of the financial sector in 
propelling economic growth and development.  
 
These policy prescriptions, notwithstanding, many governments in developing countries, have 
until recently, at one time or another, intervened in the smooth development process of their 
respective domestic financial markets through the imposition of various forms of restrictions 
and control measures that limited the scope, pace and operations of financial institutions. 
These actions subsequently crowded-out private sector initiatives and investment as financial 
institutions under state control directed credit in favour of government projects and public sector 
institutions. 
 
Meanwhile, Cameron (1967), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) maintain that the benefits 
accruing from a well-functioning and properly developed financial system can be enormous. 
First, through an efficient financial intermediation process, lenders and borrowers are easily 
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brought together, which reduces transaction and search costs. Second, financial institutions 
provide relevant services to their clients and thereby helping reduce information costs, provide 
risk management services and reduce risks involved in financial transactions in general. Third, 
financial institutions create liquidity in an economy by converting short-term borrowings into 
medium- and long-term financial assets by way of lending and other forms of business finance. 
Fourth, the intermediaries bring the benefits of asset diversification to the economy. Fifth, 
financial institutions mobilise savings from atomised individuals for investment, thereby solving 
the problem of indivisibility in financial transactions. Above all, through a well-functioning 
financial system, mobilised savings are invested in the most productive projects. This 
investment creates opportunities for full employment of factors of production to propel rapid 
economic growth and development. 
 
Essentially, the numerous merits of financial intermediation can translate into economy-wide 
benefits (Levine, 1993; 1997), which influence governments to adopt financial liberalisation 
programmes in economies where the financial sector is considered underdeveloped. These 
programmes which comprise a series of policy reforms are designed mainly to increase the 
process of financial resource mobilisation from domestic and foreign sources channelled 
through the formal financial sector; improve the efficiency of financial intermediation; and 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
 
Based on these expectations, many developing countries, including those in SSA, embarked 
upon the implementation of policies of financial liberalisation as a component of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) under varying financial structures and different macroeconomic 
fundamentals. For instance, at the commencement of the reforms within the West African sub-
region, Nigeria already had relatively more advanced financial institutions and assets than 
Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Generally, however, the financial reform programmes 
were initiated in these countries as a response to macroeconomic imbalance and financial 
distress. 
 
Through the removal of the elements of financial repression, particularly controlled interest 
rates, financial sector reform is expected to lead to higher nominal and real interest rates, which 
are, in turn, expected to serve as incentives for financial resource mobilisation and efficient 
credit allocation. This is the supposition of the liberalist hypothesis (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973). A higher real deposit rate encourages economic agents to substitute consumption for 
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savings (the substitution effect). In addition, higher interest-income on savings enables savers 
to achieve their saving targets with lower stock of savings (the wealth or income effect). The 
two effects operate in opposite directions and the net outcome depends on which one 
dominates the other. The underlying reasoning of the McKinnon-Shaw doctrine is that the 
substitution effect outweighs the wealth effect. Accordingly, financial savings will further be 
boosted by a shift in the savers‟ wealth portfolios from non-financial assets to financial assets 
(asset substitution effect). 
 
Contrary to the McKinnon-Shaw premise, the increased real interest rate may not necessarily 
lead to improved domestic financial resource mobilisation. In very low-income countries like 
those in SSA, for instance, the level of income could be so low that households spend a very 
high proportion of their earnings on basic needs1. Under this circumstance, even with high real 
deposit rates, very little or no proportion of income can be saved. It must also be emphasised 
that in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), subsistence economic activities are vibrant and quite 
pre-dominant in rural communities. These rural economies which form the largest sector in 
LDCs have the highest population of illiterate peasant farmers and petty traders who still 
engage in barter trading since household incomes are more in kind than in cash. This implies 
that the McKinnon-Shaw proposition is probably not entirely relevant to developing economies.  
A study of this proposition by Ogaki et al. (1996) shows that a 100 per cent rise in real deposit 
rate leads to a 66.7 per cent rise in savings in high-income countries, but to only 10 per cent 
rise in very low-income countries in the long run. This “basic needs” explanation and even the 
tendency of dissaving in LDCs and, for that matter SSA, could be the likely explanation for the 
insensitivity of financial savings to real deposit interest rates in many African countries2. 
 
In this era of globalisation, macroeconomic policies and programmes for all countries, including 
those in SSA, have, since the 1980s, invariably and as a matter of necessity, become more 
liberal and market oriented. This has enhanced the global mobility of factors of production in 
general and capital in particular. For instance, remittances have become topical in international 
finance and development economics as the rate and volume of cross-border asset transfers 
have been increasing exponentially since the 1980s. In 1995, migrant remittances to 
developing countries totalled US$57.8 billion and this soared up to US$96.5 billion in 2001 
(World Bank, 2006a). In 2005, the World Bank estimated that migrant remittances to 
                                                          
1
 When households‟ incomes are at subsistence level, their marginal propensity to consume is equal to one. 
2
 See Oshikoya (1992) for the case of Kenya. 
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developing countries totalled more than US$167 billion, but the actual amount could be 50 per 
cent higher or more, while others put the figure at US$298 billion. In 2006, the World Bank 
(WB) reported that official remittances increased to US$206 billion. Thus, the growth of 
remittances has now exceeded private capital flows or foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries. Besides, remittances are a 
reliable source of foreign capital and the least volatile source of foreign exchange since the 
1990s and now account for a third of global finance (World Bank, 2006a). 
 
In spite of the consistent growing trend in international remittances, the implications of 
remittances for an underdeveloped economy appear rather ambiguous. Thus, while it is true 
that increased remittances to developing countries could lead to rapid economic growth, 
macroeconomic stability, and improved livelihoods, it is also possible that continuous colossal 
remittance inflows could result in increasing brain drain, dollarisation, inflation, over-reliance 
and abandonment of the pursuit of pro-growth economic policies, and moral hazards where 
recipients heavily depend on these transfers, thereby reducing supply of labour3. Increased 
remittance inflows to developing countries could also lead to real exchange rate appreciation 
and less international competitiveness, culminating in what has been referred to as the „Dutch 
Disease‟. Altogether, these costs of high international remittance inflows could possibly retard 
the economic growth and economic development process of underdeveloped economies. 
 
The reasons for the adverse effects of remittance inflows are not far-fetched. Among the 
prominent features of underdeveloped economies are high population growth rates resulting in 
excess labour supply, high unemployment rates, low per capita incomes, widespread poverty 
and rural-urban migration (Lewis, 1954; Todaro and Smith, 2002). According to Lewis (1954), 
rural economies are subsistent in nature with low productivity and low industrialisation, and a 
high desire among the active population to move to industrialised economies where it is 
presumed that there are ready jobs with relatively higher incomes. Therefore, it is conceivable 
that in a globalised world, once migrants abroad continue to remit home consistently, those at 
home who are earning relatively abysmal incomes will yearn to join the exodus wagon leading 
to brain drain in underdeveloped economies. Besides, since developing countries have less 
developed financial markets which are not strongly integrated into the global financial system, 
there is a higher tendency among migrants from the developing world to remit home through 
                                                          
3
 Some recipients of regular remittances may become over-dependent and choose to be voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed especially in developing SSA countries where working conditions are poor and real wages are 
unattractively low. 
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unofficial routes4. As foreign currency denominated financial remittances continue to flow into 
developing countries which generally have difficulty in stabilising their national currencies, the 
existing desire for holding foreign currencies is likely to rise, culminating in de facto 
dollarisation. In fact, all over the world, there appears to be a correlation between remittance 
inflows and financial dollarisation as is evident in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
countries as well as in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) countries which are the leading 
recipients of migrant remittances (see Adenutsi and Yartey, 2007). Unofficial dollarisation is a 
recipe for inflation as monetary authorities will find it difficult to determine the actual volume of 
total money supply in the economy correctly5. Arguably, if nationals of developing countries 
continue to seek and secure more lucrative jobs abroad and remit home to support family 
members left behind, the pressure on governments of underdeveloped economies to create 
jobs and even to industrialise will reduce considerably. This is a more likely event in developing 
countries where governments receive significant revenue during episodes of higher inflation in 
the form of seigniorage (Adenutsi, 2008). 
 
Thus, though the role of international remittances in an economy has remained theoretically 
controversial, in recent times, some development economists, including Stahl and Arnold 
(1986), and Massey et al. (1998), seem to agree that generally, at least, there are good 
reasons to believe that remittances can play a critical role in economic growth and the 
development process by aiding beneficiary developing countries in poverty alleviation and 
minimising balance of payments problems. It is also widely acknowledged that remittances 
constitute an invaluable resource for consumption and employment creation through business 
finance in many developing countries (Taylor, 1992; Brown, 1994; Adams, 1998). 
 
1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
An estimated 175 million people worldwide, implying one in every 35 and approximately three 
per cent of the total world population, had settled in countries other than their native countries 
by the beginning of the 21st century (United Nations, 2002). With the advent of globalisation and 
the increasing development gap between the industrialised world and developing countries, the 
number of international migrants is estimated to increase by roughly 2.5 per cent per annum 
(IOM, 2010). Without doubt, international migration has offered an opportunity for developing 
                                                          
4
 World Bank (2005) estimates that the recorded remittances received by developing countries are just about 50 per 
cent of the actual volume received. 
5
 Adenutsi (2008) found that from official sources alone, foreign currencies form more than a third of total monetary 
aggregates in developing countries whilst economic openness causes dollarisation and inflation in Ghana. 
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countries to consider ways of benefiting from their nationals living and working abroad through 
the implementation of monetary policies and the adoption of pro-growth strategies to attract 
optimal remittances to finance their development projects rather than over-emphasizing the 
perceived negative effects. In today‟s world of globalisation and international competition, the 
significant role of remittances in propelling the development agenda of SSA6 and other 
developing economies has become even more crucial and the need to offer incentives to 
attract such transfers into local savings and investment funds has become more inevitable. 
 
Currently, SSA receives not more than seven per cent of global remittances. This is by far the 
smallest share to developing economies and less than half of the amount received by India 
alone, whilst the EAP receives nearly 30 per cent with South Asia (SAS) receiving 24 per cent 
of global remittances in 20097. Similarly, the remaining developing economies comprising 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA), LAC, and the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) received 
about 42 per cent (or an average of 14 per cent) global remittances in 2009. Even across 
Africa, SSA significantly lags behind. The questions that arise then are: Why is SSA alone 
lagging behind in attracting international remittances to augment its scanty domestic 
resources? In what ways can SSA enhance international remittance inflows and thereby 
maximise these remittances from the large pool of their citizens living abroad that could serve 
as a compensation for losing their skills to the advanced countries? How do remittance inflows 
impact on the economic growth and development in SSA? 
 
The problem is that, notwithstanding the emerging interest and extensive work on both 
remittances and economic growth and development in underdeveloped economies8, the links 
between the role of financial sector policies in mobilising and managing international 
remittances for economic growth and development in SSA as a sub-region remains 
underexplored. Hence, in the case of SSA, as a sub-region, as at now, very little is known 
about the underlying factors of remittance inflows, the linkages between remittances and 
financial liberalisation, and the implications of remittance inflows for economic growth and 
development in a liberalised financial environment. Thus, the fact remains that countries within 
SSA are generally poor but they remain a major „net exporter of labour‟ into the industrialised 
countries, yet SSA has been the least recipient of remittances over the years. Can this be 
                                                          
6
 SSA in particular is still in dire need of colossal resources to finance its development agenda. See estimates of the 
sub-region‟s critical resource gap in Table A1.1 in the Appendix. 
7
 Author based on World Bank (2011a; 2011b). See Figure A3.2 in Chapter Three for evidence. 
8
 See Chami et al. (2005), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and Adenutsi (2010). 
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attributed to the underdevelopment and non-competitive nature of the financial market? Or is it 
a case that SSA does not, in fact, receive the least international migrant remittances if 
remittances were appropriately defined? And, has the adoption of financial liberalisation 
programme three decades ago led to higher inflows of international remittances through official 
channels to be transmitted through the banking system? In order to provide some useful 
information relevant to the understanding of the linkages among financial sector reform 
programmes, international remittances, and economic growth and development in developing 
countries, this study explores the linkages between financial liberalisation and international 
remittance inflows, and the implications of remittances for economic growth and development 
for developing countries with special reference to SSA.  
 
1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Therefore, the broad and pertinent questions explored in this study with reference to SSA 
include: 
i. Does the SSA economy broadly demonstrate any significant improvement in economic 
development since the adoption of economic reform programmes in the 1980s? And 
what has been the trend in international remittance inflows since the pursuit of financial 
liberalisation in the 1980s? 
ii. What are the macroeconomic determinants of international remittance inflows to SSA 
under liberalised financial regime? 
iii. Does the implementation of financial liberalisation have any impact or causal effect on 
international remittance inflows? If so, which specific policies under financial 
liberalisation programme have been the most important in this regard? 
iv. Do international remittances impact on long-run growth under liberalised financial 
regime? And has this impact changed over time in response to the cyclical behaviour of 
remittance inflows? 
v. To what extent do international remittance inflows promote economic development? 
 
1.4 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In response to the above research questions, the objectives are to explore the macroeconomic 
factors that explain the changing levels of remittance flows to SSA and to examine the 
implications of international remittances for the financial liberalisation and economic growth and 
development in SSA empirically. More specifically, on the one hand, this study seeks to find the 
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empirical nexus between international remittance inflows and financial liberalisation, as well as 
the impact of remittances on growth and development in SSA. On another hand, this study 
seeks to propose the best measure for international remittances, and to explore how the 
changing macroeconomic policy environment affects remittance inflows into SSA. 
 
The specific objectives of this study include the following: 
i. to verify whether or not, the macroeconomic environment of SSA has changed 
significantly with the pursuit of financial liberalisation programmes, and if it does, 
whether this change has any correlation with international migrant remittance inflows; 
ii. to identify the macroeconomic factors that explain variations in international remittance 
flows to SSA under liberalised financial regime; 
iii. to trace the causal effect and examine the impact of financial liberalisation on 
international remittance inflows in SSA; 
iv. to evaluate the impact of international remittance inflows on economic growth in SSA; 
and, 
v. to determine the developmental-impact of international remittance inflows in SSA. 
 
1.5 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
There is a need to examine the implications of international remittances for policies and 
developments within the financial sector, economic growth and economic development in SSA 
empirically. This is essential because, currently, there is no apparent reason to expect a 
paradigm shift in economic policy design in favour of an inward-looking approach imbedded in 
a socialist doctrine. This is the result of the collapse of communist states. Also, there appears 
to be no reversibility from globalisation of economies, given the vast merits of economic 
openness over the states in autarky equilibrium positions. Clearly, if these expectations are 
upheld, then, given the wide development gap between the North and the South, in the interim, 
governments in SSA, and indeed, their counterparts in other less developed regions of the 
world, can do very little to prevent their active population from migrating to industrialised 
economies where higher remuneration and better conditions of work are envisaged. Evidently, 
remittance flows to developing countries, including SSA, in the form of migrant transfers have 
been rising consistently in recent years. The steady and appreciable increases in remittances 
are likely to have a strong positive correlation with the exodus of both skilled (professionals) 
and unskilled labour from developing countries to the industrialised world.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
 
As the volume of remittance inflows continues to be high and growing exponentially, broad 
money supply will continue to rise in SSA due to the likely increases in foreign currencies in 
circulation. The role of the financial sector in enhancing the mobilisation of remittances through 
official transfer channels has become even more crucial. Growth in money supply has obvious 
consequences for inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates as demand for foreign goods 
increases in import-dependent countries like those of SSA. Also, the international reserve 
component of the balance sheets of Central Banks will be enriched with the upsurge of official 
remittance inflows. This notwithstanding, the SSA sub-region has been traditionally known for 
its deficiency in formulating and implementing effective pro-growth macroeconomic policies 
over the years, which has resulted in a somewhat vicious cycle of perpetual economic 
instability, stagnation and underdevelopment. Therefore, as a result of these imperatives, it is 
important to investigate the causes, macroeconomic determinants, and the implications of 
increasing inflows of remittances for growth and development under the liberalised financial 
environment in SSA. Broadly speaking, there is motivation to explore the causal effects of 
financial liberalisation in attracting international remittances through the banking system of SSA 
as well as to examine the determinants and implications of remittances for economic growth 
and development in SSA.  
 
1.6 SPECIFIC MOTIVATIONS AND THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Consistent with the afore-stated objectives, the set of hypotheses (H) that are fundamental to 
guiding the focus of this study, with reference to SSA, includes the following: 
 
1.6.1 Macroeconomic Determinants of International Remittances in SSA 
Various empirical studies (see Table A4.1 in Chapter Four) have shown that macroeconomic 
factors in native (or home) countries and resident (or host) countries of migrants play crucial 
roles in determining international remittances. To verify this, within the context of SSA, the 
following central hypotheses were tested: 
H1: Macroeconomic factors are not determinants of international remittance inflows. 
H2: Macroeconomic determinants do not have the same influence on attracting 
remittances from permanent migrants (workers‟ remittances) and remittances from 
temporary migrants (compensation of employees). 
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1.6.2 Financial Liberalisation and International Remittance Inflows 
Essentially, financial liberalisation is implemented to deepen and widen the financial market 
and also to make the financial market more open and competitive towards accelerated financial 
development for economic growth. With these developments, it is expected that the domestic 
financial market should become attractive to the private sector as far as resource mobilisation 
is concerned since improved efficiency and reduced operational costs lead to cheaper financial 
services. Also, under competitive financial market environment, banks are expected to become 
more innovative in designing products and services for different segments of their target 
customers including international migrants. This study, therefore, examines the impact and 
causal effects of financial liberalisation on international remittance inflows in SSA as specified 
in H3 and H4. 
H3: There is no causal relationship between financial liberalisation and international 
remittance inflows. 
H4: Financial liberalisation does not impact on international remittance inflows. 
 
1.6.3 The Long-Run Growth and Developmental-Impact of International Remittances in SSA 
Both theoretically and empirically, the controversy over the developmental-impact of 
international migrant remittances has remained unresolved as evident in the conclusions drawn 
by various scholars (see Tables A6.6 and A7.1 in Chapters Six and Seven respectively). To 
contribute to this debate, hypotheses H5-H14 were tested with respect to SSA: 
H5: International remittance inflows do not affect economic growth. 
H6: International remittance inflows do not impact on poverty. 
H7: International remittance inflows do not influence income inequality. 
H8: International remittance inflows have no impact on unemployment. 
H9: International remittance inflows do not affect labour participation. 
H10: International remittance inflows do not influence labour productivity. 
H11: International remittance inflows have no effect on human welfare. 
H12: International remittance inflows have no impact on educational attainment. 
H13: International remittance inflows do not impact on life expectancy. 
H14: International remittance inflows have no relationship with financial development. 
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1.7 SCOPE 
The study period of this dissertation is restricted to 1980-2009. This is because financial 
liberalisation programmes in SSA were essentially initiated in the 1980s. Although officially 
reported data on some of the relevant variables are available up to 2011 for 27 of the 36 
sampled countries at the time of this study, the researcher was more interested in fairly 
representing the sub-region with a higher number of countries as much as possible. This is one 
of the primary underlying motivations for restricting the study to 2009 for 36 sampled countries. 
Another justification for restricting the upper limit time coverage of this study to the year 2009 is 
not only to provide for consistent decade-by-decade analysis but also to allow for a consistent 
econometric approach for testing the stability of the varying estimated coefficients across the 
three decades. Furthermore, because some of the variables used as indicators of economic 
development, notably measures of poverty and income inequality are reported in a five-year 
interval by the World Bank, stretching the study period beyond 2009 to say 2011 will imply 
using different study periods in the various chapters of this study. Finally, extending the study 
period beyond the year 2009 will require collecting new survey data on at least seven 
components of financial liberalisation identified by Abiad et al. (2010). Financial constraint and 
the slow response rate from the various central banks and stock exchanges of the sampled 
SSA countries will affect the timely completion of this study, hence the decision to restrict the 
upper study period to the year 2009. 
 
Thus, based strictly on availability of balanced panel data (see Table A1.2), this study is 
generally limited to only 36 SSA countries. Countries included in the broad panel are Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Republic, Côte d‟Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo and Uganda. 
 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation comprises eight chapters. The outline of presentation of the remaining seven 
chapters is as follows: 
 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework and Measurement Issues 
This chapter was undertaken to achieve the specific objective (i) and in response to research 
question (i). In particular, the concepts of financial liberalisation and international remittances 
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were explained with measurement issues discussed and justified.  
 
Chapter Three: Macroeconomic Environment and External Capital Flows to SSA (1960-2009) 
To begin with, an attempt was made to provide a detailed insight into the trends in 
macroeconomic performance of SSA and the flow of external capital to the sub-region since 
1960. This was meant to provide a visual impression on trends in key macroeconomic 
performance indicators under the three main policy environments, viz. the pre-reforms era, the 
reforms era, and the post-reforms era in post-independence SSA. This chapter addresses 
research question (ii) and specific objective (ii). 
 
Chapter Four: Macroeconomic Determinants of International Remittance Flows to SSA 
In order to address research question (iii), achieve specific objective (iii), and evaluate H1 and 
H2, the system Generalised Method of Moment (sys-GMM) procedure for estimating dynamic 
panel-data models was employed to determine the macroeconomic factors that affect 
international remittances at the aggregated and the disaggregated levels. 
 
Chapter Five: The Impact and Causal Effects of International Remittances on Financial 
Liberalisation in SSA 
In line with specific objective (iv), research question (iv), and hypotheses H3 and H4, following 
the Granger panel analytical framework, the empirical causal relationship between financial 
liberalisation and international remittances was investigated.  The static panel estimation 
approach for single equations was further employed to evaluate the impact of financial 
liberalisation on international remittance inflows in SSA. 
 
Chapter Six: Impact of International Remittances on Economic Growth in SSA 
To respond to question (v), achieve specific objective (v) and evaluate H5, the system GMM 
estimation procedure was followed to examine the long-run impact of international remittance 
inflows on economic growth in SSA from 1980 to 2009. 
 
Chapter Seven: The Development-Impact of International Remittances on SSA  
The dynamic panel model, following system GMM estimation technique, was followed to 
examine the hypotheses H6–H14 and in response to research question (vi) and specific 
objective (vi). In effect, the impact of international remittance inflows on indicators of poverty, 
income inequality, labour market outcomes, human development, and financial development 
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were explored in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Eight: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
As the final chapter concluding the dissertation as a whole, a summary of the major findings, 
the conclusions drawn in connection with the research questions, objectives and hypotheses, 
policy recommendations, and the suggestions for relevant areas for future research are 
outlined in this chapter. 
 
1.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provided the general introduction to the study by presenting a wide-ranging 
outlook and the motivation for this study. In particular, in the background of the study, issues 
concerning the pattern of macroeconomic policies and management during the post-
independence era, and the circumstances leading to the adoption of financial liberalisation 
across SSA in the 1980s were discussed. It also provided information that helps to explain 
what the picture looks like with regard to the changing trends in international capital flows, the 
possible causes and the likely reasons behind this new development. Following the 
background information, the research problem was formulated and the relevant research 
questions identified were raised. The central motivation for this study is the need for an 
empirical understanding of why although SSA has been a consistent leading „net exporter of 
labour‟ over the years, it has steadily remained the region receiving the least international 
remittances which are non-debt external funds critically required to address the numerous 
socioeconomic problems confronting the sub-region since post-independence. Based on the 
research problem, the research questions and the motivation for the study, the research 
objectives were specified. The general objective, from which this study takes its stimulus, was 
to identify the macroeconomic factors that explain variations in migrant remittances to SSA and 
to examine, empirically, the linkages between international remittances and financial 
liberalisation; and the determinants and impact of remittances on the economic growth and 
development in SSA.  
 
Other essential subjects related to the specific motivation behind each aspect of the research 
problem tackled, the hypotheses guiding the research, the scope of the study, as well as the 
structure of the dissertation were also addressed in this chapter. The stage has now been set 
for the study to proceed to Chapter Two, which is devoted to addressing issues related to the 
definition and measurement of international remittances and financial liberalisation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table A1.1: Estimates of Additional Critical Financial Resources for SSA 
Author(s) Estimated Amount 
Required Yearly 
 Comments/Method of Estimation/Justification 
Zedillo et al. (2001) US$50 billion Developing countries in general 
Devarajan et al. (2002) US$40-60 billion Used two estimation methods. One approach estimated the 
MDGs resource needs by computing the required economic 
growth rates of countries, and then the investment required to 
achieve these. The other method separately estimated the 
costs of achieving individual goals. Both estimates exclude 
certain costs, notably those of the complementary 
infrastructure needed to support the required rates of growth 
and investment. 
Funke and Nsouli (2003) US$64 billion Equivalent to 12 per cent of Africa‟s GDP. 
CfA (2005) US$37.5 billion Required to finance public expenditure until 2010. A third of 
this amount is expected to come from domestic sources whilst 
the remaining two-thirds US$25 billion comes from foreign aid. 
Gupta, Powell and Yang 
(2006) 
US$38-46 billion US$14-18 billion required for 2006-2008 whilst US$24-28 
billion is required by 2015 to finance infrastructural 
improvement and human development. 
Source: Author‟s compilation 
 
 
Table A1.2: Target Population and the Sample 
Country Sampled? If NO, why not? Country Sampled? If NO, why not? 
Angola NO; data not available except for 1996, 2008 Madagascar YES 
Benin YES Malawi YES 
Botswana YES Mali YES 
Burkina Faso YES Mauritania YES 
Burundi NO; data not available prior to 2004 Mauritius YES 
Cameroon YES Mayotte NO; data not available for 1994-2009 
Cape Verde YES Mozambique YES 
CAR NO; data not available except for 1990 -1993 Namibia YES 
Chad NO; data not available for 1994-2009 Niger YES 
Comoros YES Nigeria YES 
Congo, DR NO; data not reported for any of the years Rwanda YES 
Congo Rep YES ST&P YES 
Côte d'Ivoire YES Senegal YES 
Eq. Guinea NO; data not available except for 1992 & 1997 Seychelles YES 
Eritrea NO; data not available prior to 1998 & 2001
-
9 Sierra Leone YES 
Ethiopia YES Somalia NO; data not available for 1985-2009 
Gabon YES South Africa YES 
Gambia YES Sudan YES 
Ghana YES Swaziland YES 
Guinea YES Tanzania YES 
G-Bissau YES Togo YES 
Kenya YES Uganda YES 
Lesotho YES Zambia NO; data not available prior to 2003 
Liberia NO; data not available prior to 2004 Zimbabwe NO; data not available for 1995-2009 
Source: Author. Notes: CAR, Eq. Guinea, G-Bissau and ST&P represent Central African Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé & Príncipe respectively. Data availability here is restricted to remittances. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the main concepts used in this study. The concepts of international 
remittances and financial liberalisation have, thus, been elucidated and rationalised from a 
theoretical and practical viewpoint within the purview of this study. Therefore, the general 
motivation for this chapter is to define and review existing alternative measures as well as to 
justify and outline the procedure used in computing the selected indicator of international 
remittances and financial liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This is imperative because 
what is incorrectly defined can only be correctly measured by coincidence. The chapter also 
presents the procedure for computing the selected index of financial liberalisation and justifies 
why this indicator was selected among the existing alternatives. The remaining part of this 
chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 presents the definition and issues on the empirical 
measurement of international remittances. This is followed by the working definition and 
measurement of the concept of financial liberalisation in Section 2.2. Then, the summary and 
conclusions of this chapter are presented in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1 INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES 
2.1.1 Concept Definition 
There are different definitions of international remittances but the following definition makes the 
relevant points: migrant-related assets transferred across international borders from the 
migrant‟s country of residence, usually to his/her native or adopted country of citizenship. Some 
definitions of international remittances which have been advanced in contemporary studies are: 
i. Kapur (2004: 1) defines remittances broadly as financial resource flows arising from the 
cross-border movement of nationals of a country. In the narrowest sense, remittances 
as “unrequited transfers refer primarily to money sent by migrants to family and friends 
on whom there are no claims by the sender unlike other financial flows such as debt or 
equity flows”. 
ii. “Remittances are person-to-person flows (from migrants to their friends and families), 
well targeted to the needs of the recipients, who are often poor. Such remittances do 
not typically suffer from the governance problems that may be associated with official 
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aid flows” (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007: 1). 
 
From the definitions provided above, it is understandable that international remittances can be 
defined from a narrow or a broad viewpoint9. From a narrow perspective, international 
remittances are typically monetary transfers from international migrants to their countries of 
origin or nationality where their families or other relatives are residing. The key features of the 
narrow definition of international remittances are that: (i) remittances are generally monetary 
transfers; (ii) remittances are from a migrant (the relatively wealthier resident outside his/her 
home country) to a non-migrant (the relatively poorer relative/associate resident in his/her 
native country); (iii) remittances are aimed at solving or managing a specific known problem; 
and (iv) remittances are often in small amounts but with some exhibits of regularity and stability 
in flow. It is this narrow definition that is referred to as “international migrant remittances” in this 
study because the concept is directly related to individual migrants and the remittances are 
expected to be highly dependent upon the personal earnings of migrants relative to the 
average earnings of the target recipient. International migrant remittances, in this context, also 
include non-monetary transfers of small but valuable goods from a migrant to his/her family, 
friends or other relatives in his/her home country. 
 
With regard to the broader definition, international remittances are financial flows mainly 
occasioned by migration, from a person (the migrant) or an international benevolent 
organisation (such as the migrant association of a particular ethnic group) to persons and/or 
social institutions (such as orphanages, refugees, or the physically challenged) in poorer 
countries10. Thus, international remittances should be seen to include the narrow definition plus 
other non-debt transfers in the form of money or materials sent by migrants (either as 
individuals or as a group) and organisations (often specialised non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) serving households notably migrant associations) to individuals or charitable social 
institutions in poorer nations. The distinction between Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and the type of international remittances sent by humanitarian NGOs is that, unlike the former, 
the latter is essentially unofficial, relatively small in value, more regular and stable in flow, 
directed specifically at the target beneficiary, and does not require any technical and 
                                                          
9
 The current standardised definition of remittances in the Appendix 5 of IMF‟s Balance of Payments and 
International Investment Position Manual, 6
th
 Edition, is household income from foreign economies arising mainly 
from temporary or permanent movement of people to those economies. Measurement in accordance with this new 
definition is yet to be formally reported in the IMF‟s BoPS or WB‟s WDI. 
10
 International remittances may also flow to countries that may not be necessarily poor but hit by civil war or natural 
disasters. 
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managerial costs or „conditionalities‟. As Ghosh (2006: 14) puts it, “…. their characteristics, 
modus operandi, and role sharply differ, defying facile comparison. Remittances are private 
transfers, ODA flows, which are transactions between governments, are not”. 
 
2.1.2 Measurement of International Remittances 
The measurement of international remittances has consistently posed a great challenge to 
economists since the recognition of its importance as an essential source of external finance 
about two and a half decades ago (Adams and Page, 2005; Ghosh, 1997; 2006). The main 
reasons for the difficulty of measuring international remittances are that:  
i. remittance inflows to developing countries are underreported, as a colossal amount is 
believed to be channelled through the informal sector;11,12 
ii. international remittances are undercounted because in many developing countries it is 
not mandatory to report “small” remittances (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2009: 3);  
iii. illegal migration is high among natives of developing countries whilst data on migration 
in general suffer from worse problems than even data on remittances;  
iv. even if data on migration were adequately and correctly reported, accurate data on 
skills of migrants, type of employment and skills-related migrant employment, and the 
changing residential status of migrants are non-existent across countries and over 
regular time intervals;  
v. some countries report all forms of remittances as workers‟ remittances, thus ignoring 
the standard reporting system requiring categorisation according to migrant status;  
vi. migrants from poor countries are not likely to find remitting home through the formal 
channel convenient and appealing due to high illiteracy rates and illegal status;  
vii. migrants find it less costly and probably more appropriate to use the informal 
transmission channels than the officially approved routes;13 
                                                          
11
 For instance, the World Bank (2006a) estimates that, globally, at least 50 per cent of remittances are transferred 
through informal channels. Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate that remittances through informal channels are 
relatively higher in SSA, ranging between 45 and 65 per cent of formal flows as against the range of 5-20 per cent in 
Latin America. 
12
 It is important to state that this problem of data omission or underestimation in developing countries is not peculiar 
to migrant remittances alone. In fact, Schneider and Enste (2000) report that GDP values for developing countries 
are underestimated by between 25-75 per cent due to the neglect of the rather large informal sector dominated by a 
series of interrelated unreported subsistent activities. This exactly equates the magnitude of underestimation of 
officially reported migrant remittances in developing countries as noted by Fruend and Spatafora (2005). 
13
 This is especially due to the underdevelopment of the financial system in SSA and other developing economies. 
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viii. some countries only collate data from banks and overlook remittances through money 
transfer operators (MTOs), post offices, and credit unions (de Luna Martinez, 2005); 
and, 
ix. as noted by the World Bank (2006a), statisticians in some countries adopt a fuzzy 
approach for the reporting system whereby the estimated number of emigrants is 
multiplied by the  average remittance inflows. 
 
The World Bank, IMF and the UN, like many others, including Shelburne and Palacin (2007: 6), 
confirm that obtaining data on remittances is extremely difficult because many migrants are 
illegal, and with many others being “poorly educated and unskilled …with limited knowledge of 
the local language or customs,” and/or for the avoidance of tax, patronise unofficial financial 
channels which are not reported. Apart from this, the definition of the various components of 
remittances is either misunderstood by national institutions responsible for compiling the data 
or they are ambiguous and lack specificity14. The main issue is that the concepts of “residency” 
and “migration status” upon which the definitions and the distinctions are generally based are 
difficult if not impossible to measure in various countries. For instance, if a resident household 
member leaves the country where his/her household is residing and returns to his/her 
household after a limited time period of less than one year (i.e. not exceeding 12 months), the 
individual continues to be a resident of his/her home country even if he/she undertakes 
frequent journeys outside his/her „native‟ economic territory. Similarly, a person who leaves 
his/her „native‟ country with the intention of living in another country for a year or more ceases 
to be a resident of his/her native country and is considered a resident of the new economy (with 
a few exceptions, notably students, medical patients, diplomats, military personnel, and 
international volunteers). Moreover, IMF‟s Balance of Payments Guide (1993) does not specify 
any explicit definition for international migrants. 
 
Furthermore, transfers are recorded in the BoP as contra-entries to the provision of a resource 
such as grants and gifts, in cash or in kind, without a quid pro quo. Depending on the nature of 
the intended use of the „transferred resource‟, transfers are recorded as current transfers in the 
                                                          
14
 To address this problem the World Bank, IMF and the UN have been organising a series of collaborative technical 
meetings on measuring remittances in recent years since the Heads of G-8 in 2004 emphasised the need for 
measuring remittances accurately. The latest is the International Technical Meeting on Measuring Remittances held 
in Washington, DC on June 11-12, 2009. The World Bank and the UN had previously organised international 
meetings, seminars and working group discussions on the issue of measurement and statistics on remittances in 
2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. See Box A2.1 in the Appendix for the summary of consensus reached so far on 
improved measurement of remittances. 
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current account or as capital transfers in the capital account section of the capital and financial 
account. As noted by Reinke (2007), “workers‟ remittances” and “migrants‟ transfers” are 
transfers, whereas “compensation of employees” records remuneration for labour. “Workers‟ 
remittances” involve a current transfer between residents of different countries, whilst “migrants‟ 
transfers” relate to the capital account changes caused by the change of residence of a 
household at the time this relocation/resettlement takes place. “Depending on their specific 
interest, data users can decide which of these components best represents their notion on 
remittances” (Reinke, 2007: 3). 
 
As a consequence of this state of no uniformity, international remittances have been measured 
in many empirical studies from broad and narrow perspectives in various dimensions by various 
scholars (see Table 2.1 below). These measurements of remittances are: (i) workers‟ 
remittances; (ii) the sum of compensation of employees, workers‟ remittances and migrants‟ 
transfers; (iii) the sum of compensation of employees and migrants‟ transfers; (iv) the total of 
migrants‟ transfers plus an additional category in the BoPS, namely „other current transfers‟; 
and (v) compensation of employees, workers‟ remittances, migrants‟ transfers, and other 
current transfers. It is essential to stress that the IMF reports remittances under four different 
sections in its BoPS (see, for example, IMF, 2011a). IMF defines compensations of employees 
as the gross earnings of workers residing abroad for less than 12 months, including the value 
of in-kind benefits (under the current account subcategory, “income”). Workers‟ remittances are 
the value of monetary transfers sent home from workers residing abroad for more than one 
year (under the current account subcategory, “current transfers”). Migrants‟ transfers represent 
the net wealth of migrants who move from their country of employment to another, often their 
native country (under the capital account subcategory, “capital transfers”). More technically, 
migrants‟ transfers are contra-entries to the flow of goods and changes in financial items that 
arise from the migration of individuals from one economy to another. „Other current transfers‟ is 
the component that covers transfers in cash or in kind between individuals, between non-official 
organisations such as migrant associations and between an individual and a non-official 
organisation. Such transfers include gifts, inheritances, alimony and other support remittances, 
non-contractual pensions from NGOs, compensation for damages, and so on recorded under 
„other private transfers‟. This component also includes non-contractual pensions from foreign 
governments recorded under „other official unrequited transfers‟. Official fund transfers from 
foreign governments and enterprises, in the form of donations, aid, sponsorships for education 
and cultural exchange programmes including scholarships, which directly or indirectly benefit 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
households are types of the „other unrequited transfers‟ recorded in the BoPS (IMF, 1993; 
1995). 
 
Notwithstanding the identification of international remittances noted above, most researchers 
do not take the „other current transfers‟ component into account in empirical studies, probably 
because they consider it to be less migrant-related. It is for this reason that many researchers 
including Harrison (2003), and Adams and Page (2005), and subsequent debates treated 
remittances as certain transactions initiated by persons living or working outside their native 
countries and directly related to economic participation of a migrant. It, thus, follows that the 
main components of the remittances that have received attention in empirical studies are 
compensation of employees, workers‟ remittances and migrants‟ transfers as shown in Table 
2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Examples of Measures of Remittances in Recent Empirical Studies 
Author(s)  Research Problem Investigated  Measurement of Remittances  
Kapur (2004) The economic and political effects of 
remittances 
Migrant transfers plus compensation of employees  
Abdel-Rahman 
(2006) 
Determinants of Foreign Worker 
Remittances in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
Workers‟ remittances 
Niimi and 
Özden (2006) 
Migration and Remittances: Causes 
and Linkages 
Workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees 
plus migrants‟ remittances 
Vargas-Silva 
and Huang 
(2006) 
Macroeconomic Determinants of 
Workers‟ Remittances: Host vs. Home 
Country‟s Economic Conditions 
Private remittances plus other current transfers 
Shelburne and 
Palacin (2007) 
Remittances in the CIS: Their 
Economic Implications and a New 
Estimation Procedure 
Sum of workers‟ compensation, workers‟ 
remittances, and migrants‟ transfers.  
Adenutsi and 
Ahortor (2008) 
Remittances, Exchange Rate and 
Monetary Policy in Ghana 
Workers‟ remittances plus compensation of 
employees. 
Ahortor and 
Adenutsi (2009) 
The Impact of Remittances on 
Economic Growth in Small-Open 
Developing Economies 
Sum of workers‟ remittances, compensation of 
employees, migrants‟ transfers plus other current 
transfers.  
Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) 
Remittances, Financial Development 
and Growth 
Workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees, 
and migrants‟ transfers 
Gupta, Pattillo & 
Wagh (2009) 
Impact of Remittances on Poverty 
and Financial Development in SSA 
Sum of workers‟ remittances, compensation of 
employees plus migrants‟ transfers.  
 
Adenutsi 
(2010a)  
Long-Run Macroeconomic Impact of 
International Migrant Remittances on 
Human Development in Low-Income 
Countries: Evidence from SSA 
 
Workers‟ remittances and migrants‟ transfers.  
Barajas et al. 
(2010) 
The impact of the global economic 
crisis on African GDP via the 
remittance channel during 2009-2010. 
Workers‟ remittances. 
Singh et al. 
(2010) 
Determinants and Macroeconomic 
Impact of Remittances in sub-
Saharan Africa 
Workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees 
plus migrants‟ transfers or only other current 
transfers. 
Source: Author‟s compilation 
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Given the above, this study recognises that international remittances are measurable from two 
main perspectives - the narrow and the broad. Of these two, this study used the narrow 
measure as a proxy for international remittances. In the narrow sense, international remittances 
emphasise remittances from migrants only, which are measured in this study as the sum of 
compensation of employees and workers‟ remittances. This is because these are the two most 
consistently reported components of remittances across countries. Also, based on IMF‟s BoPS, 
the World Bank concentrates on reporting only these two components in its World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Migration and Remittances Factbook, and Global Development Finance 
(GDF). Furthermore, Shelburne and Palacin (2007) like many other scholars, point out that 
generally these two components form at least 75 per cent of total remittances received by every 
country. Shelburne and Palacin (2007:5) observe that “workers‟ remittances are by far the 
largest component accounting for well over one-half of the total remittances; compensation of 
employees accounts for approximately another third while migrants‟ transfers are relatively 
small”.  
 
Additionally, given that these two components (compensation of employees and workers‟ 
remittances) directly relate to migrants‟ current earnings and are reported in the current account 
section of the BoPS under income and current transfers categories respectively, unlike the 
remaining two components (migrants‟ transfers and other current transfers) there is a 
justification for homogeneity in the measurement of remittances in this context. Again, by 
definition, compensation of employees and workers‟ remittances are more regular in flow than 
the remaining two components (migrants‟ transfers and other current transfers). For example, 
migrants‟ transfers are earned and, hence, recorded only when a migrant changes his/her 
country of residence. It is possible migrant resettlement in another foreign country may not 
occur frequently, and even in many cases, relocation may never occur in the life of a migrant 
who has attained permanent residence status, and if the migrant decides never to return home.  
 
Remittances sent by international benevolent organisations recorded under „other current 
transfers‟ may be occasioned by famine, wars, natural disasters, and when a migrant 
association decides to support a particular project at home. Usually, these are events that are 
not permanent and do not induce regularity in the flow of remittances from these benevolent 
institutions. Finally, if the perception that many migrants from poor countries are illegal is 
anything to go by, then the issue of permanent residency should be considered as immaterial in 
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categorising remittance flows to developing countries, particularly those in SSA. Thus, the sum 
of workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees should be seen as a more direct 
measure of migrant remittance flows to a typical developing economy in SSA. This definition is 
the most representative of the newly adopted component in the measurement of international 
remittances called „personal remittances‟ in the 2009 edition of the IMF‟s International 
Transactions in Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users as well as the 6th edition of IMF‟s 
Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (refer to Box A2.1 in the 
Appendix for details). 
 
The broad measure of international remittances is the sum of all the four components viz. 
compensation of employees, workers‟ remittances, migrant‟s transfers plus other current 
transfers, thus taking into account the total cross-border capital inflows, directly or indirectly, 
linked to international migration. In connection with the implications of remittance inflows for 
financial dollarisation and price fluctuation, total remittances should be seen as more relevant 
and appropriate for policy design if data is available. The reason being that, unlike migrant 
remittances (the narrow measure), total remittance inflows are more representative of the 
actual addition to currency in circulation if they are immediately spent on domestically produced 
goods and services, culminating in a rise in money supply in the remittance-receiving country. 
Likewise, if international remittances are spent on imported consumables as found in many 
survey studies (for example, Tongamoa, 1987; Dennis, 2003), the threat to exchange rate 
stability and monetary policy effectiveness is obvious in an import-dependent region like SSA, 
which also has an unfavourable history of high inflation (see Chapter 3). As international 
remittances are denominated in foreign currencies, continuous inflows of these funds into a 
region with „softer‟ domestic currencies could trigger dollarisation, when households prefer to 
hold the „harder‟ foreign currencies. This is likely to be more pervasive in SSA where, due to 
the high rates of inflation, real deposit interest rates have either been low or negative. 
 
It is true that measuring remittances in its broadest sense will help reduce the magnitude of 
underestimating errors associated with recorded migrant remittances received in SSA, as it is 
widely believed that migrants from these poor countries often use unapproved/unofficial 
channels to remit due to illiteracy or underdevelopment and low integration of the financial 
markets of their native countries into the international financial system. Besides, it is likely that 
due to their status as illegal migrants, most migrants from developing countries and, indeed 
SSA, cannot conveniently remit home via the officially approved money transfer routes and 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
23 
 
hence could be inclined to remit under disguise through native associations abroad, religious or 
other benevolent organisations, or by sending easily tradable small-value gift items such as cell 
phones, laptop computers, wristwatches, healthcare products, and clothing. Meanwhile, it is 
difficult to track and quantify these informal remittances as the informal routes of remitting 
which include hand-carried cash and portable valuables are complex whilst the process is 
evolutionary. The broad definition is the most comprehensive and representative of the 
definitions of the newly adopted component in the measurement of total international 
remittances designated „total remittances and transfers to non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISHs)‟ in the 2009 edition of the IMF‟s International Transactions in 
Remittances: Guide for Compilers and Users as well as the 6th edition of IMF‟s Balance of 
Payments and International Investment Position Manual15 (refer to Box A2.1 in the Appendix for 
details). 
 
Despite the expected merits of measuring international remittances in the broadest sense, the 
main challenge that confronts analysts when using „total international remittances‟ rather than 
the narrow definition (i.e. international migrant remittances) is the absence of consistently 
reported data on „migrants‟ transfers‟ and „other current transfers‟ in most developing countries 
due to a number of reasons, some of which were mentioned earlier under this very sub-section. 
Indeed, reported data on migrants‟ transfers and other current transfers is relatively scarce in 
comparison with data on workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees. For example, 
GDF, WDI, Migration and Remittance Factbook, and the e-database of the UN report 
remittance data on workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees only, apparently 
because, generally, workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees constitute about 
three-quarters of the total remittances received in migrant-home countries. Another drawback 
of using total international remittances is that, by their very nature, the two additional 
components – migrant transfers and other current transfers – are less regular in flow compared 
to workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees, which are invariably earnings 
remitted by permanent and temporary migrants. Therefore, in analysing the motives behind the 
flow of remittances involving interpersonal transfers from permanent and temporary 
international migrants, it is the narrow definition that should be seen as the more appropriate. In 
fact, it is this narrow definition of measuring international remittances that is used throughout 
the empirical analysis of this study. 
                                                          
15
 For full references, refer to IMF (2009a) and IMF (2009b) respectively. 
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2.2 FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
2.2.1 Concept Definition 
In separate works, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) provide the prominent theoretical 
framework in support of financial liberalisation16. The McKinnon-Shaw financial liberalisation 
theory suggests that the level of financial intermediation should be closely related to the 
prevailing level of real interest rates, because the level of real interest rate when held below the 
normal competitive levels, indicates the level of financial repression (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 
1995). Financial repression, especially under inflationary conditions, stimulates demand for 
physical wealth and encourages capital flight (Fry, 1995). According to the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis, a positive real interest rate stimulates financial savings and intermediation, thereby 
increasing the supply of credit to the private sector, which in turn, stimulates investment and 
economic growth (Fry, 1995). Thus, positive real interest rates that are consistent with the 
equilibrium interest rates make the allocation of investible funds more efficient, thereby 
providing positive implications for economic growth. Financial liberalisation is, therefore, a 
possible policy response involving a package of measures intended to remove and/or reform 
any undesirable state-imposed constraints on the free mechanism of the financial markets 
(Arestis, 2005).  
 
The financial liberalisation thesis was criticised by Neostructuralists notably Taylor (1983), van 
Wijnbergen (1982; 1983a; 1983b), Bufie (1984), and Kohsaka (1984) on the grounds that the 
absolute operation of a market-based financial system is most unlikely to propel growth in Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs). In the opinion of the Neostructuralists, the role of the informal 
financial institutions is crucial in financial resource mobilisation and allocation in LDCs. First 
and foremost, this is as a result of the low level of incomes and fragmentation of the financial 
system. Secondly, information asymmetry is a common feature of the financial sector in 
developing countries and, thirdly, because in the formal financial sector, where the banking 
sector dominates, the bulk of  mandatory reserve requirements forms an important leakage in 
the circular flow of funds during the process of financial intermediation. These reasons 
underscore the importance of curb financial markets in the mobilisation of household saving 
and credit extension (Fry, 1995). The Neostructuralists conclude that, practically, for developing 
countries in particular, the pursuit of financial liberalisation is likely to inhibit the rate of 
economic growth due to credit constraints because higher real interest rates increase costs of 
                                                          
16
 Earlier to this, Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Gurley and Shaw (1955; 1960), and Goldsmith (1969) 
questioned the wisdom behind the pursuit of repressive financial policies. 
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production, reduce real wages, and cause stagflation (van Wijnbergen, 1982; Taylor, 1983). In 
fact, Stiglitz (1994) was very emphatic in suggesting that government intervention in the 
financial market will not only make financial markets function better but will also improve the 
performance of an economy. 
 
The Neostructuralists‟ scepticism of financial liberalisation notwithstanding, it is quite clear that 
the controversy between the contrasting schools of thought is not much up to this point other 
than, perhaps, with regard to the degree and pace with which liberalisation should be pursued. 
For instance, as pointed out by the advoates for financial liberalisation, the process still 
recommends a gradual approach (Edwards, 1989; McKinnon, 1991) and makes room for 
“adequate banking supervision, aiming to ensure that banks have a well-diversified loan 
portfolio, macroeconomic stability, which refers to low and stable inflation and a sustainable 
fiscal deficit, and the sequencing of financial reforms” (Arestis, 2005: 7). Indeed, as evident in 
the composite de jure indices constructed by various authors17, the implementation of financial 
reform policies has been gradual although the sequencing of the process differs across 
countries. The concept of financial liberalisation as used in this study is, thus, based on the 
McKinnon-Shaw theory. 
 
Accordingly, within the framework of the McKinnon-Shaw financial liberalisation theory, this 
study defines financial liberalisation as the process of eliminating repressive elements of 
financial regulations and policies to rational limits, which should enable financial institutions to 
operate more efficiently based on market signals at home and abroad thereby enhancing the 
free flow of financial resources. This definition seems adequate to capture the multidimensional 
nature of the financial liberalisation process, which Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) suggest 
consists of the deregulation of the domestic financial sector, the foreign sector capital account, 
and the stock market18. Financial repression originates from government policies of direct 
imposition and indirect interventions in the financial market which ultimately results in restrictive 
tendencies and unfair practices commonly associated with imperfect competition within the 
financial sector (Fry, 1995). Beim and Calomiris (2001) observe that over the years, 
researchers have identified six main ways through which governments often repress their 
                                                          
17
 See for example Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Abiad and Mody (2005), Shrestha and Chowdhury (2006), 
McDonald and Schumacher (2007) and Abiad et al. (2008, 2010). 
18
 Similarly, Beim and Calomiris (2001: 119) define financial liberalisation as “some combination of the following six 
kinds of constraint relaxation: elimination of interest controls, lowering of bank reserve requirements, reduction of 
government interference in banks‟ lending decisions, privatisation of nationalised banks, introduction of foreign bank 
competition, and facilitation and encouragement of capital inflows”. 
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financial system. These are: (i) by imposing ceilings on interest rates paid by banks for 
deposits; (ii) by imposing high reserves requirements on banks; (iii) by lending to industry 
and/or directing bank credit; (iv) by owning and/or micromanaging banks, leaving them with 
little autonomy; (v) by restricting entry into the financial market, especially by foreigners; and 
(vi) by restricting capital inflows and outflows across international borders (Beim and Calomiris, 
2001: 47). 
 
This clearly suggests that financial repression is the opposite of financial liberalisation. In other 
words, if an economy is proven to have a high level of financial repression, this directly implies 
the economy in question has a lowly-liberalised financial system, and vice versa. In effect, the 
indicators of financial repression invariably measure financial liberalisation on the same scale 
but at opposite ends of the scale. 
 
2.2.2 Measurement of Financial Liberalisation 
Beim and Calomiris (2001) identify six measures of financial liberalisation. The definition and 
measurement of each of these indicators are summarised in Table 2.2. Each of these 
measures falls into the category of what Gemech and Struthers (2003) describe as policy 
outcome measures of financial liberalisation, because they are not capable of capturing the 
liberalisation process itself. In early empirical studies, these indicators (see Table 2.2), were 
used to proxy the degree of financial liberalisation (Gemech and Struthers, 2003).  
 
Over the last two decades, however, these outcome-based measures (also known as de facto 
or ex post measures) have been used to evaluate the developments rather than the actual 
process of the liberalisation of the financial sector in many empirical studies including, inter alia, 
those by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), King and Levine (1993a; 1993b), Hermes (1994), 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Lynch (1996), Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Levine 
(1997), Kar and Pentecost (2000), Levine et al. (2000), and Ang and McKibbin (2007). Unless 
these indicators are integrated into one composite index, each of the indicators is used to 
measure a specific aspect of financial sector reforms (Williamson and Mahar, 1998; Bandiera et 
al., 2000; Laeven, 2003; Abiad and Mody, 2005; Shrestha and Chowdhury, 2006). For 
example, earlier works prior to these recent attempts at developing a comprehensive index of 
financial sector reforms which merely used ex post measures19 are those of Abe et al. (1977), 
                                                          
19
 Some of the financial reforms policy outcome indicators which were widely used in the past include nominal 
interest rates, real interest rates, interest rate spread, proportion of bank credit to the private sector, and liquidity 
ratio (i.e. M2/GDP). 
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Cho (1986; 1988), Gupta (1984), Snowden (1987), Ahmed (1988), Morisset (1991), Arestis and 
Demetriades (1992; 1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Bayoumi (1993), AfDB (1994), 
and Loayza et al. (2000). 
 
Table 2.2: Measures of Financial Repression / Liberalisation 
Indicator Description of Indicator Application of Indicator in measuring FLB 
Reserve ratio Bank reserves as a ratio of money 
plus quasi-money (M2) less 
currency held outside of banks. 
Higher reserve ratio limits banks ability to create money 
and hence an indication of financial repression. 
 
Real rates 
Nominal annual interest on bank 
deposits (i) adjusted for the 
realised annual rate of inflation
 . 
Negative real interest rates means the financial sector is 
repressed due to interest rate controls, whilst positive real 
interest rates suggests liberalised financial sector via 
deregulation of interest rates. 
Liquidity Short-term liquid liabilities (M3 if 
available, else M2) as a ratio of 
GDP. 
Higher liquidity or monetisation shows the real size of the 
financial sector and the extent to which money functions 
as a means of payment for essential services and a store 
of value. The higher the liquidity ratio the less repressed 
the financial sector. 
Private 
borrowing 
Claims on private sector as a ratio 
of total domestic credit. 
Higher private sector credit allocation indicates financial 
liberalisation since credit to government and state-owned 
enterprises are often directed and, hence uncompetitive. 
Bank lending Deposit bank assets as a ratio of 
bank assets plus central bank 
assets. 
A financial sector is less repressive if this ratio is high 
because commercial banks, for mobilising more private 
sector savings than the Central Bank, are expected to 
extend more credit than the Central Bank in financing 
profitable private sector projects. 
Market value Aggregate stock market 
capitalisation as a ratio of GDP. 
Higher market capitalisation ratio symbolises improved 
financial liberalisation via vibrant equity market, improved 
investors‟ access to correct market information, and 
superior management of investment funds. 
Source: Author based on Beim and Calomiris (2001: 66) 
 
In more recent years, various attempts have been made to develop a comprehensive index for 
measuring the actual dimensions and pace of financial liberalisation processes, such that, 
invariably, the ex post measures aforementioned are used essentially to measure the degree of 
financial development. The need for a multi-dimensional financial liberalisation index became 
increasingly imperative because financial liberalisation is a process involving a wide range of 
policy initiatives alongside institutional and structural reforms. These policy actions and reforms 
cover the licensing and restructuring of institutions; the development of the appropriate legal, 
information and liquidity infrastructure; the operational arrangement for markets; and the design 
of instruments (World Bank, 2005). Following this, Williamson and Mahar (1998), Gelbard and 
Leite (1999), Bandiera et al. (2000), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Abiad and Mody (2005), 
Bekaert et al. (2005), Shrestha and Chowdhury (2006), McDonald and Schumacher (2007) and 
Abiad et al. (2008; 2010), made rigorous attempts towards the development of a more 
representative and realistic financial liberalisation index. Of these, the indices developed by 
( ) : (1 ) /(1 ) 1r i    
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Bandiera et al. (2000), Abiad and Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2008; 2010) appear to have 
enjoyed the most patronage from researchers in recent years as shown in Shrestha (2005), 
Shrestha and Chwodhury (2006), Ang and Warwick (2007), Ang (2010), and Ang and Sen 
(2011). Table 2.3 presents a summary of some of the popular existing indices of financial 
liberalisation developed in recent years20. 
 
Table 2.3: Components and Coverage of Existing Indices of Financial Liberalisation 
Author(s), Year  Components / Dimensions of Index, (Coverage) 
Williamson and 
Mahar (1998) 
Credit controls; interest rate controls; entry barriers; regulation of bank operations; bank 
privatisation; restrictions on international capital flows (6 variables; 34 countries) 
Bandiera et al. 
(2000) 
Interest regulation, reserve requirements, direct credit, bank ownership (moves toward 
privatisation), liberalisation of securities markets, prudential regulation, and international 
financial liberalisation (6 variables; 8 countries) 
Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2003) 
Capital account liberalisation (capital mobility), domestic financial sector liberalisation 
(regulations on interest rates, credit allocation and foreign currency deposits), stock market 
liberalisation (evolution of regulations on acquisition of shares in the domestic stock market 
by foreigners, repatriation of capital, interests and dividends) (3 variables; 28 countries) 
Laeven (2003) Credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, operational restrictions, bank 
privatisation, capital account restrictions (6 variables; 13 countries) 
Abiad and Mody 
(2005) 
Credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, operational restrictions, bank 
privatisation, restrictions on international financial transactions (6 variables; 35 countries) 
Shrestha and 
Chowdhury 
(2006) 
Interest rate deregulation, removal of entry barriers, reduction in reserve requirements, 
easing in credit controls, stock market reform, privatisation of state-owned banks, external 
account liberalisation (8 variables, 1 country; Nepal) 
McDonald and 
Schumacher 
(2007) 
Interest rate liberalisation, number of years real lending and real deposit rates have been 
positive, the existence of a significant informal sector and directed credit allocation (4 
variables; 37 countries) 
Abiad et al. 
(2010) 
Credit controls, aggregate credit ceilings and reserve requirements; interest rate controls; 
entry barriers in the banking sector; state ownership of the banking sector; financial account 
restrictions; prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector; securities market 
policy (7 variables; 91 countries) 
 Source: Author‟s compilation 
 
However, Abiad et al. (2008) criticise the preceding financial liberalisation indices developed 
prior to the launch of their index in 2008. According to Abiad et al. (2008), these pre-2008 
existing indices are basically de jure measures based on subjective coding and poorly captured 
the intensity of the factual liberalisation process. Therefore, drawing lessons from Williamson 
and Mahar (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), and Abiad and Mody (2005), Abiad et al. 
(2008; 2010) developed the most recent index which captures seven dimensions21 of the 
financial sector reforms (Table 2.3).22 This new index is likely to enjoy popularity in its 
application in empirical studies because, apart from being the most recently developed index 
                                                          
20
 Only indices constructed from more than one dimension of financial reforms are reported. Accordingly, Behaert et 
al. (2005) is excluded. 
21
 It is, however, important to emphasise that Abiad et al. (2008) which is the earlier version of Abiad et al. (2010) 
attempted the construction of an eight dimensional index by separating directed credit and reserve requirements 
from aggregate credit ceilings. 
22
 For details on how this index was constructed see Section 2.2.2.1. 
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for financial liberalisation, the new index provides an adequate coverage of the essential 
dynamics in the financial policy environment (Ang, 2010). Besides, the policy variables used in 
the computation of this new index are more explicit, easy to measure and quite common in 
most countries.  
 
With the exception of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Abiad and Mody (2005), and Abiad et 
al. (2010)23, all known efforts at computing a unified index for financial liberalisation, for 
example, the attempts by Williamson and Mahar (1998), Bandiera et al. (2000), Laeven (2003), 
Shrestha and Chowdhury (2006) and McDonald and Schumacher (2007) assigned arbitrary 
scores ranging between zero (for fully repressed) and one (for fully liberalised); such that 0.25 
or 0.33, 0.50, and 0.66 or 0.75 were assigned to capture partial and gradual deregulation of 
each dimension of the financial sector policy reforms. Using Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA), the weight of each of the components of the policy reform variables was derived. The 
principal component selected is that which accounts for the highest percentage of the total 
variance of the system variables. Mathematically, the computation of financial liberalisation 
index (FLBI) as determined by these pre-2008 authors can generally be expressed as: 
   (2.1) 
where tFLBI  is the index of financial liberalisation at time t, w is the weight of a specific 
component of financial liberalisation policy (FLP) given by the respective eigenvector of the 
selected principal component, with n  denoting the number of the reforms 
components/dimensions included in the computation of the index. The index for each individual 
reforms policy component is obtained when the arbitrary scores initially assigned to 
1 2, ,...., nFLP FLP FLP  are multiplied with their respective weights ( )iw  obtained from the PCA. 
For each year ( )t , FLBI is derived through a horizontal summation of the calculated values for 
the number of the policy-specific reforms components ( )n  covered by the specific author. 
 
The approach adopted by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Abiad and Mody (2005), and Abiad 
et al. (2010) is comparable to the above, except that these authors, rather than assigning 
                                                          
23
 All these authors computed FLB using Principal Components Analysis (PCA), but did not assign equal arbitrary 
scores to the components. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) assigned more weight to capital account liberalisation 
whilst Abiad and Mody (2005) emphasize reforms in the domestic financial sector, and apart from that PCA also 
used simple sum, sum of squares and sum of square roots. Abiad and Mody (2005) found that the correlations 
among the various series obtained from different methods were highly comparable, mostly above 95 per cent with 
none below 90 per cent. 
1 1, 2 2, 3 3, ,........t t t t n n tFLBI wFLP w FLP w FLP w FLP    
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arbitrary scores used discrete scores along the different dimensions of the financial policy 
reforms identified. The scores for each category of the financial policy reform process are then 
combined in a graded index that is normalised between zero and one (Abiad and Mody, 2005; 
Abiad et al. 2010). Of these indices, Abiad et al. (2010) is the most comprehensive having 
recognised the improved multifaceted nature of the financial reform process and hence 
recorded financial policy changes along seven key dimensions instead of the four dimensions 
used by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and the six by Abiad and Mody (2005). 
 
2.2.2.1 Computation of the Empirical Financial Liberalisation Index (FLBI) 
This study relied on the index constructed by Abiad et al. (2010) on financial sector reforms not 
only because it is the most comprehensive among the three approaches that followed a 
discrete coding system, but also because an improved set of coding rules were used to 
minimise the degree of discretion in assigning scores (see Box A2.2 in the Appendix). 
Additionally, Abiad et al. (2010: 286) following Abiad and Mody (2005) allow room for 
reversibility in the financial reforms process such that “the imposition of capital controls or 
interest rate controls are recorded as shifts from a higher to lower score”, which contributes to 
making this index “a much more precise determination of the magnitude and timing of various 
events in the financial liberalisation process”.  
 
As suggested by Abiad et al. (2010), a raw score was first assigned to each of the seven 
dimensions on the specific scales outlined in Box A2.2. Next, each raw score was normalised 
between zero and three according to the rule specified in Box A2.2. Along each of the seven 
dimensions identified, therefore, a country was assigned a final score on a graded scale from 
zero (for full repression) to three (for full liberalisation). Since the maximum score a country can 
obtain for a particular year, which represents full liberalisation in all seven dimensions, is 21 
(which is obtained when  the optimal normalised score for fully liberalised (3) is multiplied by 
the number of dimensions covered, (7)), the actual normalised score for any particular year is 
expressed as a ratio of 21. Accordingly, the index of financial liberalisation (FLBI) was 
computed using Equation 2.1 which adequately represents the approach adopted by Abiad et 
al. (2010). 
         (2.1) 
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where n  is the number of measurement dimensions (in this case 7n  ); id  is the partial 
normalised score assigned to each specific component of financial reforms in year t such that 
,
1
0 21
n
i t
i
d

  , whilst iD is the full normalisation score upon which id  was assigned for each 
of the components of financial reforms, so that 
1
21
n
i
i
D

  since 3D  . For example, if for a 
particular year (say 2000) a country (say X) scored 1.5, 3, 2, 0, 1, 3, and 3 respectively (after 
normalisation)24 on each of the seven dimensions/components of financial reforms, then tFLBI  
for this country in year 2000 is determined as follows: 
        (2.2) 
This result shows that the financial market of country X is partially liberalised as at year 2000 
since the computed index exceeds the standard average score of 0.50 and the maximum FLBI 
score any country can obtain in a particular year to represent full liberalisation of its financial 
market is one. 
 
2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter defined the concepts of international remittances and financial liberalisation which 
are the running concepts of this study. The definition of these concepts made explicit the 
distinction between financial liberalisation and financial development. Whilst financial 
liberalisation is de jure, and hence concerned with the actual policy reforms process of the 
financial sector, financial development is essentially de facto, and thus concerned with the 
outcome of the implementation of financial sector policy reforms. This chapter also discussed 
existing alternative approaches and indicators of measuring international remittances and 
financial liberalisation. Based on the underlying theories of each of these concepts, the 
objectives informing this study, practicality and applicability, a specific indicator (or index) for 
each concept was chosen with justifiable explanations. As is conventional in economics and, 
indeed social sciences, there is no single measure of any of the core concepts of this study that 
can be fully exonerated from theoretical criticisms and empirical limitations. As much as 
                                                          
24
 A final normalisation score of 0.75, 1.50, 1.75, 2.50, 2.75 is possible only in the case of credit controls, aggregate 
credit ceilings and reserve requirements because this dimension was originally treated as two separate dimensions 
(directed credit and reserve requirements; and aggregate credit ceilings) in Abiad et al. (2008), therefore, the 
application of the respective 3 4 and 
1
4 sum weights and a deviation sum can result in a final code that may not 
necessarily be exactly 0, 1, 2, or 3 on the 3-0 scale. 
13.5
212000 0.6428571.
XFLBI  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
32 
 
possible, however, reasonable explanations were assigned for the measurement of each 
adopted indicator or index, which goes a long way to show that, taking into account the usual 
problem of data constraint in developing countries, the specific measure of each concept is the 
best applicable measure as per the scope and objectives of this study. 
 
Therefore, throughout the remaining part of this dissertation, unless otherwise stated, 
international (or migrant) remittances refer to the sum of “compensation of employees” and 
“workers‟ remittances”. Financial liberalisation is measured as the normalised index embracing 
seven dimensional variables viz. credit controls, reserve requirements and aggregate credit 
ceilings, interest rate control, banking sector entry requirement, international capital flows 
control, privatisation of banks, banking sector supervision and regulation, and stock market 
development, which according to Abiad et al. (2010) reflect the essential components of 
financial reforms.  With the running concepts of this dissertation now defined and measured 
within the context of this study, the stage is now set for an overview of the macroeconomy of 
post-independent SSA. For the most recent years, viz. 2006-2009 for which data is not 
available from Abiad et al. (2010), the author used the same sources of information to compute 
the financial liberalisation indices for the sampled countries. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Box A2.1: Summary of New Measurement and Definition of Remittances* 
Measurement of Concepts: 
Total remittances and transfers to NPISHs Re ReP m T m V VI     
Total Remittances (TRem) ReP m IV   
Personal Remittances (PRem) I II III    
I II III IV V VI 
Personal transfers  Net compensation 
of employees 
Capital transfers 
between 
households 
Social 
benefits 
Current 
transfers to 
NPISHs 
Capital 
transfers to 
NPISHs 
Definition of Core Concepts: 
A: Personal Remittances: This is defined as current and capital transfers (in cash and in kind) between 
resident individuals and non-resident households, plus net compensation of employees earned by persons 
working in economies where they are not resident. In other words, personal remittances include all household-
to-household transfers and net compensation of non-resident workers. 
 
B: Total Remittances: This includes all household incomes earned from working abroad. Thus, personal 
remittances plus social benefits. Intuitively, total remittances include income from individuals working abroad on 
temporary basis, earnings of individuals residing abroad, and social benefits earned for working abroad. 
 
C: Total Remittances and Transfers to Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households (NPISHs): This is to 
include the total remittances plus the sum of current and capital transfers to Non-Profit Institutions Serving 
Households (NPISHs). 
 
Definition of Sub-Concepts: 
I: Personal transfers (which now replace workers‟ remittances in BoPS) is defined to include all current transfers 
in cash or in kind between resident households and non-resident households. Unlike workers‟ remittances, the 
new concept is based neither on employment nor migration status and thus resolves inconsistencies associated 
with measuring the previous concept which was linked strictly to residential status. 
II: Net compensation of employees is to include gross compensation of employees less taxes, social security 
contributions, and travel and passengers transportation related to short-term employment and paid to resident 
entities in economies where they are not resident. It, thus, signifies “take-home compensation”. 
III: Capital transfers between households are the “non-current” transfers in cash or in kind between resident and 
non-resident households. 
IV: Social benefits are the benefits payable under social security and pension funds. 
V: Current transfers to NPISHs constitute all current transfers from governments and enterprises (in cash or in 
kind) to NPISHs from any sector of the sending economy which directly or indirectly benefit households in 
another economy (i.e. the receiving economy). 
VI: Capital Transfers to NPISHs include all current transfers from governments and enterprises (in cash or in 
kind) to NPISHs from any sector of the sending economy which directly or indirectly benefit households in 
another economy (i.e. the receiving economy). It may include private and official donations, aid, sponsorships for 
education and cultural festivities (including scholarships). 
 
NOTE: Migrant transfers have been removed from the BoP Framework as the concept of migrant has been 
abolished since the concepts of personal transfers and remittances are based on the concept of residence 
rather than migration status. This is consistent with the use of residence criteria elsewhere in the BoP and 
national accounts frameworks. 
Source: IMF (2009) Balance of Payments and Investment Position Manual, 6
th
 Edition (BPM6) 
*
Effective implementation date is unknown but the new reporting system is likely to be formally used in reporting 
2010 data as the new Remittances Compilation Guide and the programme aimed at improving Central Bank 
reporting were launched during the International Technical Meeting on Measuring Remittances in June 2009.  
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Box A2.2: Coding Rules for the Financial Liberalisation Index (FLB)  
 
To construct an index of financial liberalisation, codes were assigned along the seven dimensions below. Each 
dimension has various sub-dimensions. Based on the score for each sub-dimension, each dimension receives a 
„raw score.‟ The explanations for each sub-dimension below indicate how to assign the raw score.    
After a „raw score‟ is assigned, it is normalized to a 0-3 scale. The normalization is done on the basis of the 
classifications listed below for each dimension. That is, fully liberalised = 3; partially liberalised = 2; partially 
repressed = 1; fully repressed = 0.  
 
The final scores are used to compute an aggregate index for each country/year by assigning equal weight to each 
dimension. For example, if the „raw score‟ on credit controls and reserve requirements totals 4 (by assigning a code 
of 2 for liberal reserve requirements, 1 for lack of directed credit and 1 for lack of subsidised directed credit), this is 
equivalent to the definition of Fully Liberalised. So, the normalisation would assign a score of 3 on the 0-3 scale.    
 
 
I. Credit Controls and Reserve Requirements:  
1) Are reserve requirements restrictive?   
 Coded as 0 if reserve requirement is more than 20 per cent. 
 Coded as 1 if reserve requirements are reduced to 10–20 per cent or complicated regulations to set reserve 
requirements are simplified as a step toward reducing reserve requirements 
 Coded as 2 if reserve requirements are less than 10 per cent.   
 
2) Are there minimum amounts of credit that must be channelled to certain sectors?   
 Coded as 0 if credit allocations are determined by the central bank or if mandatory credit allocations to 
certain sectors exist. 
 Coded as 1 if mandatory credit allocations to certain sectors are eliminated or do not exist.   
 
3) Are there any credits supplied to certain sectors at subsidised rates?   
 Coded as 0 when banks have to supply credits at subsidised rates to certain sectors. 
 Coded as 1 when the mandatory requirement of credit allocation at subsidised rates is eliminated or banks 
do not have to supply credits at subsidised rates.   
 
These three questions‟ scores are summed and coded as follows: 
Fully Liberalised = [4], Largely Liberalised = [3], Partially Repressed = [1,2], Fully Repressed= [0]  
 
4) Are there any aggregate credit ceilings?   
 Coded as 0 if ceilings on expansion of bank credit are in place. This includes bank-specific credit ceilings 
imposed by the central bank.   
 Coded as 1 if no restrictions exist on the expansion of bank credit.    
The final sub-index is a weighted average of the sum of the first three categories (with a weight of ), and of the 
last category (with a weight of ). 
 
 
II. Interest Rate Liberalisation   
Deposit rates and lending rates are separately considered in coding this measure in order to look at the type of 
regulations for each set of rates. They are coded as being government set or subject to a binding ceiling (code=0), 
fluctuating within a band (code=1) or freely floating (code=2). The coding is based on the following description:   
 
FL=4 [2, 2]  
Fully Liberalised if both deposit interest rates and lending interest rates are determined at market rates.   
 
LL = 3 [2, 1]   
Largely Liberalised when either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other rates are subject to band or 
only a part of interest rates are determined at market rates.  
 
PR= 2/1 [2, 0] [1, 1] [1, 0]   
Partially Repressed when either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other interest rates are set by 
government or subject to ceiling/floor; or both deposit rates and lending rates are subject to band or partially 
liberalised; or either deposit rates or lending rates are subject to band or partially liberalized.  
 
3
4
1
4
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FR= 0 [0, 0] Fully Repressed when both deposit rates and lending rates are set by the government or subject to 
ceiling/floor.   
Coding Matrix for Interest Rate Liberalisation 
 Deposit Rates 
Lending Rates 0 1 2 
0 FR PR PR 
1 PR PR LL 
2 PR LL FL 
 
 
III. Banking Sector Entry   
The following sub-measures were considered:   
1) To what extent does the government allow foreign banks to enter a domestic market? 
This question is coded to examine whether a country allows the entry of foreign banks into a domestic market; 
whether branching restrictions of foreign banks are eased; and to what degree the equity ownership of domestic 
banks by non-residents is allowed.    
 Coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks is allowed; or tight restrictions on the opening of new foreign 
banks are in place.  
 Coded as 1 when foreign bank entry is allowed, but non-residents must hold less than 50 per cent of the 
equity share.  
 Coded as 2 when the majority of shares or equity ownership of domestic banks by non-residents is allowed; 
or equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks and domestic banks; or an unlimited number of 
branching is allowed foreign banks.   
 
Three questions look at policies to enhance competition in the domestic banking market.  
 
2) Does the government allow the entry of new domestic banks?    
 Coded as 0 when the entry of new domestic banks is not allowed or strictly regulated. 
 Coded as 1 when the entry of new domestic banks or other financial institutions is allowed into the domestic 
market.   
 
3) Are there restrictions on branching? (0/1)  
 Coded as 0 when branching restrictions are in place. 
 Coded as 1 when there are no branching restrictions or if restrictions are eased.   
 
4) Does the government allow banks to engage in a wide range of activities? (0/1) 
 Coded as 0 when the range of activities that banks can take consists of only banking activities. 
 Coded as 1 when banks are allowed to become universal banks.     
 
The dimension of entry barriers is coded by adding the scores of these three questions. 
Fully Liberalised= 4 or 5, Largely Liberalised= 3, Partially Repressed= 1 or 2, Fully Repressed = 0   
 
 
IV. Capital Account Transactions   
1) Is the exchange rate system unified? (0/1) 
 Coded as 0 when a special exchange rate regime for either capital or current account transactions exists. 
 Coded as 1 when the exchange rate system is unified.     
 
2) Does a country set restrictions on capital inflow? (0/1) 
 Coded as 0 when significant restrictions exist on capital inflows.    
 Coded as 1 when banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely without restrictions and there are no tight 
restrictions on other capital inflows.    
 
3) Does a country set restrictions on capital outflow? (0/1) 
 Coded as 0 when restrictions exist on capital outflows. 
 Coded as 1 when capital outflows are allowed to flow freely or with minimal approval restrictions.   
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By adding these three items,   
Fully Liberalised = [3], Largely Liberalized = [2], Partially Repressed = [1], Fully Repressed= [0]  
 
 
V. Privatisation   
Privatisation of banks is coded as follows:  
 FL: Fully Liberalised if no state banks exist or state-owned banks do not make up a significant portion of 
banks and/or if the percentage of public bank assets is less than 10 per cent. 
 LL: Largely Liberalised if most banks are privately owned and/or the percentage of public bank assets is 
from 10 per cent to 25 per cent.  
 PR: Partially Repressed if many banks are privately owned but major banks are still state-owned and/or 
the percentage of public bank assets is 25–50 per cent.  
 FR: Fully Repressed if major banks are all state owned banks and/or the percentage of public bank assets 
is from 50 per cent to 100 per cent.   
 
 
VI. Securities Markets    
1) Has a country taken measures to develop securities markets?    
 Coded as 0 if a securities market does not exist. 
 Coded as 1 when a securities market is starting to form with the introduction of auctioning of T-bills or the 
establishment of a security commission. 
 Coded as 2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities markets (tax exemptions, 
introduction of medium and long-term government bonds in order to build the benchmark of a yield curve, 
policies to develop corporate bond and equity markets, or the introduction of a primary dealer system to 
develop government security markets).     
 Coded as 3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop derivative markets or to broaden the 
institutional investor base by deregulating portfolio investments and pension funds, or completing the full 
deregulation of stock exchanges.    
 
2) Is a country‟s equity market open to foreign investors?   
 Coded as 0 if no foreign equity ownership is allowed. 
 Coded as 1 when foreign equity ownership is allowed but there is less than 50 per cent foreign ownership. 
 Coded as 2 when a majority equity share of foreign ownership is allowed.   
 
By adding these two sub-dimensions, 
Fully Liberalised = [4 or 5], Largely Liberalised = [3], Partially Repressed = [1, 2], and Fully Repressed = [0]   
**NOTE** If information on the second sub-dimension was not available (as is the case with some low- income 
countries), the measure was coded using information on securities market development. If information on securities 
markets only was considered, a 0-3 scale was assigned based on the score on securities markets.       
 
 
VII. Banking Sector Supervision 
1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard? (0/1)   
 Coded as 0 if the Basle risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio is not implemented. Date of implementation is 
important, in terms of passing legislation to enforce the Basle requirement of 8 per cent capital adequacy 
ratio.   
 Coded as 1 when Basle capital adequacy ratio is in force. (Note: If the large majority of banks meet the 
prudential requirement of an 8 per cent risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio, but this is not a mandatory 
ratio as in Basle, the measure is still classified as 1). Prior to 1993, when the Basle regulations were not in 
place internationally, this measure takes the value of 0.    
 
 
2) Is the banking supervisory agency independent from executives‟ influence? (0/1/2)   
A banking supervisory agency‟s independence is ensured when the banking supervisory agency can resolve banks‟ 
problems without delays. Delays are often caused by the lack of autonomy of the banking supervisory agency, which 
is caused by political interference. For example, when the banking supervisory agency has to obtain approval from 
different agencies such as the Minister of Finance (MoF) in revoking or suspending licenses of banks or liquidating 
banks‟ assets, or when the ultimate jurisdiction of the banking supervisory agency is the MoF, this often causes 
delays in resolving banking problems. In addition to the independence from political interference, the banking 
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supervisory agency also has to be given enough power to resolve banks‟ problems promptly
25
. 
 
 Coded as 0 when the banking supervisory agency does not have an adequate legal framework to intervene 
promptly in banks‟ activities; and/or when there is lack of a legal framework for the independence of the 
supervisory agency such as the appointment and removal of the head of the banking supervisory agency; 
or if the ultimate jurisdiction of the banking supervision is under the MoF; or when a frequent turnover of the 
head of the supervisory agency is experienced.    
 Coded as 1 when the objective of the supervisory agency is clearly defined and an adequate legal 
framework to resolve banking problems is provided (the revocation and the suspension of authorisation of 
banks, liquidation of banks, and the removal of banks‟ executives etc.) but potential problems remain 
concerning the independence of the banking supervisory agency (for example, when the MoF intervenes in 
the banking supervision (in such a case that) or when the board of the banking supervisory agency is 
chaired by the MoF, although the fixed term of the board is ensured by law); or when, although clear legal 
objectives and legal independence are observed, the adequate legal framework for resolving problems is 
not well articulated.    
 Coded as 2 when a legal framework for the objectives and the resolution of troubled banks is set up and if 
the banking supervisory agency is legally independent from the executive branch and actually not interfered 
with by the executive branch.    
 
3) Does a banking supervisory agency conduct effective supervisions through on-site and off-site examinations? 
(0/1/2)    
Conducting on-site and off-site examinations of banks is an important way to monitor banks‟ balance sheets. 
 Coded as 0 when a country has no legal framework and practices of on-site and off-site examinations are 
not provided or when no on-site and off-site examinations are conducted.    
 Coded as 1 when the legal framework of on-site and off-site examinations is set up and the banking 
supervision agency has conducted examinations but in an ineffective or insufficient manner. 
 Coded as 2 when the banking supervisory agency conducts effective and sophisticated examinations.    
 
4) Does a country‟s banking supervisory agency cover all financial institutions without exception? (0/1)   
If some kinds of banks are not exclusively supervised by the banking supervisory agency or if offshore 
intermediaries of banks are excluded from the supervision, the effectiveness of the banking supervision is seriously 
undermined.    
 Coded as 1 when all banks are under supervision by supervisory agencies without exception. 
 Coded as 0 if some kinds of financial institutions are not supervised by the banking supervisory or are 
excluded from banking supervisory agency oversights.   
 
Enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector is coded by summing up these four dimensions, which 
are assigned a degree of reform as follows: 
Highly Regulated = [6], Largely Regulated = [4-5], Less Regulated = [2-3], Not Regulated = [0-1]  
Source: Abiad et al. (2008; 2010)  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
25
 According to Omori (2004: 13), “Quintyn and Taylor (2002) categorise the independence of banking supervisory 
agencies into four: regulatory independence, supervisory independence, institutional independence, and budgetary 
independence. In this dataset, independence is measured by combining institutional independence and supervisory 
independence. In the case of central bank independence, a legal framework of a central bank developed for 
countries and/or the frequency of turnover of the governor of the central bank for developing countries are the often 
used indicators. However, as discussed above, since the banking supervisory agency is not necessarily vested in 
the central bank, legal documents for banking supervision are less available, and obtaining the information for 
counting the frequency of the turnover of the head of the banking supervisory agency is much more difficult. In this 
vein, we basically relied on experts or researchers‟ evaluation in coding the independence of the banking 
supervisory agency. Lora (1997) also created the indicators based on subjective judgement of the quality of banking 
supervision.” 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND EXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA (1960-2009) 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the general policy environment and macroeconomic performance of 
post-independent SSA vis-à-vis the inflows of external financial resources to the sub-region. 
The policy environment and performance of the financial sector as well as the foreign sector in 
the sub-region are discussed to determine whether the various economic policies and reforms 
implemented by the sub-region have had any significant impact on macroeconomic 
performance and external capital flows. The focus of this chapter is on the period 1960-2009, 
and this is based, essentially, on relevance and data availability. Rather than adopting a 
rigorous econometric analytical framework, a set of simple descriptive statistical measures viz. 
arithmetic mean, correlation coefficients and trend analyses are used to provide an insight into 
the historical antecedents of the sub-region from a macroeconomic perspective. In doing this, 
the chapter reviews the post-colonial political economy of SSA, and does a series of contextual 
analyses of the macroeconomic performance and policy environment of SSA under the pre-
reforms era (1960-1979), the reforms era (1980-1989), and the post-reforms era (1990-2009). 
Following this, the chapter discusses macroeconomic performance and foreign capital flows to 
SSA, and the trends and dynamics of remittance flows to SSA from a global perspective. The 
chapter also outlines the stylised facts of migrant remittance flows to SSA, and the policy 
imperatives of remittance inflows and macroeconomic policy stance for the sub-region. 
 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
Notwithstanding the Darfur crisis, which has been ongoing since February 2003, the Somalia 
civil war, the Chad civil war and the hardly settled border and territorial dispute between Nigeria 
and Cameroon over the right of ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, largely, the political 
economy of modern SSA appears to be relatively stable since post-independence. Today, 
virtually every SSA country has what can be described as a multi-party democratically elected 
president. Again, collectively, countries within the SSA sub-region now visibly frown on military 
                                                          
 A paper from this Chapter titled, “Macroeconomic Environment and Remittances in Post-Independent Sub-
Saharan Africa: Magnitudes, Trends and Stylised Facts,” was presented at IMF Staff Seminar, February 16, 2011, 
Washington, DC, USA. This paper has been published in Journal of Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 36(2): 
1-22. 
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take-overs, dictatorship, and the use of constitutionally unapproved means to assume political 
leadership. More than ever before, the African Union (AU) and the international community, 
especially western trade and donor partners26 now act very swiftly to sanction governments and 
leaders that violate human rights, adopt extremist discrimination practices, and exploit 
undemocratic means to assume political leadership in countries within the sub-region. For 
instance, unprecedented in the history of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the sub-regional body acted very swiftly to review the political and security 
situation in Côte d‟Ivoire after the declaration of certified second round Presidential election 
results on November 28, 2010. Subsequently, ECOWAS issued a statement within ten days 
after the elections to denounce the incumbent President, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, and asked him 
to concede defeat without delay. This is expected to continue to create the propitious 
environment for some consistency in the formulation and implementation of pro-growth and 
sustainable development policies under adopted national economic development programmes 
towards the socioeconomic progress of the sub-region. 
 
The strides being made in improving good governance and building stronger state institutions 
provide a stable political environemnt necessary for creating the ideal investment atmosphere 
required for the mobilisation of critical resources in SSA. Apart from the encouraging 
developments on the political landscape of the sub-region, various macroeconomic policy 
reform programmes have been adopted and implemented by SSA countries since political 
independence in the 1960s. Each of these programmes was, among other things, centred on 
mobilising domestic and external resources crucial to the socioeconomic development agenda 
of the sub-region since SSA has been identified as the region most lacking critical resources 
(Devarajan et al., 2002; Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2006). And as the sub-region is identified as 
one of the leading net exporters of skilled and unskilled labour to the industrialised world 
(Migration Policy Institute, 2006), the question that has remained unanswered is: Has the 
implementation of various macroeconomic policies led to higher inflows of migrant remittances 
during the post-independence era? In other words, are remittance inflows from SSA migrants 
from abroad responsive to the changing macroeconomic policy environment? In order to find 
the appropriate response to this question, this chapter seeks to explore the relationship 
between the changing inflows of migrant remittances and the various macroeconomic policies 
                                                          
26
 This refers essentially to those from Europe, the US and Canada. In recent years, however, China has emerged 
as the leading trading partner and investor in SSA. Chinese companies invested US$ 1 billion in Africa in 2007 
(Politzer, 2008). 
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implemented by SSA as a sub-region since independence. In doing so, rather than adopting a 
rigorous macroeconometric analytical approach, this chapter uses a set of simple descriptive 
statistics to provide insight into the performance of the sub-region in attracting remittances 
during the post-independence era. A more rigorous econometric analysis of the determinants of 
international migrant remittances under changing macroeconomic policy environment is 
reserved for Chapter Four. 
 
3.2 A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE OF SSA (1960-2009) 
Generally, the macroeconomy of SSA has not witnessed any significant and consistent 
improvement since independence27, even though there was a major policy paradigm shift 
across the length and breadth of the sub-region in the 1980s. The major policy reform the sub-
region underwent after independence has been the IMF/WB-led Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP) that embodied the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Although there 
has been some marginal progress in financial sector development and export growth, SSA still 
lags behind in development, about fifty years after independence, with no significant gains in 
terms of poverty reduction, food security, technological advancement and industrialisation, 
production capacity and high productivity. From a macroeconomic perspective, these elements 
of (under)development crop up from the structures of production, consumption, external trade, 
technology, employment as well as the economic system and socio-political configuration of an 
economy. It is, therefore, impossible to offer any functional understanding, remedies or policy 
recommendations aimed at addressing these entrenched problems of SSA without a thorough 
structural analysis of the political economy of the sub-region. Therefore, this chapter presents 
structural analyses of SSA which broadly take into account a critical examination of the 
enabling and disenabling internal and external macroeconomic factors which prevailed during 
the period 1960-2009 under three main regimes – the pre-reforms, the reforms, and the post-
reforms regimes.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 In recent years (i.e. between 2000-2009), however, available data show improvements in key macroeconomic 
indicators such as real GDP per capita, and rate of inflation comparable to what was attained in the 1960s and the 
1970s (see, for instance, Table 3.1). 
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3.2.1 The Pre-Reforms Era (1960-1979) 
Many SSA countries, including inter alia Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda, were bequeathed reasonable international 
reserves and social infrastructure in the form of schools, hospitals, and road networks  
concentrated in the urban centres at the time of their political independence, albeit with poor 
transport systems, unreliable energy supplies and  high levels of illiteracy, poverty, and 
malnutrition, especially in the rural communities which constituted at least two-thirds of their 
economies. The economy of SSA was largely subsistence and agrarian with low 
industrialisation at the time of independence. The key structural features of the economy of 
SSA at the time of independence can be described as including:  
i. over-dependency on the primary sector with raw agricultural products and exhaustible 
natural resources28 dominating exports;  
ii. a predominantly subsistence economy in production and domestic trade, and hence a 
large informal sector;  
iii. a fragmented economy that neglected the large rural economy, the informal sector and, 
indeed, the private sector which was virtually crowded out by the public sector, hence 
entrepreneurial spirit was not fostered.  
iv. an absence of strong regional trade among SSA countries;  
v. low production capacity that relied on high labour-intensive and non-scientific or out-
dated production techniques; and  
vi. low technological and infrastructural base, and absence of a strong institutional 
capacity. 
 
Nevertheless, given the enthusiastic interest and commitment of the indigenous people in 
taking over the political leadership and in managing their own affairs, there was high optimism 
that independent SSA countries would quickly transform the structure of their economies and 
attain higher-income status, once the available resources were put to optimal use. 
Unfortunately, within the era under consideration (1960-1979), most of the economic policies 
adopted by governments within the sub-region were restrictive with over-emphasis on exports 
of raw primary products rather than commitment to value-addition and industrialisation. Most of 
the industries inherited from the colonial masters were used mainly to produce import-
                                                          
28
 These include minerals like timber, gold, bauxite, manganese, diamond, iron ore, and uranium. 
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substituting consumer goods. 
 
With economic policies being largely socialist in content, the state played a leading role in 
investment and industrialisation which by the mid 1970s, had rapidly eroded all the reserves 
inherited, especially as most of the heavy investments were not made prudently29. Thus, it can 
be argued that, to a very large extent, bad governance and lack of vision and leadership 
qualities resulting in ad hoc implementation of economic policies, mismanagement and corrupt 
practices, together with political instability, drought, conflicts, and lack of adequate resources to 
address the numerous socioeconomic problems facing the sub-region, led to stagnated growth 
and underdevelopment of the sub-region. Many scholars and institutions, including Sachs and 
Warner (1997) and AFRODAD (2007), blame the economic woes of the sub-region on external 
factors such as declining prices of primary products, decreasing net inflows of official and 
private financial resources, global recessions and oil price shocks of the 1970s and early-
1980s, and policy prescriptions by international financial institutions (mainly the IMF and the 
World Bank). However, this assertion can be challenged insofar as good vision and other 
quality leadership skills can play a decisive role in negotiations, the choice of a development 
strategy, and the timing and sequencing of policy implementation. For example, according to 
Sahn et al. (1994), consensus on the causes of the abysmal performance of post-
independence Africa does not only end with external factors such as the collapse of 
commercial lending to developing countries and worldwide economic recession, but also with 
the fact that the implementation of economic policies was misguided. By the late 1970s, the 
IMF in partnership with the World Bank concluded that the source of economic problems 
confronting developing countries and, indeed, SSA is basically lack of structural transformation 
and, hence, they advocated extensive economic reforms in these economies. 
 
3.2.2 The Reforms Era (1980-1989) 
By the end of the 1970s, it was evident that SSA could no longer rely on inward-looking 
economic policies and industrialisation strategies, which were vulnerable to external shocks, to 
resolve the deep-seated impediments to economic growth and prosperity and, subsequently, 
put the sub-region on a sustainable path to reverse its worsening economic fortunes. Thus, two 
decades after the political independence of SSA, its economic performance was worse and 
                                                          
29
 In Ghana, for example, Nkrumah (the First President of the Republic) established about 200 state-owned 
industries without taking into account the regular supply of raw materials required to feed these „state-protected 
industries‟. As a result, many of these state monopolies never functioned whilst a majority of the remaining state-
owned industries operated below full capacity but with large full-time workers on the state payroll. 
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characterised with declining per capita growth, galloping inflation, a worsening balance of 
payments, a debilitating debt burden, and rising unsustainable fiscal deficits, unemployment, 
poverty and deprivation (see Figure 3.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2). It became apparent that SSA 
needed to adjust its economy to eliminate structural imbalances and react appropriately to 
external shocks. In response, during the 1980s, many SSA countries accepted and pursued the 
IMF/WB-recommended economic policy reforms towards stabilisation and structural 
transformation under a policy package known as the Economic Recovery Programme and 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ERP/SAP)30. Essentially, economic reforms connote 
economic openness and market fundamentalism for macroeconomic stability through policies 
of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation as prescribed by Bretton Woods Institutions,  
notably the IMF and the World Bank, in the late 1970s. The broad sets of policy 
recommendations by these institutions can be summarised as:  
i. austerity and fiscal policy discipline; 
ii. redirection of policy spending from subsidies (especially indiscriminate subsidies) 
toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary 
education, primary healthcare and infrastructural investment; 
iii. tax reforms via broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; 
iv. interest rates that are positive but moderate in real terms and freely determined by the 
financial market forces; 
v. competitive exchange rates; 
vi. privatisation or divestiture of state-owned enterprises; 
vii. trade liberalisation with special emphasis on elimination of quantitative restrictions 
(licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs; 
viii. financial sector reforms to include the establishment or revitalisation of domestic capital 
markets and the liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment; 
ix. deregulation to include abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environment and consumer protection 
grounds, and the prudent oversight of financial institutions; and 
x. legal security for property rights. 
                                                          
30
 According to OAU (1985), more than 30 African countries adopted ERP/SAP as of 1988 with support from the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
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It is essential to point out that although both the IMF and the World Bank often lend to 
economically depressed and developing countries, these loans are packaged to address 
different problems confronting the beneficiary countries31. For instance, while the IMF mainly 
lends to countries suffering from BoP problems and hence cannot repay their accumulated 
external debts, the World Bank extends loans to enable countries, (mainly LDCs) to finance 
specific development projects. Accordingly, traditional IMF Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) 
are due to be repaid within 30 and 48 months and are mainly directed at the temporary fixing of 
problems that confront a country in crisis of an apparently perpetual macroeconomic 
imbalance. The World Bank‟s SALs, however, are a longer-term credit package of loans and 
grants to countries to finance critical development projects. In this regard, the World Bank is 
functionally structured into two: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). Whereas IBRD focuses on 
middle-income and credit-worthy poor countries, IDA focuses on the lowest and least credit-
worthy countries. Therefore, in the 1980s, most SSA countries contracted IMF/WB SALs to 
tackle various economic problems concurrently.  
 
The pursuit of ERP/SAP generally involved the implementation of stringent economic policies 
and measures of demand management towards rationalising the overall expenditure pattern in 
order to restore financial stability, fiscal balance and external equilibrium. These policies were 
implemented through reliance on market forces and private sector-led growth. In effect, the 
pursuit of ERP/SAP signified a radical departure from all previous socialist-oriented policies 
adopted by the sub-region. By and large, the implementation of ERP/SAP resulted in the 
abandonment of state controls and restrictions on prices, imports, and exchange rates. Broadly, 
the various policy measures under the reforms programme were pursued in varying degrees of 
implementation. Whilst countries like Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana and Malawi tried to follow the 
prescriptions of the ERP/SAP strictly, others like Kenya, Nigeria ad Zimbabwe initiated a 
number of complementary policies and programmes such as national employment 
programmes, urban mass transit programmes, relief packages for public sector workers, and 
food, road and rural infrastructural programmes alongside the ERP/SAP.  
 
                                                          
31
 Aside the IMF and the World Bank as the main sources of institutional loans to developing countries, many of 
these countries also rely on bilateral loans which can take the form of overdrafts, term loans and revolving credit 
facility. Another form of credit available to developing countries is syndicated loans which are provided by a group of 
lenders to developing countries. 
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The outcome of the ERP/SAP has, however, not shown which of these forms of implementation 
is more successful. For instance, the major gains of ERP/SAP across the sub-region can be 
noted as increased access of the private sector to foreign exchange and markets, export 
diversification leading to the emergence of non-traditional commodities, increased international 
trade openness, and improved access to financial services. Other achievements include 
restructuring of public enterprises and freeing of prices. Despite these gains, the 
macroeconomy failed to recover fully from the declining trend as reflected in real income per 
capita growth, domestic savings and investment, basically because output per capita growth 
failed to keep pace with population growth (see Table 3.1). Also, until quite recently, there were 
no reversals in the rising trend of external debt accumulation and the rate of inflation. These 
suggest that the formulation of various specific macroeconomic policies and their 
implementation under the broad ERP/SAP programme were erratic, as most SSA governments 
lacked full commitment to the underlying principles and short-term objectives of ERP/SAP. For 
instance, in many SSA countries including Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania, 
governments kept on subsidising some non-essentials and at the same time continued with 
increased spending on non-productive activities in breach of the ideals of ERP/SAP in order to 
gain political popularity. This has led to structural imbalances, macroeconomic instability and 
economic retardation that still persist and abound among virtually all countries which adopted 
the ERP/SAP in SSA. 
 
Thus, by the mid-1980s, SSA countries were blaming the orthodox ERP/SAP for the poor 
economic performance of the sub-region. According to these countries, the classical policy 
instruments of credit control, tight money supply, flexible exchange rate and interest rate 
adjustments, fiscal discipline and tax reforms, and trade liberalisation, by their very design, had 
no human face to bring about the desired impact on their economies. Besides, the 
„conditionalities‟ of these IMF SALs in particular had made it difficult for the countries within the 
sub-region to attain the desired self-sufficiency and economic independence. Therefore, by 
1986, with support from the UN, governments from the sub-region, through the OAU, had 
designed three complementary/alternative SAP versions32 for selective implementation across 
SSA.  
 
                                                          
32
 This includes UN-led United Nations Programme of African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) 
for 1986-1990 and the UN-led African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for 
Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) for 1989/1990. See Table A3.2 in the Appendix for details 
on the two key alternative programmes, namely UN-PAAERD and AAF-SAP. 
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3.2.3 The Post-Reforms Era (1990-2009) 
As shown in Figure 3.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below, the various policy reforms initiated by 
SSA countries did not achieve much in the 1980s. The failure of the orthodox IMF/WB-led 
ERP/SAP33 and other modified supportive SSA versions34 to address the key problems 
confronting the sub-region meant that other purposive and positive actions were required to 
break the structural bottlenecks and imbalances to position the economy of SSA towards 
sustainable growth and to protect it against economic shocks. 
 
Figure 3.1: Trends in Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in SSA, 1960-2009 
 
Source: Author based on WDI and GDF (April 2011). Note: The starting point of gross fixed capital formation and 
external debt stock are 1970 and 1975 respectively because regional data for earlier years were non-existent. 
 
By and large, these modified ERP/SAP programmes and supportive frameworks designed to 
guide economic policy implementation and to break the shackles of underdevelopment have 
not achieved the desired results. The extent of the lack of success of these policy initiatives can 
be easily measured by the number of SSA countries that were forced into adopting the HIPC 
Initiative at the beginning of this new millennium. By adopting the HIPC Initiative, the countries 
have accepted the fact that they are poor and cannot manage their debts sustainably, and 
hence need international support to address critical socioeconomic problems under a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS) within the context of IMF‟s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
                                                          
33
 See Dollar and Svensson (2000) for evidence and reasons on why SAP was less successful in low-income and 
African countries. Van de Walle and Johnston (1996) and Knight and Santaellah (1997) also provide other possible 
reasons for the failure of ERP/SAP in most developing countries. 
34
 These are UN-PAAERD and AAF-SAP. 
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(PRGF)35. Thus, at present, SSA still remains the poorest region in the world and requires the 
most resources to provide essential social amenities and to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).36 
 
In Figure 3.1, it is shown that SSA has not made much economic progress since independence 
in the 1960s. For instance, as a proportion of GDP, gross fixed capital formation and external 
balance on goods and services are lower today than at the time of independence (see also 
Table 3.1). Similarly, GDP per capita growth is lower in the 2000s than in the 1960s just like 
gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP, although showing a consistent upward trend 
since the mid-1990s, and still lags behind the level attained in the mid-1970s. 
 
Inflation, which averaged about three per cent in the 1990s, increased to an average of seven 
per cent in the 2000s. In a similar fashion, external debt stock as a percentage of GDP 
increased from about 15 per cent during the pre-reforms era to a high of over 70 per cent in the 
1990s before debt cancellation and other reliefs under HIPC initiatives reduced it to about 22 
per cent between 2006 and 2009. 
 
3.2.4 Macroeconomic Performance and Policy Environment in SSA 
Table 3.1 summarises the key macroeconomic performance indicators of SSA since 
independence.  
 
A key feature of the sub-region is that it is apparently trapped in a low-income equilibrium level 
as its annual population growth rate consistently exceeds its annual GDP per capita growth 
rate. In fact, even though the average annual population growth rate today is similar to what it 
was at the time of independence, average yearly GDP per capita growth rate today is lower 
than the rate attained in the 1960s. During the reforms era and in the first decade of the post-
reforms era, average growth in per capita income was negative whereas population growth was 
2.81 per cent for the reforms era reaching an all-time high of 2.91 per cent in the 1980s. The 
undesirable consequences for the higher dependency, unemployment, underemployment, net 
savings and investment are obvious and unambiguous. 
                                                          
35
 See Table A3.1 in the Appendix for the list of SSA countries that adopted the HIPC Initiative as of June 30, 2010 
and Table A3.2 in the Appendix for details on HIPC Initiative as an economic development strategy. 
36
 Refer to Table A1.1 in Chapter 1, Brossard and Gacougnolle (2001), AfDB (2002), Mingat et al. (2002), World 
Bank (2002) and World Bank (2003) for details on estimated resources required by SSA to meet MDGs and see Box 
A3.1 for the list of MDGs. 
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Table 3.1: Macroeconomic Performance and Policy Environment in SSA, 1960-2009 
 Source: Author‟s computations from WDI (April 2011). Note: GGFCE and GFCF denote general government final 
consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation respectively. 
 
Again, on the average, annual GDP growth rate, external balance and domestic investment are 
lower today than at the time of political independence. Annual average inflation is also higher 
today than it was in the 1960s. These bear testimony to the fact that the economic fortunes of 
the sub-region are worse today than 50 years ago, with lower aspirations for greater prospects 
in the future. This surely is enough incentive for the active labour force to seek greener 
pastures outside the sub-region, and this has actually been the case in recent years. 
 
As far as the foreign sector is concerned, it can be argued that the sub-region chalked some 
remarkable successes, even though the ultimate indicator, the international trade balance, is 
still low and negative compared to what was recorded in the 1960s as shown in Table 3.2. For 
example, as evident in Table 3.2, on the average, the current account balance turned positive 
for the first time in the 2000s.  
 
Table 3.2: International Trade Performance and Policy Environment in SSA, 1960-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s computation based on WDI (April 2011).  
*
Exports plus imports of goods and services as % of GDP 
Reforms Overall Period
1960-69 1970-79 1960-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1990-09 1960-2009
GDP (constant 2000 US$ billions) 120.64 190.97  155.81   243.36    293.83   422.66  358.25   254.29              
GDP growth (annual %) 4.64      4.07       4.34        2.17        2.02        4.54       3.28        3.46                   
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 469.57 573.66  521.62   552.17    504.61   558.08  531.35   531.62              
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.06      1.26       1.64        -0.72 -0.67 1.97       0.65        0.75                   
External balance (% of GDP) 0.35      -1.51 -0.58 -0.37 -1.43 -1.41 -1.42 -0.87
External debt stocks, total (% of GDP) -        15.64     15.64     39.72      65.22     39.56    52.39      40.03                
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) -        18.83     18.83     18.33      17.16     16.87    17.02      17.80                
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 19.40   28.87     24.13     22.23      14.48     23.50    18.99      21.70                
Inflation (annual %) 3.06      9.18       6.28        10.68      10.00     7.03       8.51        8.09                   
Population growth (annual %) 2.53      2.78       2.66        2.91        2.71        2.52       2.62        2.69                   
Key Macroeconomic Indicators
Pre-Reforms Era Post-Reforms Era
Reforms Overall Period
1960-69 1970-79 1960-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1990-09 1960-2009
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.09 -1.56 -0.82 -2.31 -2.13 0.85 -0.64 -1.05
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) -         26.86 26.86 23.79 26.67 34.16 30.42 28.08
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) -         20.18 20.18 1.68 4.23 13.42 8.82 7.30
Exports of goods (% of GDP) -         23.90 23.90 20.94 22.52 29.42 25.97 24.26
Imports of goods (% of GDP) -         21.36 21.36 18.76 20.82 24.58 22.70 21.38
Import cover (goods exports/goods imports) -         1.12 1.12 1.13 1.09 1.20 1.14 1.14
International trade balance (% of GDP) 0.35       -1.29 -1.22 -0.97 -1.80 -0.23 -1.02 -1.06
Openness to international trade (%)* -         55.01 55.01 48.54 55.14 68.56 61.85 57.20
External Sector Policy Indicators
Pre-Reforms Era Post-Reforms Era
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In addition, despite the fact that growth in exports and imports of goods as a percentage of 
GDP can be described as virtually stagnant since political independence, foreign trade policy 
indicators, notably import cover (measured as value of exports as a ratio of imports of goods) 
and international trade openness have assumed affirmative and encouraging trends in recent 
years. More specifically, as evident in Table 3.2, import cover of 1.20 for the 2000s averaging 
1.14 for the post-reforms era is a slight improvement over the pre-reforms average of 1.12. In a 
similar fashion, the degree of international trade openness which stood at 55.01 per cent during 
the pre-reforms era, improved significantly to 68.56 per cent in the 2000s and averaged 61.85 
per cent for the post-reforms period. 
 
An overview of the performance of the financial sector has shown that, arguably, monetary 
policy instruments have not succeeded in reducing financial risk as interest rate spread 
increased from six per cent during the pre-reforms era to 11.76 per cent in the 2000s averaging 
10.98 per cent for the post-reforms era (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3: Financial Sector Performance and Monetary Policy Environment in SSA, 1960-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s computations from WDI and GDF (April 2011) 
 
Financial depth, measured as broad money (M2) as a percentage of GDP, also declined 
considerably from an average of 42.29 per cent in the 1960s with a pre-reforms average of 
32.99 per cent to 35.45 per cent in the 2000s with a post-reforms average of 34.12 per cent. 
When using this indicator, it is difficult to conclude that a significant amount of money still 
circulates outside the banking system which points to low public confidence in the banking 
system and the extent to which the economy is under-banked. The reason is that broad money 
includes currency in circulation and demand deposits; and it is expected that as a financial 
Reforms Overall Period
1960-69 1970-79 1960-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1990-09 1960-2009
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) 4.72     5.00       4.90      9.50        13.79      14.03     13.91     9.82                   
Domestic credit by banks (% of GDP) 39.32   41.64     40.87   56.49     75.48      84.09     79.79     61.64                
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 28.75   28.82     28.79   36.69 53.88 59.50     56.69     42.95                
Interest rate spread (%) -       6.00       6.00      6.59        10.35      11.76     10.98     8.65                   
Listed domestic companies, (end of period) -       -         -        -          1,139.00 991.00   991.00   991.00              
Market capitalization (% of GDP) -       -         -        -          100.51    103.94   102.23   102.23              
Money and quasi money (M₂) as % of GDP 42.29   29.26     32.99   32.71     32.80      35.45     34.12     33.44                
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) -       -         -        -          17.19      38.77     28.81     28.81                
Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%) -       -         -        -          17.53      28.56     24.55     24.55                
Monetary and Financial Sector Indicators
Pre-Reforms Era Post-Reforms Era
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system develops, quasi money should increase as financial institutions mobilise more excess 
funds, thereby reducing the currency in circulation. Unfortunately, data on narrow money (M1) is 
not available on a regional basis.  
 
However, a lot was achieved as liquid reserves to bank assets increased sharply from 4.90 per 
cent in the pre-reforms era to 9.50 per cent during the reforms, and to 13.91 per cent during the 
post-reforms era. Similarly, as a ratio of GDP, domestic credit by the banking sector increased 
from 40.87 per cent to 79.79 per cent on the average during the same period. Also worth 
noting, more importantly, is the upshot in domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of 
GDP. This ratio increased from 28.79 per cent during the pre-reforms era to as much as 36.69 
per cent during the reforms era, further rising to 56.69 per cent for the post-reforms era, as 
shown in Table 3.3. 
 
3.3 EXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO SSA (1960-2009) 
3.3.1 Composition and Trends in External Capital Flows to SSA: A Global Outlook 
Conventionally, besides contractual loans, capital flows to SSA and other developing 
economies are a composition of FDI, ODA, and portfolio equity. In recent years, however, 
remittances have emerged as a complementary source of external capital for developing 
countries. Figure A3.1 in the Appendix depicts the trends in external capital flows to the various 
developing economies of the world. Figure 3.2 shows the trends in external capital flows to 
SSA since 1970.  
 
Figure 3.2: Trends in External Capital Flows to SSA, 1970-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation based on WDI and GDF (April 2011) 
 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
C
a
p
it
a
l 
F
lo
w
s
 (
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
)
Years
FDI, net inflows ODA, net inflows Portfolio equity, net inflows Migrant remittances
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
Clearly, external capital flows to SSA were generally low during the pre-reforms era. From the 
reforms era in the 1980s and onwards, there have been somewhat consistent low upward 
trends in external capital flows to the sub-region even though these trends, except for migrant 
remittances, have been fluctuating widely. On the average, the lowest external capital inflow is 
portfolio equity, whereas, consistently, ODA has been the highest inflow to the sub-region since 
independence. As depicted in Figure 3.2, the sub-region has not been successful in attracting 
external capital inflows in a consistent manner, except probably for migrant remittances. 
Arguably, the apparent consistency in the inflows of migrant remittances could be attributed to 
the continuously growing poverty in the sub-region and the development gap between SSA and 
the industrialised world37. The persistently high rates of unemployment and underemployment, 
features of developing countries, have led to these poor SSA countries being trapped in low-
income equilibrium, with no reversibility in sight. The ever-increasing income gap has become a 
recipe for emigration and subsequent inflows of remittances in SSA. In this case, driven by 
altruism, migrants from SSA are compelled to continue to remit home, mainly for consumption 
purposes, for so long as the economic conditions at home do not improve38. Miotti et al. (2010: 
17) observe that given the severity of poverty within the sub-region, SSA migrants, unlike 
migrants from other countries in the developing world, are compelled to “send money for 
current expenditures rather than for investment purposes”. 
 
Under this circumstance, international migrants from the sub-region are compelled to remit to 
their families back home for altruistic motives and not in response to successful implementation 
of economic policies by governments. As evident from various survey studies from different 
parts of the world, migrant remittances are mainly used for consumption (Tongamoa, 1987; 
Loomis, 1990; Hayes, 1993; Clark, 2004; Miotti et al. 2010), and most migrants from poor 
countries are under social obligation to remit home (Morauta, 1985; Tongamoa, 1987; Boyd, 
1990; Brown and Poirine, 2005). It should, however, be emphasised that as to whether a 
migrant will patronise the formal financial market in remitting home or use the unofficial money 
transfer channels is largely dependent upon the degree of financial efficiency, an aspect of 
financial development which incorporates the cost of financial service delivery including the 
cost of international money transfers. Unofficial money transfer channels are private and often 
                                                          
37
 It is important to emphasise that although emigration of skilled labour from poorer regions to the industrialised 
world often leads to higher remittance inflows in migrant-home countries, it is only migrant-home countries with 
efficient institutions and financial markets that are more likely to record relatively higher remittances through official 
channels. Therefore, the fact that SSA is poorer than LAC and SAS, but the former receives less officially reported 
remittances should not be seen as counter-intuitive. 
38
 See van Dalen et al. (2005) for empirical evidence from Egypt and Turkey. 
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unorganised money transfer channels to target recipients in developing countries. These 
channels may include funds sent by the migrant when travelling home through fellow 
international migrants such as friends, relatives or drivers travelling home, and a network of 
private individuals in a system commonly called the hawala or hundi. Also, easy access for 
migrants to offshore banking services and online banking and the availability of innovative 
international financial products, which are all aspects of financial system development noted in 
Chapter Two, can be instrumental in attracting remittances through the formal financial sector. 
 
Figure 3.3 reconfirms the information in Figure 3.2 that, generally, there has been a positive 
growth trend in remittances received in SSA and other developing economies, when measured 
as a ratio of international migrant stock. This trend is also consistent with what has been 
revealed in Figure A3.1 as well as Figure A3.2 in the Appendix. With the exception of ECA 
which recorded a sharp drop in remittance flows between 1970 and 1990, virtually all the 
developing regions, including SSA, witnessed a consistent positive growth trend in migrant 
remittances per migrant (Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3: Remittances Received per Migrant (US$) in Developing Economies, 1970-2009* 
 
Source: Author based on WDI and GDF (April 2011)  *Computation based on 5-year data point intervals for which 
data is available on total international migration stock reported in WDI by the World Bank. 
 
Year EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA
1970 - - 9.42           77.39      7.33          2.45         
1975 10.14         2,840.48  37.02         309.10    28.08       36.68       
1980 567.96      1,941.07  343.39       1,511.63 338.24     108.31    
1985 761.07      1,443.75  455.76       877.43    359.29     90.45       
1990 1,115.64   107.44     887.98       1,250.01 350.31     127.20    
1995 2,928.37   218.92     2,442.82   1,477.42 754.72     191.68    
2000 3,923.40   367.20     3,588.30   1,375.69 1,337.33  294.02    
2005 10,613.30 839.20     8,400.53   2,507.37 2,878.66  578.51    
TOTAL 19,919.87 7,758.08  16,155.80 9,308.64 6,046.63  1,426.86 
MEAN 2,845.70   1,108.30  2,020.65   1,173.25 756.74     178.66    
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Although SSA receives the least remittances per migrant, both in total amount and in terms of 
growth since 1970, the sub-region, like many other developing economies, has witnessed a 
positive growth trend since the post-reforms era. What is clear from Figure 3.3 above is that, on 
the average, international migrants have been increasing the amount they send home over 
time. This may be due to the ever-increasing income gap between the industrialised countries 
where migrants are resident and the developing countries, where migrants are natives. Another 
possible reason is that developing countries which are the main „exporters of migrants‟, have 
not been able to improve upon the livelihood of their citizens, hence the compelling need for 
migrants to keep increasing remittances in support of their families left behind to enable them 
access basic human needs such as food, clothing and healthcare. 
 
Between the years 2000 and 2005, there has been about a 100 per cent rise in remittances per 
migrant to SSA and, indeed, to other developing economies. A possible explanation is that the 
US and many advanced countries strengthened regulations and clampdowns on unofficial 
international fund transfers following the September-11 Al Qaeda attacks (Gupta, 2005). Thus, 
unlike in the past, migrants are now obliged to transfer funds home using official channels. It is 
also likely that more migrants from SSA might now be more interested in returning home.  
Several studies, including those of Merkle and Zimmermann (1992), Brown (1997), Gubert 
(2002), and Cai (2003) found that migrant intention to return home (or future migration plans) 
has a strong positive impact on  the probability of remitting and the amount of funds transferred 
by migrants. The magnitude and trends in external capital flows to SSA appear quite different 
from those in other developing economies of the world, as shown in Figure A3.1 in the 
Appendix. For instance, as shown in Figure A3.1, migrant remittances are either the highest (as 
is the case for MNA and SAS) or the second-highest (as is the case for EAP, ECA and LAC) 
external capital inflows, but in the case of SSA alone, migrant remittance inflows are only 
slightly higher than portfolio equity inflows. Again, in SSA, ODA has remained consistently the 
highest type of external capital inflows, but for all other developing economies, ODA has either 
been the lowest (as is the case for EAP and LAC) or the second lowest (as is the case for ECA, 
MNA and SAS). Since the inflows of FDI are generally driven by profit motives whereas ODA 
are mainly linked to humanitarianism of the donor country or institution, the fact that SSA 
constantly receives ODA as the highest form of external capital inflows is a signal that the sub-
region has not been able to implement the appropriate economic policies to pull quality external 
resources to advance its sustainable growth and development. 
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It is also of interest to note that migrant remittances have been the most consistently growing 
external capital flows to developing economies in the world whilst ODA and portfolio equity 
have been the most volatile, as shown in Figure A3.1. In addition to its high volatility, generally, 
ODA to developing economies has been declining. This is an indication that it will be prudent 
for developing countries, particularly those in SSA, to put policy measures in place to facilitate 
an improved mobilisation of non-aid investment-related external capital to finance their 
development projects, as well as to enable them to address their numerous underdevelopment 
problems on a permanent basis. Evidently, migrant remittances are the least sensitive to 
shocks, given the high and relatively smooth pattern of inflows to SSA and other developing 
economies. Another important observation is that, whereas there seems to be a somewhat 
general positive correlation between FDI and migrant remittance inflows to developing 
economies, in contrast, there seems to be a negative relationship between migrant remittance 
inflows and ODA across the developing world. Thus, developing economies that attract higher 
migrant remittances also attract higher FDI but relatively lower ODA, and vice versa. For 
instance, while being the sub-region that receives the least remittances, SSA also receives the 
least FDI but the most ODA, whereas the opposite scenario commonly holds for the other 
developing economies (see Figure A3.1). 
 
According to the altruistic theory, given the net income of a migrant, remittances should 
negatively correlate with the income level of target recipients (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rapoport 
and Docquire, 2006). Indeed, some macro-level studies, notably those by Bougha-Hagbe 
(2004), Cartagena (2004), Gupta (2005), Mishra (2005), and World Bank (2006b) as well as 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) for countries with less developed financial systems, conclude 
that remittances are countercyclical in recipient countries. Contrary to this highly held view of 
remittance counter-cyclicality, it has been revealed that migrant remittance inflows generally 
correlate positively with real GDP per capita, growth in real per capita GDP, real GDP growth 
and even real GDP per person employed in developing economies39 as shown in Adenutsi et 
al. (2012). Other empirical studies which found that remittances are largely pro-cyclical in the 
recipient countries include studies by the IMF (2005a), Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007a), and 
Sayan (2006). 
 
 
                                                          
39
 This does not necessarily imply the popularly held view has been invalidated since correlation does not 
necessarily mean causation.  
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Table 3.4:  
Correlation between Remittances and Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 1990-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s computation based on BoPS and WDI (April 2011). Notes: HFCE denotes household final 
consumption expenditure. MRPC and MRem represent migrant remittances per capita and total migrant remittances 
received respectively. 
 
It can also be noted that migrant remittances are more strongly and positively correlated with 
gross domestic savings and investment rather than what is popularly believed, namely that  
remittances are purely for consumption purposes and driven by altruism. If, indeed, remittances 
are spent on consumption in developing countries, they are more likely  spent on imported 
consumer goods as found by Tongamoa (1987) rather than on domestically produced goods. 
This is because, as revealed in Table 3.4, there is a strong negative correlation between 
migrant remittances and household final consumption expenditure (HFCE) as they correlated 
positively and robustly with the import of goods in developing countries. This is one of the most 
consistent results across all the developing economies in the world. One should, however, be 
cautious in concluding that remittances are likely to be used for imports, since the correlation 
between the former and exports is also strong and positive for the developing economies. What 
seems clear from the foregoing is that migrant remittance inflows are likely to be highly 
associated with economic openness, given the high positive correlation coefficients of imports 
and exports as a proportion of GDP. However, although SSA has higher trade openness than 
ECA, the latter receives more remittances. In addition, there is no basis to conclude that 
remittances are a substitute for exports in developing countries. 
 
It is also observed that remittance inflows are positively associated with improved current 
balance in migrant exporting developing countries. The correlation between migrant 
MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem MRPC MRem
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.727 0.721 0.008 0.007 0.721 0.717 0.152 0.219 0.079 0.071 0.451 0.457 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) -0.185 -0.189 0.932 0.931 0.280 0.269 0.874 0.899 0.946 0.944 0.653 0.653 
GDP (constant 2000 US$) 0.986 0.984 0.881 0.881 0.961 0.962 0.840 0.917 0.971 0.968 0.954 0.956 
GDP growth (annual %) 0.197 0.196 0.389 0.387 0.193 0.184 0.128 0.124 0.428 0.418 0.489 0.475 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 0.985 0.983 0.868 0.868 0.940 0.944 0.855 0.927 0.886 0.879 0.953 0.955 
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.296 0.294 0.384 0.381 0.287 0.278 0.231 0.249 0.408 0.399 0.512 0.498 
GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP $) 0.141 0.145 0.859 0.860 0.842 0.847 0.864 0.905 0.975 0.973 0.960 0.964 
Exports of goods (% of GDP) 0.889 0.884 0.438 0.437 0.874 0.864 -     -     0.951 0.949 0.850 0.846 
Imports of goods (% of GDP) 0.760 0.755 0.479 0.478 0.805 0.794 0.206 0.071 0.954 0.956 0.740 0.729 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 0.801 0.800 0.285 0.288 0.068 0.081 0.442 0.458 0.922 0.922 0.540 0.542 
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 0.940 0.940 -0.018 -0.017 0.738 0.736 0.813 0.848 0.785 0.782 0.867 0.867 
HFCE (% GDP) -0.985 -0.984 -0.037 -0.038 -0.856 -0.851 -0.805 -0.822 -0.859 -0.853 -0.927 -0.929
Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) -0.223 -0.220 -0.386 -0.385 -0.522 -0.512 0.096 -0.016 -0.295 -0.284 -0.247 -0.245
Portfolio equity, net inflows (% of GDP) 0.429 0.424 0.243 0.240 -0.171 -0.162 0.004 0.029 0.199 0.196 0.095 0.078 
SSAEAP ECA LAC MNA SAS
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remittances received and portfolio equity is low and generally insignificant (with none attaining 
0.45). Conversely, the correlation between FDI and remittances is positive and robust for 
developing economies, except for EAP where the relationship is negative but low. Further 
evidence on the negative correlation between remittances and domestically produced 
consumables in developing countries can be ascribed to the strong positive relationship 
between remittances and gross fixed capital formation (a proxy for domestic investment) as 
well as remittances domestic savings. For SSA, the correlation between remittances and 
savings is 0.87 whilst that between remittances and investment is 0.54. One intriguing result 
obtained in Table 3.4 is that, in SSA, just as is the case in all other developing regions, 
remittance inflows are negatively correlated with the rate of inflation. This implies either that 
migrant remittances contribute to reducing inflation in recipient countries or that price stability is 
a sine qua non for migrant remittance inflows to developing countries. Finally, taking the 
correlation coefficients into account, it can be concluded that there is no significant difference 
between the volume of migrant remittance inflows and migrant remittances received per capita, 
in the context of macroeconomic implications. 
 
With regard to the relationship between the volume of migrant remittances received and the 
degree of financial development, it can generally be argued that there is positive correlation 
between the two in SSA, when bank-based indicators of financial sector development are used 
(see Figure 3.4). Although these indicators might not be the best measures of financial 
development (see Kar and Pentecost, 2000; World Bank, 2005), these are the only indicators 
for which SSA regional data is consistently available over the past two decades. 
 
The amount of migrant remittances received in SSA positively correlates with the proportion  of 
bank credit to the private sector in GDP and broad money as a ratio of GDP, as is the case for 
all the other developing regions except LAC. The positive correlation between remittances and 
financial depth could imply that, in SSA, official remittance inflows are likely to be deposited at 
banks. This reaffirms the strong positive correlation between remittances received and 
domestic savings in developing countries, as shown in Adenutsi et al. (2012). There is, 
however, no clear-cut pattern of the magnitude of the correlation between remittances and 
financial depth, which could be due to the variations in the relative magnitude of money to 
quasi money across the various regions under consideration. For instance, with a coefficient of 
0.92, SSA and ECA are the regions with the most financial depth, followed by EAP (0.84) and 
LAC (0.80). However, with regard to attracting migrant remittances, LAC and EAP are the 
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highest recipients whilst ECA and SSA received the least (see Figure A3.2 Panel A and Figure 
A3.3 in the Appendix). 
 
Figure 3.4: 
 Correlation between Migrant Remittances and Financial Development Indicators, 1990-2009* 
 
Source: Author based on WDI (April 2011).    *Period chosen based on consistent data availability across regions 
 
A contrasting revelation is that, unlike in the case of other developing regions, the correlation 
between migrant remittances received and the number of listed firms is negative for SSA (the 
region that received the least remittances) and LAC (the region that received the most). 
Probably, in SSA and LAC, some of the firms which were listed at the establishment of the 
stock markets in the 1990s under-performed and were eventually delisted. Thus, the number of 
listed firms has been declining over time amidst increasing remittance inflows throughout the 
post-reforms era. Although, there is a higher correlation between remittances received and 
bank-based financial sector development indicators in SSA than in LAC, MNA and SAS, each 
of these regions receives higher remittances than SSA in absolute, per capita, and per migrant 
terms (see Figure A3.2 Panels A and B, and Figure A3.3 in the Appendix). In fact, even as a 
proportion to GDP, SSA only managed to occupy the third spot, behind MNA and SAS. 
Likewise, ECA recorded the highest correlation between remittances and bank-based financial 
sector indicators, and was the least recipient of remittances as a ratio of GDP and in terms of 
actual volume of remittances received; this sub-region struggled to outperform only SSA.  
 
3.3.2 The Dynamics of Remittances and the Macroeconomic Environment in SSA 
From a macroeconomic perspective, there seems to be sufficient evidence for three stylised 
facts regarding the flow of migrant remittances to developing countries: (i) geographically 
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smaller countries are more likely to attract relatively higher migrant remittances probably 
because, as a result of their small size, there is stronger social cohesion and ties; (ii) small 
island countries such as Cape Verde, Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles tend to attract higher 
official remittances, probably, because, unlike non-island and landlocked countries, it is difficult 
to remit through unofficial remittance service providers such as bus drivers and traders; and, 
(iii) although poorer countries are more likely to attract higher remittances because harsh 
economic conditions at home (e.g. high unemployment, poor working conditions, low wages) 
are a recipe for higher emigration40, remittance flows through official channels to these low-
income countries are not automatic, but dependent on some macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
For instance, as shown in Table 3.5, in terms of real GDP per capita, Seychelles, Mauritius, 
Botswana, Swaziland and Cape Verde can be described as relatively rich within the sub-region. 
Yet, in relative terms, these countries were the leading recipients of migrant remittances in SSA 
after Lesotho between 1980 and 2009. Similarly, the remaining countries in the top 10 
remittance-recipient category such as Senegal, Comoros, Lesotho, Gambia, Lesotho and 
Sudan are by far less poor than Niger, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia and Malawi, 
classified among the 10 least remittance-recipients, as depicted in Table 3.5. Thus, considering 
real GDP per capita, it is observed that the very poorest countries in the sub-region (Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Niger and Sierra Leone) are among the countries that receive the least remittances, as 
shown in Table 3.5. Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Uganda and Togo, however, managed to defy the 
odds and are among the leading 10 remittance-receiving countries within the sub-region in 
recent years, when measured relative to GDP or population size (see Table 3.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 There is a consensus in the migration and remittance literature that it is actual or perceived income gap (or 
differences in quality of life) that underlie the South-North migration leading to southwards remittance flows (Beijer, 
1970; Lipton 1980; Clarke and Wallsten, 2003; 2004; Kapur, 2004; Yang, 2005; de Haas, 2007; UN, 2010). 
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Table 3.5: 
Comparative Analysis of Top-10 and Bottom-10 Migrant Remittance per capita Recipients in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation mainly based on MRF-2011, BoPS, WDI, and GDF (April 2011). Note: Averages were 
computed for each country for only the years from 1980-2009 for which data was available. . 
 
Broadly, the top-10 remittance-receiving SSA countries are those with relatively higher tax 
revenue, exports and imports of goods, FDI, investment ratio, financial deepening (M2/GDP), 
bank credit to private sector ratio and real interest rate, but lower rate of inflation and domestic 
savings. These leading remittance-recipients in per capita terms also have relatively higher 
household consumption expenditure, real deposit interest rate, real GDP per capita, and real 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP). However, taking a cursory look at country-
specific features, it is observed that, with the exception of Sudan, the top-10 remittance-
recipients in per capita terms are those with a stronger fiscal policy stance in terms of tax 
Lesotho C-Verde Mauritius Swaziland Seychelles Botswana Senegal Sudan Comoros Gambia Mean Cor_
Migrant remittances per capita  (US$) 202.042  183.365  97.235     81.747     58.405       44.198     32.834    19.116        18.972     18.254    75.62       1.000
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) 0.08         0.31         0.04          0.07          0.16            0.57          -           0.22            0.80         -           0.22         -0.461
Broad money (% of GDP) 37.69       57.07      67.64       24.25       60.23         27.49       24.80      16.97          21.48       29.86       36.75       0.514
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 14.93       32.08      47.30       18.58       18.98         13.73       24.21      7.31            12.24       15.07       20.44       0.384
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 7.70         4.41         1.14          3.90          9.32            3.44          0.98         2.28            0.64         4.06         3.79         0.455
GDP per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 347.59    1,072.30 3,110.32  1,213.09  6,116.13    2,654.25  498.06    336.69        387.07     321.79    1,605.73 -0.031
GDP PPP per capita  (constant 2005 US$) 999.77    1,977.75 7,374.04  3,545.54  14,721.73 7,895.60  1,539.00 1,300.26    1,131.72 1,147.73 4,163.31 -0.091
Goods exports (% of GDP) 26.90       5.92         37.63       62.06       20.35         46.82       17.89      8.35            10.08       29.16       26.52       -0.006
Goods imports (% of GDP) 112.14    43.39      45.59       70.81       56.58         37.54       26.95      11.24          21.95       45.06       47.13       0.723
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 45.20       30.86      23.75       19.71       26.41         26.96       21.10      13.92          16.56       19.63       24.41       0.856
HFCE per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 409.75    1,073.98 1,961.61  953.28     3,918.43    958.12     383.40    290.04        349.67     251.90    1,055.02 0.074
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 11.20       4.78         8.24          10.81       5.17            10.11       4.48         41.76          3.31         9.85         10.97       -0.226
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) -44.40 -3.79 21.29       5.03          19.71         36.86       6.20         10.71          -6.81 7.56         5.24         -0.607
Real deposit interest rate (%) 1.94 -2.68 1.84          -2.33 2.24            -0.86 0.40         -28.07 -0.14 3.23         -2.44 0.244
Real lending interest rate (%) 4.66         7.64         10.21       4.86          7.22            3.81          9.97         -              6.19         14.19       6.87         -0.332
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 45.69       22.31      18.61       25.45       28.04         22.26       15.25      6.29            -           18.20       20.21       0.720
Mauritania Niger S-Leone Congo Rwanda Ghana Ethiopia Madagascar Tanzania Malawi Mean Cor_
Migrant remittances per capita  (US$) 2.500       2.364      2.245       2.014       1.688         1.653       0.904      0.694          0.179       0.087       1.43         1.000
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%) 9.40         18.49      40.62       19.96       13.19         26.49       25.09      16.61          8.92         28.37       20.71       0.078
Broad money (% of GDP) 14.13       14.20      16.52       16.02       14.85         18.70       28.79      18.43          20.45       17.60       17.97       -0.547
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 16.93       10.39      4.32          11.39       8.11            7.65          15.06      13.33          9.00         6.53         10.27       0.117
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 4.20         1.25         0.57          6.59          0.68            1.57          2.01         1.86            2.25         1.17         2.21         0.242
GDP per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 424.96    188.78    236.44     1,136.80  248.12       247.66     135.27    267.16        327.95     148.34    336.15    0.302
GDP PPP per capita  (constant 2005 US$) 1,610.38 684.55    653.61     3,454.06  765.47       1,017.28  572.23    956.57        834.22     637.46    1,118.58 0.338
Goods exports (% of GDP) 37.75       16.82      12.79       59.29       5.53            21.20       4.96         13.67          10.46       22.51       20.50       0.375
Goods imports (% of GDP) 37.38       19.89      21.04       25.56       16.04         29.48       14.66      17.67          22.31       22.08       22.61       0.407
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 22.14       12.20      10.28       26.98       15.69         16.93       18.36      15.99          21.78       16.49       17.68       -0.107
HFCE per capita  (constant 2000 US$) 341.37    137.35    151.74     299.03     187.83       218.87     110.45    226.60        240.46     112.71    202.64    0.327
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 6.51         3.67         11.91       4.64          7.06            31.45       7.85         15.47          19.99       20.83       12.94       -0.513
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 2.14         5.22         3.43          36.34       0.65            6.05          8.58         5.44            8.30         7.18         8.33         0.048
Real deposit interest rate (%) 0.37         1.21         -23.81 4.84          3.87            -14.18 -2.60 0.61            -13.17 -3.47 -4.63 0.066
Real lending interest rate (%) 8.56         11.68      -1.113 10.49       8.22            -16.46 2.11         14.54          3.78         7.93         4.97         -0.050
Tax revenue (% of GDP) -           10.71      9.83          9.26          9.03            15.22       8.70         10.54          -           -           7.33         0.066
Top-10 Migrant Remittance-Dependent Countries in SSA, 1980-2009
Bottom-10 Migrant Remittance-Dependent Countries in SSA, 1980-2009
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revenue mobilisation. Furthermore, countries which are successful in attracting higher 
remittances in per capita terms are those with more developed financial systems when proxied 
by M2/GDP and credit to the private sector (Table 3.5). This is also true for countries that lead 
in attracting remittances in actual volumes and, even in terms of GDP (see Figure A3.4 in the 
Appendix). It should also be noted that Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, and Sierra Leone can be 
described as the very poorest in the sub-region in terms of real per capita GDP (Table 3.5). 
These countries also attracted very low migrant remittances as well as FDI during the post-
reforms era, 1980-2009 (Table 3.5). It can be argued that the success in implementing sound 
macroeconomic policies, to a reasonable extent, may be necessary to attract international 
migrant remittances through official channels. Alternatively, remittances could be important in 
determining the success of macroeconomic policy implementation in remittance-recipients in 
SSA. 
 
For both top-10 and bottom-10 SSA remittance-recipients in Table 3.5, migrant remittances per 
capita positively correlates with private sector credit, FDI, goods imports, tax revenue, real 
deposit interest rate and HFCE, whilst for the rate of inflation and real lending interest rate, the 
correlation is negative. With the exception of HFCE and inflation, in each of these cases, the 
correlation is stronger for the top-10 than the for bottom-10 recipient countries. The 
conspicuous differences, however, are that, whereas migrant remittances per capita positively 
correlates with real GDP per capita, regarding real GDP PPP per capita, export of goods, gross 
domestic savings, and bank liquid reserve to bank assets ratio among the lowest 10 
remittance-recipients, the correlation is negative for the top 10 remittance-recipients (Table 
3.5). Also, whereas there is a fairly strong positive correlation between remittances per capita, 
and gross fixed capital formation and broad money to GDP ratio in the top 10 remittance-
recipient countries, in the case of the bottom 10 remittance-recipients, the respective 
correlation coefficients are negative. 
 
With a coefficient in excess of 99 per cent (see Figure A3.3), there is a near perfect positive 
correlation between migrant remittances received per capita and remittances per migrant 
received in SSA and, indeed, for all other developing regions excluding ECA. For these other 
developing regions, the correlation coefficients range between 97 per cent for MNA and 100 
per cent for EAP and LAC. In the case of ECA, a correlation coefficient of -37 per cent (see 
Figure A3.3) signifies a relatively low negative relationship between migrant remittances per 
capita and remittances per migrant. Consequently, for the entire developing world, remittances 
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per capita and remittances per migrant are strongly positively correlated. Therefore, in the 
absence of regular annual data on migrant stock, generally, migrant remittances per capita 
should be seen as a perfect proxy for remittances per migrant because it is statistically evident 
that the evolution of remittances per capita could be used to proxy the evolution of remittances 
per migrant. In other words, Figure 3.5 is seen as providing good insight into the dynamics of 
remittances sent by SSA migrants to their native countries over the past three decades, 1980-
2009. 
 
SSA as a sub-region has remained the least recipient of migrant remittances in the world, when 
measured in actual volume of inflows or as a ratio of population or migrant (Figure A3.2). 
Comparing SSA to other developing regions, it is quite apparent that the rate of growth in total 
migrant remittance inflows as well as migrant remittances received by the sub-region relative to 
population size or migrant stock is relatively slow (Figure A3.2 Panels A2 and B). On the basis 
of individual SSA countries, however, (Table A3.3), it is evident that the trend in migrant 
remittances received by the sub-region increased steadily and fairly robustly during the post-
reforms era as shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
For the individual countries within the sub-region, the number of SSA countries that received an 
annual minimum of US$1 in migrant remittances per capita increased from 25 in the 1980s to 
31 in the 1990s and to 32 in the 2000s (Figure 3.5). In the 2000s, none of the 32 SSA countries 
referred to above received less than US$2 in migrant remittances per capita (Figure 3.5). For 
the period 1980-2009, 32 of the sampled 36 countries received at least US$1 in migrant 
remittances per capita on annual basis. In per capita terms, Lesotho (US$202.04), Cape Verde 
(US$183.36), Mauritius (US$97.24), Swaziland (US$81.75), Seychelles (US$58.40), Botswana 
(US$44.20), and Senegal (US$32.83) are SSA countries that consistently received the highest 
inflows of migrant remittances between 1980 and 2009 (Figure 3.5). Nevertheless, during the 
most recent decade, (2000-2009), Cape Verde (US$249.28) and Mauritius (US$170.62) 
displaced Lesotho (US$164.94) as the traditional leading recipient of migrant remittances in per 
capita terms (Figure 3.5). Burkina Faso and Benin which ranked among the top 10 recipients of 
remittances per capita during the 1980s and 1990s were dislodged by Gambia and Togo in the 
2000s (Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5: Migrant Remittances Received per capita by SSA Countries (in US$), 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author based on MRF-2011, BoPS, WDI, and GDF (April 2011) and estimates from country-specific desks 
of IMF and WB. Note: Only the 36 sampled countries are included due to data constraint. 
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A similar trend is discernible when the number of SSA countries that received at least one per 
cent of remittances as a ratio of GDP is considered. From 15 countries in the 1980s, the 
number of countries rose to 18 in the 1990s before reaching 22 in the 2000s, based on the 36 
sampled countries for which consistent data are available over the past three decades41 (Figure 
A3.4). For the overall period, more than 50 per cent of the sampled countries, specifically 19 of 
the 36 sampled countries, received migrant remittances worth, at least, one per cent of their 
GDP (Figure A3.4). Furthermore, as shown in Figure A3.5, although only 17 SSA countries 
received an annual average of at least US$12 million, representing a minimum monthly 
average of US$1 million in the 1980s, as many as 25 and 29 out of the 36 sampled SSA 
countries received this minimum amount of remittances in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. 
Overall, more than two-thirds, (specifically 25) of the sampled countries, received migrant 
remittances representing not less than one per cent of GDP between 1980 and 2009 (Figure 
A3.4). Additionally, on the average, the amount of international migrant remittances received by 
each of the sampled SSA countries has been increasing over time, whether in absolute or 
relative terms (Table A3.3). 
 
Whereas Botswana, just like Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and Namibia, recorded a consistent 
decline in remittances per capita over the past three decades (Table A3.3), Nigeria defied the 
odds as the only country ranked among the bottom 10 recipients in the 1980s to occupy a 
position among the top 10 in the 2000s (Figure 3.5). By this feat, Nigeria has not only managed  
effectively  to escape from the bottom 10 in per capita terms, but to progress from the 19th in 
the 1980s to the first position since the 1990s as the largest recipient of actual volume of 
remittances received (Figure A3.5). The situation at the opposite end of the migrant remittance 
per capita ladder can be described as less competitive as six countries (Malawi, Tanzania, 
Madagascar, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana) never moved out of the bottom 10 category 
throughout the past three decades (see Figure 3.5).  
 
Regarding migrant remittances as a percentage of GDP, just as in terms of remittances per 
capita, Lesotho (54.52 per cent), Cape Verde (15.98 per cent) and Swaziland (6.93 per cent) 
maintained the top-three positions in the SSA for the period, 1980-2009, although Gambia 
                                                          
41
 Despite this encouraging trend, however, the overall average of remittance/GDP percentage for the 36 sample 
countries declined consistently between 1980 and 2009 due to the consistent fall in remittance/GDP ratios in some 
leading recipients notably Botswana, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, and Swaziland. This might be due to a higher rate of 
growth in GDP relative to migrant remittances as with the exception Burkina Faso, none of these countries recorded 
consistent decline in actual volume of remittances received during the period under review (see Table A3.3). 
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dislodged Swaziland from the third spot in the 2000s. Here again, seven countries (Malawi, 
Tanzania, Gabon, South Africa, Congo Republic, Madagascar, and Ghana) firmly remained 
within the bottom 10 remittance-recipients relative to GDP over the past three decades, 1980-
2009. However, Nigeria, which was ranked among the least 10 recipients, moved from the 33rd 
position with a remittances/GDP per cent of 0.03 in the 1980s to the 15th with a remarkable 
3.42 per cent in the 2000s (Figure A3.4). Other countries that made significant and consistent 
progress on the migrant remittance-GDP ladder are Guinea-Bissau which moved from 19th 
position with 0.77 per cent to 6th with 5.28 per cent, Kenya (17th, 0.91 per cent) to (9th, 4.58 per 
cent), Senegal (10th, 2.29 per cent) to (5th, 8.43 per cent), and Togo (14th, 1.30 per cent) to (4th, 
8.52 per cent) from the 1980s to the 2000s. In contrast, Botswana (6th, 4.05 per cent) to (26th, 
0.75 per cent); Burkina Faso (4th, 7.39 per cent) to (19th, 1.42 per cent); and Swaziland (3rd, 
10.82 per cent) to (12th, 3.61 per cent) experienced the most significant and consistent 
retrogression on the remittance-GDP ladder (Figure A3.5). 
 
As far as actual volume of migrant remittances received is concerned, based on 1980-2009 
average in millions of US dollars, Nigeria (1,758.48), Sudan (675.97), Kenya (418.95), Lesotho 
(341.67), Senegal (339.28), South Africa (269.19), Uganda (201.06), Mali (126.52), Mauritius 
(115.33), and Benin (103.05) are the largest recipients in SSA. At the opposite end of this same 
ladder, Malawi (0.84), São Tomé and Príncipe (0.92), Gabon (4.03), Seychelles (4.50), 
Mauritania (5.22), Congo Republic (6.09), Tanzania (6.54), Comoros (9.57), Madagascar 
(9.72), and Guinea-Bissau (10.18) each receiving an average migrant remittances of less than 
US$100 million per annum, are the least recipients between 1980 and 2009. Thus, in actual 
volume, Nigeria is the largest migrant remittance recipient in the sub-region with South Africa 
being the 6th largest recipient, yet Nigeria is ranked 14th(17th) and South Africa as 21st(33rd) in 
relative terms of population and GDP respectively. Equivalently, although Gambia, Comoros 
and Seychelles are ranked 23rd, 29th and 33rd largest recipients of remittances in absolute 
terms, these countries are ranked 10th, 9th and 5th respectively in per capita terms with Gambia 
and Comoros occupying the 4th and 8th positions on the remittance-GDP ladder. This implies 
that large and populous countries such as Nigeria and South Africa are likely to receive more 
migrant remittances in absolute terms whilst smaller and less populous countries like Comoros 
and Seychelles are more likely to be counted among the high remittance-recipients in relative 
terms. Notwithstanding this observation, there are reasons to believe that there may be certain 
conditions, policies and strategies that might be essential to attracting migrant remittances, as 
some geographically small countries with relatively low population size are among the largest 
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remittance recipients in absolute terms. These countries include Lesotho (4th), Senegal (5th), 
Mauritius (9th), Benin (10th), Cape Verde (13th), Swaziland (14th) and Togo (15th). In contrast, 
some geographically large countries such as Mauritania (32nd), Tanzania (30th) and 
Madagascar (28th), with relatively large population size, attracted relatively low migrant 
remittances over the past 30 years (Figure A3.5). 
 
For the 36 sampled SSA countries, migrant remittances received in absolute terms increased 
steadily over the past three decades. From a low of US$40.24 million in the 1980s, migrant 
remittances increased by over 100 per cent to US$87.36 million and by more than 350 per cent 
to reach US$307.23 million in the 1990s and 2000s respectively (Table A3.3). Consistent with 
this increasing trend, the 36 sampled SSA countries, migrant remittances per capita also 
witnessed a steady rise since the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1989, the average migrant 
remittances received by these sampled countries were US$17.92 per annum. This figure 
increased to US$24.58 in the 1990s and to a further US$32.89 in the 2000s. This increasing 
trend might be due to the fact that the growth in migrant remittances received was faster than 
the population growth rate of the sub-region during the period under review. Another possible 
reason attributable to this consistent positive growth trend in officially reported remittances 
received in SSA is the pursuit of increasing financial liberalisation policies by the sampled SSA 
countries over the past three decades.  
 
Another important point worth noting is the fact that leading migrant remittance-recipient 
countries (in actual volumes) such as Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda, are 
also countries with relatively very high GDP, an explanation for the reason why none of these 
countries is listed among the top 10 migrant remittance-recipient countries when measured as 
a percentage of GDP (see Figure A3.4). For example, out of the US$156,536.76 million migrant 
remittances received by the 36 sampled SSA countries between 1980 and 2009, Nigeria, the 
highest recipient with a total of US$52,754.25 million controlled more than one-third, specifically 
33.70 per cent whilst the second-highest recipient, Sudan, received US$20,279.10 million in 
total (accounting for 12.95 per cent). Thus, Sudan, together with Nigeria, received nearly half, 
specifically 46.66 per cent of the total amount received by the sampled 36 SSA countries. 
Kenya, the third-highest recipient, received a total of US$12,568.59 million, representing 8.03 
per cent of the entire 36 sampled countries; hence, together with Nigeria and Sudan, these 
three countries alone received more than 50 per cent, specifically, 54.68 per cent of the total 
amount received by the group of 36 sampled countries. Therefore, as these three countries are 
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not ranked among the top 10 migrant remittance-GDP recipients in the sub-region, given the 
relatively large size of the respective economies, the sample average of the remittance-GDP 
was depressingly affected as manifested in Figure A3.4. 
 
3.4 THE STYLISED FACTS OF MIGRANT REMITTANCE FLOWS TO SSA 
Based on the evidence from the above expositions, the under-listed are presented as 
constituting the stylised facts of international migrant remittance flows to SSA: 
 
i. There has been a fairly strong positive trend in international migrant remittance inflows 
in SSA since the implementation of financial liberalisation in the 1980s. 
 
ii. SSA is the least recipient of migrant remittances when measured in terms of absolute 
values and relative to population size and international migration stock. 
 
iii. In terms of remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP, SSA is the third highest 
recipient after SAS and MNA in recent years. Although in absolute volumes and in 
terms of population size and international migrant stock, SSA has consistently been the 
least recipient of migrant remittances, yet the sub-region emerged as the third highest 
recipient of remittances as a percentage of GDP, this goes to show that in relative 
terms, SSA has been recording a lower rate of GDP growth than the rate of growth in 
migrant remittance inflows, in contrast to what pertains in other developing economies. 
 
iv. The correlation between migrant remittance inflows per capita and (migrant) remittances 
per migrant in SSA is positive and more than 99 per cent. Accordingly, remittances per 
capita can be an excellent proxy for remittances per migrant in SSA when the 
underlying evolution of each of these measures is taken into account. 
 
v. SSA is the only sub-region in the world today that receives more ODA than migrant 
remittances. 
 
vi. As revealed by the changing trend in remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP in 
Figure A3.1, SSA is the sub-region with the most sluggish but resilient growth rate in 
remittance inflows. 
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vii. Of all external capital flows to SSA, migrant remittances are the least volatile as is the 
case in all other developing economies (see Figure A3.1).  
 
viii. Officially reported migrant remittances to SSA, in both absolute and relative terms, 
stagnated throughout the pre-reforms era but with the inception of the reforms and, 
especially, during the post-reforms era, migrant remittance inflows to SSA have been 
growing at a faster rate. 
 
ix. On the average, richer SSA countries (when measured in terms of real per capita GDP) 
are the recipients of higher official migrant remittances per capita. However, the 
correlation between remittances and GDP per capita varies between the top 10 
remittance-recipients (negative but approximately zero) and the bottom 10 remittance-
recipients (positive). 
 
x. In SSA, countries that lead in attracting higher migrant remittances (when measured in 
relative terms) also lead in attracting higher FDI as a ratio of GDP; and these are 
countries with a higher real GDP per capita, investment/GDP ratio and a lower rate of 
inflation. This again points to the fact that macroeconomic performance and migrant 
remittance inflows are positively related within the sub-region. 
 
xi. Fiscal policy effectiveness seems to be crucial to attracting migrant remittance inflows 
as tax revenue/GDP ratio positively correlates with migrant remittances received with 
stronger correlation for the top 10 remittance recipients, which also have a higher tax 
revenue/GDP ratio. 
 
xii. On the average, higher official migrant remittances are received in SSA countries with 
relatively more developed bank-based financial market indicators compared to other 
countries within the sub-region with relatively underdeveloped financial markets (Table 
3.5). At this point, however, it may not be absolutely correct to conclude that financial 
development directly impacts on official remittance inflows and vice versa since, in the 
compilation of the remittance data, non-bank remittance service providers particularly 
MTOs, which are the main agents in most SSA countries and other developing 
countries, are recognised as formal money transfer service providers. 
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3.5 REMITTANCES AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY IMPERATIVES IN SSA 
There is the need for economic policy re-orientation directed at attracting higher remittances 
from abroad rather than over-relying on other volatile and unpredictable external capital 
especially ODA, the inflows of which are largely exogenous to domestic economic policy design 
in recipient economies. Without doubt, the under-listed policy initiatives could be relevant to 
attracting international migrant remittances to SSA: 
 
i. Remittances received in excess of present consumption could be used for investment 
purposes rather than spent on imported consumer goods. This will result in accelerated 
economic growth since investment is an injection whereas imports are leakages. 
 
ii. Governments of SSA countries could establish special international relations with 
foreign industrialised countries recognised as the main destinations of their migrants, so 
that through an agreed framework (similar to what pertains under double taxation 
agreements  among nations), migrants could remit home without paying transfer fees 
and any other charges more than once. For instance, it should be possible for a migrant 
working abroad to remit home regularly towards the payment of his/her social security 
and pension funds without paying fees for this purpose. 
 
iii. Implementation of macroeconomic policies aimed at stabilising the domestic prices and 
currency in SSA to motivate migrants to remit home more regularly. With stabilised 
domestic price and currency in SSA countries, it becomes easier for migrants to plan, 
predict and regularise the amount of money to remit home. 
 
iv. Financial institutions could develop innovative financial products and incentive 
packages aimed at enticing migrants abroad to remit home using approved routes more 
regularly and conveniently at reduced cost. This can only be done sustainably when the 
domestic financial market is open to competition and integrated at the domestic and the 
international levels. 
 
v. Domestic banks could either directly go off-shore and open more branches in major 
migrant „host‟ countries or collaborate with foreign banks in these migrant „host‟ 
countries so as to strategically increase banking convenience and access, thereby 
motivating SSA migrants to remit home more regularly and at reduced costs using 
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official channels. 
 
vi. A stable macroeconomic environment with some consistency in positive real growth is a 
signal of good economic fortunes in the future. Migrants who were compelled to seek 
greener pastures abroad because they lost hope in the domestic economy are likely to 
reconsider returning home in the future if there are better economic prospects. Such 
migrants are less likely to spend significant proportions of their earnings in their host 
countries, but rather remit more funds to their native countries towards investment 
projects such as financing entrepreneurial ventures. Under this circumstance, improved 
macroeconomic management could serve as a catalyst for receiving higher remittances 
through official routes. 
 
vii. It is crucial for SSA to develop the appropriate policy framework for attracting 
remittances through the formal transfer channels since continuous and colossal inflows 
of foreign currencies through unapproved routes, which represent additional currencies 
outside the banking system, could endanger currency stability and pose challenges for 
effective macroeconomic management in the long run. This could have adverse effects 
on economic growth and development prospects of the sub-region in the long run. 
 
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, it is found that, generally, not much has been achieved by 
the sub-region in terms of real per capita income growth, investment and resource mobilisation, 
although some marginal gains have been made in recent years. Indeed, except in terms of 
financial market development and international trade, there is no strong evidence that the 
macroeconomic conditions of SSA have improved since the implementation of economic reform 
policies in the 1980s. Thus, by and large, the unfavourable structural features of SSA which 
existed at the time of independence are still prevalent today and there is no basis for any 
strong argument that the standard of living today in SSA is an improvement on what prevailed 
at the time of political independence in the 1960s. 
 
Overall, FDI has remained the highest external capital inflows in developing economies, but 
faces a strong challenge from migrant remittances which have been growing more consistently 
in all developing economies. In other developing economies where FDI is not the leading 
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source of external capital inflow, migrant remittances have overtaken FDI in recent years. 
However, in SSA alone, the leading capital inflow has been ODA with remittances being the 
smallest in relative per capita and per migrant terms as well as in absolute volume. The 
relatively high performance of SSA by emerging as the third-highest recipient of migrant 
remittances in the world, when measured as a percentage to GDP, can be described as ironical 
and misleading. This might be due to the fact that SSA, as a sub-region, has witnessed a 
relatively slower rate of GDP growth than other developing economies like LAC and SAS during 
the period under consideration. Portfolio equity flows have remained the least form of capital 
inflows to developing economies as a whole. Across developing economies, portfolio equity, 
FDI and ODA inflows are highly volatile but, whereas FDI exhibits an upward trend, ODA and 
portfolio equity have been exhibiting a negative or a stagnated trend in recent years. This 
makes migrant remittances the least volatile form of external capital in SSA in particular and in 
other developing economies as a whole. 
 
It has been observed that migrant remittances received by SSA as a sub-region have been 
rising in both relative and absolute terms, but SSA still remains the least recipient of migrant 
remittances with the lowest rate of growth. Besides, the dependency of the sub-region on 
migrant remittances received is still very low with only five countries (Lesotho, Cape Verde, 
Swaziland and Gambia) receiving more than five per cent of GDP. About 50 per cent of SSA 
countries (17 out of the 36 sampled) received less than one per cent of GDP in migrant 
remittances between 1980 and 2009 with a general improvement from 21 countries in the1980s 
to 14 countries in the 2000s. It is also quite encouraging to observe that the number of SSA 
countries receiving at least five per cent migrant remittances relative to GDP increased from 
four in the 1980s and five in the 1990s to seven in the 2000s. Even though the growth trend in 
migrant remittances per capita in SSA has been positive throughout the past 30 years, no SSA 
country earns up to US$1 a day. This is evident from the fact that even the highest migrant 
remittance per capita recipients, Lesotho (US$219.19 in the 1980s and US$222.00 in the 
1990s), and Cape Verde (US$249.88 in the 2000s), received less than US$365.25 per annum, 
an equivalent of US$1 per day.  
 
Perhaps, the most fascinating conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that, five 
countries, viz. Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, and Mauritius, which are classified by the 
IMF as having emerging or frontier financial markets, have „coincidentally‟ dominated the list  of 
the top 10 migrant remittance recipients (in actual amounts through official channels) in recent 
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years. Even relative to population and GDP, the 13 SSA countries with emerging and frontier 
financial markets still dominate as the leading recipients of official remittance. For instance, six 
and five of these 13 SSA countries are listed among the top 10 recipients of remittances as a 
ratio of population and GDP respectively. Virtually, all the countries ranked as least remittances 
recipients are those with highly underdeveloped financial markets. The role of the financial 
sector in attracting migrant remittances into the sub-region could be explored from various 
facets such as analysing the sub-region as a bloc or a comparative analyses between various 
cohorts in relation to financial market environment, together with other unique homogenous 
macroeconomic policy environment, which have been varying over time since the adoption of 
financial liberalisation programme in the 1980s. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A3.1: HIPC Status and Date of Political Independence of SSA Countries* 
Country Date of Independence Country Date of Independence 
Angola November 11, 1975 Madagascar
+
 June 26, 1960 
Benin
+
 August 1, 1960 Malawi
+
 July 6, 1964 
Botswana September 30, 1966 Mali
+
 June 20, 1960 
Burkina Faso
+
 August 5, 1960 Mauritania
+
 November 28, 1960 
Burundi
+
 July 1, 1962 Mauritius March 12, 1968 
Cameroon
+
 January 1, 1960 Mayotte Territorial collectivity of France 
Cape Verde July 5, 1975 Mozambique
+
 June 25, 1975 
Central African Republic
+
 August 13, 1960 Namibia March 12, 1990 
Chad
+
 August 11, 1960 Niger
+
 August 3, 1960 
Comoros
+
 July 6, 1975 Nigeria October 1, 1960 
Congo, DR
+
 June 30, 1960 Rwanda
+
 July 1, 1962 
Congo, Republic
+
 August 15, 1960 São Tomé & Príncipe
+
 July 12, 1975 
Côte d'Ivoire
+
 August 7, 1960 Senegal
+
 April 4, 1960 
Equatorial Guinea October 12, 1968 Seychelles June 29, 1976 
Eritrea
+
 May 24, 1993 Sierra Leone
+
 April 27, 1961 
Ethiopia
+
 4th Century, BC Somalia
+
 July 1, 1960 
Gabon August 17, 1960 South Africa May 31, 1961 
Gambia, The
+
 February 18, 1965 Sudan
+
 January 1, 1956 
Ghana
+
 March 6, 1957 Swaziland September 6, 1968 
Guinea
+
 October 2, 1958 Tanzania
+
 December 9, 1961 
Guinea-Bissau
+
 September 24, 1973 Togo
+
 April 27, 1960 
Kenya December 12, 1963 Uganda
+
 October 9, 1962 
Lesotho October 4, 1966 Zambia
+
 October 24, 1964 
Liberia
+
 July 26, 1847 Zimbabwe April 18, 1980 
Source: http:en.wikipidia.org/wiki/Decolonization_of_Africa. (Date posted/accessed: unknown/June 28, 2010). 
+ 
HIPC countries (33 out of 48 countries as at June 30, 2010). See http://go.worldbank.org/4IMVXTQ090.  
*Republic of South Sudan which was not part of the population from which the sampled was selected attained its 
political autonomy and independence on July 09, 2011. 
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Table A3.2: Summary of Major Economic Policies Pursued in SSA since Post-Independence, 1960-2009 
I: Inward-Looking Socialist Economic Policy (l960-1979) 
Compelling Issues Key Policy Objectives Key Policy Instruments Number/ List of Countries Main Policy Outcome 
 Policy inherited from 
colonial masters 
 Underdeveloped private 
sector 
 Lack of adequate private 
capital and absence of 
entrepreneurial class 
 Openness and 
excessive dependence 
on imports and external 
factor inputs 
 Excessive dependency 
on exports of primary 
products with limited 
capacity for export 
expansion 
 Provide critical social 
infrastructure 
 Provide basic essential 
needs of life and simple 
farm inputs through 
subsidies 
 Promote import 
substitution 
industrialisation 
 Create jobs especially 
within the public sector 
 Provide finance for key 
sectors of the economy 
 Government spending 
(infrastructural-based 
expansionary fiscal) 
 Exchange rate (pegging / 
fixed regime) 
 Money supply  
 Credit control 
 All independent states 
of the sub-region as at 
1979 
 Excessive protection of State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) which resulted in losses arising from 
production and managerial inefficiencies. 
 Excessive government spending resulting in high 
inflation and depletion of international reserves 
 Fixed exchange rate regime led to currency 
overvaluation and lack of international 
competitiveness in exports of primary products 
 High and unsustainable external debts, and hence 
absence of internal and external financial balances 
 High financial repression with low access of private 
sector to credit 
II: Economic Recovery Programme / Structural Adjustment Programme (ERP/SAP) (1980-1989) 
Compelling Issues Key Policy Objectives Key Policy Instruments Number/ List of Countries Main Policy Outcome 
 Huge and unsustainable 
deficits in current 
accounts of BoP 
 Imbalances between 
government revenue 
and expenditure 
resulting in huge deficits 
being financed through 
printing of money 
 Financial repression 
 Reduce the size of public 
sector and improve upon 
its management 
 Eliminate price distortions 
 Promote economic 
liberalisation with 
emphasis on trade and the 
financial sector 
 Promote deregulation and 
price mechanism to 
minimise the role of the 
state in resource allocation 
 Promote domestic savings 
and investment in the 
public and private sectors 
 Increase tax revenue by 
broadening the tax base 
 Increase the efficiency of 
 Money supply and public 
sector credit controls 
 Fiscal discipline to reduce 
government spending and 
deficit finance 
 Privatisation of SOEs 
 Exchange rate reforms 
and liberalisation 
 Interest rate reforms and 
liberalisation 
 Deregulation of credit 
control 
 Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Central African 
Rep, Comoros, Congo 
Republic, Congo DR, 
Côte d‟Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Togo, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
 Some temporary improvements in macroeconomic 
stability were achieved but these were inadequate 
and below the desired levels 
 External sector dependency still prominent and many 
countries had limited capacity to expand exports, 
decreases in investment rate, and wider budget and 
BoP deficits 
 Social issues ignored as governments reduced 
spending on provision of social services especially 
public healthcare, education, size of public sector and 
parastatals with adverse consequences for 
improvements in poverty, starvation, unemployment, 
and malnutrition had not witnessed marked 
improvements, and even worsened in some countries 
like Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
74 
 
the financial system 
III: African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)
42
, 1989-99 
Compelling Issues Key Policy Objectives Key Policy Instruments Number/ List of 
Countries 
Main Policy Outcome 
 Absence of holistic 
macroeconomic 
framework and policy 
measures and 
directions that takes 
into account the 
dynamic 
interrelationships 
existing among the key 
elements of the 
adjustment with 
transformation process. 
Thus, to address the 
missing dichotomy 
between structural 
adjustment and 
sustainable 
development. 
 Other adjustment 
programmes ignored or 
marginalised the 
people. 
 No justification for 
orthodox SAP as 
privatisation failed in 
most countries mainly 
due to inefficiency, and 
absence of robust 
private sector.  
 Improve human resource 
capacity through higher 
incomes, motivation and 
empowerment as well as 
equitable distribution of 
income 
 Adjust the pattern of public 
expenditure to satisfy the 
essential needs of citizens 
 Strengthen scientific and 
technological base to 
enhance production and 
diversification 
 Provide institutional support 
for adjustment with 
transformation towards less 
import dependency and 
improved debt servicing 
and management 
 Establish a pragmatic 
balance between public 
and private sectors of the 
economy 
 
 Multiple exchange rates 
system in a rationalised 
manner and/or creating and 
streamlining such a system for 
the purposes of resource 
transfers, resource 
mobilisation and reversal of 
capital flight and ensuring 
availability of essential imports 
 Land reforms for better access 
and entitlement to land for 
productive use 
 Greater mass participation in 
governance (decision-making 
and implementation of 
government programmes) 
 Trade reforms with differential 
export subsidies and 
encouragement of barter trade 
to boost sub-regional trade 
 Allocation of increasing share 
of foreign exchange for 
imports of vital inputs for 
agriculture and manufacturing 
 Bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements on primary 
commodities 
 Supervised food production 
credit systems in rural areas 
 All SSA countries 
except those like 
South Africa which 
were under sanctions / 
interdictions from 
global community 
including the UN and 
OAU as at that time 
 Under democratic governance, some gains were made 
in reducing expenditure on military and defence in 
favour of providing essential services to the citizens, 
but these were still inadequate. 
 Governments continued to privatise key state 
enterprises and seek foreign partnership in managing 
strategic SOEs due to lack of finance 
 With high external debts accumulated and increasing 
social demand, governments did not succeed in 
integrating the marginalised into adjustment 
programmes 
 Private sector contributed positively to exports of non-
traditional commodities, but these enterprises lacked 
adequate resources to meet high foreign demand. 
                                                          
42
 This is not a universal economic model, but a special framework applicable with selective emphasis according to the peculiar characteristics of the country in question and the 
circumstances under which the country finds itself, as AAF-SAP is meant to be used for designing specific country programmes, selecting appropriate policy instruments and 
measures as well as adopting the relevant implementation strategy. Also, as a human-centred framework, AAF-SAP is based on the assumption of full democratisation of all aspects 
of economic and social activities and in all stages from decision making to implementation. This framework again requires intensified international co-operation in the formulation, 
implementation and monitoring of national programmes for adjustments with transformation. 
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 A danger of foreign 
capital dominance over 
domestic ownership 
under privatisation 
where collaterals are scarce 
 Support for cottage industries 
with emphasis on indigenous 
technology 
VI: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative
43
 / Millennium Development Programme (1999/2000 - 2015) 
Compelling Issues Key Policy Objectives Key Policy Instruments Number/ List of 
Participating Countries 
Main Policy Outcome 
 Debt burden of LDCs 
became unsustainable 
 External debt servicing 
prevents poor countries 
from addressing critical 
social issues such as 
poverty. 
 Economic constraints 
forcing poor / SAP 
countries to reduce 
conservation allocation, 
and use up natural 
resources leading to 
environmental 
degradation, especially 
in the form of 
deforestation and soil 
overuse 
 Debt-trapped SSA 
forced to cut back on 
imports and increase 
exports, but LDCs 
suffer low export prices 
whilst industrialised 
economies suffer fewer 
market distortions. 
 Bail countries out of 
unsustainable debt and 
focus on building policy and 
institutional foundation for 
sustainable development 
and poverty reduction 
 Greater emphasis on more 
effective social policies like 
investing in human capital 
(education and health) for 
long term growth 
 Increased emphasis on 
ownership, transparency 
and broad-based 
participation 
 Since 2001, achieve MDGs 
by the year 2015 
 Fiscal policy (prudent 
development-driven spending) 
 Public sector reforms towards 
higher transparency and 
accountability by public office 
holders 
 Democratic governance and 
collective participation in 
decision-making as well as 
policy implementation of 
issues that directly affect the 
ordinary man 
 Strategic trade and 
international relations 
 Adopting non-debt and anti-
inflationary approach to 
financing development 
programmes 
 33 countries as of 
June 30, 2010 (see 
Table A2.1 above) but 
all SSA countries have 
consented to work 
towards achieving the 
MDGs 
 Increasing investment in essential social infrastructure 
like schools and healthcare centres 
 External debts reduced temporarily as some countries 
have started accumulating debts after reaching the 
HIPC decision point. 
 Improvements in access to essential social services. 
For example, many HIPC countries have now 
introduced a free immunisation programme for 
children, abolished user fees for primary education, 
and cash-and-carry healthcare delivery system. 
 Improved consultation process in designing Poverty 
Reduction Strategies has helped to increase the 
potential of the poor to influence national resource 
allocation 
 Many of the early beneficiaries of debt relief and 
enhanced aid have consistently sustained annual 
growth rates over 5 per cent. 
 There are fears that majority of SSA countries will miss 
MDGs by 2015 (see Carceles et al., 2001; Bruns et al., 
2003; UNDP, 2003; White and Black, 2004; Fay et al., 
2005). 
Source: Author‟s compilation based on various sources 
                                                          
43
 A country is defined as HIPC if its net present value of debt is above 150 per cent of exports or above 250 per cent of total government revenue. 
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Table A3.3: Remittances Received by Sampled SSA Countries, 1980-2009 (period averages) 
 
Source: Author‟s computation base on MRF-2011, BoPS, WDI and GDF (April 2011) and estimates from country-
specific desks of IMF and WB. Note: Due to lack of consistent data, only the 36 sampled countries are listed. 
 
 
 
 
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009
Benin 57.57   97.83    153.74     103.05       14.12    17.80     19.10    17.00       4.32       5.06       3.45       4.27          
Botswana 54.11   64.19    76.43       64.91         48.35    43.12     41.12    44.20       4.05       1.47       0.75       2.09          
Burkina Faso 145.07 94.82    68.17       102.69       18.90    9.71        4.96       11.19       7.39       3.72       1.42       4.18          
Cameroon 21.36   20.21    94.89       45.48         2.09      1.45        5.21       2.92          0.25       0.19       0.54       0.33          
Cape_Verde 31.39   79.49    118.82     76.57         98.95    201.87   249.28  183.36     17.17     18.02     12.67     15.96       
Comoros 4.02      12.75    11.93       9.57            10.25    26.57     20.10    18.97       2.58       5.54       3.62       3.92          
Congo, Rep 1.96      4.43      11.89       6.09            0.95      1.59        3.51       2.01          0.09       0.19       0.23       0.17          
Côte d'Ivoire 32.48   101.80  155.52     96.60         3.17      6.71        8.08       5.99          0.38       0.91       0.99       0.76          
Ethiopia 10.95   18.66    163.65     64.42         0.27      0.33        2.11       0.90          0.12       0.22       1.00       0.45          
Gabon 0.16      3.77      8.16         4.03            0.21      3.44        5.94       3.19          0.00       0.08       0.10       0.06          
Gambia 8.60      13.10    48.29       23.33         11.18    12.58     31.00    18.25       3.75       3.58       9.24       5.52          
Ghana 2.65      17.62    83.17       34.48         0.20      1.00        3.76       1.65          0.06       0.26       0.68       0.33          
Guinea 4.94      6.04      66.67       25.89         0.85      0.90        7.10       2.95          0.21       0.20       1.92       0.77          
Guinea Bissau 1.17      2.25      27.11       10.18         1.27      1.90        18.10    7.09          0.77       0.96       5.27       2.33          
Kenya 63.89   235.16  957.81     418.95       3.29      8.43        26.20    12.64       0.91       2.27       4.58       2.59          
Lesotho 317.12 378.83  329.06     341.67       219.18  222.00   164.94  202.04     81.55     53.29     28.73     54.52       
Madagascar 3.53      12.29    13.35       9.72            0.35      0.95        0.78       0.69          0.13       0.38       0.26       0.25          
Malawi 0.92      0.69      0.92         0.84            0.13      0.07        0.07       0.09          0.07       0.04       0.03       0.05          
Mali 58.82   103.06  217.69     126.52       7.47      10.96     17.99    12.14       3.61       4.20       3.84       3.88          
Mauritania 3.72      9.95      1.99         5.22            2.13      4.69        0.68       2.50          0.44       0.76       0.12       0.44          
Mauritius 15.67   119.50  210.82     115.33       15.31    105.78   170.62  97.24       1.03       3.12       3.47       2.54          
Mozambique 60.53   56.64    72.11       63.09         4.65      3.68        3.44       3.92          1.99       2.15       1.12       1.76          
Namibia 10.91   13.63    13.24       12.59         9.28      8.59        6.59       8.16          0.59       0.45       0.22       0.42          
Niger 11.19   13.08    54.72       26.33         1.64      1.43        4.03       2.36          0.56       0.65       1.52       0.91          
Nigeria 11.10   799.10  4,465.23 1,758.48    0.14      6.98        30.56    12.56       0.03       2.59       3.42       2.01          
Rwanda 4.00      7.62      29.48       13.70         0.66      1.29        3.11       1.69          0.24       0.57       0.88       0.56          
São Tomé & Prínicipe 0.74      0.53      1.48         0.92            7.42      4.11        9.62       7.05          0.82       0.42       1.18       0.81          
Senegal 86.08   154.46  777.32     339.28       13.20    18.13     67.17    32.83       2.29       2.99       8.43       4.57          
Seychelles 3.17      2.79      7.54         4.50            46.98    39.13     89.09    58.40       1.63       0.69       0.90       1.07          
Sierra Leone 0.07      9.81      22.04       10.64         0.02      2.43        4.28       2.24          0.01       1.25       1.68       0.98          
South Africa 63.05   160.79  583.74     269.19       2.06      4.06        12.31    6.15          0.07       0.12       0.27       0.15          
Sudan 248.46 275.24  1,504.21 675.97       10.63    8.57        38.15    19.12       2.26       2.52       5.22       3.33          
Swaziland 60.42   88.23    78.01       75.55         83.36    92.95     68.93    81.75       10.82     6.36       3.61       6.93          
Tanzania 0.38      4.33      14.90       6.54            0.02      0.14        0.38       0.18          0.01       0.06       0.11       0.06          
Togo 13.76   21.12    188.66     74.51         4.04      4.80        30.81    13.22       1.30       1.44       8.52       3.76          
Uganda 34.57   140.99  427.62     201.06       2.21      6.68        14.77    7.89          0.88       2.94       4.62       2.81          
Sample Average 40.24   87.36    307.23     144.94       17.92    24.58     32.89    25.13       4.23       3.60       3.46       3.77          
Migrant Remittances Received (US$'m) Migrant Remittances per capita (US$) Migrant Remittances as % of GDP
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Box A3.1: The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
Preamble: MDGs are eight international development goals commonly accepted as a framework for measuring the 
pace of socioeconomic development progress by the World Bank, UN, IMF and other credible international 
organisations since its unanimous adoption in September 2000. These goals, with 21 targets and a series of 
measurable indicators for each target, are to be achieved by 2015. 
 
MDG 1:Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger 
Target 1A: Halve the proportion of people living on less than US$1 a day 
Target 1B: Achieve decent employment for women, men, and young people 
Target 1C: Halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger 
 
MDG 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education 
Target 2A: By 2015, all children can complete a full course of primary schooling, girls and boys 
 
MDG 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women 
Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferrably by 2005, and at all levels by 
2015 
 
MDG 4: Reduce Child Mortality Rate 
Target 4A: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate 
 
MDG 5: Improve Maternal Health 
Target 5A: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio 
Target 5B: Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health 
 
MDG 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases 
Target 6A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
Target 6B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 
Target 6C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases 
 
MDG 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability 
Target 7A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of 
environmental resources 
Target 7B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss 
Target 7C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation 
Target 7D: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers 
 
MDG 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development 
Target 8A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system 
Target 8B: Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Target 8C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states 
Target 8D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international 
measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term 
Target 8E: In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in 
developing countries 
Target 8F: In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially 
information and communications 
Source: UN MDGs website, retrieved 30 June, 2010. 
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Figure A3.1: Trends in External Capital Flows to Developing Economies, 1970-2009 
 
Source: Author based on BoPS as reported by the World Bank in WDI and GDF (April 2011) 
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Figure A3.2:  
Migrant Remittance Flows to Developing Economies, 1970-2009 (actual, per capita & % of GDP)
 
Source: Author‟s estimations based on data WDI and GDF (April 2011) 
 
 
 
Year EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA
1970 -       -        0.18      1.66       0.17      0.08        
1975 0.02     3.87      0.63      6.63       0.55      1.08        
1980 1.19     5.80      5.38      35.94    5.84      3.61        
1985 1.40     4.57      6.60      31.25    5.73      2.63        
1990 1.93     8.27      13.07   50.10    4.94      3.65        
1995 5.21     16.28   28.06   52.20    8.04      5.42        
2000 8.75     25.91   39.39   46.57    12.63    6.90        
2001 11.51  25.77   47.06   53.62    13.83    6.75        
2002 14.68  26.81   53.49   54.72    17.12    7.15        
2003 17.39  29.01   68.95   68.96    21.19    8.23        
2004 21.38  40.00   80.27   76.80    19.71    10.80     
2005 26.66  58.12   91.72   81.41    22.95    12.37     
2006 30.21  70.86   107.02 84.34    28.34    16.24     
2007 37.10  97.94   113.04 100.65  35.49    23.24     
2008 44.29  113.75 114.18 110.55  46.34    26.07     
2009 43.71  87.63   99.40   101.32  47.74    24.80     
Year EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS SSA
1970 -       -        0.03      0.75       0.14      0.03        
1975 0.01     -        0.05      1.05       0.32      0.26        
1980 0.43     -        0.26      3.01       2.25      0.51        
1985 0.39     -        0.37      2.16       1.99      0.52        
1990 0.46     0.34      0.52      4.29       1.39      0.62        
1995 0.68     0.85      0.76      4.21       2.12      0.97        
2000 0.92     1.48      0.99      3.03       2.85      1.36        
2001 1.15     1.47      1.24      3.53       3.08      1.39        
2002 1.33     1.34      1.61      3.75       3.68      1.39        
2003 1.41     1.15      1.95      4.32       3.96      1.34        
2004 1.51     1.20      1.99      4.25       3.15      1.45        
2005 1.64     1.38      1.89      3.98       3.24      1.46        
2006 1.55     1.37      1.90      3.58       3.59      1.70        
2007 1.52     1.47      1.72      3.57       3.60      2.17        
2008 1.45     1.39      1.51      3.21       4.69      2.18        
2009 1.34     1.37      1.43      3.16       4.61      2.25        
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Figure A3.3: Remittances per capita vs per Migrant in Developing Economies, 1970-2009 
 
Source: Author based on WDI and GDF (April 2011). Note: 5-year data ranging 1970, 1975,….2005 was used as 
data on total international migration stock was not reported on annual basis by the World Bank in its WDI. MRPC 
represents migrant remittances per capita whilst MRPM denotes (migrant) remittances per migrant. 
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Figure A3.4: 
Migrant Remittance-Recipient Countries in SSA (average, based on % of GDP), 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation from MRF-2011, BoPS, WDI, and GDF (April 2011) and estimates from country-specific 
desks of IMF and World Bank. Note: Only the 36 sampled countries are included due to data constraint. 
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Figure A3.5: 
Migrant Remittances Received in SSA Countries (period average in US$‟m), 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation from MRF-2011, BoPS, WDI, and GDF (April 2010) and estimates from country-specific 
desks of IMF and World Bank. Note: Only the 36 sampled countries are included due to data constraint.  
317.12 
248.46 
145.07 
86.08 
63.89 
63.05 
60.53 
60.42 
58.82 
57.57 
54.11 
34.57 
32.48 
31.39 
21.36 
15.67 
13.76 
11.19 
11.10 
10.95 
10.91 
8.60 
4.94 
4.02 
4.00 
3.72 
3.53 
3.17 
2.65 
1.96 
1.17 
0.92 
0.74 
0.38 
0.16 
0.07 
- 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 
Lesotho
Sudan
Burkina Faso
Senegal
Kenya
South Africa
Mozambique
Swaziland
Mali
Benin
Botswana
Uganda
Côte d'Ivoire
Cape Verde
Cameroon
Mauritius
Togo
Niger
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Namibia
Gambia
Guinea
Comoros
Rwanda
Mauritania
Madagascar
Seychelles
Ghana
Congo, Rep
Guinea …
Malawi
ST&P
Tanzania
Gabon
Sierra Leone
1980-1989
799.10 
378.83 
275.24 
235.16 
160.79 
154.46 
140.99 
119.50 
103.06 
101.80 
97.83 
94.82 
88.23 
79.49 
64.19 
56.64 
21.12 
20.21 
18.66 
17.62 
13.63 
13.10 
13.08 
12.75 
12.29 
9.95 
9.81 
7.62 
6.04 
4.43 
4.33 
3.77 
2.79 
2.25 
0.69 
0.53 
- 500.00 1,000.00 
Nigeria
Lesotho
Sudan
Kenya
South Africa
Senegal
Uganda
Mauritius
Mali
Côte d'Ivoire
Benin
Burkina Faso
Swaziland
Cape Verde
Botswana
Mozambique
Togo
Cameroon
Ethiopia
Ghana
Namibia
Gambia
Niger
Comoros
Madagascar
Mauritania
Sierra Leone
Rwanda
Guinea
Congo, Rep
Tanzania
Gabon
Seychelles
Guinea Bissau
Malawi
ST&P
1990-1999
4,465.23 
1,504.21 
957.81 
777.32 
583.74 
427.62 
329.06 
217.69 
210.82 
188.66 
163.65 
155.52 
153.74 
118.82 
94.89 
83.17 
78.01 
76.43 
72.11 
68.17 
66.67 
54.72 
48.29 
29.48 
27.11 
22.04 
14.90 
13.35 
13.24 
11.93 
11.89 
8.16 
7.54 
1.99 
1.48 
0.92 
- 2,000.00 4,000.00 6,000.00 
Nigeria
Sudan
Kenya
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda
Lesotho
Mali
Mauritius
Togo
Ethiopia
Côte d'Ivoire
Benin
Cape Verde
Cameroon
Ghana
Swaziland
Botswana
Mozambique
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Niger
Gambia
Rwanda
Guinea Bissau
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Madagascar
Namibia
Comoros
Congo, Rep
Gabon
Seychelles
Mauritania
ST&P
Malawi 2000-2009
1,758.48 
675.97 
418.95 
341.67 
339.28 
269.19 
201.06 
126.52 
115.33 
103.05 
102.69 
96.60 
76.57 
75.55 
74.51 
64.91 
64.42 
63.09 
45.48 
34.48 
26.33 
25.89 
23.33 
13.70 
12.59 
10.64 
10.18 
9.72 
9.57 
6.54 
6.09 
5.22 
4.50 
4.03 
0.92 
0.84 
- 500.00 1,000.00 1,500.00 2,000.00 
Nigeria
Sudan
Kenya
Lesotho
Senegal
South Africa
Uganda
Mali
Mauritius
Benin
Burkina Faso
Côte d'Ivoire
Cape Verde
Swaziland
Togo
Botswana
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Cameroon
Ghana
Niger
Guinea
Gambia
Rwanda
Namibia
Sierra Leone
Guinea Bissau
Madagascar
Comoros
Tanzania
Congo, Rep
Mauritania
Seychelles
Gabon
ST&P
Malawi 1980-2009
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA, 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims at identifying the core macroeconomic factors responsible for explaining the 
changing levels of international migrant remittances received by sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
countries since the implementation of financial liberalisation programme in the 1980s. A set of 
annual panel data on 36 SSA countries, covering 1980-2009, was used in a system 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM), following Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel 
data estimation technique. In order to provide a more detailed insight into the possible 
dynamics of the varying impact of macroeconomic variables that explain the inflow of 
remittances in SSA, decade-based (1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09), as well as an overall 
study period 1980-2009, estimations were carried out. Furthermore, efforts were made to 
explore the determinants of migrant remittances at the disaggregated level - workers‟ 
remittances and compensation of employees. This chapter proceeds with a background 
discussion to motivate the study and to outline its objectives. This is followed by selected 
stylised facts in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, a review of the theoretical and empirical literature is 
presented, whilst Section 4.4 presents the theoretical framework. Section 4.5 formulates the 
empirical model and the methodology adopted in analysing the data.  A presentation and 
discussion of the empirical results can be found in Section 4.6, whilst Section 4.7 concludes the 
chapter with policy implications. 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
Over the past two to three decades in particular, international migration from low-income 
countries to high-income countries has been rising steadily.  From a low 75 million international 
                                                          
 Papers based on this chapter were presented at African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) bi-annual 
conferences (May/June 2010; November/December 2010; May/June 2011) at Mombasa and Nairobi, Kenya. Also, 
at IMF Staff Seminar (March 2, 2011), Washington, DC, USA; and Economic Society of South Africa (ESSA) bi-
annual conference, September 5-7, 2011, Cape Town, South Africa. 
 A paper based on this chapter, entitled “Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa,” has 
been accepted for publication as a chapter in The Macroeconomics of Africa‟s Recent Growth edited by Shanta 
Devarajan and Ibi Ajayi. Also published from this chapter are: “The Changing Impact of Macroeconomic Environment 
on Remittance Inflows in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Academic Research in Economics (2011), 3(2): 136-167. 
“Macroeconomic Determinants of Workers‟ Remittances and Compensation of Employees in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 
Journal of Developing Areas, 48(1): 337-360. 
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migrant stock in 1965, the figure gradually rose to 120 million in 1990, and to more than 176 
million in the year 2000, before attaining a high of 191 million and 214 million44 in 2005 and 
2010 respectively (IOM, 2010; UN, 2010). There is no compelling reason to expect a reversal 
trend in international migration in this era of increasing globalisation and widening income-gap 
between low income migrant-home countries and high income migrant-host countries45. Indeed, 
in various Human Development Reports since 2005, the United Nations (UN) attributes this 
trend of migration, involving both skilled and unskilled labour from developing countries to the 
industrialised world, to low living standards and poor working conditions in developing 
countries. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Migration Policy Institute (2006) reports 
that more than 20 per cent of tertiary graduates from the sub-region compared to less than 10 
per cent of their counterparts from the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) were working in the 
industrialised countries as at the end of 2006. During this same period, Angola, Guinea-Bissau 
and Mozambique had at least 50 per cent of their tertiary graduates working in advanced 
countries. According to UN (2009), Europe, with 32.6 per cent of international migrant stock, 
leads as the main host of emigrants, followed by Asia (28.6 per cent), North America (23.4 per 
cent), Africa (9 per cent), Oceania (2.8 per cent) and Latin America (2.4 per cent). 
 
Although migrant-home countries may suffer from brain drain, these low-income countries have 
been benefiting directly and quite instantaneously from their citizens who migrate abroad 
through the receipt of remittances. This could be the most obvious reason why developing 
countries are the main destination of migrant remittances with the industrialised world 
maintaining their status as the main source of remittances46. Parallel to the recent upsurge of 
cross-border migration, international remittances received by developing countries have been 
rising rapidly and incessantly since the 1980s. The significant and consistent growth trend in 
remittance flows in recent years obviously has important implications for economic growth and 
development in the recipient countries. For instance, some macro-level studies have shown 
that official remittance inflows promote long-run growth (Faini, 2003; Ahortor and Adenutsi, 
2009; Adenutsi, 2011) and socioeconomic development (Özden and Schiff, 2005; Adenutsi, 
                                                          
44
 According to UN (2010), the stock of international migrants represents more than three per cent of the world‟s 
population in 2010. 128 million persons, being 60 per cent of international migrant stock, were residing in 
industrialised countries of which 74 million representing 57.8 per cent were nationals from developing countries. 
45
 High search frictions in the labour market due to low value addition in production (de-industrialisation) in the 
developing world are the most obvious explanations for the low wages and poor living standards in this part of the 
world. 
46
 Developing countries receive at least 75 per cent of reported migrant remittances. In 2009, developing countries 
alone received as much as US$ 316 billion out of the world‟s total of US$ 414 billion, representing 76.3 per cent 
even though the amount they received in 2009 fell by about six per cent of the amount they received in 2008 
(Author‟s computation based on World Bank‟s WDI, April 2011). 
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2010a, 2010b). Also, it has been proven that, in the long run, remittances foster price and 
currency stability or appreciation (Katseli and Glytsos, 1986; Adenutsi and Ahortor, 2008), and 
reduce poverty but do not necessarily improve income inequality (Adams and Page, 2005; 
Azam and Gubert, 2005; Adams, 2006; Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007; Nguyen, 2008). 
Remittances also create employment in recipient countries through increased investment and 
productivity (El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Ratha, 2003; IMF, 2005). In effect, in recent years, 
remittances have emerged as an important source of external development finance and a 
mitigating factor for economic imbalances and financial instability, particularly in 
underdeveloped countries, including those in SSA (Ratha, 2003; IMF, 2005; World Bank, 
2006a).  
 
Furthermore, in some developing countries such as India, Mexico, Philippines, and Lesotho, 
remittances have far exceeded other international capital flows in the form of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in recent years47. 
Accordingly, remittances have become a crucial source of foreign exchange in most developing 
countries. Consistent with the trend in international migration, official migrant remittances 
received by developing countries reached US$116 billion in 2003 representing more than 1.5 
per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP). In 2004, migrant remittances of US$126 billion 
became the second most important source of foreign exchange earnings to developing 
countries (World Bank, 2006a,b). This was the year in which FDI to developing countries stood 
at US$165 billion with gross ODA amounting to US$79 billion (World Bank, 2006a). Recorded 
migrant remittances received by developing countries rose to US$194.2 billion in 2005, 
reaching an all-time high of US$336 billion in 2008 before plummeting slightly to US$316 billion 
in 2009, in response to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 (World Bank, 2010). Yet, the 
relative importance of migrant remittances over other capital inflows in developing countries, 
with respect to the size, growth rate and stability, remains unchanged over the past four 
decades as the decline in 2009 is only the second after the first was recorded in 1985. 
 
Even though remittances received by developing countries have more than doubled during the 
last decade in terms of absolute volume, Africa experienced only a marginal rise. For instance, 
official migrant remittances to Africa amounted to US$9 billion (out of which SSA received 
$1.86 billion) in 1990; and by 2003, migrant remittance flows to Africa had reached US$14 
                                                          
47
 Migrant remittances are the second largest form of non-debt capital inflows in developing countries. In the Middle 
East and North Africa (MNA) just as in South Asia (SAS), migrant remittances are now the leading source of external 
capital (see Figure 3A.1 in Chapter Three). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
billion (out of which SSA received $5.96 billion)48. During this period, Egypt and Morocco were 
the largest recipients of remittances in Africa with Northern Africa as a sub-region receiving 
over 60 per cent of the total remittance flows to the continent. The rising trend in official migrant 
remittance flows to SSA continued, reaching US$10 billion in 2005; attaining an all-time high of 
US$21.6 billion in 2008 before dropping slightly to US$ 20.7 billion in 2009 following the global 
financial crisis which led to 2007-2009 economic recession that hit the industrialised world. 
Despite this positive growth trend SSA remains the least recipient of migrant remittances, 
receiving only five per cent of global remittances compared to East Asia and the Pacific (20.7 
per cent), South Asia (18 per cent), LAC (13.7 per cent), Europe and Central Asia (11.0 per 
cent) and MNA (7.7 per cent). In fact, as at the end of 2009, SSA as a sub-region received far 
less official remittances (US$20.74 billion) than any of the world‟s top-three migrant remittance-
recipient countries - India (US$49.26 billion), China (US$47.55 billion) and Mexico (US$22.16 
billion)49. It is acknowledged that the officially reported value of migrant remittances received by 
developing countries is far lower than the actual amount received which is estimated to be at 
least 50 per cent higher than the officially reported amount (World Bank, 2006a,b). Freund and 
Spatafora (2005) posit that SSA receives the highest informal remittances, representing 45-65 
per cent of what is officially reported, unlike 5-20 per cent in the case of Latin America. The 
adverse repercussions of the increasing flow of migrant remittances to SSA, and the 
developing world as a whole, through informal channels cannot be underestimated. These 
include money laundering, sponsorship of anti-government groups for self-centred interest, 
financing terrorist activities, creation or expansion of existing informal financial markets such as 
the „underground‟ foreign exchange market, de facto dollarisation, and arbitrary growth in 
money supply in remittance-receiving countries. Ultimately, the continuous inflows of 
remittances through the informal channels can undermine the economic and political stability of 
the remittance-receiving countries and, at the same time, threaten the peace and security of 
the world. 
 
Certainly, several factors, ranging from micro to macro, might have accounted for the relatively 
low receipt of official migrant remittances (or high receipt of informal remittances) by SSA. This 
chapter explores the factors that inhibit the optimal inflows of migrant remittances through 
official channels to SSA as a sub-region from a macroeconomic perspective. The fundamental 
question is: What role can macroeconomic factors play under liberalised financial market 
                                                          
48
 Author‟s calculation based on World Bank‟s WDI (April, 2011)  
49
 Author‟s compilation from World Bank (2011b) Remittance Database 
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regime in attracting official migrant remittances to SSA? The interrelated pertinent research 
questions with regard to SSA are: 
i. What macroeconomic factors explain variations in official migrant remittance inflows? 
ii. Are there any time variations in the impact of these macroeconomic factors on official 
migrant remittance inflows over the past three decades? 
iii. Do macroeconomic factors impact differently on migrant remittances and workers‟ 
remittance inflows? 
iv. To what extent do macroeconomic factors explain variations in the inflow of 
compensation of employees? 
 
In response to the above research questions, this study attempts to explain broadly the 
macroeconomic factors behind migrant remittance flows to SSA. It seeks to find the long-run 
macroeconomic determinants of remittance flows to SSA. More specifically, with respect to 
SSA, the study seeks to: 
i. determine the impact of macroeconomic factors on official migrant remittance inflows; 
ii. examine if the impact of the macroeconomic factors identified in (i) vary on migrant 
remittances inflows over time; 
iii. verify if macroeconomic factors have any unique impact on workers‟ remittances; and, 
iv. explore the influence of macroeconomic factors on compensation of employees inflows. 
 
Based on the empirical findings, appropriate policy recommendations are made to guide 
macroeconomic policy formulation towards attracting a higher inflow of official migrant 
remittances in SSA. As far as the sub-region is concerned, this study is novel in the 
measurement of migrant remittances and in providing an insight into the time-dependent 
changing role of macroeconomic factors affecting migrant remittances over the past three 
decades. Also of unparalleled contribution is the fact that this study identifies the 
macroeconomic factors that explain migrant remittances at the disaggregated levels. 
 
4.2 SELECTED STYLISED FACTS ON REMITTANCE FLOWS TO SSA 
This section presents some stylised facts on the cyclical behaviour and the composition of 
migrant remittance inflows, as well as the destination of SSA migrants outside the sub-region. 
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4.2.1: The Cyclical Behaviour of Remittance Flows to SSA, 1980-2009 
In line with the altruistic theory, migrant remittance inflows are expected to be countercyclical; 
pro-cyclical in conformity with the self-interest motive, and acyclical in manifestation of the 
mixed motive (or tempered self-interest) in the recipient countries.  
 
Figure 4.1: 
Trends in Migrant Remittances, Household Consumption and Income in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author based on WDI (April 2011).              Note: HFCE denotes household final consumption expenditure 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the trends in migrant remittances received, household consumption and 
income in SSA between 1980 and 2009. With reference to Figure 4.1, there is fairly strong 
evidence of pro-cyclicality in the growth of migrant remittances per capita and GDP per capita 
in SSA in the 1980s and in the 2000s. In the 1990s, there appears to be countercyclicality in 
the inflow of migrant remittances per capita as against GDP per capita growth in SSA. This 
trend is notwithstanding the fact that over the past three decades, migrant remittances (both in 
actual volumes and per capita terms) to the sampled 36 SSA countries have been increasing 
consistently taking into account the group mean for each decade as shown in Table A3.3 in 
Chapter Three. 
 
The trends in the annual growth in household final consumption expenditure per capita and 
migrant remittances per capita confirm the pro-cyclicality in the flow of remittances to SSA in 
the 1980s and in the 2000s. The pro-cyclicality in the flow of migrant remittances in relation to 
household final consumption expenditure can be attributed to altruistic motive driving 
remittances. Therefore, with reference to the trends in per capita income growth and migrant 
remittances per capita growth, it can be argued that migrant remittances received by SSA are 
generally pro-cyclical during „good times‟ (i.e. the 1980s and the 2000s). Furthermore, as 
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revealed in Figure 4.1, in terms of growth in migrant remittances per capita, the flow of migrant 
remittances to SSA cannot be described as unwavering but rather as erratic, especially in the 
1990s. This suggests that in understanding the cyclical behaviour of migrant remittance inflows 
the use of the growth rate in the flow of remittances per capita rather than the popularly used 
absolute volume (as in Figure 4.2 Panel A) or relative to nominal GDP should be seen as more 
appropriate (cf. Chami et al., 2005; Gupta, 2005; Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2007a).  
 
Figure 4.2: 
Trends in Components of Migrant Remittances and GDP per capita in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author based on WDI (April 2011) 
 
Figure 4.2 presents the cyclical behaviour of migrant remittance inflows per capita (MREMPC), 
as well as the components of MREMPC – the inflows of workers‟ remittances per capita 
(WREMPC) and compensation of employees per capita (COMPPC) in SSA between 1980 and 
2009. Figure 4.2 Panel A, reveals that the actual values of per capita migrant remittances and 
workers‟ remittances received in SSA are highly pro-cyclical with respect to real GDP per capita 
over the past three decades. During this same period, actual values of COMPPC were acyclical 
to real GDP per capita prior to the year 2005. Beyond 2005, however, COMPPC became 
countercyclical relative to real GDP per capita (Panel A). 
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Figure 4.2 Panel B shows that between 1980 and 2009 the trend in the annual growth rate of 
per capita workers‟ remittances received in SSA was pro-cyclical in the 1980s and 2000s but 
countercyclical in the 1990s. Coincidentally, it was in the 1990s that SSA as a sub-region 
recorded its worst macroeconomic performance as reflected in reduced real GDP per capita, 
domestic savings, higher external imbalance and debt stock (see Table 3.1). It can be seen 
that the inflows of workers‟ remittances and migrant remittances follow a similar growth trend, 
understandably because the former constitutes a significant component of the latter. In other 
words, the cyclical behaviour of migrant remittance inflows is dependent upon the growth trend 
of workers‟ remittances which is the dominant component of migrant remittances. From Figure 
4.2 Panel C, it is apparent that the annual growth in compensation of employees received per 
capita (COMPPC) has been acyclical to the growth in real GDP per capita in SSA since 1980. 
Whilst this trend analysis cannot be interpreted as akin to or underscored by causal effects, two 
main conclusions are possible from the observations based on Figure 4.2. Either, (i) 
remittances from „permanent‟ migrants are positively responsive to macroeconomic conditions 
at home, whilst remittances from „temporary‟ migrants are irresponsive to home-country 
macroeconomic conditions; or (ii) workers‟ remittances can contribute more positively to home-
country macroeconomic performance whilst the impact of compensation of employees on 
macroeconomic performance in SSA is relatively less important, given that workers‟ 
remittances form an integral part of migrant remittance inflows in SSA (see Figure 4.3). 
 
4.2.2 The Composition of Migrant Remittances Received in SSA, 1980-2009 
Figure 4.3 shows the composition and the degree of dependency on migrant remittances in the 
36 SSA countries sampled for the empirical analysis. Figure 4.3 Panel A reveals that, with the 
exception of Cape Verde, countries in the southern part of the sub-region viz. Lesotho, 
Mauritius, Swaziland, Seychelles and Botswana, dominate the top-six migrant remittance-
recipient countries. The remaining top-12 migrant remittance-recipients (Cape Verde, Senegal, 
Sudan, Gambia, Benin and Togo) are predominantly West African countries. Comoros is the 
only country from the eastern part of the sub-region listed among the top-12 remittance-
recipients. Also, although the majority of the top-12 leading remittance-recipient countries are 
small in geographical size, Botswana and Sudan are relatively large.  
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Figure 4.3: Composition of Migrant Remittances Received by SSA Countries, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author based mainly on WDI (April 2011).   Note: Only the 36 sampled countries included. 
 
The geographical background of the bottom-third of migrant remittance-recipient countries is 
quite heterogeneous. All the same, West African countries dominate with five countries 
(Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone and Ghana) in this bottom 12 category. Central and 
Eastern Africa are represented by four countries (Cameroon, Congo, Rwanda and Ethiopia) 
with Southern Africa having three countries (Madagascar, Tanzania and Malawi) among 
countries which received the least migrant remittances. Again, Panel B is dominated by 
countries with relatively large geographical size such as Cameroon, Mauritania, Niger, Congo, 
Madagascar and Tanzania. Despite this, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Malawi, with 
relatively small geographical size are also included in this category of countries which receive 
the least migrant remittances. 
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With the exception of Congo Republic, only countries in the southern part of the sub-region 
(Lesotho, Botswana and Tanzania) depend more on compensation of employees than how 
they depend on workers‟ remittances. This implies that relatively high frequency of temporary or 
circular migration is likely to be more common among countries in the southern part than 
elsewhere in the sub-region. It is likely that unlike the nationals of other countries in the sub-
region the nationals of these Southern African countries might find it relatively easier, cheaper 
and more convenient to migrate temporarily to neighbouring South Africa, the country that can 
be described as industrialised, at least, by the standard of the sub-region. 
 
In terms of income status, there is no distinctive pattern of dominance in either category as 
relatively high-income countries such as Cameroon, Congo and Ghana are listed among the 
least migrant remittance recipients just as other high-income countries like Seychelles, Cape 
Verde, Mauritius and Botswana are listed among the high migrant remittance recipients. Thus, 
migrant remittances flow to both high-income and low-income SSA countries; and the inflow of 
remittances does not depend necessarily on the geographical size or location of the country. 
This implies that some macroeconomic fundamentals and policies could be responsible for the 
changing and unequal flow of migrant remittances received by the various SSA countries. 
 
4.2.3 Migratory Patterns in SSA: Main Destinations and Sources of Remittances 
Theoretical as well as empirical literature suggests the inclusion of both home-country and the 
host-country factors in identifying the macroeconomic factors that explain migrant remittances 
received by developing countries (see Section 4.4 and Table A4.1 in the Appendix). As 
reported in Table A4.1, most empirical works on macroeconomic determinants of remittances 
tend to use the USA as the migrant-host country. Some authors including Elbadawi and Rocha 
(1992), Lianos (1997), Bouhga-Hagbe (2004), Akkoyunlu and Kholodilin (2006) and Akkoyunlu 
(2010) made attempts at using countries other than the USA as the migrant-host nations in 
macro-level country-specific studies with focus on bilateral remittances. In the case of SSA 
countries, however, the majority of their migrants, at least 70 per cent, migrate to reside in other 
SSA countries as shown in Table A4.3 in the Appendix.50 This makes the pattern of migration 
among citizens of SSA unique compared to the rest of the world. Notwithstanding the fact that 
SSA still serves as the main host of its „own migrants‟, the most important source of 
international remittances to the various SSA countries is the SSA migrants residing in countries 
                                                          
50
 This confirms earlier estimate by Ratha and Shaw (2007). For Africa as a whole, Barajas et al. (2010) observe that 
more than 50 per cent of African migrants reside in Africa. 
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outside the sub-region (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bollard et al., 2010). Table 4.1 presents a list of 
the 36 sampled SSA countries and the main host of their citizens residing outside Africa. 
 
Table 4.1: Host Countries of SSA Migrants Resident outside SSA 
 
Source: Author based on Parson et al. (2007). 
 
A key feature in the pattern of SSA international migration as shown in Table 4.1 is that most of 
its citizens outside the sub-region reside in Europe rather than in the Americas. It is also logical 
to think that factors such as distance or travelling cost, geopolitical history or former colonial 
relationship, lingual Franca and religious affinities underlie the choice of destination of SSA 
international migrants. For instance, international migrants from Francophone SSA countries 
such as Benin, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Côte d‟Ivoire, Mauritania and Senegal are hosted 
by France with which they have a common language. These SSA countries were also 
colonised by France in the past. The same trend is easily visible in the case of migrants from 
Portuguese speaking SSA countries (Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, and 
Guinea-Bissau) and migrants from English speaking SSA countries such as Kenya, Botswana, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Uganda. On religious affinities, SSA migrants from Muslim-
dominated countries such as Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger and Sudan are mostly resident in 
countries like Jordan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with which these SSA countries have a 
common dominant religion. Evidence of proximity can be traced to Australia as an important 
host country where many international migrants from southern SSA countries, notably 
Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles are resident (see Table A4.3).  
 
Country Code Country Name Non-SSA Host-Country Country Code Country Name Non-SSA Host-Country
1 Benin (BEN) France (FRA) 19 Mali (MLI) France (FRA)
2 Botswana (BSW) Great Britain (GBR) 20 Mauritania (MRT) France (FRA)
3 Burkina Faso (BFA) Pakistan (PAK) 21 Mauritius (MRS) France (FRA)
4 Cameroon (CAM) France (FRA) 22 Mozambique (MZQ) Portugal (POR)
5 Cape Verde (CPV) Portugal (POR) 23 Namibia (NAM) Great Britain (GBR)
6 Comoros (COM) France (FRA) 24 Niger (NGR) Germany (GER)
7 Congo Republic (CON) France (FRA) 25 Nigeria (NIG) United States of America (USA)
8 Côte d'Ivoire (CIV) France (FRA) 26 Rwanda (RWA) Belgium (BEL)
9 Ethiopia (ETH) United States of America (USA) 27 São Tomé & Príncipe (ST&P) Portugal (POR)
10 Gabon (GAB) France (FRA) 28 Senegal (SEN) France (FRA)
11 Gambia (GAM) Spain (ESP) 29 Seychelles (SEY) Great Britain (GBR)
12 Ghana (GHA) United States of America (USA) 30 Sierra Leone (SLE) United States of America (USA)
13 Guinea (GUI) Great Britain (GBR) 31 South Africa (RSA) Great Britain (GBR)
14 Guinea-Bissau (GBS) Portugal (POR) 32 Sudan (SUD) Saudi Arabia (SAU)
15 Kenya (KEN) Great Britain (GBR) 33 Swaziland (SWZ) Great Britain (GBR)
16 Lesotho (LSO) Germany (GER) 34 Tanzania (TNZ) Great Britain (GBR)
17 Madagascar (MAD) France (FRA) 35 Togo (TOG) France (FRA)
18 Malawi (MLI) Great Britain (GBR) 36 Uganda (UGA) Great Britain (GBR)
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From Table 4.1, France (12), Great Britain (10), United States of America (4), Portugal (4) and 
Germany (2) lead as the first-choice host of SSA migrants outside the sub-region. This implies 
that Europe leads as the main host of SSA international migrants51. Clearly, using the USA as 
the main host of SSA migrants in an empirical study cannot be considered as appropriate. 
Nevertheless, when the first three leading hosts of SSA international migrants are taken into 
account as presented in Table A4.3, the USA emerges strongly as one of the leading hosts. In 
fact, the USA hosts migrants from 24 SSA countries and ranks second only after Germany (27) 
and is followed by France (17), Great Britain (16) and Portugal (3). From this perspective using 
USA as the main host of international migrants from SSA could be considered a fairly good 
proxy. This is because in this context, with 24, USA leads Germany in number of SSA migrants 
that chooses the former as the first (or the most preferred) destination outside the continent. 
 
Some important conclusions can be drawn from the stylised facts. First, the changing 
macroeconomic policy environment in SSA is likely to impact on remittances received by the 
sub-region in view of the fact that the cyclicality in the flow of migrant remittances were found to 
vary over time – pro-cyclical in the 1980s and the 2000s but countercyclical in the 1990s. It is 
for this reason that this chapter seeks to investigate, among other issues, the impact of 
changing macroeconomic policy environment on remittance inflows in SSA by undertaking a 
decade-by-decade analysis. Second, whereas just like migrant remittances, workers‟ 
remittances were largely pro-cyclical in the 1980s and in the 2000s but countercyclical in the 
1990s, compensation of employees received in SSA were acyclical, hence less responsive to 
the changing macroeconomic policy environment of SSA. This study took this observation into 
account by analysing the determinants of migrant remittances at the aggregated and 
disaggregated levels. Third, contrary to popular perception, some SSA countries, mainly SADC 
countries other than South Africa, receive more compensation of employees than workers‟ 
remittances. This study did not probe this unique characteristic of SADC countries because as 
explained earlier, there is the likelihood that proximity to a „big brother‟ industrialised country (in 
this particular case, South Africa) could explain this phenomenon, requiring the inclusion of 
physical distance (a non-macroeconomic variable) into the model as in (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2007b). Finally, because the facts clearly show that it is Europe and not the USA that leads as 
the host of SSA migrants, it is the leading non-SSA migrant-host country of each sampled SSA 
country rather than the USA that was used as the migrant-host country in this study. 
                                                          
51
 Sander and Maimbo (2003), and Barajas et al. (2010) also identify Europe rather than North America as the main 
host of African migrants. 
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4.3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature reviewed in this chapter covers the microeconomic foundation underlying the flow 
of migrant remittances which discusses the reason why migrants remit, the uses of migrant 
remittances, and the characteristics of potential remitters and potential recipients of 
remittances. Also covered are the theories regarding remittance flows from a macroeconomic 
perspective and the empirical studies on macroeconomic determinants of remittance inflows. 
 
4.3.1 The Microeconomic Foundation and Theoretical Underpinnings of Remittances 
4.3.1.1 Motivations to Remit and Uses of Migrant Remittances 
Cross-border remittances are usually small value non-debt-creating monetary transfers from 
income-earning migrants or benevolent organisations resident abroad and sent to family 
members, other close associates, or social welfare institutions resident in native countries 
directed at meeting a specific need. These flows are called migrant remittances if they strictly 
involve interpersonal transfers from an international migrant to his/her close relation(s) resident 
in his/her native country. In other words, international migrant remittances exclude the transfer 
of funds from institutions to persons or social institutions in less privileged and vulnerable 
economic environment. This study is centred on migrant remittance flows as they directly relate 
to migration of labour, an important resource for which the SSA sub-region is well endowed.  
 
From  a microeconomic viewpoint, it can be observed that the motivation for a migrant to remit 
part of his/her earnings to his/her native country is, either directly or indirectly, influenced by the 
end use of remittances. For instance, in order to thoroughly understand the motives behind 
migrant remittance inflows as well as the magnitude, regularity and volatility of these flows to 
SSA it is essential to be acquainted with how remittances are used within the sub-region. 
Although, admittedly, the uses of remittances can only be studied appropriately and 
comprehensively at the micro level (which is outside the scope of this study), a review of the 
available survey studies on the uses of remittances could offer some important insights into the 
understanding of the dynamics and trends in migrant remittance flows at the macro level. 
 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) identify altruism, exchange, strategic behaviour, co-insurance, 
inheritance, investment and mixed factors as the motives behind migrant remittance flows at 
the microeconomic level. This was after the debate on motivations to remit was initiated by 
Lucas and Stark (1985) who identified pure altruism, pure self-interest and tempered altruism 
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(or enlightened self-interest) as the microeconomic determinants of remittances using evidence 
from Botswana. Becker (1974) argues that altruism is the most fundamental reason for 
remitting. The altruistic motive of remittances is driven by natural love and concern for 
improving the living standards of the other family members and close associates left behind in 
the migrant‟s home country. In this case, a migrant derives positive utility from sending funds 
home to improve upon the distressing economic condition of the target recipients (often close 
relatives and friends) in his/her home country knowing very well that these recipients are in a 
less advantageous economic environment. It is expected that a rise in migrant income, a 
negative economic shock in the home country, a decrease in the real disposable income of the 
target recipients and the migrant‟s intention to return to his/her home country after some time 
should positively impact on remittance flows driven by altruism. From a migrant‟s perspective, 
however, the number of international migrants in a target household should inversely relate the 
regularity and the size of the remittances per migrant received by a household over time. 
 
The pure self-interest theory of remittances as proposed by Lucas and Stark (1985) generates 
three critical motives from the perspective of the remitting migrant. These are inheritance, 
assets accumulation and intention to return home at a future date. Thus, under the theory of 
pure self-interest, a migrant‟s motivation to remit is driven essentially by the migrant‟s intention 
to return home after some time and, hence, the need to save at home in advance as well as to 
earn respect among his/her family and close associates; and the aspiration to inherit a family 
property like land, chieftaincy reign, and even sometimes to galvanise support for a political 
position upon return. De la Brière et al. (2002) find evidence for this proposition in Dominican 
Sierra. With regard to the intention to return home in the future, the migrant can then use a 
member of his/her family or a close associate as a trustworthy supervisor and well-informed 
agent who will monitor his/her children and spouse left behind as well as capital-intensive 
investment projects such as construction of an apartment, commercial farming and other 
entrepreneurial initiatives (Bernheim et al. 1985; Cox, 1987). Cox and Stark (1994) note that, in 
a three-generational setting, a migrant may be motivated to remit to  his/her parents as a 
demonstration to his/her children how he/she (the migrant) should also be taken care of in old 
age by them (the children). For this demonstrative effect to be effective under this 
circumstance, the migrant makes sure the transfers of funds (i.e. remittances) are visible to 
his/her children and even, in some cases, to his/her grandchildren. The net earnings of the 
migrant and the intention to return home after some time rather than the negative economic 
shocks at home and the number of emigrants in a household are the contributing factors that 
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are expected to have a significant positive impact on remittances. Also, the stability and growth 
prospects of a migrant‟s home country as reflected in good democratic and accountable 
governance, low inflation, higher per capita income and improved access to bank credit by the 
private sector can positively influence a migrant‟s return and, hence, higher inflow of self-
interest driven remittances. 
 
Tempered altruism (or enlightened self-interest) is the mixed motive of migrant remittances 
representing the less extreme cases of pure altruism or pure self-interest (Lucas and Stark, 
1985). This motive of remittances is informed by an implicit contractual framework of mutual 
benefit from international migration which involves the migrant and his/her family resident in 
his/her country of origin. The implicit contractual agreements would normally include co-
insurance, loan repayment, exchange for services and strategic behaviour (Bernheim, et al. 
1985; Poirine, 1997). For instance, a household may agree to mobilise funds to finance the 
initial cost of migration of a family member to a country where the probability of job acquisition 
and earning higher real wages is relatively high. The migrant is expected to remit part of his/her 
income to the household left behind to offset the debt acquired in sponsoring his/her trip, and 
thereafter, remittances are expected to continue to flow especially during periods of negative 
economic shocks. A migrant could also enter into an agreement with his/her family to be 
sponsored abroad so that in return, he/she will pay the airfare of an agreed number of 
economically active family members to travel abroad for greener pastures. Besides, both 
parties (the migrant and his/her family) might agree to invest the remittances received by the 
household into an agreed investment project that could be mutually beneficial to both parties. 
The investment project could serve as a hedge against uncertain future misfortunes such as ill-
health and deportation of the migrant and negative shocks at home or in the country of 
residence of the migrant. Furthermore, in economies where the extended family systems and 
social ties are strong migrants may be compelled to remit home regularly as a compensation 
for the loss of his/her personal services to his/her family and community. 
 
It should be obvious from the foregoing that the uses of international migrant remittances at the 
microeconomic level can be many and varied over time. Besides, the use to which remittances 
are put can be influenced by the gender of the recipient (Russell, et al. 1990). In addition, the 
educational status, marital status, family size, age, level and regularity of income, and the type 
of employment of the recipient are some other obvious personal characteristics that can 
influence the uses of remittances. Aside these personal features, the season, the value of the 
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amount received and the frequency of the flow of remittances could influence the use to which 
these funds are put. It is very likely that for whichever underlying motive remittances are sent, 
in most average homes, consumption and loan repayment towards improved living standards 
will lead the uses of remittances at the initial stages. Over time, the uses of remittances in a 
typical household are expected to switch in favour of investment in education and 
entrepreneurial ventures. As Gupta (2005: 4) puts it, evidence from different parts of the world 
shows that “remittances are mostly used for consumption and for investment in land and 
property”. Connell (1980) and Ahlburg (1991) posit that remittances are used primarily for 
consumption rather than for financing investment projects because of the barriers and 
inconveniences attached to private investment in most developing countries. An overriding 
conclusion from survey studies conducted by Morauta (1985) and Boyd (1990) in New Papua 
Guinea, Tongamoa (1987) for Tonga, Cox and Jimenez (1992) for Peru, and Ilahi and Jafarey 
(1999) for Pakistan supports the view of Poirine (1997), and Brown and Poirine (2005) that 
most migrants are under social obligation to remit home and that these remittances are firstly 
used to settle family debts incurred in financing their trips and/or education. 
 
Of all the consumption purposes of using migrant remittances clearly driven by altruism, 
available evidence shows that food and other general living expenses constitute the largest 
proportion of the uses to which remittances are put. For example, cross-sectional studies 
conducted by Tongamoa (1987) in Tonga, Georges (1990) and Pessar and Grasmuck (1991) 
in Dominican Republic, Loomis (1990) in Cook Islands, Hayes (1993) in New Papua Guinea, 
Rensel (1993) in Fiji, Durand et al. (1996a,b) in Mexico, Dennis (2003), and Clark (2004) in 
Tuvalu and Kiribati, and Miotti et al. (2010) in Africa, find that between 67 and 88 per cent of 
remittances received are spent instantaneously on basic needs especially food items. 
Regarding the rural southern districts of Zimbabwe, Maphosa (2005) finds that 98.8 per cent of 
remittance-receiving families spend these funds primarily on food. Also, Pendleton et al. (2006) 
find that household consumption represents 93 per cent of migrant remittance usage by 
recipient households in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Generally, the 
food items comprise imported tinned and processed foods, beverages and tobacco 
(Tongamoa, 1987; Dennis, 2003). Usually, the non-food consumables on which migrant 
remittances are spent in developing countries include healthcare services, clothes, telephones, 
household electronic appliances such as television sets, sound and video systems, simple tools 
and equipment, and housing and construction materials (Shankman, 1976; Loomis, 1990; 
James, 1991; Scott, 2003). 
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Investment in human capital, housing and business ventures also benefit from migrant 
remittance usage (Özden and Schiff, 2005). In Tuvalu and Kiribati, for instance, Borovnik 
(2003) and Clark (2004) find that education appears to be the second most important reason 
for remitting after food. The usage of remittances in human capital accumulation can take many 
forms namely finance of schooling, vocational training, and emigration. Özden and Schiff 
(2005) observe a similar trend in the use of foreign remittances in SSA. Brown (1995) observes 
that 75 per cent of Samoan migrants and 33 per cent of Tongan migrants have had their 
airfares paid by a family member who migrated earlier. Shankman (1976) finds that in Western 
Samoa, remittances were seldom used for capital investment projects because emigration was 
regarded as a more lucrative investment than capital investment in businesses and other 
entrepreneurial initiatives. In contrast, Walker and Brown (1995), and Muliaina (2001) find out 
that in Tonga and Samoa, a significant proportion of remittances are used for investment in 
farm inputs and simple tools and business establishments (see also Georges, 1990; Pessar 
and Grasmuck, 1991; Brown and Connell, 1993; Faeamani, 1995; Taylor, 1996). In a study on 
Mali, Findley and Sow (1998) also substantiated this finding by noting that remittances are not 
only used for consumption purposes but also for investment into mechanisation in agriculture. 
Similarly, Gubert (2000) observes that migrant remittance-receiving households in the Kayes 
region of Mali do not only have higher income per capita but also these households use more 
mechanised farming techniques and sophisticated farm implements than their counterparts who 
have no family member resident abroad. Ahmed (2000) reveals that Somaliland remittance-
receiving households use these funds mainly for financing productive activities even in periods 
of harsh economic and political conditions. Similarly, for Zambia, Chilivumbu (1985) observes 
that remittances are largely used to finance agricultural inputs. In the case of southern rural 
districts in Zimbabwe, Maphosa (2005) discovers that migrant remittances in excess of 
immediate consumption are also used to purchase agricultural farm inputs. 
 
If remittances are meant for small and medium-scale capital investment projects they are likely 
to be initially saved until the target working capital is obtained. James (1991) and Borovnik 
(2003) observe that young families in Tonga save a portion of remittances received towards 
future use. In LAC, a small proportion of remittances in excess of basic subsistence needs is 
used for investment and business initiatives, as found by Gorges (1990) and Pessar and 
Grasmuck (1991) for the Dominican Republic, and Durand et al. (1996a,b) for Mexico. 
McCormick and Wahba (2001) observe that literate returnees to Egypt have a higher probability 
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of using their savings from abroad to become entrepreneurs, while a longer stay abroad has no 
influence on a returnee migrant‟s chances of becoming an entrepreneur. Miotti et al. (2010) 
point out that the general motivation to remit for investment purposes other than owning a 
house in a native country is a major concern for uneducated migrants and those who have 
stayed in France the longest. In contrast migrants from SSA “send money for current 
expenditures rather than for investment” (Miotti et al., 2010: 17). This finding confirms the 
conclusion by Mophosa (2005) on Zimbabwe and Pendleton et al. (2006) from a survey report 
on SADC that, apart from consumption, remittances are used for financing transportation, fuel, 
utilities, education and medical services by recipient households. 
 
International migrants also remit to native communities and religious bodies and leaders 
according to Shankman (1976), Brown (1995) and Scott (2003), whilst Walker and Brown 
(1995) claim that remittance-recipient households sometimes spend these funds (often only in 
excess of consumption) on payment of marriage expenses, funerals and other social, cultural 
and religious ceremonies. For SSA, Diatta and Mbow (1999) indicate that besides household 
consumption, remittances were used to finance development projects in migrant‟s home 
communities in Senegal. Gubert (2002) explains that household members52 who fall ill during 
the year are the most significant reason why Malian migrants remit and migrant remittances to 
Mali increase at once when a family member dies. On the average, one death and one sick 
family member induce an increase in migrant remittances by 124 per cent (ibid). 
 
Given the above scenarios, there are no clear-cut uses of migrant remittances across recipient 
families in the developing world. The implication is that there is no universal answer to the 
question as to whether remittances are spent on „productive‟ or „unproductive‟ activities. For 
instance, even though consumption remains the most important use of remittances in many 
remittance-recipient homes as the evidence shows, the microeconomic impact of remittances 
on welfare is obviously positive as far as household access to basic essential needs of life are 
concerned. At the macroeconomic level, however, the composition of the consumption basket 
(whether or not, remittances are spent on imported or locally produced consumables) is critical 
to economic growth and stability. 
 
 
                                                          
52
 The number of relatives and the severity of the sickness should influence the regularity and magnitude of 
remittance flows. 
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4.3.1.2 Potential Remitters and Sources of Remittances to SSA 
At the household level, there are a litany of factors directly relating to a migrant, including net 
average income, educational status, economic status of the family at home, number of closely 
related emigrants in a family, marital status, and job security. Other factors are gender, age, the 
desire to return home in the future, duration of stay, and the strength of social ties between the 
migrant and the potential recipients. These can affect not only the willingness and the ability to 
remit, but also the amount and the regularity of the flow of remittances.  Additional factors that 
can influence the willingness and the ability as well as the magnitude and the regularity of 
remittance flows are migrant co-habitation with spouse, children and parents, number of 
younger siblings at home, motive for migration, future supportive expectations from family and 
migrant‟s legal status in host country. Durand et al. (1996a,b) identify labour market experience 
in the host country, homeownership status, access to capital, duration of trip and cost of 
migration as other factors that can play an important role in this respect. 
 
Migrants on regular income and those with an accumulated stock of wealth are easily the most 
likely to remit home since remittances are a portion of a migrant‟s earnings transferred to meet 
a specific purpose in his/her native country. In this regard, a migrant with no accumulated 
wealth and who is a full-time student and, therefore, does not engage in any income-generating 
activity cannot be seen as a reliable potential remitter at the contemporary time. This is 
consistent with the definition of migrant remittances discussed in Chapter Two. However, there 
is no theoretical consensus on the question as to whether the regularity in the flow of migrant 
remittances is dependent upon the income level of the migrant even if the taxonomy provided 
by Wahba (1991)53 is taken into account. The reason is that where altruism strongly dominates 
as  the motive for remitting a migrant may keep remitting home irrespective of the level of 
his/her disposable income, even though under this circumstance income level is likely to be 
positively related to the amount of funds remitted. Blom and Henriksen (2008) find out that in 
Norway, Somali immigrants are by far the most regular remitters although they are in a weaker 
financial condition than other immigrants. 
 
                                                          
53
  In this taxanomy, Wahba (1991) argues that: (i) the maximum transferrable income of a migrant at any given time 
is the excess income available to a migrant after meeting his/her basic needs in the host country; (ii) fixed 
remittances are  the minimum funds a migrant is required to transfer to enable his/her family back home to meet the 
basic needs and other contractual obligations; (iii) discretionary remittances are transfers in excess of fixed 
remittances, which together with fixed remittances represent  the level of actual remittances. Discretionary 
remittances vary according to financial risks and rewards on savings and investment in home and host countries; 
and (iv) saved remittances are the difference between potential remittances and the amount remitted during a given 
period. 
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Probably, the most important factor that influences the decision of migrants to remit is related to 
marital status and number of children left behind in migrants‟ home country. For instance, it 
should be very easy to find that married migrants whose spouses and children are living with 
them abroad are less likely to remit home than their counterparts who leave their spouses and 
children in their home countries. The reason is simple and straightforward: migrants who are 
motivated to remit home in support of their spouses, children and parents will remit larger 
amounts and more regularly when these direct dependants are staying behind. And as can be 
expected these migrants will be less inclined to remit more and more regularly when their 
spouses, children and parents who were previously staying behind now unite with them in the 
host country. Also, all other things being equal, migrants who stay with their spouses, children 
and parents abroad are less likely to remit and to remit larger amounts on regular basis, 
because such migrants often spend a higher proportion of their disposable incomes on 
essential basic necessities of life, with very little left over for savings and remittance-related 
investment. 
 
There is evidence that remittances tend to decrease in value with duration of migrant stay 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985). In the case of Germany, migrants who intend to stay abroad longer 
remit less Merkle and Zimmermann (1992). Similarly, among the migrants from Pacific Islands, 
those who intend to return home remit more (Brown, 1997) in consistency with the observation 
by Glytsos (1997) that Greek temporary migrants remit more than Greek permanent migrants.  
 
If the conclusion drawn from the various studies that remittances per migrant decrease over 
time is anything to go by, then the less educated migrants are more likely remit than the more 
educated migrants, notwithstanding the finding by Rodriguez and Horton (1995) that the level 
of education of migrants has no effect on the amount of migrant remittances. This is because 
various research reports by Borjas (1989), Knerr (1994), and Reagan and Olsen (2000) 
suggest that, generally, the higher the level of education of a migrant, the higher the duration of 
stay abroad. Earlier reports by Johnson and Whitelaw (1974), and Rempel and Lobdell (1978), 
however, suggest that remittances tend to increase with the level of formal education and skills 
of migrants (cf. Faini, 2006b). 
 
In Somalia, Lindley (2007: 12) found that women are better remitters, especially in terms of 
reliability and consistency than men, to the extent that, “…it is better to have one daughter 
abroad than ten sons”, notwithstanding that the empirical evidence shows that Somali men 
resident abroad remit higher amounts than their women do. Thus, on the average, in Somali 
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communities, men who remit home, remit higher amounts, but there is a higher probability that 
a Somali female migrant will remit home more than what her male counterpart will. This finding 
supports the observation by Ponsel (2001) on South Africa that women migrants remit larger 
proportions of their net earnings although men generally remit larger amounts than women. 
Exceptions to this finding can be found in studies by Crãciun (2006) and Osaki (2003) in the 
case of Moldova and Thailand respectively. 
 
Bollard, McKenzie and Morton (2010), in a survey study involving a sample of 12,875 SSA and 
North African migrants in nine Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries conclude that: 
i. African migrants remit twice more (an average of US$1,263) than migrants from other 
developing countries (an average of US$668), with migrants from poorer African 
countries more likely to remit than those from richer African countries.54 
ii. Among migrants with spouses left behind at home, male migrants are more likely to 
remit and actually remit more (an average of 42 per cent) than female migrants (with an 
average of 26 per cent probability to remit). Men with spouses left behind remit an 
average of US$3,879 per annum more than their female counterparts. 
iii. Migrants with higher education remit more than migrants with less education. This 
pattern is stronger among African migrants compared with non-African migrants. 
Bollard, McKenzie, Morton and Rapoport (2009) found a similar result. This finding 
could, however, be explained by the fact that migrants with a higher level of education 
are more likely to find jobs and earn higher incomes. Notwithstanding this, it must be 
borne in mind that most migrants from developing countries seldom find jobs that are 
directly related to their level of education in the industrialised countries where these 
migrants are hosted. 
iv. In relative terms, high income earners remit more than low income earners, but this 
relationship is quite flat over middle ranges of income and steeper at the tails of the 
distribution frequency. On the average, an increase in a migrant‟s income by 10 per 
cent is associated with an additional US$110 remitted per annum. 
v. There is no strong evidence that remittances decrease with time spent abroad in 
relation to the policy debate as to whether or not the episode of temporary or permanent 
                                                          
54
 Given that this finding clearly contradicts the facts presented in Chapter Three that SSA is the least recipient of 
migrant remittances in per capita and in absolute terms, it is possible either that most Africa migrants remit via 
unofficial channels, or that there are relatively fewer African migrants in OECD countries (as shown in Table A4.3), 
or that African migrants in non-OECD countries do not remit regularly. 
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migration impacts on remittance inflows to migrant-home countries. It was observed that 
the likelihood to remit and the amount remitted increased over the first five years to ten 
years of migration. The likelihood to remit begins to fall only after 20 years, but at this 
stage the total amount remitted does not fall since migrants with longer years of stay 
abroad, remit more on the few occasions that they do remit. 
vi. Out of the over 12,000 respondents, only a third remit, and with those who remit 
sending an average of US$2,638 annually (with a medium of US$1,088), “an amount far 
exceeding SSA‟s per capita GNI of US$1,082” (op. cit. 2010: 5). 
vii. Only a few migrants remit amounts worth US$5,000 or more per annum. This is five per 
cent to SSA and nine per cent to North Africa. The majority of African migrants remit 
US$500 or less in a year. 
viii. Migrants with excellent legal status are approximately 12 per cent more likely to remit 
than those with illegal status. “This may reflect differences in access to formal financial 
institutions such as banks, between legal and illegal migrants” (ibid. 2010: 17). This 
finding is consistent with the finding of Konica and Filer (2005) on Albanian emigrants 
who remit less if they do not have the appropriate documents. 
 
Ratha and Shaw (2007) observe that international migration in SSA occurs predominantly 
within the sub-region, but the major source of remittance flows to the sub-region are 
industrialised countries outside the sub-region. Various World Bank reports on remittances 
corroborate this fact by noting that about 75 per cent of all remittances received in SSA are 
sent from the USA and Western Europe. Major migrant-host countries in Western Europe are 
former colonial powers such as Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain as well 
as Germany (see Table 4.1). The obvious reasons are that these countries have the largest 
economies in Europe, common language, or close historical and political ties with most SSA 
countries. Bollard, McKenzie and Morton (2010) also identify OECD countries as the main 
source of remittances received by developing countries.  
 
4.3.1.3 Potential Receivers of Migrant Remittances 
Frontline potential recipients of migrant remittances are low-income households55 with an 
economically active adult nuclear family member resident and working in a foreign high-income 
country. Other potential recipients of migrant remittances are low-income communities and 
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 Itzigsohn (1995) in comparative analysis of four countries finds that household income had a positive effect on 
remittances received in Guatemala, negative effect in the Dominican Republic but no effect in Haiti and Jamaica. 
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countries with a relatively large segment of their active adult citizens working in a relatively 
developed country. Among these households and communities, those that practise communal 
inheritance and give prestigious awards or respectable social titles to their members/citizens 
are more likely to receive higher remittances than those that do not. Moreover, in a typical 
household with a migrant abroad, spouses, children of school going age, economically inactive 
parents, and younger siblings are, in descending order of importance, the most likely to receive  
the highest and most regular remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985) report evidence for this 
hypothesis in Botswana where male migrants who are prospective heirs, competitively remit 
home in order to receive favour, respect and inheritance from their family and community back 
home. This suggests the value of assets such as land, plantation and animals owned by a 
household or a community is a positive determinant of migrant remittance inflows. Similarly, in 
societies where assumption of a chieftaincy reign is directly linked to donations and exhibits of 
wealth and generosity, migrants are more likely to remit, remit larger amounts and remit 
regularly. Osili (2007), however, argues that the relationship between household assets and 
remittances received may not necessarily be direct or simple as it is possible that the current 
assets owned by remittance-receiving households might be financed by previous remittances 
received. 
 
Notwithstanding the above it must be pointed out that although „migrant-exporting‟ 
households/communities are the main recipients of migrant remittances, whether driven by 
altruism or otherwise, the amount and the regularity in the flow of remittances received is highly 
contingent on the social ties between the remittance-sending migrant and the target recipient 
as well as the economic conditions at home. Conceivably, social ties between a migrant and 
his/her target recipients of remittances can be positively influenced by the premium the migrant 
places on the type of family and/or social support the migrant received prior to his/her 
migration. Lucas and Stark (1985) and Pleitez-Chavez (2004) upon studying the pattern of 
remittance inflows in Botswana and El Salvador respectively, conclude that negative income 
shocks in native countries significantly increased remittances received from relatives abroad. 
However, Lozano-Ascencio (1993) concludes from a study on Mexican migrants in the USA 
that remittances often decrease after the first or second generation of migrants, so that the 
stability in the flow of remittances is mainly sustained by a new generation of migrants.  
 
Although, social ties between a migrant and his/her family at home is the nucleus of altruism, to 
a very large extent, migrants who remit for self-interest motives are also indirectly influenced by 
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social ties. For example, the stronger the social tie between a migrant and his/her family at 
home, all other factors being equal, the more likely the migrant will be willing to return home in 
the future. Naturally, migrants who plan to return home in the future are those who will be more 
concerned about economic opportunities at home and consequently, more motivated to initiate 
income-generating projects in their home countries, hence more likely to remit regularly. 
 
4.3.2 Theoretical Review of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
There are no distinctive macroeconomic theories underlying the flow of remittances. 
Macroeconomic models on the determination of remittances are, thus, based directly on the 
microeconomic theories of altruism and self-interest. Russell (1986a,b), Elbadawi and Rocha 
(1992), Lianos (1997), Bouhga-Hagbe (2004), Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006), and Coulibaly 
(2009) argue from the theoretical viewpoint that macroeconomic factors can play an influential 
role in the determination of international remittance flows. From the perspective of altruism at 
the macro level, remittances are higher when negative shocks associated with higher rates of 
underemployment and unemployment occur in the migrant‟s native country as the desperate 
macroeconomic conditions compel active labour to travel abroad in search of greener 
pastures56. In this context of pure altruism, lower growth in real income (or economic 
recession), higher rate of inflation, bad governance and weak institutions, exchange rate 
instability and limited access to private sector credit in migrant-home countries stimulate a 
higher inflow of migrant remittances (Wahba, 1991; Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Vargas-Silva 
and Huang, 2006; Coulibaly 2009).  
 
Generally, the level of economic activities in the migrant‟s resident country is important 
because improved economic conditions in the host country boost the ability of migrants to 
increase their employment and earnings prospects, which puts them in a better position to be 
able to remit more. For example, a migrant who is willing to remit for whichever purpose, but 
was unable to remit in the past because he/she was unemployed should have a higher 
propensity to remit once he/she is gainfully employed. Specifically, however, pure altruistic 
theory and pure self-interest investment theory predict different impacts of relative 
improvements in host-country income level on remittances received in migrant-home countries. 
According to the theory of altruism, when the real income of the migrant-host country improves 
                                                          
56
 This is in line with the Lewis (1954) theory of excess supply of labour, resulting in high unemployment and low 
wages in underdeveloped economies, which forces the nationals of these underdeveloped economies to migrate to 
the industrialised world where there is a higher prospect of being engaged in relatively higher income jobs. 
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relative to that of his/her home country, the migrant is motivated to remit more because he/she 
sees his/her family back home as being worse off (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2006; Vargas-Silva, 2006). Thus, host-country income positively determines 
remittance inflows in the migrant-home country. In contrast, self-interest investment theory 
contends that as the real income level of the migrant-host country improves relative to that of 
the migrant-home country worsening the North-South income gap, migrants remit less because 
with improved income conditions  abroad, it is more lucrative to invest in the host country than 
at home (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Vargas-Silva, 2006; Coulibaly, 2009). Also, conceivably 
because the incentive to return home in the future reduces as the economic conditions in 
migrant-host country improve relative to the migrant-home country conditions, there is a higher 
tendency that remittances from permanent migrants may fall. However, because this widening 
income gap encourages further South-North migration the newly arrived migrants who often 
have stronger social ties with their families back home during the initial stages of migration are 
likely to keep the tempo of remittances active. 
 
In accordance with the altruistic theory, remittances received in migrant-home countries fall 
when, in real terms, the income level of developing countries improves to narrow the income 
gap between the migrant-home country and the migrant-host country (Lucas and Stark, 1985; 
Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006). The decline in remittances in 
response to a relatively improved economic condition of the target recipients is underscored by 
a reduction in the pressure on migrants to remit home to lessen income constraints faced by 
their direct dependants. The altruistic theorists, thus, argue that during periods of economic 
recession, as the real income level of the home country declines, migrants are compelled to 
increase remittances in a bid to mitigate the adverse effects of the negative economic shocks at 
home (Swamy, 1981; Brown, 1997, Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006; Coulibaly 2009). With 
regard to home-country economic conditions and self-interest theory of remittances, the 
microeconomic theory can be transformed and directly related into a portfolio choice theory at 
the macro level. The portfolio choice theory implies that as economic conditions in migrant-
home countries improve relative to the rest of the world, more remittances are received in the 
home country through higher savings and investment by migrants (Russell, 1986a,b; Wahba, 
1991; Coulibaly, 2009). Higher real average income growth in the migrant-home country signals 
improved economic conditions and bigger potential markets which are required for increased 
private investment and the emergence of a vibrant entrepreneurial society. Consequently, self-
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interest investment-oriented migrants tend to remit more for business or investment purposes 
when the potential market size in their home countries expands. 
 
Return on financial assets having accounted for inflation is usually proxied by real deposit 
interest rates (Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992). According to the self-interest theory of remittances, 
increases in the real return on investment and savings in a migrant-home country relative to the 
migrant-host country induce higher inflows of investment-driven remittances in the migrant-
home country (Schiopu and Siegfried, 2006; Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006; Coulibaly, 2009). 
This is because if, for example, real deposit interest rates are relatively more attractive in 
migrant-home countries than migrant-host countries, non-altruistic migrants (especially those 
with an intention of  returning home in the future) may increase their marginal propensities to 
save and invest at home in a bid to augment their expected lifetime utility at home. Therefore, a 
migrant-home country that creates a stable macroeconomic environment and an unrestricted 
opportunity for earning a higher return on domestic financial assets relative to the rest of the 
world can attract higher inflows of remittances, most likely through the formal financial system 
when, for example, the expected returns on portfolio assets in the home-country equity market 
become relatively more attractive. The pure altruistic theory of remittances does not predict any 
relationship between remittance inflows and real deposit interest rate57 in the migrant-home 
country suggesting that remittances may flow to migrant-home countries irrespective of the 
level of deposit interest rate. 
 
Real exchange rate can have an ambiguous effect on remittance inflows depending upon 
whether or not it is a fixed amount in the home-country denominated currency or host-country 
denominated currency that is remitted by a migrant, irrespective of the underlying motive for 
remitting. On the one hand, real exchange rate can positively influence remittance inflows as 
depreciation of the home-country currency against the host-country currency raises the 
purchasing power of the foreign currencies remitted, thereby making remittances more 
economically valuable in the home country as far as locally produced goods and services are 
concerned. An altruistic-oriented migrant who remits an equivalent fixed amount of local 
                                                          
57
 Altruistic theory seems more concerned with real lending rates which are considered as the cost of borrowing 
funds in the migrant-home country. The lower the cost of borrowing from financial institutions, the lower the expected 
amount of remittances received and vice versa, as altruistic migrants become less worried about the cost of living 
and constraints to financing entrepreneurial ventures at home. Because data on lending rates in most of the sampled 
SSA countries are at best incomplete; and consistent with most previous studies (see Table A4.1) and with the 
Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) theoretical framework adopted by this study, only real deposit interest rates were 
used in the empirical analysis. 
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currency to his/her dependants58, can under this circumstance, decide to remit less in terms of 
host-country currency but which in the eyes of the ordinary recipients represents the same 
amount in nominal terms. Indeed, where these remittances are spent on domestically produced 
goods, the purchasing power of the amount received remains unchanged when inflation and all 
other related factors remain constant. However, in an import-dependent migrant-sending 
country or where the purpose of remittances is to purchase some essential necessities such as 
imported medication, under the same conditions, an altruistic migrant may be compelled to 
remit more foreign currency to enable recipients of remittances to fulfil the “life-smoothing” 
purpose behind the sending of the remittances.  
 
Likewise, migrants who remit for non-altruistic motives may either respond positively or 
negatively to changes in real exchange rate depending upon their level of financial literacy and 
their specific objective of remitting. For example, a rational migrant with a reasonable level of 
financial literacy who remits an equivalent local currency fixed amount for the payment of 
wages and rent at home will hedge by remitting more59 to cover a reasonable given period of 
time when real exchange rate of the home-country currency depreciates against the currency of 
his/her host country. Ceteris paribus, when the home-country currency depreciates, migrants 
who remit for the purposes of investment in locally denominated financial assets will have a 
higher incentive for sending more remittances for investment purposes (say the purchase of 
land or listed shares), but as domestic currency appreciates, the incentive for investment at 
home, say the purchase of stocks,  falls. Here, non-altruistic migrants see remittances as more 
profitable at home due to home-country currency depreciation. Under the same circumstances, 
a migrant who does not have the capacity to hedge will remit less when his/her home-country 
currency depreciates against his/her host-country currency as less foreign currency may now 
be required to meet the same fixed expenditure budget denominated in the home-country 
currency. The migrant, in this case, will have to remit more in the event of real exchange rate 
appreciation in order to meet the same expenditure budget in his/her home country. 
Investment-oriented migrants who consider stronger domestic currency as improvement in 
macroeconomic conditions at home and, hence, have higher confidence in the economy of the 
home country may be inclined to remit more when the home-country currency appreciates, and 
                                                          
58
 Equivalent local currency denominated fixed value remittances can be easily applicable in situations where 
migrants remit to their non-working spouses and children who attend school at home. 
59
 Here, although the total amount remitted might appear higher even in the foreign currency, in actual fact, the 
migrant has remitted less in terms of the host-country currency, if the normal average value of remittances per 
transaction were to be taken into consideration. 
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as the domestic currency depreciates, the amount of foreign currency denominated remittances 
are reduced. Finally, Gupta (2005) argues that, in general, there is a high tendency for officially 
channelled remittances to increase when home-country currency depreciates in developing 
countries where dual exchange rate exists, as depreciation of the home-country currency raises 
the official rate to comparable levels with the black market rate, or even raises migrants‟ 
expectations of a future appreciation. 
 
The impact of home-country rate of inflation on remittances received is not straightforward and 
it is dependent upon which of the main motives behind remittance inflows dominates the other. 
Generally, higher inflation is analogous to harsh and unstable macroeconomic conditions in a 
country, therefore, given the rate of unemployment, the incentive for international migration 
increases. Increased migrant stock, all other factors remaining equal, increases total migrant 
remittances received from abroad as revealed by Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), Liano (1997), 
and Freund and Spatafora (2005) inter alia. Besides, the altruistic motive of remittances 
predicts that remittances meant to lessen constraints to consumption and general living 
expenses of recipients will increase when the cost of living soars in the migrant‟s home country 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985; Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). As the rate of inflation in the migrant‟s 
home country falls, the altruistic theory predicts a decline in the amount of remittances received 
because migrants now regard the economic condition of target recipients as less deplorable. 
According to the self-interest investment theory, higher rates of inflation and higher price 
uncertainty are deterrent to remittance inflows as migrants anticipate a  lower rate of return on 
investment alongside higher investment risk under inflationary conditions at home (Schiopu and 
Siegfried, 2006). Nevertheless, this will depend upon the prevailing price level and the rate of 
inflation as a moderate rate of inflation at manageable levels in SSA could signal the 
opportunity for making higher profits at home, which subsequently induces investment-oriented 
SSA migrants to remit more. Therefore, where altruism dominates self-interest investment 
motive, a positive effect of inflation on remittances received is expected because higher 
inflation erodes the purchasing power of the target recipients. Be that as it may, where 
investment motive dominates, inflation is expected to impact negatively on remittance inflows 
because of higher investment risk at home. In the very long run, however, it is expected that 
lower rates of inflation should impact positively on remittance inflows as migrants who remit for 
purely altruistic motives become more investment-oriented at home due to improved 
macroeconomic conditions and, hence, reallocate remittances in favour of investment at home 
even as altruistic remittances fall. 
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According to the theory of altruism, when there is restricted private sector access to quality 
credit in migrant-home countries, migrant remittances increase to ameliorate liquidity 
constraints in the migrant-home country (Schrooten, 2005; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). 
Altruistic theory, thus, predicts that when private sector access to competitive credit improves in 
migrant-home countries, remittances received decline not only because the pressure on 
migrants to remit to offset limited access to credit reduces, but also because the motivation for 
international migration in search of working capital to finance business falls. In contrast, the 
self-interest investment theory envisages higher inflows of remittances when there is less 
restricted private sector access to credit and working capital in migrant-home countries. This is 
because reduction in liquidity constraint is regarded as an improved development of the 
financial sector which is required for private sector participation in economic activities at home. 
 
Russell (1986a,b) and Funkhouser (1995) argue that political risk factors in migrant-home 
countries can determine the inflow of migrant remittances. The impact of political risk in a home 
country on remittances received is dependent upon the motive behind the remittances. Whilst it 
may be positive or zero when remittances are driven by altruism, the impact of political risk is 
expected to be negative when the underlying motive is self-interest. Thus, institutional quality 
which embodies democratic governance and geopolitical conditions of the migrant-home 
country is expected to have an ambiguous effect on international remittance inflows. Going by 
the theory of altruism, remittances, in the short run, are expected to respond negatively to 
higher quality home-country institutions for two main reasons: (i) poor institutions and bad 
governance at home encourage higher international emigration, hence higher remittance 
inflows, as is the case in Somalia; and, (ii) when institutions become weaker, more remittances 
are expected to be received as international migrants become more sympathetic towards their 
relatives at home. In the long run, quality institutions at home can impact negatively on 
remittances received when more migrants (most likely temporary migrants) return home in 
response to improved political conditions in the home country. Furthermore, the self-interest 
investment theory of remittances, predicts a positive effect of institutional quality on remittance 
inflows because financial assets such as bank deposits, stocks and real estate are adversely 
affected by the risks associated with investment return and geopolitics. For example, a rise in 
political risk and uncertainty in a migrant-home country which adversely affects its credit rating 
and economic stability also deters the inflow of investment-seeking remittances as migrants 
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become pessimistic about investment security at home. In this respect, quality institutions in the 
country enhance higher remittance inflows. 
 
The McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) theory of financial liberalisation postulates that 
deregulation and abandonment of repressive financial policies breed competition and efficiency 
in the financial market, thereby enabling financial institutions to pay attractive returns on 
deposits. Through the pursuit of financial liberalisation policies, therefore, financial institutions 
are encouraged to develop cost-saving strategies and innovative products for resource 
mobilisation from domestic and external sources. Consistent with the McKinnon-Shaw theory, 
Alberola and Salvado (2006), Ghosh (2006), Suki (2007) and Singer (2010) assert that the 
implementation of restrictive economic policies such as exchange rate restrictions in migrant-
home countries do not attract  a higher inflow of international remittances. Conversely, a 
liberalised financial sector and improved financial development in migrant-home countries are 
imperative if a country is to attract higher remittances from its migrants through official 
channels. 
 
It is, however, important to stress that, at the macro level, migrant remittances are often driven 
by mixed motives in so far as the altruistic and self-interest theories are not mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, altruism underlies all kinds of remittances. This might be the main reason why in 
macro-level studies on the determinants of remittance inflows (see Table A4.1) analysts do not 
often attribute their findings strictly to the validity of any particular remittance theory. 
 
4.3.3 Empirical Review of Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
The motivation for providing empirical evidence has increased since Lucas and Stark (1985) 
formally initiated60 the debate on the determinants of remittances. Though the motives behind 
remitting might differ across time, households and countries, it is generally believed that 
improvement in migrant income and negative shocks in the migrant-home country have a direct 
relationship with remittances. For instance, with respect to home-country‟s economic 
performance many studies, including those of El-Sakka and McNabb (1999), de la Brière et al. 
(2002), Bouhga-Hagbe (2006), Yang and Choi (2007), and Singh et al. (2010) provide evidence 
on the countercyclical property of remittances. In sharp contrast, Aydaş et al. (2004) and 
Higgins et al. (2004) conclude that remittances exhibit pro-cyclical behaviour as they tend to 
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 Prior to the contribution of Lucas and Stark in 1985, Johnson and Whitelaw (1974) argued that the incentive 
behind migrant remittances is income disparity between the resident countries of migrants and their home countries. 
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rise with improvements in per capita income and the growth rate of remittance-receiving 
economies. Sayan (2006) also observes that in most cases remittances tend to be acyclical or 
pro-cyclical. 
 
Russell (1986a), and Chipeta and Kachaka (2005) reveal that the decision to remit depends on 
different factors over the business cycle rather than on the altruistic motive of smoothing 
consumption of recipients. In particular, Chipeta and Kachaka (2005) reaffirm an earlier 
observation by Russell (1986a,b) and Russell et al. (1990) that, from a macroeconomic 
perspective, the inflow of remittances depends on deposit interest rate differentials of the home 
country and the main host country of migrants, the rate of inflation, political atmosphere, the 
level of economic activity in the host country and the exchange rate in the home country. 
 
El-Sakka and McNabb (1999), in an attempt to explain remittances received by Egypt,  included 
real income levels of the sending and receiving countries, interest rate differentials, rate of 
inflation in Egypt, and the black market premium for foreign exchange  as regressors in a single 
equation following the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure. The empirical results show 
that whereas remittances increase with the Egyptian rate of inflation and income abroad, they 
decline with the black market premium. Bouhga-Hagbe (2004) analyses workers‟ remittance 
flows to Morocco using cointegrating and error-correction models. Bouhga-Hagbe finds that, 
consistent with the altruistic theory, remittance inflows are, in the long run, positively correlated 
with wage levels in the source country proxied by wage levels in France whilst they negatively 
correlate with real GDP growth in Morocco.  
 
Empirical literature suggests that the number of migrant workers outside the  home country61,  
differences in wage rates at home and abroad, economic condition in the migrant-native 
country, exchange rate fluctuations, interest rates, political risk, facilities or mechanisms of 
international money transfer and the economic conditions in the country of residence influence 
remittance flows (see Table A4.1). With respect to official flow of remittances, the level of 
financial development as reflected in the cost of funds transfer, existence or absence of dual 
exchange rate, and the availability of financial infrastructure and innovative products in migrant-
home countries are also important (Orozco, 2002; 2003; Ratha, 2003; Gupta, 2005; Terry and 
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 Freund and Spatafora (2005) find that a 100 per cent rise in migrant stock causes a 75 per cent rise in remittance 
inflows, but Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), and Aydaş et al. (2004) observe that the importance of migrant stock in 
determining remittance inflows declines over time as a result of ageing labour force. 
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Wilson, 2005). For instance, Hadjimichael et al. (1998) and Pinto et al. (2000) conclude from 
various empirical studies that financial development and economic growth in migrant-home 
countries are crucial positive determinants of remittance inflows. With particular reference to 
financial infrastructure, Wahba (1991) concludes that financial institutions play a crucial role in 
attracting higher remittances through the formal money transfer channels. And as found by 
Orozco (2002), and Freund and Spatafora (2005), migrant-home countries that have relatively 
developed financial systems as reflected in reduced transaction costs on remittances, attract 
more remittances because the propensity to remit increases at lower money transfer cost. 
 
Jadhav (2003) analyses the determinants of workers‟ remittance inflows in India using a log-
linear regression specification involving oil prices as an indicator for level of economic activities 
in the Middle East and the Gulf region considered as the hosts of Indian migrants, US GDP as 
proxy for economic activities for non-oil India migrant hosts, interest rate differentials measured 
as the difference between nominal domestic interest rate and LIBOR, and exchange rate 
depreciation as explanatory variables. The estimated results show that whereas interest rate 
differentials do not affect remittance flows to India, the level of economic activities in both 
categories of migrant-host countries and exchange rate depreciation positively impact on 
remittance flows to India. In a similar fashion, Gupta (2005), in an attempt to analyse a more 
complete model to unearth the determinants of remittances in India, included trend, number of 
migrants, changes in country rating, and return on domestic stock market. The findings lend 
strong support for altruism as the main determinant of remittances. It was found out that 
migrant stock, migrant earnings, economic environment in migrant resident country, and Indian 
drought dummy variable each has positive impact on the cyclical component of remittances in 
India. Gupta (2005) did not find a statistically significant impact of political uncertainty, interest 
rates, and exchange rate depreciation on the flow of remittances to India. 
 
Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) and Aydaş et al. (2004) find that migrant stock loses its importance 
as a determinant of remittances over time due to the ageing of the labour force. Therefore, in 
relative terms, it is not countries with the largest Diaspora population that attract the most 
remittances, but rather the countries where migrants are more sensitive to the economic 
conditions at home (as is the case for small island countries such as Cape Verde, Comoros 
and Cook Islands inter alia) and developing countries that are closer to industrialised countries 
(as is the case for Lesotho and Mexico) that attract more remittances (see also Buch et al., 
2002 for details). Possible reasons that can be attributed to these findings are closer family ties 
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between migrants and the family back home due to proximity resulting in frequent home visits 
by migrants, and the generally small geographical size of island countries.  
 
From a more general perspective, World Bank (2006a) underscores the fact that government 
policies clearly affect remittance inflows. The World Bank (2006a: 93) concludes that “in the 
remittance-receiving countries, these policies include tax exemptions for remittance income; 
improved access to banking services by recipients; incentives to attract investments by the 
Diaspora; access to foreign exchange or lower duties on imports; support for the projects of 
migrant associations; and help for migrants in accessing financial systems. In the remittance-
source countries, they include policies affecting access to banks, access to foreign exchange, 
support to migrant groups, types of immigration regimes, and co-operation with receiving 
countries”. 
 
In summary, empirical results from various macroeconomic studies62 on remittance inflows 
reveal that at the initial stage of migration, remittances are likely to be: (i) countercyclical in so 
far as they increase during economic downturns in recipient countries; (ii) driven more by an 
altruistic motive than by an investment motive; (iii) stimulated by life-sustaining motives, for 
which reason they are more for transactions motive (consumption) than for investment motive; 
and (iv) relatively insensitive to interest rate differentials between home and abroad. At the later 
stages of migration when the self-interest investment motive is more likely to emerge stronger 
than altruism, remittances flow pro-cyclically; or acyclically, because altruism and self-interest 
are of equal importance to the remitting migrant. Other macro variables that have been of 
empirical relevance to remittance flows to developing countries include the rate of inflation as a 
measure of financial instability in the home country, private sector access to bank credit, and 
exchange rates. 
 
4.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Using a two-period scenario, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) analyse the flow of remittances to 
developing countries under the assumptions that period one represents an initial stage of 
international migration of an individual, typically from a less developed country (the migrant-
home country) to a more developed country (the migrant-host country). During this period, the 
individual (the migrant) does not migrate with his/her direct dependants (family). Thus, the 
economically active migrant resides in a relatively industrialised country where he/she is 
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 See Table A4.1 in the Appendix for the review of other empirical studies on the determinants of remittances. 
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engaged in an income-generating economic activity whilst his/her dependants continue to live 
in his/her low-income native (home) country. In this context, the utility of the migrant depends 
on his/her personal consumption in the host country ( )fC  
and the consumption of his/her 
family ( )hC  
living in his/her native country. Accordingly, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) specify 
that the utility function of the migrant in the initial period of migration is given as ( , )f hU C C  
with 
1 0U  , 11 0,U  2 0U  , 22 0;U  and under the assumption that utility is additively separable
63. 
The consumption expenditure of the migrant‟s household living in his/her home country is 
dependent upon the income and remittances received ( )r  with   which is the cost of 
transferring funds from the host country to the home country being of the form, 1  . This 
implies that although a migrant remits r  amount of money only a fraction of this amount r is 
received by his/her family. 
 
The income received by the migrant‟s household living at home is made up of two components 
and given as h hY Y  with  capturing the relationship between the economic conditions in the 
migrant‟s native country and the average income earned by his/her family living at home. hY  is 
the fraction of the household income that is not susceptible to changes in the macroeconomic 
conditions of the home country, whilst hY  is that part of the household income that is 
predisposed to changes in the macroeconomic environment of the home country. It is assumed 
that 0   which implies that an improvement in the economic conditions of the home country is 
generally associated with an improvement in the household‟s (the family left behind‟s) income, 
even though the magnitude of   may differ across households. The consumption of the 
migrant‟s household living at home is given by (( ), )h h hC Y Y r  . This consumption function is 
additively separable with 
1
0,hC  2 110, 0h hC C   
and 
22
0.hC   Likewise, the income of the 
migrant is in the form f fy Y  
such that   reflects the relationship between the economic 
conditions in the host country and the income the migrant earns in the host country. Here 
again, fy  
is that portion of the migrant‟s disposable income in the initial stages of migration 
that is not susceptible to varying macroeconomic conditions of the host country. Similarly, fY
is the portion of household income that is susceptible to changes in the economic condition of 
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 In this case 
1U is the derivative of utility with respect to home-country consumption. 
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the host country ( ).fY  The income constraint of the migrant during this first or initial period of 
migration can, thus be given as f f fy Y C r s    , in which case 0   with r  being the 
proportion of the migrant‟s disposable income which he/she remits home, whilst s  represents 
the fraction of migrant‟s income saved in the home country.  
 
During the second period (i.e. at the later stages) of migration, the migrant‟s household 
migrates to a foreign industrialised country, often joining the migrant in his/her host country64. If 
this assumption holds, then the migrant‟s optimisation problem is given as follows: 
 ( , ) ( )f h zMaxU C C V C        (4.1)
 { , , }C r s  
subject to 
 f f fy Y C r s            (4.2) 
and 
 (1 )z z zC y Y i s           (4.3) 
where ( )zV C  
denotes the utility from second-period consumption so that 1 0V   and 11 0V  , 
is a discount factor, i  is the interest rate (intuitively the deposit interest rate) of the home 
country, with zy  
and zY  
having similar interpretations as fy  
and fY  
but for the second period. 
By finding the first-order conditions of this problem, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) obtained 
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) below: 
 1 1(1 )U V i          (4.4) 
 
 2 1(1 )rhU C V i           (4.5) 
From Equations (4.4) and (4.5), it is possible to derive r  with respect to host-country income 
( )fY  as shown in Equation (4.6) below: 
2
11 11(1 ) 0
f
U V ir
Y D
 
 

      (4.6) 
                                                          
64
 According to Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006: 86), “similar results can be obtained assuming that, in the second 
period, the emigrant returns to the home country and joins the household”. 
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where D, the determinant of the matrix of the second derivatives, is 
2 2 2 2 2
11 11 11 22 2 11 22 2(1 ) (1 ) (( ) ) 0r rr r rrh h h hD U V i V i U C U C U C U C U            
 for a 
maximum (Vargas-Silva and Huang, 2006). The central implication of Equation (4.6) is that an 
improvement in the economic conditions of the host country positively affects remittance flows 
from the migrant-host country to the migrant-home country. This is so because an increase in Y 
implies improvements in economic conditions in the migrant-host country which enables a 
migrant to send more money home as 0;   given that households spend their incomes on 
normal goods. In Equation (4.7), it is also shown that an improvement in the economic 
conditions of the migrant-home country is associated with a decrease in remittance inflows in 
the remittance-receiving (migrant‟s home) country. 
 
 
2
22 11 11(1 )
( ) 0
r y
h
h h
h
U C C U V ir
Y D
         
 
 
    (4.7) 
 
Impliedly, Equation (4.7) is non-positive when a migrant is remitting for altruistic purposes. 
Under this assumption, the migrant remits less funds to his/her family in the home country 
because the target household is better off, 0.   To conclude, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) 
prove that changes in remittances as a result of changes in the rate of interest in the host 
country could have two contrasting effects for which reason the sign of Equation (4.8) is 
indeterminate unless further assumptions are made. 
 
 
 11 1 11(1 )
/ 0
U V V i sr
i D
   
   
  
     (4.8) 
 
Thus, from Equation (4.8), it is evident that, on the one hand, if there is a higher real rate of 
interest on deposits in the host country a rational migrant who is driven by a self-interest 
investment motive, will reduce the amount of funds remitted to his/her home country and 
increase his/her savings in the host country. On the other hand, if the real deposit interest rate 
in the host country increases, a migrant can now consume more in the future and since 
remittances form part of the consumption basket of the consumer, funds remitted home during 
the second period may increase.  
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However, a typical non-altruistic migrant from a developing country is more likely to react more 
to changes in real interest rate in his/her home country than in the host country. The logical 
reasoning being that the average price level in a migrant-host country often tends to be lower 
and more stable than what pertains in the migrant‟s home country (a typical SSA country), 
which makes real deposit interest rates lower and more erratic at home than abroad. Apart from 
this, migrants under implicit social contract would still be compelled to remit under duress 
irrespective of changes in the returns on financial assets in their respective host countries. With 
a higher real deposit interest rate at home, migrants with the intention of returning home after 
some time may be motivated to remit through the formal financial system in which banks and 
stock markets are prominent. Real interest rates on deposits at home are an indication of 
improved financial sector development through competition and risk diversification. In other 
words, commercial banks in the migrant-home country are likely to mobilise more private funds 
in the form of remittances from migrants living abroad if real deposit interest rates are positive 
and attractive. Accordingly, in an attempt to respond to what macroeconomic policy SSA 
countries must implement to attract higher inflows of migrant remittances through the official 
channels, the role of the domestic financial sector and, for that matter, the level of real deposit 
interest rate in the home countries should be more imperative. This is why with the same level 
of interest rates in France (the leading host nation of SSA migrants) some SSA countries 
(Benin, Comoros, Mauritius, Senegal and Togo) receive more official remittances than other 
SSA countries (Congo, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Niger) in per capita terms (see Figure 
3.5).  
 
Again, it is imprudent to assume that a rational pure self-interest investment-driven migrant, in 
taking investment decisions in this globalised world, will restrict such decisions to his/her home 
country conditions in comparison with the prevailing and/or anticipated conditions in his/her 
host country only, and completely ignore the relevant investment conditions of the rest of the 
world. Therefore, the key modification made in this study to the Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) 
theoretical framework is to, rather than emphasising  the real interest rate differential between 
the migrant-host country and the migrant-home country, the migrant-host country real interest 
rate is held constant whilst attention is given to the real deposit interest of the migrant-home 
country. This is imperative because in devising an effective policy strategy for attracting higher 
migrant remittances through the formal transfer channels to the sub-region, policy makers in 
potential remittance-receiving SSA countries can influence only the domestic factors such as 
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interest rates, bearing in mind the exogenous prevailing and expected global economic 
conditions. 
 
4.5 EMPIRICAL MODEL, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA ISSUES 
This section presents the empirical model, methodology and data issues under in sub-sections 
4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 respectively. 
 
4.5.1 The Empirical Model 
In line with the modified Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) theoretical framework, Equation (4.9) 
constitutes the baseline specification of the empirical dynamic panel-data model, involving the 
36 sampled SSA countries over a 30-year period, 1980-2009: 
 ,Rit i t l it itR x              (4.9) 
where   is a scalar, and itx  
is the thi  observation on the k  explanatory variables. And 
because Equation (4.9) is a model with a one-way error component it has unobservable 
country-specific effect ( )i  and the remaining residuals ( )it , such that it i it    . More 
explicitly, the estimated model is of the form: 
 ,Rit i t l it i itR x               (4.10)
 
where the residuals ( )it  are white-noise such that 
2(0, )it IID   , 
2(0, )i IID    and   is a 
scalar such that, generally, 1  ; 1,2,3,....,i N  is an index for individual sampled SSA 
countries, implying 36N  ; 1,2,3,....,t T  is an index for time-variant periods, in this case, 
years, so that 10T   for decade-based estimations such as 1980-89, 1990-99, and 2000-09; 
whilst 30T   for the estimations involving the overall study period, 1980-2009. The country-
specific effect and the disturbance term are independent of each other and among themselves. 
itx  
as row vector of explanatory variables, excluding the lagged dependent variable, has the 
dimension k  where 1k n   with n  being the number of exogenous variables, but it is 
acknowledged that these variables may not be strictly exogenous.   is the unknown parameter 
of the lagged endogenous variable;   is the unknown parameter vector of the k  exogenous 
variables; l  is the number of significant lags carried by the dependent variable to capture “the 
entire history of the right-hand side variables, so that any measured influence is conditioned on 
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this history”65 (Greene, 2003: 307); and i  country-specific fixed effects. This model is also 
based on the assumptions that: (i) the error term is orthogonal to the exogenous variables so 
that ( ) 0;it itE x    (ii) the independently and identically distributed error term is uncorrelated 
with the lagged endogenous variable implying that , 1( ) 0;i t itE R    (iii) the exogenous variables 
might be correlated with the individual effect for which reason, ( ) 0;it iE x    and (iv) there is the 
need to capture the dynamic effects of remittances because either altruistic migrant remittances 
could decay often by the second generation as family and social ties become weak (Lucas and 
Stark, 1985; Lozano-Ascencio, 1993; Glytsos, 1997), or the value of migrant remittances 
increase over time for self-interest investment motive as the legal residential and income status 
of migrants improve. 
 
The endogenous variable R is a measure of remittances either as migrant remittances (MRem), 
workers‟ remittances (WREM) or compensation of employees (COMP). When deflated by 
population, the endogenous variable is redefined as REMPC, WREMPC and COMPPC 
respectively in the specific estimated models. In estimating the model on the total migrant 
remittance inflows in SSA, the natural logarithmic form of the dependent variable (lnMRem) 
was used. Macroeconomic factors influencing migrant remittance inflows as a percentage of 
GDP (REMGDP) were also explored to make room for comparison with the preferred REMPC 
results. The explanatory variables are real deposit interest rate of a typical SSA country (RIR), 
real bilateral exchange rate (RXR), host-country income ( )
fY , home-country income ( )
hY , 
home-country CPI-based inflation rate (INF), bank credit to the private sector as a percentage 
of GDP in the home country (PSC), and the quality of institutions in the home country (INS). For 
the entire sample period analysis, a dummy (D9_11) was introduced for post-September 11, 
2001 such that D9_11=0 for 1980-2001, and D9_11=1 for 2002-2009 to reflect the era of 
improved enforcement of regulations and tougher laws on international money transfers in a bid 
to clampdown on money laundering, official corruption and other illegal activities that threaten 
global security. The introduction of this time dummy (D9_11) is also important as it helps to 
prevent any possible cross-individual correlation or contemporaneous correlation. 
                                                          
65
 Because of the implicit effect of altruism behind all kinds of migrant remittances and because of the continuous 
influence of newly-arrived migrants on remittance flows, the number of significant lags can be very high, as many as 
eight, as noted in this study (the results are available but are not reported due to space), but the study restricted the 
number of significant lags to two as the key motivation is not to determine the historical trend in remittance flows in 
completeness. The lag of two is also consistent with the migrant remittances inter-generational effects theory 
(Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992; Lozano-Ascencio, 1993) and the optimal number of lags for stationarity (Table A4.5). 
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From Equation (4.10), there are 2T   orthogonality restrictions in levels which are exploited; 
hence that observation t  in levels was used for the estimation, where differences are used as 
valid instruments, when it is assumed that x  is at least predetermined66. For instance, for the 
last observation, T , specified as , 1iT i T iT i iTR R x         , the instruments used are 
,1 ,2 ,3 , 1 1 2 3 ,, , ,...., , , , ,...., .i i i i T i i i i Tdy dy dy dy dx dx dx dx     The corresponding matrices used for the 
estimation as given by Behr (2003)  are shown in Box A4.1 in the Appendix. 
 
The choice of the dynamic panel-data model is informed by the fact that data on remittance 
inflows in most SSA countries have been more consistently available across countries only in 
recent years and, therefore, the panel has small fixed T  and large N . The small T  large N  
dimension of the panel data is also underscored by the fact that a decade-by-decade analysis 
was carried out prior to estimating for the overall study period so as to find out, whether or not, 
the macroeconomic factors that attract remittances to SSA have been consistent over the past 
three decades. Another justification for the dynamic panel-data estimation approach is that the 
relationship under consideration is linear; the left-hand side variable is singular and dynamic; 
the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous; there are fixed individual effects; and there 
are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within the cross-sectional units but not across them 
(Behr, 2003; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2009a). A unique advantage of dynamic 
panel-data models is that, by allowing for empirical modelling of dynamics alongside the 
individual-specific dynamics, they provide the necessary platform to account for past behaviour-
effect directly on current behaviour, whilst recognising the fact that individual cross-sectional 
units have a  predilection to behave in any particular way. 
 
4.5.2 The Methodological Approach 
The methodological approach is presented under five sub-themes namely, the system 
Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator, the Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation, the decade-based 
parameter evolution and instability test, and the panel-data unit root test. 
  
 
                                                          
66
 Further discussions and insights can be found in Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundell and Bond (1998), Wooldridge 
(2002), Behr (2003), and Greene (2003). 
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4.5.2.1 The System Generalised Method of Moment (sys-GMM) Estimator 
The Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimation procedure is the preferred choice over 
other alternative panel-data estimation techniques such as instrumental variable panel-data 
fixed (or random) effects (IV FE/RE) and 2SLS panel FE/RE, because: (i) some of the 
explanatory variables viz. PSC, RXR, 
fY and hY are known not to be strictly exogenous,67 
given the possibility of a two-way causality (see Section 4.3.2); (ii) time-invariant individual 
features such as geography, demography and economic policy may correlate with the 
explanatory variables so that the error term is influenced by unobserved country-specific effects 
and the observation-specific errors; (iii) the dynamic nature of the model naturally gives rise to 
serial correlation; and (iv) the panel data setting is structured by small time dimension ( )T  and 
large cross-sectional dimension ( )N . In the presence of the aforementioned econometric 
problems, neither IV FE/RE nor 2SLS FE/RE panel-data estimators can be efficient, whilst 
GMM estimation technique was specially developed to handle these problems more 
efficiently.68 For instance, instead of using only exogenous instruments as is in panel FE/RE 
and 2SLS FE/RE, the lagged endogenous regressors are also instrumented with their past 
levels, thereby making endogenous variables pre-determined and, hence, uncorrelated with the 
error term. Also, to circumvent the problems associated with time-invariant country-specific 
characteristics, GMM uses a unique difference transformation process to eliminate these 
effects (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Greene, 2003). Furthermore, 
Roodman (2009a) explains with experimental evidence that within a panel data setting of 
N T  as is conditional to the application of GMM technique, where T  is large but not in 
relation to N (i.e. both T  and N  are large, but N  is still larger than T ), a shock to a country-
fixed effect which is captured in the idiosyncratic error term will decline over time. 
 
The Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimation technique rather than the „difference‟ 
GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the „deviation‟ GMM suggested by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) is employed in this study. The system GMM (henceforth sys-GMM) is the 
preferred choice because within this framework it is possible to include non-country-specific 
time-invariant regressors such as D9_11, which tend to disappear in „difference‟ GMM (Baltagi, 
2008; Roodman, 2009a). Additionally, the Arellano and Bond (1991) and the Arellano and 
                                                          
67
 Apart from simultaneity, endogeneity in Equation (4.9) can arise from period effects which occur due to systematic 
shocks after a change in any of the explanatory variables; unobserved heterogeneity due to omitted variables; and 
variable measurement errors (Woodridge, 2002; Greene, 2003; Balgati, 2008). 
68
 For proof or further insight, see Hansen (1982), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), and Arellano and Bond (1991). 
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Bover (1995) GMM techniques are known to be inefficient when the instruments are weak as 
they make use of the information contained in differences only, but in the sys-GMM framework, 
additional level information besides the differences are used (Blundell and Bond, 1998; 
Roodman, 2009a). More specifically, the sys-GMM estimator uses the levels equation to obtain 
a system of two equations – a differenced equation and a levels equation – such that by adding 
the second equation, additional instruments are generated. Thus, by allowing for more 
instruments the estimated coefficients of the Blundell and Bond (1998) sys-GMM are not only 
more efficient, but also more consistent than other alternative techniques of dynamic panel-
data analysis. The Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM is popularly referred to as the sys-GMM 
because it is composed of moment restrictions for differences and levels resulting in a common 
efficient estimator. This study adopted the two-step sys-GMM estimator which combines the 
1T   first-differenced equations and the average level equation, and has been proven69 to 
produce a standard covariance matrix that is robust to panel-specific autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
The main econometric concern of GMM methodological approach is the problem of instrument 
proliferation (Roodman, 2009b). The instrument proliferation problem is more severe in large 
samples70 whereby a large collection of instruments, even if individually valid, can be invalid as 
a group in infinite samples because the instruments over-fit the endogenous variables 
(Roodman, 2009b). According to Roodman (2009b), because models involving sys-GMM are 
almost always over-identified, and because the Hansen J  statistic71 theoretically detects any 
violation of the instrument validity assumption, econometricians using sys-GMM are relieved of 
the need to probe this further. The problem, however, is that there are contexts in which 
instrument proliferation weakens the Hansen J  test statistic (Baum et al. 2003; Roodman, 
2009b). Proliferating purely by increasing T to prevent covariates, Roodman (2009b) concludes 
that the symptoms of proliferation became noticeable only when 15T  , implying a longer time 
dimension reduces instrument invalidity in a simulation exercise. At 20,T   the full-instrument 
variant never detects it, with an average  -value on the Hansen J  test of 1.00. 
                                                          
69
 See Roodman (2009a,b) for this proof. 
70
 Although „large samples‟ in this context are not explicitly defined, various Monte Carlo experiments in this regard 
seem to suggest the severe manifestation of this problem as N is about 50 in rare cases but often when 100N  
(see, for example, Roodman, 2009b; Chan et al. 2012). 
71
 The Hansen J statistic is equivalent to the Sargan test statistic for over-identifying restrictions computed from 
robust estimates (Baum et al., 2003; Roodman, 2009a,b; Chan et al. 2012). This is why some scholars refer to the 
Sargan statistic from robust estimates as the Hansen-Sargan statistic or the Sargan-Hansen statistic or as in the 
case of this study, simply the Sargan statistic. 
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The two conventional techniques to addressing instrument over-fitting in dynamic GMM panels 
is limiting. One of the techniques that is often used to overcome the problem of instrument 
proliferation is to limit the lag depth by selecting some of the lags to be included in the 
instrument set, making the instrument count linear in T . Another approach is to collapse the 
instrument set to the extent that the orthogonality condition no longer needs to be valid for any 
one time period but still for each lag, again making the instrument linear in T . A combination of 
both techniques makes the instrument count invariant to T (Mehrhoff, 2009). Currently, there is 
no widely accepted rule of thumb for optimal instrumentation whilst the decision to choose any 
of the aforementioned approaches to instrument proliferation treatment has been done 
arbitrarily stirring further controversy. Studies are currently underway to establish how the data 
can decide how the transformation matrix should look (see, for example, Mehrhoff, 2009). So 
far, the available preliminary results from work-in-progress on using Monte Carlo simulation to 
investigate model performance with instrument over-fitting has been for samples of minimum of 
100N   and 30T   at best (see, for example, Mehrhoff, 2009; Roodman, 2009b). What 
remains unclear and unresolved in the literature of GMM estimation is how large or small T and 
N  have to be, relative to each other, for the GMM estimator to be „perfect‟ (Roodman, 2009b).  
 
As has been widely documented in the literature, it must be emphasised that the instrument 
proliferation problem is not peculiar to GMM estimators (Tauchen, 1986; Anderson and 
Sørensen, 1996; Altonji and Segal, 1996; Ziliak, 1997; Bowsher, 2002). For instance, the poor 
performance of IV estimators when instruments are too many has been long identified by 
Hayashi, 2000; Ruud, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002; Arellano, 2003). Moreover, over-fitting is still a 
problem even at low instrument counts (Roodman, 2009b). 
 
Furthermore, if heteroskedasticity is present the GMM estimator is more efficient than the 
simple IV estimator, whereas “if heteroskedasticity is absent, the GMM estimator is no worse 
asymptotically than the IV estimator” (Baum et al. 2003: 11). There is no proof suggesting, 
however, that in the presence of homoscedasticity other panel-data estimators including the IV 
estimator in a dynamic context are more efficient than the sys-GMM estimator. According to 
Balgati (2008: 87) “homoskedastic disturbances when heteroskedasticity is present will still 
result in consistent estimates of the regression coefficients, but these estimates will not be 
efficient” because of biased standard errors. This requires the econometrician to compute 
robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity (Baum et al. 2003; Balgati, 
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2008; Roodman, 2009b; Chan et al. 2012). Robust estimation by two-step GMM automatically 
generates homoscedastic standard errors (ibid). In consequence of this, to exonerate the 
empirical results from criticisms of heteroskedasticity, a two-step robust sys-GMM estimation 
procedure was followed in this study. 
 
To demonstrate empirically that in spite of the fact that there is no universally accepted perfect 
estimator in econometric modelling, the dynamic panel-data sys-GMM estimator is more 
appropriate, efficient and reliable than both conventional and robust static panel-data 
estimators in the general context of this study, the researcher proceeded to estimate the 
empirical static panel-data models involving the complete sample size, in other words, where
( ) (30 36)N T   .  
 
4.5.2.2 The Sargan-Hansen Test for Over-Identifying Restrictions 
If, and only if, a dynamic panel-data model is over-identified, it should be possible to verify if the 
excluded instruments are correctly independent of the residual process. Therefore, to test for 
the joint validity of the instruments used, the study adhered to the suggestions by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), and Roodman (2009a) inter alia by conducting the Sargan-Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions after the sys-GMM estimation. Like the conventional Sargan test, the 
Sargan-Hansen test can only be performed when a model is estimated using instrumental 
variable techniques and the estimated model is actually over-identified (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). The “robustified Sargan statistic is numerically identical to the Hansen J statistic 
computed from feasible efficient two-step GMM for that model” which is commonly referred to 
as the Hansen-Sargan or the Sargan-Hansen statistic (Baum et al., 2003: 18). In fact, in robust 
estimation, stata reports the Hansen J statistic in the place of the usual Sargan statistic with the 
same null hypothesis (Baum et al., 2003; Roodman, 2009a,b). For simplicity sake, however, the 
test statistics for the joint validity of the instruments used in the sys-GMM estimations are 
reported as the Sargan test in this dissertation. 
 
The routine Sargan-Hansen test is formulated on the null hypothesis that the instruments used 
as a group are exogenous, therefore, the higher the p-value of the test statistic, the better. The 
Sargan-Hansen test, which has an asymptotic 
2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of over-identifying restrictions (i.e. number of instruments used minus number of 
endogenous variables), is often weak in small N where the number of instruments is large and 
exceeds the number of groups. Roodman (2009a,b) cautions that the Sargan-Hansen test 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
127 
 
should not be relied upon too faithfully, as it is prone to weakness” because “large instrument 
collection can over-fit endogenous variables, but notes also that this does not compromise the 
consistency of the coefficient estimates. 
 
According to Roodman (2009b), although the Sargan-Hansen test requires homoskedastic 
errors in order to be consistent, it is not vulnerable to instrument proliferation because it does 
not depend on an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix. The Sargan-Hansen test is based 
on the observation that the residuals should be uncorrelated with the set of exogenous 
variables if the instruments are truly exogenous (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982). The Sargan 
test statistic can be calculated as 2nR  (the number of observations n  multiplied by the 
coefficient of determination 
2R ) from the OLS regression of the residuals (from IV estimation) 
onto the set of exogenous variables (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982; Wooldridge, 2002; Baum et 
al. 2003). This test statistic will be asymptotically chi-squared with m k  (where m  is the 
number of instruments and k  is the number of endogenous variables) degrees of freedom 
under the 0H  that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments. 
 
4.5.2.3 The Arellano-Bond Test for Second-Order Serial Correlation 
Following the recommendations by Arellano and Bond (1991) which were later substantiated by 
a host of other panel data experts, including Blundell and Bond (1998), Behr (2003), Greene 
(2003), Roodman (2009a,b), and Baltagi (2008), the Arellano-Bond test (henceforth the A-B 
test) was performed. The A-B test is specially designed to detect second-order serial 
correlation (AR(2)) in the idiosyncratic disturbance term within a GMM framework, a situation 
which rendered some lags invalid as instruments. Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the A-B 
test for AR(2) in first differences is more relevant than that of the AR(1) because the former 
specifically examines the presence of autocorrelation in levels. Arellano and Bond (1991) prove 
that the A-B test is critically important because the consistency of the GMM estimator is 
dependent upon the realism of the condition that , 2( ) 0it i tE      .  
 
The A-B test for autocorrelation is based on a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and it is 
applied to the differenced residuals. It is for this reason that the A-B test for (1)AR  process in 
first differences usually rejects the null hypothesis essentially because , 1it it i t      and 
, 1 , 1 , 2i t i t i t        
both have , 1i t  (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond 2000). This 
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hypothesis holds true if it is serially uncorrelated or does not follow a random walk to 
undermine the appropriate specification of an estimated dynamic panel-data model by GMM.  
Technically, therefore, the test for (2)AR  in first differences is more important because, as 
noted earlier, it will detect autocorrelation in levels. This study transgresses accordingly by 
testing and reporting the A-B statistics for second-order autocorrelation. 
 
Based on the outcome of experimental evidence, Roodman (2009a), however, observes that in 
small N dynamic panels the A-B test may not be reliable, but so far a more efficient alternative 
test for this purpose has not been developed. 
 
4.5.2.4 The Decade-Based Parameter Evolution and Instability Test 
Generally, all available sample observations are used for estimation to enhance the possibility 
of an econometric specification that best fits a given dataset. This does not allow the 
econometrician to test for parameter constancy, stability and robustness of the estimated 
relationship (Brown et al. 1975). In panel-data econometric modelling, the econometrician will 
have to go by either the observations in time ( )T  or the observations in cross section ( )N  and 
use a subset of either panel-data dimension (i.e. T or N ) for the parameter evolution and 
instability testing. Consistent with the time-dependent decade-based analysis in Chapter Three 
and the revealed cyclical pattern of migrant remittances received by SSA, there is a reasonable 
basis to expect a priori a structural break by the end of each decade (in this case, 1989 and 
1999). 
 
In testing for the decade-based structural break, this study fits the specified panel-data 
econometric model separately for each decade in order to verify whether there are statistically 
significant differences in the estimated decade-based parameters. A statistically significant 
difference indicates a parameter evolution, hence a validated evidence of a changing impact of 
the explanatory variables on the dependent variable over time according to the specific 
decades. Accordingly, to investigate the instability of the estimated coefficients obtained from 
the three decades (1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09), the full sample data was further partitioned 
into two overlapping decades - 1985-1994 and 1995-2004. Within the confines of this study, 
only two additional time-variant sub-samples (1985-1994 and 1995-2004) are possible because 
as shown by Chow (1960), Gujarati (1970a,b), Fomby et al. (1984) and Chan et al. (2012), 
each sub-sample must necessarily have the same dimension. 
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Empirical econometric parameters are unlikely to be stable over time in response to policy 
regime changes because rational economic agents are likely to change their decisions 
according to the prevailing or the anticipated policy environment. In view of this hypothesis, the 
parameter instability test procedure proposed by Andrews (2003) and Chan et al. (2012) was 
adopted to examine the degree of instability of the estimated decade-based parameters across 
the three decades, 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09. The justification for the Andrews (2003) 
and Chan et al. (2012) test for structural breaks and parameter instability is that the well-known 
econometric tests for structural breaks in the literature including the celebrated Chow (1960; 
1984) test are often applied in cases of a single structural break. The modified related 
alternative statistical tests proposed by Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994), and 
Bai and Perron (1998) for an unknown structural breakpoint or the multiple breakpoints are 
appropriate only when the break is relatively long lasting and occurs in the midpoint of the 
sample distribution (Chan et al. 2012). As shown in Mancini-Griffoli and Pauwels (2006) the 
application of the Andrews (2003) coefficient stability test under the assumption of fixed effects 
panel data is straightforward. 
 
The standardised „diferential‟ Z statistic for evolution and instability in panel-data model 
essentially amounts to comparing two average statistics taken from a pre-break sub-sample 
and a post-break sample (Andrews, 2003; Chan et al. 2012). The determination of the average 
statistic for a pre-break and the post-break sub-samples requires the computation of the test 
statistic s  times for each individual sub-sample panel in addition to any overlapping sub-
sample of equal dimension if the interest is to include verifying coefficient stability by rolling 
over time. In general terms, Andrews (2003) and Chan et al. (2012) specify the standardised Z
statistic to test for evolution and instability in panel-data models which involves taking the 
difference of the post- and pre-break average statistics as: 
 
 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
2 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
      
( ) 2
Z
Var S S S S S S 
   
    
 
  
    (6.11) 
where 
1ˆ  and 
0ˆ  are the estimated coefficient for the post- and pre-break samples 
respectively, 0ˆS  and 1ˆS  are the corresponding standard errors, and Z  follows an asymptotic 
distribution (0,1)
A
NZ N . Intuitively, if the 0H  
is true then Z  will be centred around zero. 
However, under the alternative, the Z  will centre further away from zero, indicating more 
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evidence against the 0H . The sample size that was used to determine 
0ˆ  is the same as in 
the case of 
1ˆ , implying that, with reference to this study, each of the comparing decade-based 
estimated coefficient was obtained from a panel dimension of ( ) (36 10).N T    According to 
Chan et al. (2012), it is recommended to use the first i  observations to estimate 
0ˆ  in order 
to effectively minimise the potential impact of serial correlation in the errors by maximising the 
distance between any two sub-samples.  
 
Using ,j  ,j  C ,j D j  
and E j  
to represent a decade-based estimated parameter for a given 
explanatory variable for the periods, 1980-89, 1990-99, 2000-09, 1985-94, and 1995-2004 
respectively, the „differential‟ ijZ test for each of the three decades of interest i  and a specific 
explanatory variable j  was computed by finding the following differences: 
i. j j   to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 1980-89 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 1990-99. 
ii. Cj j   to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 1990-99 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 2000-09. 
iii. Cj j   to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 1980-89 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 2000-09. 
 
Similarly, to establish the degree of time-variant evolution stability of the respective estimated 
parameters for each of the three decades of interest (i.e. 1980-89, 1990-99, and 2000-09) the 
„differential‟ ijZ test was computed for: 
i. Dj j   to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 1980-89 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 1985-1994. 
ii. B Dj j  to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 1990-99 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 1985-1994. 
iii. Ej j   to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 1990-99 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 1995-2004. 
iv. C Ej j  to determine how each of the estimated coefficients of the results for 2000-09 
is statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of 1995-2004. 
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Therefore, to establish, whether or not, the estimated parameter inf( )  of a given explanatory 
variable (say, inflation abbreviated as inf) for a decade (say, 1980-89) is statistically different 
from the estimated parameter inf( )  
of the same explanatory variable (inf) for another decade 
(say, 1990-99) the „differential‟ ijZ  
statistic was computed by evaluating the expression:  
 
 
 inf
inf
2 2
inf
    
2
cZ Z
S S S S

   

 
 
       (6.12)
 
where cZ denotes the computed „differential‟ Z  statistic so that in case  c critical valueZ Z  
at 95 
per cent confidence interval, then the conclusion would be that the difference between the two 
estimated coefficients ( inf and inf ) is not statistically different from zero, hence the 
0 inf inf: 0H     
which implies inf inf   would not be rejected. Thus, from an econometric 
viewpoint, the impact of inflation on the dependent variable (say, remittances) in the 1980s and 
in the 1990s is actually the same. Otherwise, if  c critical valueZ Z , then the 0 inf inf: 0H    or 
0 inf inf:H    
is rejected at the conventional statistical levels. 
 
4.5.2.5 The Panel-Data Unit Root Test 
Concerning the possible problems associated with data non-stationarity, Phillips and Moon 
(2000) dismiss earlier arguments by Kao (1999), and Phillips and Moon (1999) that the use of 
panel data naturally evades spurious regression and produces efficient, reliable and consistent 
parameter estimates even when both N and T are large and approach infinity. According to 
Phillips and Moon (2000), unlike in the case involving the use of survey data, it is often 
impossible to have a panel setting where N is sufficiently large in macro panel-data models. 
Consequently, many macro cases actually involve (in relation to each other) large N and large 
T even where N T . And in the case of panels where both N and T are large, there is the 
need to pay serious attention to verifying the asymptotic properties of the data. Therefore, to 
exonerate this study from criticisms of spurious regressions, unit root tests for panel data were 
performed on each of the variables included in the empirical analyses despite the fact that the 
panel data structure is of N T . This is because for the estimations based on the overall study 
period, whilst N still remained at 36, T increased to 30, compared to 10T   in the case of 
decade-based regressions. This study assumes that since 30T   is generally considered large 
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enough for a country-specific time series analysis, issues related to spurious regression cannot 
be downplayed, though N T .  
 
Consequently, out of the various panel-data unit root tests available (see Asteriou, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008), this study essentially relied on the Fisher Phillips-Perron (Fisher P-P) chi-square 
test of individual root test and the Hadri Heteroskedasticity Consistent z-statistic (HHC) test, 
whilst the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) adjusted t test was evoked when the Fisher P-P and HHC tests 
were in conflict. The Fisher P-P test is essentially the panel version of the P-P test used in time 
series econometrics, and in reality and similarity, the average of the P-P t-test statistics of the 
individual cross-sectional units where the disturbance term is serially correlated with different 
autocorrelation properties across the cross-sectional units (Im et al. 2003). The null hypothesis 
of Fisher P-P is that each series in the panel has a unit root whilst the alternative hypothesis 
permits some of the individual series to be non-stationary. The main advantage of the Fisher P-
P over the other alternative tests, (notably, HHC, LLC and Breitung t-test), is its ability to handle 
both balanced and unbalanced panel data, including balanced panels with missing data points. 
The HHC residual-based Lagrange Multiplier (LM) panel unit root test was developed by Hadri 
(2000) from the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) stationarity test for time series 
data. The null hypothesis of HHC test is that there is no unit root in any of the series in the 
panel against the alternative of a unit root in the panel. The key advantage of HHC is its ability 
to handle panels with heteroskedasticity, but it is not applicable where a series suffers from 
omission(s). The LLC panel unit root test is particularly designed for panels with size structure 
where 10 250N   and 25 250T  , under the assumptions of no cross-sectional 
correlations, and all cross-sectional units having or not having a unit root (Levin et al. 2002). 
The LLC test, which is essentially the panel version of the popular Dickey-Fuller or Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test in time series econometrics, is formulated on the hypothesis that each 
individual time series has a unit root against the alternative that each time series is stationary in 
levels (Levin et al. 2002). The main limitation of LLC is its inability to handle heterogeneous 
panels and panel series with missing data points72. 
 
4.5.3 Data Measurement, Sources and Expected Impact on Remittances 
Low frequency balanced panel data from secondary sources was used in this study. The 
relevant annual series were collated on 36 SSA countries for the period, 1980-2009. The 
                                                          
72
 Further information on panel unit root tests, including the formula for the Fisher P-P, HHC, and LLC test statistics 
can be found in Asteriou (2006) and Baltagi (2008). 
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sample size was determined strictly by the availability of consistent data on the relevant 
variables particularly migrant remittances. The choice of the start date was contingent upon the 
desire to cover as many countries as possible for higher representation of the population rather 
than covering longer periods with limited coverage of the target population. Besides, the 
relevance of migrant remittance inflows in SSA became evident only in the 1980s as shown by 
the stylised facts presented in Chapter Three. Among other reasons, the choice of the upper 
limit of the study period is based on the availability of consistent data as data on some of key 
variables notably financial liberalisation, poverty and income inequality proxied by Gini 
coefficient are not currently available beyond 2009. In fact, the World Bank publishes data on 
poverty and income inequality after every five years. Coincidentally, the upper limit of 2009 has 
also enabled the researcher to be consistent with the objective of undertaking a decade-based 
analysis. 
 
For this study, migrant remittances as defined in Chapter Two constitute the sum of workers‟ 
remittances recorded in the current account of IMF‟s Balance of Payments Statistics (BoPS) 
under the heading “current transfers”; and compensation of employees recorded under the 
“Income” sub-category of the current account. Mathematically, compensation of employees is 
the net of migrant remittances less workers‟ remittances. Migrant remittances and workers‟ 
remittances were obtained mainly from the World Development Indicators (WDI) published by 
the World Bank based on the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook (BoPS) of the IMF, and 
the Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 published by the World Bank. Other sources 
such as estimates based on IMF country-specific desk official information were used to fill in 
some of the missing data points where possible73. Compensation of employees received 
(COMP) was obtained by subtracting workers‟ remittances received (WREM) from migrant 
remittances (MRem) received but due to problems related to the classification of reported 
remittances from migrants, there are instances where the implied COMP received was less 
than zero because the reported WREM was greater than migrant remittances. Consistent with 
the definition of migrant remittances and underlying BoP double-entry accounting principle 
where a credit transaction cannot be negative74, for the estimations based on COMP, only data 
points for which COMP is non-negative were used in this study. 
 
                                                          
73
 In a recent study, Singh et al. (2010) used a similar approach to obtain remittances data on 36 SSA countries. 
74
 See Chapter Two of this dissertation, and IMF‟s BoPS Yearbook and Balance of Payment Textbook for details. 
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The measurement of home-country income and host-country income adopted in this study is 
quite rare in empirical studies. Real GDP per capita in US dollars at purchasing power parity 
(PPP) of a typical SSA country (
hY ) was used as a proxy for the migrant-home country income 
which also represents the average annual earnings of the family left behind who are considered 
as the main prospective recipients of migrant remittances. Similarly, real GDP per capita PPP 
in US dollars of a typical migrant-host country (
fY ) was used as a proxy for the average 
annual earnings of an SSA international migrant who is considered as a potential remitter. The 
use of real GDP per capita PPP instead of the commonly used real GDP per capita as a proxy 
for host-country (migrant) income and home-country (family) income in this study is second 
only to Schiopu and Siegfried (2006), Moore and Greenidge (2008), and Adams (2009). The 
justification for using the PPP-based real income includes, that: (i) in making decisions on how 
much and how often to remit, migrants take into consideration the quantity of goods and 
services the assets transferred (remittances) can actually buy in the recipient country at the 
prevailing market conditions; (ii) inflating the income gap between countries are resolved as 
non-tradables are accounted for; and (iii) any perceived existing country-specific 
misrepresentation of facts arising especially from monetary and exchange rate policies such as 
redenomination of a national currency that might be misinterpreted as leading to currency 
overvaluation is adequately accounted for. 
 
Human capital accumulation (HCA) is a more comprehensive concept than just acquisition of 
formal education by a portion of the population of a particular country. However, most macro-
level empirical studies are restricted to the measures of education (see, for example, Table 
A4.1) so that education and human capital are often conflated and used interchangeably in the 
literature. For the sake of easy access to adequate data which is its clear advantage over other 
alternative measures in macro-level cross-country studies, this study transgresses similarly by 
using secondary school enrolment to proxy for human capital accumulation (Mankiw et al. 
1992). Barror and Lee (1996) used average years of schooling. Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) used 
the proportion of government expenditure devoted to education. Bils and Klenow (1998) 
suggest the use of life expectancy to proxy for human capital accumulation. Barro (1998) and 
Barro and Sala-í-Martin (1995) assert that the gender disparity component of school attainment 
can be an alternative measure of human capital accumulation in a typical growth equation.  
 
Measurement of institutional quality (INS) is a daunting task because it is both complex and 
subjective. It is complex not only because institutions have two main dimensions viz. the formal 
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and the informal, but also because each of these aspects has various components. For 
example, formal institutions cover bureaucracy, corruption, law, property rights protection, 
political environment, governance, access to information, freedom, and economic and political 
participation. Informal institutions cover and wide range of indicators including perceptions of 
life, environment, work, family, politics and society, religion and morality, and national identity 
(Knack, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Knowles and Weatherston, 2006). It is subjective 
because an objective measure of institutions does not exist (Duc and Lavallee, 2004) 
necessitating measurement according to the feelings and perceptions of economic actors. 
 
There are alternative proxies to the institutional quality index constructed by Marshall and 
Jaggers (2011) used in this study. A typical alternative is the worldwide governance indicators 
compiled by the World Bank based on the governance research index developed by Kaufmann 
et al. (2003; 2008) for six dimensions namely, voice and accountability, political stability and 
presence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption. However, a major limitation of the World Bank‟s worldwide governance indicators is 
that data are only available for the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and from 2002-2007. Like the WB‟s 
worldwide governance indicators, the governance research index by Kaufmann et al. (2003) is 
not available on annual basis neither is it available for periods prior to 1996 nor after 2002. 
Similarly, although the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) reports a composite political 
risk index that comprises 12 institutional measures, it is limited in terms of time coverage. The 
12 dimensions of the ICRG index include bureaucratic quality, corruption, internal conflict, 
external conflict, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, government stability, investment 
profile, law and order, military in politics, socioeconomic conditions, and religious tensions. The 
ICRG data is not available prior to 1984 and while a good number of the sampled SSA 
countries do not have the ICRG data prior to the 1990s, some of the countries are not either 
consistently covered or they are completely excluded. There is also the worldwide index of 
human freedom constructed by the Fraser Institute (2008). The Fraser freedom index cover five 
categories, namely the size of government, the legal structures and security of property right, 
the access to sound money, the regulation of credit, labour and business, and the freedom to 
trade internationally. However, only 25 of the 36 sampled SSA countries are covered by the 
Fraser index. Moreover, the 10-category based economic freedom index developed by 
Heritage Foundation covers periods starting from 1995 at best and it is available for only 12 out 
of the sampled 36 SSA countries. It is for these reasons that the author relied on the Marshall 
and Jaggers polity2 index. 
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Meanwhile, Rodrik (2004) cautions that because the composite governance research index and 
the ICRG proxies for institutional quality are generally based on surveys of domestic and 
foreign investors they capture perceptions rather than the true formal aspects of the institutional 
setting. This creates problems of reverse causality and endogeneity. Moers (1999), however, 
observes that the use of subjective institutional measures instead of objective indicators in 
growth empirics is quite consistently verified. 
 
Liquid liabilities of the financial system are the sum of currency plus demand and interest-
bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries divided by nominal GDP. 
Broad money ratio which is often considered as the broadest measure of financial 
intermediation (King and Levine, 1993) encompasses the overall lending capacity of the 
financial system which covers the Central Bank, deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions. The merits and demerits of M2/GDP and PSC are discussed quite extensively in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
Whilst the degree of trade openness (OPN) is defined and is measured as the percentage of 
the volume of cross-border trade flows (exports plus imports of goods) undertaken by a typical 
migrant-home  country to its nominal GDP, the rate of inflation (INF) is measured as the annual 
percentage variations in consumer price index (CPI) of a typical SSA home country. Trade 
openness index shows the degree of economic liberalisation and participation in a globalised 
world whilst inflation rate measures the speed of adjustment in general price level, which 
reflects macroeconomic uncertainty and investment risk in the „labour-exporting‟ SSA country. 
 
Real bilateral exchange rate (RXR) is the annual average value of the national currency of a 
typical SSA migrant-sending country in real terms of the national currency of its leading non-
SSA migrant-host country. Mathematically, it is computed as the multiplication of the nominal 
bilateral exchange rate by the ratio of the migrant-host country CPI to the migrant-home country 
CPI. Real deposit interest rate (RIR) is the annual average bank deposit interest rate less the 
annual average CPI-based rate of inflation of a typical migrant-sending country. 
 
Apart from these traditional macroeconomic variables which were obtained essentially from the 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook / CD-ROM (IFS) and World Economic Outlook 
(WEO), as well as the World Bank‟s WDI and AfDB‟s African Development Indicators (ADI), a 
dummy variable for capturing the global regulatory environment in connection with cross-border 
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money transfer following September 11, 2001 was also introduced into the empirical model. In 
Table A4.2 in the Appendix, a more concise and exact information on the description, 
measurement and sources of the specific variables used in this study is provided. The a priori 
sign of each of the explanatory variables is also indicated in Table A4.2. 
 
4.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section is organised into four sub-sections. The results on robustness test models and the 
diagnostic tests are discussed in Section 4.6.1. Then, the main results upon which policy 
recommendations are made follow in this order: the empirical results on the determinants of 
migrant remittance inflows are presented and discussed in Section 4.6.2; those related to 
workers‟ remittance inflows are presented and discussed in Section 4.6.3; while those on 
compensation of employees are presented and discussed in Section 4.6.4. 
 
4.6.1 Results of Robustness Models and Diagnostic Tests 
To be able to compare the results from this study with those obtained from previous related 
studies, estimations were carried out following the common practice where international 
migrant remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP (REMGDP), and where the USA was 
assumed to be the main host country of SSA migrants. The results of these estimations are 
presented in Table A4.4 in the Appendix. These results show that the use of the SSA country-
specific leading migrant-host countries compares very closely with using the USA as the 
migrant-host nation in many respects except for the differences in the magnitude of the 
economic and the statistical significance75. In relative terms, in the estimation involving the use 
of the USA as  the migrant-host of SSA migrants, the test statistics (both the z-statistics and the 
Wald 
2 statistic) are generally lower, with only two exceptions, home-country income and real 
exchange rate (see Table A4.4). Ignoring the dynamic effects of migrant remittances, the 
robustness results on USA versus country-specific migrant-host nations show that apart from 
institutional quality and the migrant-host country income the estimated coefficients of the results 
based on the USA as the common host nation of SSA migrants are economically more 
                                                          
75
 Many reasons can be assigned to the close comparison of the two results. The reasons include: (1) the USA 
might, for security reasons, have tougher rules and regulations on international money transfers compared with other 
migrant-host nations, following  the 9-11 terrorist attack on the former; (2) Money transfer costs might be cheaper in 
the  USA than in the other nations hosting SSA migrants; (3) The USA might have a relatively more advanced 
financial infrastructure with wider migrant access to alternative official cross-border money transfers than the other 
SSA migrant-host nations such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, France, Germany and Great 
Britain; (4) SSA migrants in USA might be more skilful and economically viable, and hence with higher incomes than 
their counterparts in Europe and the rest of the world; and (5) The cost of living in USA might be relatively less than 
the average cost of living in Europe, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. 
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significant than those obtained from country-specific migrant-host countries. On a lesser note, 
the Wald statistics76 of 1400000 and the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test on the first-
difference errors at order-2 probability value of 0.9152 for the specific migrant-host nation, 
compared with 454424.61 and 0.9043 respectively obtained in the estimation involving USA as 
the SSA migrant-host nation shows that the former estimation is relatively more efficient. 
Therefore, for policy relevant studies, the use of „true‟ migrant-host country rather than the 
generally assumed use of the USA as the migrant-host nation should be more appropriate. 
 
Regarding the appropriateness of migrant remittances in per capita (REMPC) as against 
migrant remittances as a percentage of GDP (REMGDP), the estimated results presented in 
Table A4.4 justify REMPC in a number of ways. Generally, with the exception of home-country 
income and without taking into account the dynamic effects, each of the estimated coefficients 
from the REMPC model is both economically and statistically more robust in comparison with 
the estimated REMGDP model. The fact that the results from the REMGDP model suggest 
that, in the long run, as the income of SSA migrants increases in real terms, migrant 
remittances received by the sub-region decline, which is in sharp contrast to the fundamental 
theories of remittances and a priori expectation, the use of REMGDP instead of REMPC cannot 
be described as the more appropriate. The low value of the reported Wald statistic and the 
parameter estimates together with the high probability values of the majority of the explanatory 
variables is an attestation that the estimated lnMRem is the least efficient in comparison with 
REMGDP and REMPC. This is notwithstanding the fact that the signs of the estimated 
parameters of the lnMRem model, in contrast to the modelled REMGDP, are more consistent 
with those obtained from REMPC and in conformity to the underlying theories of remittances. 
 
To demonstrate empirically that dynamic panel-data modelling by GMM is more appropriate 
than static panel-data estimations either by Fixed (within) Effects (FE) or by Generalised Least 
Squares Random Effects (RE), both the conventional and the robust FE and RE estimations 
were carried out for the overall study period. The empirical static panel-data modelling results 
for REMPC, WREMPC and COMPPC are presented in Table A4.6, Table A4.7 and Table A4.8 
respectively. As extensively discussed under sub-section 4.5.2.1, these empirical static panel-
                                                          
76
 Under
0H , in large samples, the Stata-automatically generated Wald statistic has a chi-squared distribution with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of coefficient restrictions imposed on a model. According to Baltagi (2008), 
the Wald test for restrictions has its power dependent upon the number of instruments used and the degree of serial 
correlation and heterogeneity in the residuals. It, thus, is the test statistic interpreted in determining the joint 
statistical significance of the explanatory variables in GMM models.  
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data models are not expected and, in fact, did not produce unbiased estimators due to the 
presence of obvious endogeneity among the explanatory variables and the omission of the 
dynamic components. For each of the estimated static panel-data models (see Table A4.6-
A4.8), the reported overall coefficient of determination 
2( )R  did not exceed 10 per cent whilst 
the Breusch-Pagan statistic suggest the presence of serious heteroskedasticity. Besides, there 
is a serious concern for multicollinearity because in the midst of very low coefficient of 
determination 
2R , the computed z-statistics are relatively high for the conventional static panel-
data estimators. In the case of the heteroskedastic-corrected standard errors obtained from the 
robust static panel-data estimations, the reported z-statistics and 
2R are statistically 
insignificant in each case. 
 
The main results upon which policies are prescribed in this chapter are presented in Tables 4.2, 
4.3 and 4.4 in Sections 4.6.2, 4.6.3 and 4.6.4 respectively. Given the distinctiveness of each 
component of migrant remittances, three main sets of estimations were carried out. Each set of 
estimations is either on migrant remittances, workers‟ remittances or compensation of 
employees received by SSA countries during the period 1980-2009. An overall study period, 
1980-2009, as well as decade-by-decade (1980-89; 1990-99 and 2000-09) estimations was 
carried out. In each of these estimations international migrant remittances were measured in 
per capita terms which represent the closest proxy for remittances per migrant as revealed in 
Chapter Three. Also, for each of these estimations, the USA was not chosen as the common 
host country for SSA migrants as done in many previous studies. In other words, this study 
used non-SSA countries with the highest percentage of migrants from the various SSA 
countries as the migrant-host countries. 
 
Each of the estimated results presented in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 comprised of the 36 
sampled SSA countries with 51, and 441 or 442 valid instruments for decade-based analysis 
and the overall study period analysis respectively. The number of observations for the various 
decade-based analyses ranges from 217 to 288, whilst 1006 was reported for the overall study 
period analyses except in the case of the compensation of employees estimated model for 
which 823 was reported due to missing observations. The reported probability value of the 
Wald statistic for each estimated model was 0.000, suggesting that for the balanced panel-data 
empirical models, each regressand was jointly explained by the set of regressors at one per 
cent level of statistical significance. The various statistics reported by the Arellano-Bond test 
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point to the fact that at five per cent level of statistical significance the idiosyncratic residuals 
generated from the two-step sys-GMM estimation do not suffer from second-order 
autocorrelation in any of the estimated results. To provide further proof that each estimated 
model is statistically efficient with unbiased and reliable estimated parameters, the Sargan test 
for over-identifying restrictions was conducted. The reported Sargan test statistic for each 
estimated model confirms the selected instruments for each empirical model as valid, while 
none of the estimated models suffered from endogeneity bias. Meanwhile, a pre-estimation 
examination of the asymptotic properties of the relevant variables included in the estimated 
model indicate that each variable is integrated of order zero (see Table A4.5 in the Appendix), 
hence proving the existence of a cointegrating relationship77. It also shows that none of the 
estimated results from this chapter is spurious whilst the estimated coefficients are 
cointegrating parameters. Essentially, because the motivation for this study is not just to 
determine the particular decade in which macroeconomic factors contributed more to migrant 
remittances received in SSA but more importantly to verify if as the liberalisation of the SSA 
financial market improves, the macroeconomic environment has had a changing impact on 
remittance inflows in SSA, in discussing the results presented in Sections 4.6.2, 4.6.3, and 
4.6.4, more emphasis is laid on the overall study period rather than on the various decades. 
 
4.6.2 Macroeconomic Determinants of Migrant Remittances 
The estimated results on the macroeconomic determinants of migrant remittance inflows in 
SSA are presented in Table 4.2. The results show that the current amount of remittances sent 
by SSA migrants resident outside the sub-region is determined by past remittances, migrant-
host country income and migrant-home country factors viz. institutional quality, real „family‟ 
income, rate of inflation, credit to the private sector, real bilateral exchange rate and real 
deposit interest rate. The tightening rules and regulations aimed at clamping down on the use 
of informal money transfer channels by migrants have since 2002 contributed substantially to 
the increasing inflow of migrant remittances received in SSA through official channels. 
 
The size of the amount remitted by a migrant over the immediate past two years affect the 
current inflow of official remittances. Whilst the immediate past year amount remitted positively 
impacts on the current level of migrant remittance inflows, the impact of the past two years is 
largely negative on current level of official remittances received by the sub-region. This seems 
to support the view that new migrants often remit more in the initial stages of their migration 
                                                          
77
 For the proof of this assertion, refer to Engle and Granger (1987). 
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when the social ties are strong or when they are under implicit social contractual obligation to 
remit. Therefore, from an individual migrant‟s perspective, remittances are likely to decrease 
over time and, indeed, after a second generation of migrants, so that the stability in the flow of 
remittances is mainly sustained by a new generation of migrants, as observed by Elbadawi and 
Rocha (1992) on North African migrants in Europe, and Lozano-Ascencio (1993) in the case of 
Mexican migrants in USA. 
  
Table 4.2: Estimated Results of Migrant Remittances (REMPC) Flows to SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel Data Procedure 
 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
REMPC lag 1 (REMPC_1) 1.0998 0.6586 0.8896 0.9477 
 (2875.64)*** (361.51)*** (325.32)*** (359.71)*** 
REMPC lag 2 (REMPC_2) -0.3488 0.1011 -0.2315 -0.1267 
 (-303.75)*** (185.00)*** (-99.26)*** (-107.93)*** 
Institutional quality (INS) 0.9483 -0.2308 -0.6938 -0.3107 
 (34.62)*** (-9.08)*** (-6.62)*** (-8.17)*** 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) 3.1063 -13.0805 -0.6076 -1.0084 
 (6.95)*** (-58.22)*** (-0.87) (-2.82)*** 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) 31.6778 1.71530 142.5704 18.3925 
 (87.42)*** (1.98)** (42.29)*** (13.93)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0507 0.1407 -0.1395 0.0449 
 (-2.07)** (10.91)*** (-5.35)*** (4.75)*** 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 0.7645 8.9322 -4.6438 2.3553 
 (4.19)*** (36.86)*** (-9.92)*** (7.12)*** 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -9.0491 -2.4873 -3.0266 -4.9314 
 (-112.66)*** (-14.36)*** (-9.92)*** (-12.98)*** 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) -0.0300 0.0760 0.0263 0.0347 
 (-1.14) (5.58)*** (0.89) (4.46)*** 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) ………. ……… ………. 4.6614 
 ………. ……… ………. (71.91)*** 
Constant term (constant) -285.9995 71.8419 -1414.6010 -157.9818 
 (-101.71)*** (7.79)*** (-43.12)*** (-12.40)*** 
Number of observations 288 286 288 1006 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 51 51 51 442 
Wald 2
[ ],   [9],5520000*** [9],1260000*** [9],1230000*** [10],1400000*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2): 
 -1.0780{0.281} -1.5868{0.113} -0.6783{0.498} -0.1065{0.915} 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions: 
2
[ ],   [41],28.1669 [41],27.3812 [41],28.6736 [431],27.1849 
Source: Author‟s estimation **(***) denotes 5(1) per cent respectively. 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { }  
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Over the 1980-2009 period, the most important factor that positively impact on migrant 
remittance inflows in SSA through official channels is the improvement in real income of 
countries hosting SSA migrants. In particular, a percentage rise in the real GDP per capita PPP 
in migrant-host country resulted in, on the average, about a US$18.39 increase in remittances 
per capita received in SSA when the entire study period is taken into consideration. Although 
the positive effect of migrant income on remittances received in SSA was unswerving in each of 
the past three decades considered in this study, one striking revelation from this study is that 
during good economic times in the home country, thus, in the 1980s and the 2000s (see Table 
3.1 in Chapter Three) SSA migrants remitted more. This finding is consistent with both altruism 
and self-interest theories of migrant remittance inflows which predict that as the economic 
status of migrants improve, migrants will remit more of their incomes home ceteris paribus. This 
result validates the findings from a host of previous related studies, notably those of Elbadawi 
and Rocha (1992) for six North African and European countries, Bouhga-Hagbe (2004) for 
Morocco, Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) in a global study, Coulibaly (2009) for 16 LAC 
countries, and Singh et al. (2010) for 36 SSA countries. At the same time, however, this result 
contradicts the result obtained by Freund and Spatafora (2005) for 104 countries in SSA, EAP 
and ECA. The sources of this contradiction could include the use of the FE model by Freund 
and Spatafora (2005) which is less efficient than the sys-GMM used in this study. Also, in 
contrast to this study, Freund and Spatafora (2005) defined migrant remittances beyond the 
two current account elements (WREM and COMP) by adding migrant transfers; and covered 
104 countries from various continents over the study period of 1995-2003 compared to only 36 
SSA countries over the period 1980-2009 in this study. Obviously, differences in economic 
conditions in the sampled countries during the study periods in the two studies could affect the 
results obtained. 
 
Turning to the domestic macroeconomic environment, overall, the leading puller of official 
migrant remittances is improved macroeconomic performance as reflected in a stronger 
national currency. In fact, apart from having the highest economic impact, as far as domestic 
factors are concerned, currency appreciation is also the most consistent determinant of migrant 
remittance inflows through official channels in SSA. Overall, between 1980 and 2009, the real 
appreciation of a typical SSA migrant-home country currency against the national currency of 
its migrant-host country by one percentage point increased the official inflow of migrant 
remittances by at least US$4.93 in the SSA migrant-home country. In fact, in the 1980s, a 
similar rate of currency appreciation could attract as much as US$9.05 per capita migrant 
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remittances compared to US$2.49 and US$3.03 in the 1990s and the 2000s respectively. 
Though this finding is in affirmation of the result obtained by Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007a) for 
Sri Lanka, it is in contrast with the results obtained by Jadhav (2003) for India, Adenutsi and 
Ahortor (2008) for Ghana, and Singh et al. (2010) for 36 SSA countries who found depressing 
effects of appreciation of local currencies on remittances received. Apart from differences in 
estimation techniques and scope as regards the sample size and/or the study period, and 
unlike the real bilateral exchange rate used in this study, nominal bilateral exchange rate was 
used in Jadhav (2003) and Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) whilst Singh et al. (2010) used real 
effective exchange rate (REER). These could be the main sources of the inconsistencies in the 
results across the various studies. In other studies, Lianos (1997) on Greece, Aydaş et al. 
(2004) on Turkey, Gupta (2005) on India, and Moore and Greenidge (2008) on 15 Caribbean 
islands, failed to find exchange rate as a determinant of remittance inflows. Here again, 
differences in the measurement of remittances, study period, sampled countries, sample size 
as well as the methodology could be the underlying sources of this contradiction. 
 
In terms of economic significance, improved private sector access to bank credit in SSA is the 
second most important domestic factor that impacts on migrant remittance flows to the sub-
region. A one per cent increment in private sector credit as a ratio of GDP in SSA leads to at 
least a US$2.35 rise in migrant remittances received per capita in SSA between 1980 and 
2009. With the one percentage increase in private sector access to bank credit in SSA, migrant 
remittances per capita increased by about US$0.76 and US$8.93 in the 1980s and the 1990s 
respectively. In the 2000s, however, improved access to private sector credit in SSA impacted 
negatively, (as much as US$4.64), on migrant remittances per capita received by the sub-
region. This finding seems to support the altruistic hypothesis of migrant remittances formulated 
by Schrooten (2005), and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). According to this hypothesis, in 
periods of improved but limited access to credit by the private sector in SSA migrant-home 
countries as witnessed in the 1980s and the 1990s (Table 3.3), migrants are compelled to remit 
more to ease the liquidity constraints at home. In the case of SSA, as there was more restricted 
access to private sector credit in the 1980s and the 1990s than in the 2000s (see Table 3.3 in 
Chapter Three), SSA international migrants were probably compelled to remit more funds to 
their families during the first two decades of the financial liberalisation and as access to private 
sector credit improved in the 2000s, migrant remittances declined. To this extent, the findings 
support earlier results obtained by Schrooten (2005) for 24 transition countries, Niimi and 
Özden (2006) for 85 countries, and Singh et al. (2010) for 36 SSA countries. 
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Overall, improvements in home-country income had depressing effects on migrant remittances 
received in SSA between 1980 and 2009. Over the entire study period, this depressing effect of 
home-country income was more pronounced in the 1990s when SSA as a sub-region recorded 
its worst economic performance as evident in the negative growth rate in real GDP per capita, 
the least real GDP per capita, and the highest external debt stock (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 
Three). In the 1980s, home-country income impacted positively on migrant remittance inflows, 
whilst in the 2000s its impact was statistically insignificant. Coincidentally, with reference to the 
study period, the 1980s and the 2000s were the periods in which the sub-region recorded its 
best economic performance as measured in the level of real GDP per capita, domestic savings, 
and external debt stock (Table 3.1). This suggests that, although, home-country income has an 
overall negative impact on migrant remittance inflows in SSA, under sound macroeconomic 
environment, migrant remittances became less altruistic, hence SSA migrants are likely to be 
motivated to remit more as the economic prospects of their home country improve.  
 
The general finding that migrant remittances received in SSA increase as home-country income 
falls is consistent with the results obtained in all previous related studies reviewed in this study 
except those obtained by Freund and Spatafora (2005) for 104 developing countries, and Lueth 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2007b) for 11 developing countries in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. The 
reasons for the contrasting results obtained in this study with those aforementioned can be 
ascribed to differences in the measurement of remittances, choice of methodology, and scope 
of study (see Table A4.1). For instance, whereas a dynamic panel-data sys-GMM estimation 
procedure was followed in this study which effectively accounted for all possible endogeneity 
problems associated with remittances, Freund and Spatafora (2005), and Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz (2007b) estimated static panel-data models without IV procedures which are less 
efficient in this particular context. Also, while this study, just as that of Freund and Spatafora 
(2005) relied on global remittance data from the World Bank and the IMF, Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz (2007b) used bilateral remittances data as reported by the various Central Banks. 
Finally, because the results of this study suggest that the response of remittance inflows to 
home-country income is dependent upon the soundness of the macroeconomic environment of 
the recipient-countries; probably, the countries studied in the Freund and Spatafora (2005), and 
Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007b) had superior macroeconomic conditions which enabled them to 
attract more non-altruistic remittances. 
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Generally, SSA migrants tend to remit home as a result of loss of confidence in their 
governments, given that institutional quality negatively impacts on migrant remittances. In the 
1980s, quality institutions impacted positively on remittance inflows in SSA, but in the 1990s 
and the 2000s the effect of institutional quality on migrant remittance inflows was increasingly 
negative. This could imply that the sub-region actually suffers from „forced‟ migration in more 
recent years, due to weak institutions and poor governance,  so that these „forced migrants‟ are 
under pressure to remit more funds home as institutions become weaker. In this case, the 
altruistic motive of remittances outweighs the self-interest investment motive. This finding 
invalidates previous results obtained by Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2007b) for 11 developing 
countries from Asia, Europe and the Middle East, and Singh et al. (2010) who found a positive 
effect of institutional quality on 36 SSA countries as well as Schrooten (2005) who found no 
impact of political uncertainty on remittance inflows for 42 countries in transition. The main 
possible source of this contrast could be the differences in measurement of institutional quality. 
Whereas previous studies used international country credit risk rating, this study used a more 
comprehensive index constructed by Marshall and Jaggers (2011) to capture the qualities in 
governance and institutions directly. In addition, the differences in the prevailing economic 
conditions in the sampled countries and the differences in the study periods covered could be 
the underlying reason for this discrepancy. 
 
For the entire study period, 1980-2009, the results of this study show that SSA countries 
receive more migrant remittances as the rate of inflation in migrant-home countries increases. 
This study further reveals that higher rates of inflation in migrant-sending SSA countries led to a 
lower inflow of remittances in the 1980s and in the 2000s, but in the 1990s, higher rates of 
inflation in SSA were required for the receipt of higher migrant remittances in the sub-region. 
This implies that during good economic times (e.g. periods with higher real per capita incomes 
in home countries) such as the 1980s and the 2000s in the context of this study (see Table 
3.1), SSA countries with lower rates of inflation are more likely to receive higher migrant 
remittances, but during periods of economic recession more migrant remittances are received 
in SSA even as inflation rate escalates. This result confirms the earlier findings reported by El-
Sakka and McNabb (1999) for Egypt, and Moore and Greenidge (2008) for 15 Caribbean 
countries. This finding, however, contradicts the results obtained by Elbadawi and Rocha 
(1992) for six North African and European countries, and Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) for 
Ghana. Whilst sys-GMM was used in estimating a dynamic panel-data model in this study 
which is also on SSA countries, Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) used a panel FE model. 
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Additionally, differences in sampled countries and the study periods could account for this 
nonconformity because as revealed by the results of this study, macroeconomic fundamentals 
at any particular time could affect the magnitude and sign of the impact of inflation on migrant 
remittances received. 
 
By and large, the real deposit interest rate of the home country is a positive factor that explains 
variations in per capita migrant remittances received by SSA between 1980 and 2009. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that, in the 1980s and the 2000s, real deposit interest rate of the 
migrant-sending SSA country was statistically insignificant in the determination of migrant 
remittance inflows. The implication of this finding is that a typical SSA migrant-home country 
can attract more migrant remittances through the formal transfer channels by offering higher 
returns on savings and investment. This result validates the findings of all previous related 
studies, viz. those of Lianos (1997) for Greece, Adenutsi and Ahortor (2008) for Ghana, and 
Adams (2009) in a cross-sectional analysis involving 76 developing countries, which also used 
home-country interest rates rather than interest rate differentials. 
 
The results in Table 4.2 show that macroeconomic factors that influence migrant remittance 
inflows in SSA migrant-home countries have a varying impact over time and, to a very large 
extent, in accordance with the macroeconomic environment of the migrant-home countries. 
This might be the reason behind the close comparison between the results obtained for the 
1980s and those for the 2000s. For example, even though migrant-host country income had a 
consistently positive impact on migrant remittances received in SSA in each of the past three 
decades, the impact was statistically and economically more robust in the 1980s and the 2000s 
than in the 1990s. A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the impact of real bilateral 
exchange rate on migrant remittances received in SSA. Evidently, the changing impact of 
home-country macroeconomic factors on migrant remittance flows to SSA was for the most part 
different in the 1990s and consistent with the stylised fact revealed by Figure 4.1, that migrant 
remittance flows to SSA were most volatile and countercyclical in the 1990s. 
 
The empirical results of the test verifying, whether or not, the estimated decade-based 
parameters of the macroeconomic determinants of migrant remittances are statistically different 
from decade to decade and stable over time are presented in Table 4.2.1. In columns A-B, B-C 
and A-C of Table 4.2.1, the results validate the hypothesis that the estimated decade-based 
coefficients of the various explanatory variables reported in Table 4.2 actually differ from 
decade to decade. Given the significance of each of the explanatory variables reported in 
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column A-B in Table 4.2.1 at the conventional statistical levels, it is concluded that, with 
reference to Table 4.2, the estimated parameters for the 1980-89 decade are statistically 
different from the corresponding estimated coefficients of the 1990-99 decade. Similarly, 
because the computed „differential‟ z-statistic of each of the explanatory variables reported in 
columns B-C and A-C is statistically significant within 95 per cent confidence interval, the 
hypothesis that the individual explanatory variables have a decade-based changing impact on 
migrant remittance inflows in SSA during the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s is upheld. In 
other words, the estimated decade-based coefficients of the macroeconomic determinants of 
migrant remittance inflows reported in Table 4.2 are statistically different from each other, so 
that the impact of any particular explanatory variable on international migrant remittance inflows 
evolves from one decade to another in an apparent response to the cyclical behaviour of 
remittance inflows depicted in Figure 4.1. The implications of these results are that the 
macroeconomic determinants of migrant remittance inflows in SSA have a changing impact 
according to macroeconomic fundamentals and policy environment as explained in Chapter 
Three. This result has also lend credence to the proposition that macroeconomic policy 
environment plays a crucial role in attracting official remittances in a migrant-home country. In 
fact, the results also suggest the negative impact of harsh macroeconomic environment on 
remittance inflows in SSA can outweigh the potential strength of financial liberalisation policy in 
attracting remittances through the formal channels. 
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Table 4.2.1: Results of Decade-Based Parameter Evolution and Instability Tests for Migrant Remittances 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/***denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively. Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
REMPC lag 1 (REMPC_1) 1.0998 0.6586 0.8896 0.8088 1.0725 0.4411 -0.2310 0.2102 0.2909 -0.1502 -0.4139 -0.1829
[0.0004] [0.0018] [0.0027] [0.0013] [0.0018] [0.0014] [0.0009] [0.0023] [0.0010] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.00094]
{2875.64}*** {361.51}*** {325.32}*** {607.78}*** {598.37}*** {306.33}*** {-253.80}*** {89.43}*** {306.24}*** {-306.49}*** {-1379.53}*** {-194.57}***
REMPC lag 2 (REMPC_2) -0.3488 0.1011 -0.2315 -0.1528 -0.3019 -0.4499 0.3325 -0.1174 -0.1960 0.2539 0.4029 0.0704
[0.0011] [0.0005] [0.0023] [0.0037] [0.0016] [0.0006] [0.0018] [0.0012] [0.0025] [0.0031] [0.0010] [0.0008]
{-303.75}*** {185.00}*** {-99.26}*** {-41.29}*** {-192.64}*** {-749.85}*** {186.81}*** {-99.47}*** {-76.88}*** {80.59}*** {395.04}*** {92.64}***
Institutional quality (INS) 0.9483 -0.2308 -0.6938 -0.8735 0.4469 1.1791 0.4630 1.6420 1.8217 0.6427 -0.6777 -1.1406
[0.0274] [0.0254] [0.1048] [0.0284] [0.0134] [0.0020] [0.0794] [0.0774] [0.0010] [0.0030] [0.0120] [0.0914]
{34.62}*** {-9.08}*** {-6.62}*** {-30.72}*** {33.32}*** {598.50}*** {5.83}*** {21.21}*** {1751.65}*** {213.51}*** {-56.42}*** {-12.48}***
Home-country income (lnYh) 3.1063 -13.0805 -0.6076 0.9956 ? 16.1868 -12.4729 3.7139 2.1108 -14.0761 ? ?
[0.4469] [0.2247] [0.6984] [0.6914] ? [0.2222] [0.4737] [0.2515] [0.2444] [0.4667] ? ?
{6.95}*** {-58.22)*** {-0.87} {1.44} ? {72.84}*** {-26.33}*** {14.77}*** {8.64}*** {-30.16}*** ? ?
Host-country income (lnYf) 31.6778 1.7153 142.5704 0.3230 -0.1107 29.9625 -140.8550 -110.8930 31.3547 1.3923 1.8260 142.6810
[0.3624] [0.8663] [3.3713] [4.0380] [0.0441] [0.5039] [2.5049] [3.0089] [3.6756] [3.1717] [0.8222] [3.3271]
{87.42}*** {1.98}** {42.29}*** {0.08} {-2.51}** {59.46}*** {-56.23}*** {-36.85}*** {8.53}*** {0.44} {2.22}** {42.88}***
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0507 0.1407 -0.1395 -0.0146 -0.2744 -0.1914 0.2802 0.0889 -0.0361 0.1553 0.4151 0.1349
[0.0245] [0.0129] [0.0261] [0.0331] [0.0166] [0.0116] [0.0132] [0.0016] [0.0086] [0.0202] [0.0037] [0.0095]
{-2.07}** {10.91}*** {-5.35}*** {-0.44} {-16.52}*** {-16.53}*** {21.26}*** {55.53}*** {-4.18}*** {7.68}*** {111.89}*** {14.24}***
Bank credit to private sector (InPSC) 0.7645 8.9322 -4.6438 2.5136 6.3097 -8.1677 13.5761 5.4084 -1.7490 6.4187 2.6226 -10.9535
[0.1825] [0.2423] [0.4681] [0.4997] [0.2173] [0.0599] [0.2258] [0.2857] [0.3172] [0.2574] [0.0250] [0.2508]
{4.19}*** {36.86}*** {-9.92}*** {5.03}*** {29.04}*** {-136.45}*** {60.12}*** {18.933}*** {-5.51}*** {24.94}*** {104.69}*** {-43.67}***
Real exchange rate (InRXR) -9.0491 -2.4873 -3.0266 -14.9534 ? -6.5618 0.5393 -6.0225 5.9043 12.4661 ? ?
[0.0803] [0.1732] [0.3051] [0.6270] ? [0.0929] [0.1319] [0.2248] [0.5467] [0.4538] ? ?
{-112.66)*** {-14.36}*** {-9.92}*** {-23.85}*** ? {-70.64}*** {4.09}*** {-26.79}*** {10.80}*** {27.47}*** ? ?
Real depositt interest rate (RIR) -0.0300 0.0760 0.0263 0.0163 -0.2326 -0.1060 0.0497 -0.0563 -0.0463 0.0597 0.3086 0.2589
[0.0263] [0.0136] [0.0296] [0.0297] [0.0171] [0.0127] [0.0159] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0161] [0.0035] [0.0125]
{-1.14} {5.58}*** {0.89} {0.55} {-13.61}*** {-8.36}*** {3.12}*** {-17.27}*** {-13.74}*** {3.72}*** {88.93}*** {20.76}***
Constant term (constant) -285.9995 71.8419 -1414.6010 61.9620 ? -357.8410 1486.4429 1128.6015 -347.9615 9.8799 ? ?
[2.8119] [9.2223] [32.8062] [33.6750] ? [6.4104] [23.5838] [29.9942] [30.8631] [24.4527] ? ?
{-101.71}*** {7.79}*** {-43.12}*** {1.84}** ? {-55.82}*** {63.03}*** {37.63}*** {-11.27}*** {0.40} ? ?
Number of observations 288 286 288 288 286 287 287 288 288 287 286 287
Number of groups 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Number of instruments 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Wald statistic 5520000*** 1260000*** 1230000*** 4740000*** 2320000*** 3390000*** 1245000*** 3375000*** 5130000*** 3000000*** 2320000*** 2324000***
A-B 2ⁿᵈ-order autocorrelation test -1.078(0.28) -1.587(0.11) -0.678(0.50) 1.192(0.23) n/a -            -             -            -            -           -              -            
Sargan over-identifying restrictions 28.167(0.94) 27.381(0.95) 28.674(0.93) 33.784(0.78) n/a -            -             -            -            -           -              -            
C-E
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient Stability 
Test ResultsEstimated Decade-Based Results
A-DA-B B-C A-C B-D B-E
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With reference to columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E in Table 4.2.1, it can be generally concluded 
that the statistical evolution of the estimated decade-based parameters associated with the 
explanatory variables in the empirical model involving migrant remittances are statistically 
consistent but evolutionarily unstable over time. The only isolated exceptions to the affirmation 
of the instability of the estimated decade-based coefficients are the constant term and the host-
country income in column B-D where the parameter estimates of the 1990s was compared with 
the corresponding estimated parameters of the 1985-1994 overlapping decade. In effect, a 
statistical justification is hereby given to the extent that the computed „differential‟ z -statistics 
reported in columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E are statistically significant suggesting that, at the 
conventional levels of statistical significance, the estimated decade-based coefficients are 
centred further away from zero. Therefore, statistical evidence is hereby established that the 
estimated decade-based evolving coefficients reported in Table 4.2 are generally consistent 
and statistically stable over time. The evidence also favours instability in the estimated 
parameters of the decade-based empirical migrant remittance model. 
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4.6.3 Macroeconomic Determinants of Workers’ Remittances 
The empirical results on the macroeconomic determinants of workers‟ remittance inflows in 
SSA are presented in Table 4.3. The results suggest that, aside the asynchronous effects, 
workers‟ remittance inflows are driven by both home-country and host-country macroeconomic 
factors. For the overall 30-year study period, the two most important factors which positively 
impact on the inflow of workers‟ remittances in SSA are the host-country factors viz. host-
country income, and the enforcement of rules and regulations directed at clamping down on the 
use of informal channels to transfer funds globally. Among the home-country factors, „family‟ 
income, real bilateral exchange rate, quality of institutions, and bank credit to the private sector 
are the most important. Besides, real deposit interest rate and inflation did have some 
significant impact on remittances received in SSA at various times over the past three decades, 
albeit the overall individual impact of each of these variables on workers‟ remittances was 
statistically insignificant. Only previous empirical studies on macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances in which remittances were exclusively measured as workers‟ remittances like the 
studies by Jadhav (2003), Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007), and Shahbaz and Aamir (2009) are 
considered relevant when comparing the results reported in Table 4.3 with those obtained in 
the past. 
 
The empirical results suggest that improvements in host-country income, and regulations 
aimed at clamping down on the activities of informal money transfer agents were crucial in 
attracting higher workers‟ remittances through official channels to SSA between 1980 and 
2009. At one per cent level of statistical significance, a one percentage rise in the real per 
capita income of a typical host country of SSA migrants had the tendency of increasing 
WREMPC to SSA by roughly US$19.11 during the 1980s, US$18.34 in the 1990s and 
US$40.34 in the 2000s. This result points to the fact that during periods of relatively sound 
macroeconomic environment in SSA (i.e. in the 1980s and 2000s as shown in Table 3.1), a 
typical remittance-receiving SSA country could attract more remittances from its permanent 
migrants than in times (such as in the 1990s) when macroeconomic conditions at home are 
unfavourable. To this extent, this result is consistent with the self-interest investment motive 
and confirms earlier findings by Jadhav (2003) for India, and Shahbaz and Aamir (2009) for 
Pakistan. In the study by Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) migrant-host income was not included 
in the analysis. 
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Table 4.3: Estimated Results of Workers‟ Remittances (WREMPC) Flows to SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel Data Procedure 
 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
WREMPC lag 1 (WREMPC_1) 0.8856 0.5810 0.9734 0.9805 
 (952.27)*** (440.56)*** (365.67)*** (343.77)*** 
WREMPC lag 2 (WREMPC_2) -0.1240 0.0803 -0.2868 -0.1151 
 (-145.23)*** (76.17)*** (-172.32)*** (-40.47)*** 
Institutional quality (INS) 2.0974 -1.3010 -0.1695 -0.8428 
 (68.13)*** (-51.60)*** (-3.17)*** (-64.21)*** 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) 10.6169 14.0312 -0.6866 2.7488 
 (49.61)*** (28.06)*** (-1.05) (6.67)*** 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) 19.1087 18.3370 40.3369 7.2828 
 (72.93)*** (12.30)*** (22.17)*** (6.37)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0483 -0.2398 0.0910 -0.0302 
 (-2.55)** (-5.01)*** (8.07)*** (-1.51) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 2.0462 -1.2281 8.4104 0.6757 
 (9.84)*** (-2.52)** (14.45)*** (1.75)* 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -8.2534 14.3902 -1.7684 -0.8803 
 (-163.05)*** (41.23)*** (-11.07)*** (-1.98)** 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) -0.0469 -0.2161 0.0898 -0.0321 
 (-2.45)** (-4.49)*** (8.26)*** (-1.59) 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) ………. ……… ………. 5.4166 
 ………. ……… ………. (72.67)*** 
Constant term (constant) -218.4456 -346.9176 -413.6602 -99.1562 
 (-91.29)*** (-26.55)*** (-25.20)*** (-12.55)*** 
Number of observations 288 286 288 1006 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 51 51 51 442 
Wald 2
[ ],   [9],2610000*** [9],4410000*** [9],1270000*** [10],1520000*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2): 
 -0.4067{0.684} -1.7114{0.088}* 1.1479{0.251} 0.2257{0.821} 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions: 
2
[ ],   [41],28.2255 [41],33.2958 [41],28.3559 [431],28.3907 
Source: Author‟s estimation **(***) denotes 5(1) per cent respectively.  
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
 
Consistent with the result obtained by Shahbaz and Aamir (2009) for Pakistan, this study finds 
that for the overall study period, 1980-2009, workers‟ remittance inflows were positively 
influenced by the level of real per capita income in SSA migrant-home countries. A one 
percentage rise in the real per capita GDP PPP in a typical „labour-exporting‟ SSA country 
increased WREMPC by about US$$10.62, US$14.03 and US$2.75 for the periods, 1980-1989, 
1990-1999, and 1980-2009 respectively. During the 2000s, the impact of migrant-home country 
income on workers‟ remittance inflows was statistically insignificant probably because in the 
opinion of permanent migrants, the growth of real per capita income recorded in the 2000s was 
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too low to attract more investment-oriented remittances from them. Overall, this finding seems 
to support the self-interest economic theory of remittances. In this case, permanent SSA 
migrants from whom the largest proportion of remittances is received are generally driven by 
self-interest economic motives to remit. Again, permanent migrants are likely to remit more with 
the slightest improvement in income level at home during difficult economic times as was the 
case during the 1990s in SSA. 
 
As far as the home-country factors are concerned, variation in real bilateral exchange rate of 
the domestic currency relative to the currency of the migrant-host country is the second most 
important reason why permanent SSA migrants remit. At five per cent level of statistical 
significance, a one per cent rate of depreciation of the currency of a typical migrant-home 
country led to a decrease in WREMPC by US$0.88 during the past three decades. Although it 
is difficult to clearly attribute this result to the dominance of any particular remittance theory, the 
evidence seems to support the self-interest economic theory when the results of the decade-
by-decade analysis are taken into account. This is because during periods of favourable 
economic conditions at home (i.e. the 1980s and 2000s in the context of this study), permanent 
migrants remit less as home-country currency depreciates against host-country currency. 
However, during periods of unfavourable macroeconomic conditions at home (e.g. the 1990s) 
depreciation of the home-country currency increased remittances received from permanent 
SSA migrants. Perhaps, permanent migrants regard weaker home-country currency as an 
outcome of poor economic management at home, hence the need to remit less for investment 
purposes. However, altruistic-driven permanent migrants who remit an equivalent home-
country currency denominated fixed amount without taking into account the purchasing power 
of the domestic currency, remit less equivalent foreign currency when the home-country 
currency depreciates. The overall positive impact of real exchange rate on workers‟ remittance 
inflows in SSA validates previous results reported by Jadhav (2003) for India, Amuedo-
Dorantes et al. (2007) for 111 developing countries, and Shahbaz and Aamir (2009) for 
Pakistan. 
 
At one per cent level of statistical significance, a unit improvement in the index of institutional 
quality could increase WREMPC by US$2.10 in 1980s, but decrease WREMPC by US$1.30 in 
the 1990s, US$0.17 in the 2000s and US$0.84 over the entire study period, 1980-2009. The 
negative impact of institutional quality on workers‟ remittance inflows in the 1990s and the 
2000s might be due to the increasing exodus of SSA citizens in recent years due to poor 
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governance, because with higher stock of migrants, the possibility of receiving more altruistic 
remittances increases. In other words, consistent with the predictions of the altruistic theory, 
the more SSA permanent migrants lose confidence in the rule of law and governance at home, 
the more these migrants will remit home to support their families left behind. It is also possible 
that as institutions become weaker and corruption becomes more prevalent, permanent 
migrants take advantage to invest more at home since it is then relatively easier for the elite 
class to set up businesses and to evade taxes on returns on investment. The changing trend in 
the magnitude of institutional quality on WREMPC received in SSA points to the fact that 
improvements in the quality of institutions could enhance the chances of a migrant-home 
country to receive more non-altruistic remittances from its permanent migrants. Previous 
related studies did not analyse the effects of institutional quality on workers‟ remittances. 
 
Consistent with the predictions of the self-interest remittance investment theory, this study finds 
that for the overall study period 1980-2009, official workers‟ remittance inflows are positively 
influenced by the level of financial development as reflected in the access of the private sector 
to bank credit. A one per cent improvement in private sector access to bank credit as a ratio of 
nominal GDP in the migrant-home country stimulated about a US$2.05 rise in WREMPC in the 
1980s, a US$1.23 decrease in WREMPC in the 1990s, and a US$8.41 increase in WREMPC 
in the 2000s. Thus, under favourable macroeconomic conditions, an SSA migrant-home 
country stands a higher chance of attracting more remittances from its permanent migrants by 
promoting private sector access to bank credit. In other words, workers‟ remittances were 
complementary rather than a substitute for private sector credit in SSA between 1980 and 
2009. This finding appears somehow more consistent with the self-interest investment motive 
than to the altruistic motive because improved private sector access to bank credit could 
encourage investment-oriented permanent SSA migrants to remit more through official 
channels for self-interest economic motive. None of the previous related studies reviewed in 
this study analysed the effects of private sector credit on workers‟ remittance inflows. 
 
Overall, there was a statistically zero-effect of home-country real deposit interest rate on 
WREMPC in SSA between 1980 and 2009. However, the same cannot be said for the decade-
based analysis. A one percentage rise in home-country real deposit interest rate decreased 
WREMPC by US$0.05 and US$0.22 in the 1980s and the 1990s respectively; but in the 2000s, 
a similar change in the real deposit interest rate increased WREMPC by US$0.09. This implies 
that under similar macroeconomic conditions, with the passage of time, permanent SSA 
migrants have been becoming more and more positively responsive to increases in real deposit 
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interest rate at home since the implementation of financial liberalisation in the 1980s. This 
seems to justify the self-interest investment theory of remittances among permanent SSA 
migrants in recent years. Previous related studies failed to consider the effect of home-country 
interest rate on workers‟ remittance inflows. 
 
In the 1980s and the 1990s, migrant-home country inflation had a depressive effect on 
WREMPC received (-US$0.05 and -US$0.24 respectively), but a positive effect of US$0.09 in 
the 2000s. For the entire study period, however, the effect of domestic inflation on WREMPC 
was statistically insignificant in SSA. This result suggests that workers‟ remittances were 
inversely related to home-country inflation in the early years of financial liberalisation in SSA 
when the rate of inflation was relatively higher (see Table 3.1). Nonetheless, as the home-
country macroeconomic environment became fairly stable and the tendencies for rising price 
levels in SSA decreased in the 2000s, a marginal rise in the rate of inflation stimulated higher 
inflows of remittances from permanent migrants probably because this was considered by 
investment-oriented migrants as an opportunity for making higher profits. As shown in this 
study that the overall impact of inflation on workers‟ remittances received by SSA countries is 
statistically insignificant, it is contradictory to the findings from the only relevant previous study 
in which home-country inflation was found to have negatively impacted on workers‟ remittance 
inflows. Contextually, the relevant previous study is that by Shahbaz and Aamir (2009) on 
Pakistan over the period, 1971-2006. A possible reason for this conflicting result could be the 
differences in the macroeconomic fundamentals such as differences in the rates of inflation 
between Pakistan and the SSA migrant-home countries analysed in this study. Besides 
methodological differences, the contradiction could also be attributed to differences between 
the relatively high WREMPC received by Pakistan as one of the all-time leading recipients of 
workers‟ remittances in the world compared to the sampled SSA countries, none of which 
received REMPC up to US$1 per day during the period under investigation. 
 
The estimated results on the determinants of workers‟ remittances in SSA suggest that optimal 
remittances from permanent SSA migrants cannot be received unconditionally as permanent 
SSA migrants are sensitive to home-country macroeconomic conditions when making 
remittance decisions. It is the migrant-sending SSA countries with conducive investment 
climate as reflected in higher real per capita income, stronger domestic currency, lower rate of 
inflation, and higher private sector access to bank credit, inter alia that have the chance of 
mobilising optimal remittances from their permanent migrants.
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Table 4.3.1: Results of Decade-Based Parameter Evolution and Instability Tests for Workers‟ Remittances 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/***denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively. Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( )
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
WREMPC lag 1 (WREMPC_1) 0.8856 0.5810 0.9731 0.7754 0.9731 0.3047 -0.3922 -0.0875 0.1103 -0.1944 -0.3921 0.0001
[0.0009] [0.0013] [0.0027] [0.0009] [0.0025] [0.0004] [0.0013] [0.0017] [0.0000] [0.0004] [0.0011] [0.0002]
{952.27}*** {440.56}*** {365.67}*** {819.38}*** {397.3}*** {781.15}*** {-292.68}*** {-50.60}*** {5512.5}*** {-525.41)*** {-347.02}*** {0.29}
WREMPC lag 2 (WREMPC_2) -0.1240 0.0803 -0.2868 0.0079 -0.0979 -0.2043 0.3671 0.1628 -0.1319 0.0724 0.1782 -0.1889
[0.0008] [0.0011] [0.0017] [0.0031] [0.0013] [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0023] [0.0021] [0.0002] [0.0004]
{-145.23}*** {76.17}*** {-172.32}*** {2.51}** {-75.77}*** {-1021.35}*** {601.79}*** {201.01}*** {-57.84}*** {34.81}*** {742.33}*** {-510.62}***
Institututional quality (INS) 2.0974 -1.3010 -0.1695 -0.5978 -0.6550 3.3983 -1.1315 2.2668 2.6952 -0.7031 -0.6459 0.4856
[0.0308] [0.0252] [0.0535] [0.0120] [0.0637] [0.0056] [0.0282] [0.0227] [0.0188] [0.0132] [0.0385] [0.0103]
{68.13}*** {-51.60}*** {-3.17}*** {-49.98}*** {-10.28}*** {610.11}*** {-40.05}*** {99.95}*** {143.21}*** {-53.07}*** {-16.77}*** {47.33}***
Home-country income (lnYh) 10.6169 14.0312 -0.6866 -13.1980 -11.3476 -3.4143 14.7178 11.3035 23.8149 27.2291 25.3787 10.6610
[0.2140] [0.5000] [0.6539] [0.3407] [0.5582] [0.2860] [0.1539] [0.4399] [0.1267] [0.1594] [0.5000] [0.6539]
{49.61}*** {28.06}*** {-1.05} {-38.74}*** {-20.33}*** {-11.94}*** {95.67}*** {25.70}*** {188.01}*** {170.87}*** {50.75}*** {16.30}***
Host-country income (InYf) 19.1087 18.3370 40.3369 -9.4318 51.6566 0.7717 -21.9999 -21.2283 28.5405 27.7688 -33.3196 -11.3197
[0.2620] [1.4908] [1.8194] [0.7102] [0.7455] [1.2288] [0.3286] [1.5574] [0.4482] [0.7806] [0.7453] [1.0739]
{72.93}*** {12.30}*** {22.17}*** {-13.28}*** {69.29}*** {0.63} {-66.95}*** {-13.63}*** {63.67}*** {35.57}*** {-44.71}*** {-10.54}***
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0483 -0.2398 0.0910 0.0559 -0.1129 0.1915 -0.3308 -0.1393 -0.1042 -0.2957 -0.1270 0.2038
[0.0189] [0.0479] [0.0113] [0.0180] [0.0279] [0.0289] [0.0366] [0.0077] [0.0009] [0.0298] [0.0199] [0.0167]
{-2.55}** {-5.01}*** {8.07}*** {3.10}*** {-4.04}*** {6.62}*** {-9.04}*** {-18.14}*** {-112.03}*** {-9.91}*** {-6.37}*** {12.23}***
Bank credit to private sector (InPSC) 2.0462 -1.2281 8.4104 0.3494 4.1030 3.2743 -9.6385 -6.3642 1.6968 -1.5776 -5.3311 4.3073
[0.2079] [0.4873] [0.5820] [0.4922] [0.2726] [0.2794] [0.0947] [0.3741] [0.2842] [0.0048] [0.2147] [0.3094]
{9.84}*** {-2.52}** {14.45}*** {0.71} {15.05)*** {11.72}*** {-101.80}*** {-17.01}*** {5.97}*** {-327.29}*** {-24.83}*** {13.92}***
Real exchange rate (InRXR) -8.2534 14.3902 -1.7684 -12.0783 2.6634 -22.6436 16.1586 -6.4850 3.8249 26.4686 11.7268 -4.4318
[0.0506] [0.3490] [0.1597] [0.2149] [0.1481] [0.2984] [0.1893] [0.1091] [0.1643] [0.1341] [0.1357] [0.0116]
{-163.05}*** {41.23}*** {-11.07}*** {-56.20}*** {17.98}*** {-75.88}*** {85.37}*** {-59.43}*** {23.28}*** {197.38}*** {86.42}*** {-381.72}***
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) -0.0469 -0.2161 0.0898 0.0468 -0.1165 0.1691 -0.3059 -0.1367 -0.0938 -0.2629 -0.0996 0.2063
[0.0192] [0.0481] [0.0109] [0.0183] [0.0288] [0.0290] [0.0372] [0.0083] [0.0009] [0.0298] [0.0194] [0.0179]
{-2.45}** {-4.49)*** {8.26}*** {2.56}*** {-4.05}*** {5.84}*** {-8.21}*** {-16.49}*** {-107.76}*** {-8.81}*** {-5.15}*** {11.53}***
Constant term (constant) -218.4456 -346.9176 -413.6602 251.4770 -463.1400 128.4720 66.7430 195.2150 -469.9220 -598.3940 116.2220 49.4793
[2.3929] [13.0666] [16.4151] [6.6599] [8.3179] [10.6737] [3.3485] [14.0222] [4.2670] [6.4067] [4.7487] [8.0972]
{-91.29}*** {-26.55}*** {-25.20}*** {37.76}*** {-55.68}*** {12.04}*** {19.93}*** {13.92}*** {-110.13}*** {-93.40}*** {24.47}*** {6.11}***
Number of observations 288 286 288 288 286 287 287 288 288 287 286 287
Number of groups 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Number of instruments 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Wald statistic 2610000*** 410000*** 127000*** 407000*** 998838.91*** 1510000*** 268500*** 1368500*** 1508500*** 224000*** 704420*** 562919***
A-B 2ⁿᵈ-order autocorrelation test -0.407(0.68) -1.711(0.09)* 1.148(0.25) -0.459(0.65) -0.411(0.68) -             -           -           -           -            -           -            
Sargan over-identifying restrictions 28.223(0.94) 33.296(0.80) 28.356(0.93) 26.984(0.95) 26.903(0.96) -             -           -           -           -            -           -            
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient 
Stability Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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In Table 4.3.1, the results of the statistical inquiry into the extent to which the estimated 
parameters of the decade-based estimations actually differ from decade to decade are 
reported. The extent to which the estimated coefficients of each of the explanatory variables for 
the 1980-89 decade differ from the corresponding estimated coefficients of the 1990-99 decade 
as well as those of the 1990-99 and the 1980-89 decade respectively differ from those of the 
2000-09 decade are reported in columns A-B, B-C and A-C respectively. 
 
With reference to column A-B, the results of the reported „differential‟ z -statistics suggest that 
with the exception of host-country income, each of the estimated parameters for the 1980-89 
decade is statistically different from the corresponding estimated parameters for the 1990-99 
decade at five per cent level of statistical significance. Furthermore, the statistical significance 
of the computed „differential‟ z -statistics reported in column B-C validate the hypothesis that 
each explanatory variable actually had a decade-based varying impact on workers‟ remittances 
in the 1990-99 decade compared with the 2000-09 decade. In much the same manner, with 95 
per cent statistical confidence, each explanatory variable had a decade-based evolving impact 
on workers‟ remittance inflows in SSA when the 1980-89 decade is compared with the 2000-09 
decade. Therefore, in statistical terms, the macroeconomic factors determining workers‟ 
remittance inflows in SSA between 1980 and 2009 had a changing impact according to the 
macroeconomic conditions and policy environment in each of the three identified decades 
1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09. 
 
Each of the computed „differential‟ z -statistics reported in columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E is 
statistically significant at five per cent level. The only exception is the immediate past value of 
workers‟ remittances (WREMPC_1) in column C-E where the estimated parameter of the 2000-
09 decade statistically compares to the corresponding parameter estimate of the overlapping 
decade, 1995-2004. Therefore, overall, a statistical basis has now been established that there 
is statistical evolution and instability in each of the estimated decade-based parameters over 
time. Needless to say, the reported results in Table 4.3.1 suggests that the extent to which the 
macroeconomic factors influence workers‟ remittance inflows in SSA between 1980 and 2009 
differ across the three decades (1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09), which can possibly be 
attributed to the changing macroeconomic policy environment. 
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4.6.4 Macroeconomic Determinants of Compensation of Employees 
The estimated results on the determinants of compensation of employees received in SSA are 
presented in Table 4.4. As expected, these results show that remittances sent by temporary 
migrants follow a historical process with an evidence of decay by the second generation of 
temporary migrants. Econometrically, the estimated results are reliable having passed all the 
relevant diagnostic tests discussed under Section 4.6.1. The empirical results show that in 
descending order of economic significance of the estimated parameters, host-country income, 
home-country income, real bilateral exchange rate, tougher rules and regulations prohibiting 
unofficial remittance channels, bank credit to the private sector, institutional quality, real deposit 
interest rate, and inflation are crucial to understanding the changing levels of compensation of 
employees per capita (COMPPC) received in SSA between 1980 and 2009. Over the past 
three decades, host-country income, regulations discouraging illegal remittances, the amount 
of COMPPC received last year, institutional quality, real deposit interest rate, and inflation 
impacted positively on current COMPPC received in the migrant-sending SSA countries. 
Conversely, home-country income, real exchange rate, bank credit to the private sector, and 
the amount of COMPPC received two years ago impacted negatively on current COMPPC 
received in SSA. In the absence of any known previous related studies on macroeconomic 
determinants of compensation of employees, it is impossible to compare the results reported in 
Table 4.4 with others.   
 
A one percentage increase in the real GDP per capita PPP of a migrant-host country had a 
US$2.85 depressing effect on COMPPC in the 1980s. The impact of host-country income, 
however, turned positive thereafter and became even more economically significant over time. 
For example, with a one percentage rise in migrant-host country real per capita GDP PPP, 
there was the propensity for per capita remittances received from temporary migrants to 
increase by US46.57 in the 1990s, US$89.30 in the 2000s, and for the overall study period (i.e. 
1980-2009), by US$15.80. This shows a consistent increasing impact of host-country income 
on remittances received from temporary SSA migrants. One possible reason could be the ever-
increasing income gap between migrant-sending countries and the more industrialised migrant-
host countries, which has led to unusually increasing temporary migration in recent years. 
Another possible explanation for the negative impact of migrant-host country income on 
COMPPC received in SSA in the 1980s could be the saving and investment constraints faced 
by investment-oriented temporary SSA migrants that might favour migrant investment in the 
host country rather than in the home country in the early years of financial liberalisation.  
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Table 4.4: Results on Compensation of Employees (COMPPC) Flows to SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel Data Procedure 
 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
COMPPC lag 1 (COMPPC_1) 0.6704 0.7143 0.6996 0.8388 
 (424.00)*** (816.56)*** (352.48)*** (324.16)*** 
COMPPC lag 2 (COMPPC_2) 0.0111 -0.0993 0.0016 -0.0363 
 (23.07)*** (-67.68)*** (1.30) (-26.09)*** 
Institutional quality (INS) -0.0171 0.5569 0.3930 0.5401 
 (-1.00) (189.29)*** (7.22)*** (18.58)*** 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) -6.9860 -17.9083 -5.1970 -8.6096 
 (-27.27)*** (-75.68)*** (-15.92)*** (-36.15)*** 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) -2.8463 46.5742 89.3016 15.8024 
 (-5.31)*** (31.91)*** (89.31)*** (20.16)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.5289 0.3423 -0.5403 0.1525 
 (56.50)*** (14.58)*** (-25.50)*** (10.24)*** 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 2.1798 1.1275 -14.2033 -2.2669 
 (12.98)*** (11.07)*** (-50.18)*** (-17.40)*** 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -4.8357 -2.6922 -10.1267 -3.7227 
 (-182.02)*** (-38.34)*** (-74.26)*** (-26.70)*** 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) 0.5229 0.3512 -0.2282 0.1539 
 (70.89)*** (15.71)*** (-8.76)*** (10.19)*** 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) ………. ……… ………. 2.3746 
 ………. ……… ………. (29.40)*** 
Constant term (constant) 89.1156 -328.6384 -778.5007 -72.0586 
 (24.70)*** (-24.67)*** (-88.61)*** (-8.80)*** 
Number of observations 217 237 251 823 
Number of groups (N) 34 35 35 35 
Number of instruments 51 51 51 441 
Wald 2
[ ],   [9],3220000*** [9],7030000*** [9],1820000*** [10],8170000*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2): 
 0.9107{0.362} -0.9071{0.364} -1.1818{0.237} -0.8738{0.382} 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:    
2
[ ],   [41],21.0029 [41],29.2380 [41],30.4453 [431],31.3146 
Source: Author‟s estimation **(***) denotes 5(1) per cent respectively. 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
 
The reason is that the majority of the SSA countries that embarked upon financial liberalisation 
in the 1980s actually started implementing the programme in the latter years of the decade 
(see Table 5.1 in Chapter Five). In this regard, the possibility of SSA temporary migrants 
finding it relatively more costly and frustrating to remit through official channels and to invest at 
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home is high. Also, a fall in the real per capita income in migrant-host countries could dampen 
the aspiration of temporary migrants to seek permanent residential status and rather encourage 
higher return of temporary migrants, hence the need to remit more in the 1980s. Finally, self-
interest seeking temporary migrants who remit mainly because they consider their family at 
home as insurance in the event of undesirable economic shocks in the host country, are likely 
to remit more even as their real earnings fall and the general economic prospects in the host 
country become bleak. 
 
In line with the altruistic theory, migrant-sending SSA countries received more remittances from 
temporary migrants when the real per capita GDP PPP declined at home. This finding is 
consistent throughout the three decades. In fact, during periods of economic recession as 
reflected in the reduced real per capita GDP in the 1990s (see Table 3.1), a one percentage 
decrease in home-country income stimulated as much as a US$17.91 increase in COMPPC 
received compared to US$6.96 in the 1980s and US$5.20 in the 2000s. Thus, unlike 
permanent SSA migrants, temporary SSA migrants seem to remit more for altruism rather than 
for self-interest investment purposes. 
 
With a one percentage real depreciation of the national currency of a typical migrant-sending 
SSA country against the currency of the migrant-host country, COMPPC received in SSA 
declined by US$4.84 in the 1980s, US$2.69 in the 1990s, US$10.13 in the 2000s, and 
US$3.72 for the overall period, 1980-2009. Although this result is applicable to both altruism 
and self-interest economic theories, given the consistency with which it is parallel to the sign of 
home-country income, altruism seems the more likely underlying reason behind remittances 
received by SSA from its temporary migrants since 1980. The altruistic theory of migrant 
remittances predicts that where the amount remitted is fixed in home-country denominated 
currency, migrants tend to remit less when the home-country currency depreciates against the 
host-country currency because a smaller amount of the foreign currency (say, the French franc) 
would be equivalent to the usual nominal amount of remittances sent by migrants in the home-
country currency. 
 
In conformity with the altruistic theory, between 1980 and 2009, the overall impact of private 
sector access to bank credit is negative on COMPPC received in SSA. This is notwithstanding 
the fact that, in the 1980s and the 1990s, increased access to private sector credit was a 
positive determinant of COMPPC received in SSA. In the 2000s, a one percentage increase in 
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private sector access to bank credit in migrant-home country reduced COMPPC received by 
the sub-region by about US$2.27. A possible explanation for this result within the context of 
altruistic theory is that in the early years of financial liberalisation, private sector credit in SSA 
was very low due to the underdevelopment of the financial market. Therefore, initially, 
temporary migrants might have remitted more to alleviate credit constraints at home since the 
marginal improvement in private sector access to credit in migrant-home countries might still be 
low in the early years of financial liberalisation. However, as the financial markets developed 
with improved private sector access to competitive credit over time, the incentive for remitting 
by temporary migrants for this specific purpose might have waned. 
 
Generally, an improvement in the quality of institutions impacted positively on remittances 
received by SSA from its temporary migrants between 1980 and 2009, although the effect of 
institutions was not statistically significant at the conventional statistical levels during the initial 
years of financial liberalisation, 1980-1989. Holding all other factors constant, with a one 
percentage improvement in governance and democratic dispensation in SSA, COMPPC 
received by migrant-sending countries within the sub-region increased by US$0.56 in the 
1990s, US$0.39 in the 2000s, and US$0.54 over the entire study period, 1980-2009. The 
possible reason for this finding is that as political risks are reduced and state governance 
improves at home, temporary migrants are more likely to return home instead of using the 
geopolitical tensions at home to seek asylum or permanent residential status abroad. With the 
higher return rate of temporary migrants, all other things remaining equal, COMPPC received 
by migrant-sending SSA countries are increased for both altruistic and non-altruistic reasons. 
 
For the entire study period, the impact of home-country real deposit interest rate on COMPPC 
received was positive in SSA. In the 1980-89 period, a one percentage increase in the home-
country real deposit interest rate increased COMPPC received in SSA by US$0.52. In the 
1990s, this positive impact decreased to US$0.35. In the 2000s, a similar rise in the home-
country real deposit interest rate reduced COMPPC received in SSA by US$0.23. These 
results suggest that the apparent self-interest investment motive that might have stimulated 
temporary migrants in the 1980s steadily faded away and by the 2000s, altruism seems to have 
emerged more dominantly. It is also possible that the self-interest motive might still be a 
dominant reason behind the compensation of employees even in the 2000s except that 
temporary migrants now invest more in the host country than at home due to higher rate of real 
returns on investment in the migrant-host country. 
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A one percentage increase in the home-country rate of inflation increased COMPPC received 
by US$0.53 in the 1980s, US$0.34 in the 1990s, and US$0.15 for the overall period, 1980-
2009, in migrant-sending SSA countries. In the 2000s, however, the impact of inflation on 
COMPPC received in SSA was negative. This seems to suggest that in the 1980s and the 
1990s, temporary SSA migrants might have remitted more for altruism, but in more recent 
years, these migrants are becoming more self-interest investment driven. Here again, the 
evidence seems to suggest that unlike in the initial years of implementing financial liberalisation 
in SSA temporary migrants are becoming increasingly motivated by the self-interest investment 
motive rather than by altruism. 
 
The varying impact of home-country macroeconomic factors on the amount of COMPPC 
received in SSA is evident in the decade-based analysis. It is apparent that besides home-
country income, host-country income, and real exchange rate, the estimated parameters of the 
remaining factors failed to carry the same sign from the 1980s to the 2000s. There seems to be 
sufficient evidence to conclude that temporary migrants are generally altruistic, but the extent of 
this altruism seems to be fading in favour of the self-interest economic motive. 
 
In columns A-B, B-C and A-C of Table 4.4.1, the empirical results on the extent to which the 
decade-based parameter estimates of the inflows of compensation of employees in SSA from 
1980 to 2009 differ over time are reported. Column A-B reports the results on comparing the 
parameter estimates of the 1980-89 decade with the corresponding parameter estimates of the 
1990-99 decade. In column B-C of Table 4.4.1, the results on comparing the parameter 
estimates of the 1990-99 decade with the corresponding parameter estimates of 2000-09 
decade are reported, whilst the results on the statistical difference between the parameter 
estimates of the 1980-89 decade and the 2000-09 decade are reported in column A-C. The 
reported „differential‟ z -statistics in columns A-B, B-C and A-C show that each of the estimated 
parameters reported in Table 4.4 is statistically different from decade to decade. Stated 
differently, at one per cent level of statistical significance, each of the macroeconomic factors 
influencing the inflows of COMPPC received in SSA between 1980 and 2009 had a decade-
based evolving impact in an apparent response to the macroeconomic policy environment in 
the remittance-receiving SSA country. 
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Table 4.4.1: Results of Decade-Based Parameter Evolution and Instability Tests for Compensation of Employees 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/***denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively. Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
 
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
COMPPC lag 1 (COMPPC_1) 0.6704 0.7143 0.6996 0.4992 1.1879 -0.0440 0.0147 -0.0293 0.1712 0.2151 -0.4736 -0.4883
[0.0016] [0.0009] [0.0020] [0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0007] [0.0011] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0010] [0.0008] [0.0003]
{424.00}*** {816.56}*** {352.48}*** {272.01}*** {708.15}*** {-61.90}*** {13.23}*** {-73.15}*** {658.42}*** {221.79}*** {-584.65}*** {-1627.53}***
COMPPC lag 2 (COMPPC_2) 0.0111 -0.0993 0.0016 -0.0982 -0.2497 0.1103 -0.1009 0.0095 0.1093 -0.0011 0.1504 0.2513
[0.0005] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0021] [0.0063] [0.0010] [0.0002] [0.0008] [0.0016] [0.0006] [0.0049] [0.0051]
{23.07}*** {-67.68}*** {1.30} {-47.29}*** {-39.50}*** {111.45}*** {-458.55}*** {12.29}*** {68.31}*** {-1.72}* {31.01}*** {49.56}***
Institutional quality (INS) -0.0171 0.5569 0.3930 -0.2142 -0.3961 -0.5740 0.1639 -0.4101 0.1971 0.7711 0.9530 0.7891
[0.0171] [0.0029] [0.0544] [0.0046] [0.0477] [0.0142] [0.0515] [0.0373] [0.0126] [0.0016] [0.0447] [0.0068]
{-1.00} {189.29}*** {7.22}*** {-47.02}*** {-8.31}*** {-40.54}*** {3.18}*** {-10.99}*** {15.70}*** {478.94}*** {21.31}*** {116.55}***
Home-country income (lnYh) -6.9860 -17.9083 -5.1970 -9.2130 1.6488 10.9223 -12.7112 -1.7889 2.2271 -8.6952 -19.5570 -6.8458
[0.2562] [0.2366] [0.3264] [0.1209] [0.5646] [0.0195] [0.0898] [0.0703] [0.1352] [0.1157] [0.2366] [0.3264]
{-27.27}*** {-75.68}*** {-15.92}*** {-76.17}*** {2.92}*** {558.75}*** {-141.52}*** {-25.46}*** {16.47}*** {-75.17}*** {-82.65}*** {-20.97}***
Host-country income (InYf) -2.8463 46.5742 89.3016 39.4113 30.1835 -49.4205 -42.7274 -92.1479 -42.2576 7.1630 16.3907 59.1181
[0.5360] [1.4595] [0.9999] [0.7525] [0.6356] [0.9235] [0.4596] [0.4639] [0.2165] [0.7070] [0.8240] [0.3643]
{-5.31}*** {31.91}*** {89.31}*** {52.37}*** {47.49}*** {-53.51}*** {-92.96}*** {-198.65}*** {-195.17}*** {10.13}*** {19.89}*** {162.26}***
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.5289 0.3423 -0.5403 0.1089 -0.0775 0.1866 0.8826 1.0692 0.4200 0.2333 0.4198 -0.4628
[0.0094] [0.0235] [0.0212] [0.0152] [0.0446] [0.0141] [0.0023] [0.0118] [0.0059] [0.0082] [0.0211] [0.0234]
{56.50}*** {14.58}*** {-25.50}*** {7.15}*** {-1.74}* {13.22}*** {385.40}*** {90.38}*** {71.42}*** {28.32}*** {19.92}*** {-19.80}***
Bank credit to private sector (InPSC) 2.1798 1.1275 -14.2033 3.7781 -9.7486 1.0523 15.3308 16.3830 -1.5983 -2.6506 10.8761 -4.4547
[0.1679] [0.1018] [0.2831] [0.0892] [0.3211] [0.0661] [0.1812] [0.1151] [0.0787] [0.0127] [0.2192] [0.0381]
{12.98}*** {11.07}*** {-50.18}*** {42.36}*** {-30.36}*** {15.92}*** {84.61}*** {142.31}*** {-20.30}*** {-209.37}*** {49.61}*** {-117.07}***
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -4.8357 -2.6922 -10.1267 -4.8532 -1.9484 -2.1434 7.4344 5.2910 0.0175 2.1609 -0.7438 -8.1783
[0.0266] [0.0702] [0.1364] [0.1075] [0.0661] [0.0436] [0.0662] [0.1098] [0.0810] [0.0373] [0.0041] [0.0702]
{-182.02}*** {-38.34}*** {-74.26}*** {-45.13}*** {-29.46}*** {-49.10}*** {112.39}*** {48.19}*** {0.22} {57.90}*** {-182.31}*** {-116.45}***
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) 0.5229 0.3512 -0.2282 0.0813 -0.0540 0.1716 0.5794 0.7510 0.4415 0.2699 0.4052 -0.1742
[0.0074] [0.0224] [0.0261] [0.0117] [0.0446] [0.0150] [0.0037] [0.0187] [0.0044] [0.0106] [0.0222] [0.0185]
{70.89}*** {15.71}*** {-8.76}*** {6.92}*** {-1.21} {11.46}*** {157.03}*** {40.23}*** {101.04}*** {25.44}*** {18.23}*** {-9.40}***
Constant term (constant) 89.1156 -328.6384 -778.5007 -314.0904 -282.4071 417.7540 449.8620 867.6163 403.2060 -14.5480 -46.2313 -496.0940
[3.6079] [13.3214] [8.7857] [8.0930] [9.2079] [9.7135] [4.5357] [5.1778] [4.4851] [5.2284] [4.1135] [0.4222]
{24.70}*** {-24.67}*** {-88.61}*** {-38.81}*** {-30.67}*** {43.01}*** {99.18}*** {167.57}*** {89.90)*** {-2.78}*** {-11.24}*** {-1174.94}***
Number of observations 217 237 251 237 286 227 244 234 227 237 262 268
Number of groups 34 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Number of instruments 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Wald statistic 3220000*** 7030000*** 1820000*** 407000*** 2320000*** 5125000*** 4425000*** 2520000*** 1813500*** 3718500*** 4675000*** 2070000***
A-B 2ⁿᵈ-order autocorrelation test 0.911(0.36) -0.907(0.36) -1.182(0.24) -0.459(0.65) 1.192(0.23) -             -            -            -             -            -            -              
Sargan over-identifying restrictions 21.002(0.99) 29.238(0.92) 30.45(0.89) 26.984(0.95)33.784(0.78) -             -            -            -             -            -            -              
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient Stability 
Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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In the strict sense of stability of the estimated decade-based coefficients over time, the results 
as reported in columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E of Table 4.4.1 suggest that, generally, the 
statistical differences in each of the estimated decade-based parameters is statistically 
consistent over time and this provides the statistical evidence for evolution and instability in the 
estimated decade-based parameters. The only exception to this finding is the reported z -
statistic associated with real bilateral exchange rate reported in column A-D of Table 4.4.1 
suggesting that there is evidence against statistical instability of the estimated coefficient when 
the 1980-89 decade and the 1985-94 decade are compared. 
 
4.7 CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In harmony with the objectives specified, this chapter examined at both the aggregated and 
disaggregated levels, the macroeconomic factors that influence the flow of migrant remittances 
to SSA. To verify if the impact of the macroeconomic factors that influence migrant remittance 
inflows in SSA vary over time, separate empirical analyses were carried out for each of the past 
three decades along with the overall study period analysis. Given the results obtained and in 
response to the underlying research questions, the study concludes that, generally: 
 
i. Both host-country and home-country macroeconomic factors play a crucial role in 
determining the amount of officially reported remittances received in SSA between 1980 
and 2009. Of these factors, however, host-country factors viz. migrant-host country 
income, and the enforcement of laws and regulations prohibiting the use of informal 
channels in remitting were found to be the most positive determinants of remittances 
received in SSA. Concerning home-country macroeconomic factors, overall, real 
bilateral exchange rate, real income per capita PPP and institutional quality impacted 
negatively on migrant remittances received, whilst bank credit to private sector, inflation, 
and real deposit interest rate had positive impact on remittance inflows in SSA. Apart 
from these factors, the amount of remittances received over the past two years also 
influence how much remittances are received at any particular point in time.  
 
ii. The impact of macroeconomic factors on migrant remittances received in SSA varied 
over time, but the pattern of this varying effect is largely dependent upon the general 
macroeconomic performance rather than on any specific programme such as financial 
liberalisation. For example, in the 1980s and the 2000s when real income levels were 
relatively high, migrant remittances were pro-cyclical, and seemed to be driven more by 
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the self-interest investment motive rather than by altruism. Unlike in the „bad times‟ of 
the 1990s, during the „good times‟ of the 1980s and the 2000s, it was migrant-sending 
SSA countries with lower rates of inflation, higher income growth, stronger currencies 
and higher real deposit interest rates that mobilised more remittances through the 
official channels. This implies that though the pursuit of financial liberalisation has a 
substantial potential of enhancing the mobilisation of international migrant remittances 
in SSA through official channels, this ambition can only be successful provided 
favourable macroeconomic environment exists in the migrant-sending country. Stated 
differently, financial liberalisation should be seen only as a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for mobilising remittances from SSA migrants outside the sub-region 
since its impact on remittance inflows is contingent upon the macroeconomic 
fundamentals of the migrant-sending countries. 
 
iii. Macroeconomic factors, to a reasonable extent, impacted differently on workers‟ 
remittances and migrant remittances received in SSA over the past three decades even 
though the results from these two measures of remittances are more consistent than in 
comparison with compensation of employees. Both workers‟ remittances and migrant 
remittances seem to be driven by the self-interest economic motive. For the entire study 
period, real deposit interest rate and inflation were not statistically significant in 
determining workers‟ remittances received in SSA, but these two variables had 
significant positive impact on migrant remittances received in the sub-region. The 
impact of home-country income on migrant remittances was negative but positive in the 
case of workers‟ remittances. The effects of the remaining macroeconomic variables, 
viz. host-country income, bank credit to the private sector, regulatory environment, 
institutional quality and real exchange rate on migrant remittances and workers‟ 
remittances received in SSA were the same in terms of statistical direction. However, in 
terms of economic importance, generally, each of these variables exerted higher impact 
on migrant remittances than on workers‟ remittances, except for the „political economy‟ 
variables - institutional quality and regulatory environment. This finding implies that it 
may not be appropriate to use only workers‟ remittances in studies that aim at trying to 
provide a complete insight into remittances from international migrants. 
 
iv. Macroeconomic factors were important determinants of compensation of employees 
received in SSA between 1980 and 2009. Overall, whereas host-country income, 
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regulatory environment, quality institutions, real deposit interest rate and rate of inflation 
had positive effects, home-country income, bank credit to private sector, and real 
exchange rate had negative effects on compensation of employees. This finding 
appears to lend support for the validity of the altruistic theory of remittance inflows. 
Thus, while permanent migrants from SSA seem to be influenced by the self-interest 
investment motive, temporary migrants from the sub-region are likely to be more 
altruistic. 
 
The conclusions of this study are imperative with a number of policy implications for strategies 
aimed at attracting optimal migrant remittances to SSA through the formal financial sector. The 
key policy implication is that since host-country factors are exogenous to remittance-recipient 
countries and because these industrialised countries host migrants from other countries of the 
developing world that have been receiving higher remittances than SSA as a sub-region, SSA  
cannot attribute its low receipt of officially reported remittances to factors in the migrant-host 
countries. By implication, the low receipt of migrant remittances by SSA countries should be 
ascribed to the absence of relevant and effective macroeconomic policies for the mobilisation 
of remittances from their citizens living abroad. Explicitly, countries that are receiving higher 
official migrant remittances today are doing so largely because these countries have put some 
policy measures in place for this specific purpose. Therefore, to mobilise increased remittances 
from SSA migrants through official channels, it is recommended that SSA countries should 
design attractive policies that will induce its nationals living and working outside the sub-region, 
to remit home conveniently. More specifically, policy makers in SSA should: 
 
i. advance stable and credible macroeconomic policy environment through reduction in 
the rate of inflation, improvement in economic performance which reflects in higher real 
per capita income, and stronger national currency in the international financial market 
so as to encourage private sector savings and investment. Self-interest seeking 
migrants may be encouraged to remit more funds home for investment purposes if the 
macroeconomic conditions at home are favourable or investment friendly. For instance, 
with higher growth in home-country income, not only migrants but recipients of 
remittances be will encouraged to invest as the domestic market expands; 
 
ii. ensure that they encourage stronger institutions through improved democratic 
governance and freedom from strife as in more recent years, since quality institutions 
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impact positively on the inflows of workers‟ remittances and compensation of 
employees. To achieve this, pragmatic measures must be put in place to reduce 
corruption (or the perception thereof), improve national security and peace, and create 
a conducive environment through the enactment of laws that protect the interest of 
investors and entrepreneurs, whether resident at home or abroad; 
 
iii. continue to rigorously pursue prudent financial market liberalisation programmes which 
are expected to deregulate exchange rates, promote competition among banks and 
other like-service providers, including post offices working with Money Transfer 
Operators (MTOs). In SSA, the most notable MTOs are Western Union and 
MoneyGram for which many financial institutions, especially commercial banks and post 
offices, act as agents or intermediaries. When financial liberalisation leads to 
competition in the financial market, financial institutions are expected to become more 
efficient, resulting in reduced money transfer fees, the introduction of innovative and 
diversified financial products and services, and expansion and wider coverage with 
more outlets at home and abroad. This is critical because for as long as SSA migrants 
find the patronage of informal money transfer channels cheaper, safer, more convenient 
and accessible, the sub-region cannot improve upon the mobilisation of remittances 
from its nationals living abroad through the formal transfer  channels.  
 
iv. roll out strategic policies under the pursuit of financial liberalisation programmes that will 
motivate commercial banks to reach out to migrants in their host countries. For 
instance, commercial banks can open outlets in major migrant-host nations, offer 
preferential interest rates on remittances saved, convert asset holdings in local 
currencies at a premium rate, and invest saved remittances in high-yielding financial 
instruments. It should also be feasible for local banks to open a joint account for 
migrants and their main target remittance-recipients. Banks can even pay „assured 
remittances‟ on behalf of migrants under special terms and conditions; 
 
v. not only stabilise the local currency in the international markets under the pursuit of 
financial liberalisation programme but also integrate foreign exchange markets so as to 
abolish the existence of dual exchange rates, which hitherto, create incentive for 
migrants to use unofficial channels for transferring funds. Normally, under a dual 
exchange rate regime, there is a wide disparity between a relatively lower official rate 
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and a relatively higher parallel rate. Under this condition, more local currencies are 
received in any given amount of foreign currency as higher premiums exist in „black‟ 
foreign markets where operators do not pay any commission on their earnings. Also, 
high exchange rate volatility can provide an incentive for currency hedging or hoarding 
which can ultimately reduce the patronage of official channels to remit; and 
 
vi. design special incentive packages, including zero tax on remittances received, special 
remittance agreements with major migrant-host countries, the regulation of informal 
intermediaries in the money transfer market, the issuing of special foreign currency 
denominated bonds targeted at the Diaspora communities, establishing „remittance 
banks‟ at home with branches, and creating opportunities for social security 
contributions from abroad, in order to attract SSA citizens resident abroad to remit funds 
home through the formal money transfer channels. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Table A4.1: Summary of Empirical Studies on Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
Author(s), Year Case Study Study 
Period 
Model & Estimation 
Method 
Variables Included  Key Finding(s) 
Elbadawi and 
Rocha (1992) 
Six North 
African and 
European 
countries 
(Algeria, 
Morocco, 
Portugal, 
Tunisia, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia) 
1977-1989 Correlation analysis for 
six countries. 
 
Fixed-Effects model 
involving a panel of five 
countries (excluding 
Algeria) 
Dependent: Logarithm of remittances; remittances per 
migrant worker; logarithm of remittances per capita. 
(Remittances here mean remittances from both 
categories of foreign residents either for 12 or more 
months or less than 12 months). 
Explanatory: Migrant stock, native-country real GDP, 
black market premium, inflation, duration of stay in host 
country, dummy for political stability, host-nation GDP 
and deposit interest rate differential between home and 
host country. 
Migrant stock and real GDP in host 
country have positive effects on 
remittance inflows. Black market 
premium, domestic inflation rate, and 
length of stay negatively impact on 
remittance inflows. Thus, although 
migrant stock may positively affect 
remittances in migrant-home countries, 
an ageing labour force abroad 
decelerates remittance inflows. Also, 
special incentive schemes cannot 
substitute for a stable and credible 
macroeconomic policy. 
Lianos (1997) Greece 1961-1991 
for Germany; 
1981-1991 
for Belgium; 
1980-1991 
for Sweden. 
A set of single equation 
OLS models on 
bilateral remittances 
from Belgium, Germany 
and Sweden to Greece 
Dependent: Unpublished data obtained from the Bank 
of Greece on funds sent home by Greek migrants in 
Belgium, Germany, Sweden) 
Explanatory: migrant‟s income, family income, rate of 
interest, rate of inflation, exchange rate, rate of 
unemployment, number of migrants 
Remittance inflows are positively 
influenced by migrants‟ income, inflation, 
real discount (or deposit) interest rate 
and number of migrants. Exchange rate,   
Unemployment rate and home country 
income have no statistical significant 
impact 
Buch et al. (2002) 145 countries 1970-99 for 
Correlation. 
1990-99 
averages for 
OLS 
Correlations coefficient.  
Cross-sectional OLS 
based on each 
country‟s averages of 
the 1990s 
Dependent (for OLS): Remittance (WREM plus private 
capital flows) ratio to GDP. For correlation analysis, 
remittances/GDP and growth rates of remittances were 
used. 
Explanatory: GDP per capita or Human Development 
Indicator (HDI) or index of economic freedom 
representing the level of country development, 
macroeconomic instability, inflation, dummy for Island 
states, and female economic participation 
Land dummy positively impact on 
remittances; GDP per capita and female 
activity have negative effects on inward 
remittances whilst inflation was 
statistically insignificant. 
Jadhav (2003) India 1988(2)-
2003(1) 
(quarterly 
data) 
Single equation OLS 
estimation 
Dependent: Log of WREM 
Explanatory: Price of international crude oil used as an 
indicator of economic activities in oil exporting Middle 
East and Gulf regions as Indian migrant hosts, US GDP 
Improved economic activities of migrant 
host countries (both oil exporting and 
non-oil exporting hosts) and exchange 
rate depreciation are positive drivers of 
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as economic activity indicator of non-oil Indian migrant 
hosts, interest (deposit) rate differential (domestic 
minus LIBOR), nominal exchange rate. 
remittance flows to India. Deposit interest 
rate differential does not affect remittance 
flows to India. 
Aydaş et al. 
(2004) 
Turkey 1964-1993 Single equation OLS Dependent: Remittance data restricted to only cash 
transfers 
Explanatory: Log of: migrant stock, host-country per 
capita income, home-country per capita income, 
domestic growth, and black market premium. Also, 
dummy for military regime to capture political instability, 
interest rate differential, domestic inflation, and real 
currency overvaluation. 
Results reported for 1979-1993 show that 
stock of migrants and real overvaluation 
of domestic currency were insignificant. 
Interest rate differential and host-country 
income positively determines 
remittances. Home-country income, 
inflation, black market premium and 
political instability negatively affect 
remittance inflows. 
Bouhga-Hagbe 
(2004) 
Morocco 
(Bilateral study 
with France as 
host nation for 
Moroccan 
migrants) 
1993(1)-
2004(4) 
(quarterly 
data) 
Co-integration graphing 
and error-correction 
(ECM) modelling by 
OLS 
Dependent: Logarithm of remittances (defined as total 
migrant worker transfers) an equivalence of 
WREM+COMP+ migrant transfers (MT). 
Explanatory: Wages in France, financial assets held by 
Moroccan emigrants, interest rate differential, bilateral 
exchange rate, and real GDP 
Wages in France and interest rate 
differential and are positive long-run 
determinants. No evidence of portfolio 
diversification motives behind 
remittances in the long run. In the short 
run, volume of real estate construction in 
Morocco by Moroccan migrants is a 
positive driver of remittances into 
Morocco. Exchange rate depreciation 
enhances remittance inflows in the short 
run. 
Freund and 
Spatafora (2005) 
104 countries in 
SSA, EAP and 
ECA 
1995-2003 Fixed effects panel 
data estimation. 
Dependent: Remittances (WREM+COMP+MT with 
many adjustments in absence of data) in logarithmic 
levels, per capita, and per emigrant. 
Explanatory: Domestic output, domestic per capita 
income, stock of migrant workers, dummy for dual 
exchange rate, transfer or service fees, exchange rate 
spread, host country (the country which has the largest 
share of a sampled country‟s migrant workers) per 
capita income 
Transfer fee, host-country per capita 
income and dual exchange rate 
adversely affect remittance inflows. 
Migrant stock and home-country per 
capita income positively impact on 
remittance inflows. Exchange rate spread 
not significant. 
Gupta (2005) India 1990-2003 A set of single 
equations OLS 
Dependent: Logarithm of real remittances defined as 
private transfers on current accounts of BoPS 
Explanatory: Trend, migrant stock, lagged dependent 
variable, migrant earnings, US non-agricultural 
employment, credit rating of India, political uncertainty, 
stock market return, exchange rate variation, drought, 
annual changes in LIBOR, changes in oil prices, 
issuance of bonds, dummy for Asian financial crisis, 
Migrant stock, earnings of migrants, and 
host-country economic environment are 
positive determinants of remittances 
received by India. Interest differential not 
statistically significant. 
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and dummy for post-September-11, 2001 
Schrooten (2005) 24 transition 
countries 
1990-2003 Dynamic panel data 
estimation technique 
following first-
differenced 
Generalised Method of 
Moment (GMM) 
Dependent: REMGDP and REMPC where remittances 
are defined as WREM+COMP+MT. 
Explanatory: Lagged dependent variable, native-
country GDP per capita, unemployment rate, domestic 
credit to private sector/GDP, dummy for wars, 
institutional development measured by an index that 
takes the value between 1 and 4.5, openness, per 
capita income growth rate. 
Remittances per capita and remittances 
per GDP are driven by similar factors. 
Remittances are highly driven by 
unemployment rate in native country, 
GDP per capita, and higher international 
integration of host country‟s real sector 
decrease remittances. Institutional 
development has no impact on 
remittances per capita. War dummy has 
no effect on remittances/GDP but 
remittances per capita increase during 
war times. Remittances act as substitute 
for well-performing banking sector. 
Akkoyunlu and 
Kholodilin (2006) 
Turkey 
(focus on 
bilateral analysis 
involving Turkish 
migrants in 
Germany) 
1962-2004 Cross-correlations, 
unrestricted bivariate 
VARs and Granger-
causality test 
Two forms of remittances were tried. Bilateral real total 
remittances and bilateral real remittances per capita. 
Bilateral remittances (measured directly from official 
source – Deutsche Bundesbank) in this study imply 
remittances from Germany to Turkey. 
Real German GDP, real Turkish GDP, exchange rate, 
CPI and number of migrants 
Remittances response more positively to 
changes in economic activity in host 
country. No causality between 
remittances and real GDP per capita or 
with real growth in German GDP. No 
correlation between growth rate of 
German real GDP and growth rate of real 
remittances per migrant. No correlation 
between annual growth rates of Turkish 
real GDP and annual growth rates of real 
remittances per migrant. 
Niimi and Özden 
(2006) 
85 countries 2000 (due to 
limited time 
series data 
on migrant 
stock) 
Cross-country analysis 
involving single 
equation OLS (ignoring 
endogeneity) and 
Instrumental Variable 
(IV) estimation (taking 
into account 
endogeneity problems) 
Dependent: Three forms of remittances (measured as 
WREM+COMP+MT) were tried. These are 
remittances/GDP ratio, logarithm of real remittances, 
and the logarithm of real remittances per capita. 
Explanatory: Level of migration, educational level of 
migrants, financial development (either bank deposit or 
private sector bank credit to GDP), and economic 
conditions in native-country (GDP growth and GDP per 
capita) 
Stock of migrants is the main determinant 
of remittances. Education level of migrant 
relative to population in home country, 
size of economy and level of economic 
development adversely affect remittance 
inflows. Financial development positive 
but largely insignificant and where private 
sector credit is occasionally significant, it 
is generally positive. 
Schiopu and 
Siegfried (2006) 
21 Western 
European 
countries (as 
source 
countries) 7 EU 
neighbouring 
Differ across 
nations but 
averagely 
between 
2001-2003 
A set of 11 single 
equations OLS (With 
the exception of income 
differential and return 
on financial assets the 
other explanatory 
Dependent: Logarithm of bilateral remittances (which 
were not specifically defined) per migrant obtained from 
Central Banks in recipient countries 
Explanatory: Rate of return on financial assets, income 
differentials (real per capita GDP PPP of host country 
minus real per capita GDP PPP of home country), 
Increases in migrant skills, GDP 
differential between home and host 
countries promote remittances received. 
Large informal sector in migrant resident 
country and fund transfer fees depress 
official remittances. Interest rate 
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countries variables were not 
included at the same 
time)  
migration, skill level, income inequality, remittance 
transfer cost, unofficial economic activity, and rate of 
return on real estate 
differential not significant determinant. 
Vargas-Silva and 
Huang (2006) 
Two cases: (1) 
Net remittances 
between US and 
rest of the world 
(ROW). (2) 
Remittances to 
Mexico from US 
1981(1)-
2003(4): 
Quarterly 
data 
Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) 
supported by Variance 
Decomposition, 
Impulse Response, 
Granger-causality 
US study: Net aggregate remittances (i.e. private 
remittances plus other transfers) with ROW). US 
Federal Funds Rate (US FFR), US money supply (US 
M2), US CPI, US unemployment, two indices of 
economic conditions (exchange with the US$ and home 
country inflation) from ROW
78
. 
Mexico study: Inward remittances (i.e. Mexico‟s credit 
current transfers)). US FFR, US M2, US CPI, US 
unemployment; and Mexican GDP, CPI and domestic 
currency exchange rate with the US$ (to represent 
home country economic conditions). All variables in real 
terms or logarithm. 
Generally, host-country economic 
conditions are relatively important in 
driving remittances. For Mexico, none of 
the home-country economic factors was 
significant. US M2 explains the largest 
percentage of remittance variance. A 
positive shock to US M2 elicits a positive 
response from both measures of 
remittances. US FFR, US inflation, US 
unemployment Granger-cause inward 
remittances to Mexico. 
Amuedo-
Dorantes et al. 
(2007) 
111 developing 
countries with a 
comparative 
analysis of 19 
Small Island 
Developing 
States (SIDS) 
and 92 
developing 
countries 
1990-2003 Panel VAR with 
variance 
decompositions, and 
impulse response 
functions. Three 
estimations: 19 SIDS 
only, 92 developing 
countries only, and 111 
full sample developing 
countries  
Dependent: WREM as ratio of GDP 
Explanatory: Multilateral real effective exchange rate, 
natural disasters and official foreign aid. 
Real effective exchange rate depreciation 
enhances remittance inflows. 2.4% of 
remittances‟ error forecast variance 
explained by the remaining system 
variables. Remittances explain 27.5% of 
foreign aid‟s error forecast variance. 
Remittances increase following a disaster 
shock but that of aid is more robust. 
Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz (2007a) 
Sri Lanka 1996-2004 
(Quarterly 
observations) 
Co-integrating single 
equation OLS for long-
run parameter 
estimations and 
Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) for short 
run parameter 
estimations. 
Dependent: Remittances (WREM+COMP+MT) in actual 
volumes and not seasonally adjusted 
Explanatory: Real GDP, CPI, exchange rate, and oil 
price (simple average of UK Brent, Dubai and West 
Texas crude oil prices). 
Remittances and oil price positively 
correlate. Real GDP and exchange rate 
of home country adversely affect 
remittance inflows. 
Lueth and Ruiz-
Arranz (2007b) 
11 developing 
countries in 
Asia, Europe 
Differ across 
countries, but 
generally 
Pooled OLS, Fixed 
Effects and Random 
Effects panel data 
Dependent: Logarithm of total bilateral remittances (as 
reported by various Central Banks) 
Explanatory: Nominal GDP of home country, physical 
Motive to remit is mixed, but altruism 
appears less of a factor than is widely 
believed. Remittances are positively 
                                                          
78
 ROW is proxied by Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Mexico because these were the largest five recipients of remittances from the US at the time of this 
study. 
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and the Middle 
East 
ranged 1980-
2004. 
Average 
period is 9 
years 
estimation 
 
 
distance between a sampled country and source 
countries, and a vector of potential factors influencing 
remittance flows which includes GDP per capita of 
home and source countries, separate dummies for 
share border, common language, and political risks 
proxied by country international credit rating. 
driven by oil prices and native-country 
GDP. Remittances reduce as exports 
decline, investment and political climate 
of home country worsen. 
Adenutsi and 
Ahortor (2008) 
Ghana 1983(4)-
2005(4) 
Static and dynamic 
VAR, Vector Error 
Correction Model 
(VECM), Impulse 
Response Functions 
and Variance 
Decompositions 
Dependent: Log of remittances (WREM+COMP) 
Explanatory: Interest rate (treasury bill rate), monetary 
aggregate (M1), exchange rate and domestic price 
level. 
Static long-run model reveals that 
monetary aggregates, exchange rate, 
and interest rate impact positively on 
remittance inflows whilst domestic price 
level negatively affect the inflow of 
remittances. This result holds for the 
dynamic long-run model except that 
exchange rate has a negative influence 
on remittances under this circumstance. 
Elkhider et al. 
(2008) 
Morocco 1970-2006 VAR and Vector Error 
Correction Model 
(VECM) 
Dependent: Logarithm of total remittances 
(WREM+COMP+MT) sent by Moroccan migrants 
abroad 
Explanatory: Agricultural GDP, exchange rate, time 
trend 
Agricultural GDP has a positive effect on 
remittances received whereas exchange 
rate negatively affects remittance inflows 
in the long run. In the short run, however, 
exchange rate positively influences 
remittances. Thus, over the long run, 
exchange rate depreciation does not 
positively impact on the Moroccan 
resident abroad. 
Moore and 
Greenidge (2008) 
15 Caribbean 
countries 
1987-2008 Panel Generalised 
Least Squares (Panel 
GLS) 
Dependent: Logarithm of remittances (WREM+COMP) 
as a ratio of GDP. 
Explanatory: Real interest rate differential, real GDP per 
capita differential (the PPP measure), home country 
inflation, real effective exchange rate, age dependency 
ratio 
Interest rate differential, income 
differential, inflation and dependency 
ratio have significant positive impact on 
remittances. Real effective exchange rate 
(REER) negative but insignificant impact. 
Adams (2009) 76 developing 
countries 
Cross-
sectional 
data with 
each country 
having a data 
point 
between 
1995-2001 
2-stage Instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation. 
Instruments for migrant 
skills, migrant stock 
and poverty. 
Dependent: Log of REMPC where remittances are new 
undefined national data assembled by the author. 
Explanatory: Skill composition of migrants, home 
country poverty, per capita GDP, per capita GDP 
square, real deposit interest rate, exchange rate 
spread, cost of remitting money, GINI coefficient, 
percentage of population under 14 years and dummy 
for war 
Skills of migrants play a crucial in 
remittance determination. Higher-skilled 
labour exporters receive less REMPC 
than countries which export a larger 
proportion of low-skilled migrants. Real 
deposit interest rate impact positively on 
REMPC. Poverty incidence at home, 
exchange rate spread, cost of remitting, 
and periods of war do not affect REMPC. 
Coulibaly (2009) 16 LAC 1980-2006 Panel VAR, impulse Dependent: Remittances (WREM+COMP+MT) per Host-country GDP and interest 
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countries response functions, 
variance 
decompositions 
capita. 
Explanatory: Growth rates in host country (US) GDP 
and home-country GDP, interest rate differential 
differential positively drive remittances to 
LAC whilst increases in native-country 
GDP dampens inward remittances. 
Shahbaz and 
Aamir (2009) 
Pakistan 1971-2006 Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag (ARDL) 
model 
Dependent: WREMGDP and WREMPC. 
Explanatory: Manufacturing output used as proxy for 
economic activity at home country, world GDP, inflation, 
REER, world interest rate, and secondary school 
enrolment as proxy for skilled labour at home. 
In the long run, increases in world GDP, 
REER and inflation impact positively on 
remittance inflows, whereas world 
interest rate, home-country 
manufacturing output and secondary 
school enrolment adversely affect 
remittances in the long run. 
Akkoyunlu (2010) Turkey 
(Bilateral study 
involving Turkish 
migrants in 
Germany) 
1962-2005 Single equation co-
integration and error-
correction models by 
OLS. General-to-
specific approach for a 
parsimonious 
unrestricted general 
model. 
Dependent: Remittances from Germany (obtained from 
Balance sheets of Bundesbank) as a ratio of GDP. 
Explanatory: Real Turkish GDP per capita, real German 
GDP per capita, stock of Turkish migrant workers in 
Germany, real exchange rate, government instability. 
Turkish income negatively impact on 
remittance inflows in the long run but 
stock of migrants, real exchange rate, 
and political instability have positive 
effects.  
In the short run, German GDP had a 
positive but Turkish GDP had a negative 
effect on remittance inflows. 
Singh et al. 
(2010) 
36 SSA 
countries 
1990-2005 Fixed Effects Panel 
Data (Single Equation 
and 2SLS) Estimation 
Dependent: Measurement of remittances was 
inconsistent. It ranged from constructing new dataset, 
WREM+COMP+MT to using only “other current 
transfers” due to data unavailability. In the empirical 
model, logarithm of remittances/GDP was used as the 
dependent variable. 
Explanatory: Real GDP per capita of home country, real 
GDP per capita of host country, migrant 
stock/population, dual exchange rate regime, 
institutional quality (proxied by international country risk 
index which is on financial risk as far as the debt 
payment of a country is concerned), financial 
development (M2/GDP or domestic credit/GDP), real 
bilateral exchange rate against the US dollar, interest 
rate differential 
Stock of migrants residing in wealthier 
nations, quality institutions and host-
country income positively impacted on 
remittance inflows. Also, financial 
development proxied by M2/GDP and 
domestic credit/GDP impacted positively 
on remittance inflows with M2/GDP 
having a more robust effect. Home-
country income and interest differential 
have depressing effects on remittances 
inflows. Real exchange rate and dual 
exchange regime had no significant 
impact on remittance inflows. 
Source: Author‟s compilation from various sources.
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Box A4.1: Matrices Corresponding to the Instruments Used in the Estimation 
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The first-step estimator uses a covariance matrix taking this autocorrelation into account 
enlarged for the level equations. 
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 where  ,D LNG I G    and 
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The two-step GMM estimator used the residuals of the first-step to estimate the covariance 
matrix as suggested by White (1980): 
  
1
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N
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i
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Hence, finally, the resulting estimator is 
1 1 1ˆ ˆˆ ( ) .sys GMM XWV WX XWV WR        
 
Source: Behr (2003: 13-14). 
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Table A4.2: Data Description, Measurement and Sources 
Variable Notation Description, Measurement and Main Sources 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
Remittances 
 
 
lnMRem 
The sum of workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees. Source: 
Mainly WDI based on BoPS, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 
(MRF-2011), and author‟s compilations from country desks under the African 
Department of the IMF and WB. 
 
Remittances as 
percentage of GDP 
 
REMGDP 
Source: Author‟s computation as total migrant remittances received as a 
percentage of nominal GDP of a recipient SSA country based on the 
sources of migrant remittances cited above and nominal GDP data reported 
mainly in WDI and WEO. 
Remittances per 
capita 
REMPC Source: Author‟s computation as total migrant remittances received as a 
ratio of total population of a recipient SSA country based on the sources of 
migrant remittances cited above and population data reported mainly in WDI 
and WEO. 
 
Workers‟ 
remittances per 
capita 
 
 
WREMPC 
Workers‟ remittances are the remittances sent by migrants who spent 12 
months or more in the host country. Source: Author‟s computation as gross 
workers‟ remittances received as a ratio of total population of a recipient 
SSA country based on the sources of migrant remittances cited above and 
population data reported mainly in WDI. 
Compensation of 
employees per 
capita 
 
COMPPC 
Compensation of employees are the remittances received from citizens who 
spent less than 12 months in the host country. Source: Author‟s 
computation as total compensation of employees received as a ratio of total 
population of a recipient SSA country based on the sources of migrant 
remittances cited above. The population data was collated mainly from WDI. 
Explanatory Variables 
Lagged dependent (•)_l
+
 The immediate past values of the dependent variable. Source: Author‟s 
computation. 
Inflation rate INF
+/-
 Rate of growth in annual average consumer price index. Source: WDI, IFS 
and WEO. 
 
 
Real exchange 
rate 
 
 
lnRXR
+/-
 
The annual average value of the national currency of a sampled SSA 
country in real terms of the national currency of the migrant-host country. 
Computed as a multiplication of nominal exchange rate by the ratio of host-
country CPI to home-country CPI. Source: Author‟s computation based on 
WDI, IFS and WEO.  
Host-country 
income ln
fY

 
Real per capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) in US dollars 
(constant 2000 prices) of a typical non-SSA migrant host country. Source: 
WDI. 
Home-country 
income 
/
ln hY
 
 
Real per capita GDP PPP in US dollars (constant 2000 prices) of a typical 
SSA country. Source: WDI. 
Real Deposit 
Interest Rate  
 
RIR
+/-
 
Average annual deposit rate of a typical SSA country less minus average 
annualised CPI-based inflation rate. Source: Author based on WDI, IFS, 
WEO and Central Banks of selected countries. 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
 
lnPSC
+/-
 
Total domestic credit to the private sector by the home-country financial 
system as a ratio of nominal GDP. Source: WDI, ADI and the Central Bank 
website of selected sampled countries. 
 
 
Institutional quality  
 
 
INS
+/-
 
A polity2 index used to capture the qualities of democratic governance and 
institutions in a typical home SSA country. It ranges between -10 for low 
democratic governance (including dictatorship and autocratic regimes) and 
weak institutions, and +10 for high democratic governance and strong 
institutions. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2011) 
 
Regulatory 
environment  
 
D9_11
+
 
A dummy (=1 for post-2001 and 0 elsewhere) to capture post-September 11, 
2001, when the US and other migrant-host countries improved regulations 
on international money transfers, which has discouraged migrants from 
using informal channels to remit. Source: Author‟s construction. 
Source: Author. Note: The a priori sign is indicated by +/- in the notation column of each variable. WDI, ADI, WEO, 
IFS and BoPS refer to April 2011 CD-ROM and e-database editions. The prefix notation „ln‟ denotes natural 
logarithm. 
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Table A4.3: Host Countries of SSA Migrants 
 
Source: Author‟s compilation from Parson et al. (2007). Note: AUS, CAN, ISR, ITA, LIB, DRC, EGY, REU, SWE, 
ZAM, ZIM, JOR and LBY stand for Australia, Canada, Israel, Italy, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Reunion, Sweden, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Jordan and Libya respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 1: Host 2 3
Benin (BEN) NIG (27.71) BFA (12.68) TOG (12.45) CIV (10.60) GAB (5.59) FRA (2.22) GER (1.30) PAK (1.07)
Botswana (BSW) RSA (18.01) NAM (16.96) GBR (12.47) ZIM (11.64) USA (9.58) GBR (12.47) USA (9.58) AUS (4.27)
Burkina Faso (BFA) CIV (72.47) GUI (11.03) GHA (5.13) DRC (1.38) PAK (1.06) PAK (1.06) GER (1.03) FRA (0.37)
Cameroon (CAM) FRA (22.62) GAB (17.74) NIG (9.91) USA (7.53) GER (5.43) FRA (22.62) USA (7.53) GER (5.43)
Cape Verde (CPV) POR (22.52) USA (13.83) FRA (6.65) GER (6.61) MZQ (8.44) POR (22.52) USA (13.83) FRA (6.65)
Comoros (COM) FRA (43.14) UGA (22.47) GER (7.01) TZA (4.68) LBY (2.59) FRA (43.14) GER (7.01) USA (0.50)
Congo Republic (CON) SUD (47.91) TZA (16.03) FRA (8.34) BEL (2.68) GER (2.29) FRA (8.34) BEL (2.68) GER (2.29)
Côte d'Ivoire (CIV) FRA (27.38) BFA (19.72) GER (5.95) BEN (6.56) GUI (5.40) FRA (27.38) GER (5.95) USA (4.57)
Ethiopia (ETH) USA (25.65) ISR (20.67) SAU (7.72) CAN (5.08) SWE (3.40) USA (25.65) ISR (20.67) SAU (7.72)
Gabon (GAB) SUD (47.30) FRA (19.69) SLE (4.39) GER (3.44) KEN (3.66) FRA (19.69) GER (3.44) USA (0.92)
Gambia (GAM) ESP (12.18) USA (11.95) NIG (8.45) GBR (7.73) SEN (3.67) ESP (12.18) USA (11.95) GBR (7.73)
Ghana (GHA) CIV (31.91) NIG (13.06) BFA (9.74) GUI (8.69) USA (7.31) USA (7.31) GBR (5.97) GER (2.27)
Guinea (GUI) CIV (23.74) LIB (12.11) SEN (18.69) BFA (11.17) GAM (6.57) GBR (1.45) GER (1.34) USA (1.15)
Guinea-Bissau (GBS) SEN (25.45) GAM (13.36) POR (16.72) FRA (6.34) BFA (5.81) POR (16.72) FRA (6.34) GER (4.45)
Kenya (KEN) GBR (28.54) TZA (27.04) UGA (7.35) USA (9.85) GER (5.38) GBR (28.54) USA (9.85) GER (5.38)
Lesotho (LSO) MZQ (46.02) ZIM (19.45) RSA (16.18) MWI (2.38) TZA (1.72) GER (0.82) USA (0.81) PAK (0.71)
Madagascar (MAD) FRA (51.55) REU (12.88) GER (8.64) ZIM (4.22) COM (3.82) FRA (51.55) REU (12.88) GER (8.64)
Malawi (MWI) ZAM (19.03) TZA (18.93) RSA (17.65) ZIM (12.91) GBR (8.30) GBR (8.30) GER (1.93) USA (1.38)
Mali (MLI) CIV (30.82) BFA (27.74) GUI (10.32) NIG (5.77) GHA (5.22) FRA (2.73) GER (1.37) USA (0.45)
Mauritania (MRT) SEN (34.21) NIG (10.32) FRA (8.78) BFA (7.68) GUI (7.56) FRA (8.78) ESP (3.21) GER (2.72)
Mauritius (MRS) FRA (18.41) RSA (18.39) GBR (15.63) AUS (9.70) GER (6.53) FRA (18.41) GBR (15.63) AUS (9.70)
Mozambique (MZQ) TZA (22.78) ZIM (19.98) MWI (19.16) RSA (17.74) POR (8.97) POR (8.97) GER (2.07) GBR (0.50)
Namibia (NAM) MZQ (23.07) RSA (17.28) ZIM (13.13) TZA (1.50) GBR (5.14) GBR (5.14) USA (4.19) GER (1.88)
Niger (NGR) BFA (27.84) CIV (26.25) NIG (11.89) GUI (10.79) GHA (5.16) GER (1.10) PAK (1.06) FRA (0.73)
Nigeria (NIG) SUD (23.76) USA (13.74) GBR (8.60) CAM (8.39) GHA (5.14) USA (13.74) GBR (8.60) GER (2.91)
Rwanda (RWA) UGA (42.17) TZA (27.94) KEN (4.89) BEL (2.83) GER (1.87) BEL (2.83) GER (1.87) USA (1.16)
São Tomé & Príncipe POR (54.97) CPV (15.94) GER (9.30) BFA (3.00) GUI (2.93) POR (54.97) GER (9.30) FRA (1.02)
Senegal (SEN) GAM (20.56) FRA (18.32) ITA (9.58) MRT (8.48) GER (5.30) FRA (18.32) ITA (9.58) GER (5.30)
Seychelles (SEY) GBR (17.40) RSA (18.69) AUS (14.55) ZIM (6.24) TZA (6.18) GBR (17.40) AUS (14.55) CAN (6.15)
Sierra Leone (SLE) USA (22.87) LIB (18.31) GBR (18.18) GHA (5.00) GER (4.50) USA (22.87) GBR (18.18) GER (4.50)
South Africa (RSA) GBR (18.15) MZQ (16.04) AUS (10.12) USA (8.99) ZIM (7.37) GBR (18.15) AUS (10.12) USA (8.99)
Sudan (SUD) SAU (32.05) UGA (24.31) JOR (3.78) USA (3.43) EGY (2.64) SAU (32.05) JOR (3.78) USA (3.43)
Swaziland (SWZ) MZQ (28.48) RSA (17.05) ZIM (14.53) GBR (7.43) USA (5.46) GBR (7.43) USA (5.46) GER (2.30)
Tanzania (TNZ) UGA (20.46) RSA (18.31) GBR (11.48) ZIM (8.81) CAN (6.95) GBR (11.48) CAN (6.95) USA (4.47)
Togo (TOG) NIG (36.10) BEN (12.05) BFA (8.75) GUI (8.84) GAM (6.61) FRA (6.38) GER (2.02) USA (1.63)
Uganda (UGA) GBR (32.41) TZA (23.82) USA (7.38) CAN (6.48) GER (6.06) GBR (32.41) USA (7.38) CAN (6.48)
Migrant Home-Country
Top-5 SSA Migrant Host Countries in the World Top-3 Non-SSA Host Countries
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Table A4.4: 
 Robustness Test Results of International Migrant Remittance Flows to SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Number of obs = 1006 
Time variable: Year Number of groups (N)= 36 
   Number of instruments = 442 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel Data Procedure 
  REMPC lnMRem REMGDP REMPC_USA 
Migrant remittances lag 1 (•_1) 0.9477 0.6438 1.0306 0.9359 
  (359.71)*** (13.19)*** (203.61)*** (331.25)*** 
Migrant remittances lag 2 (•_2) -0.1267 0.0851 -0.1009 -0.1248 
  (-107.93)*** (2.98)*** (-18.52)*** (-46.02)*** 
Institutional quality (INS) -0.3107 -0.0054 -0.0469 -0.1087 
  (-8.17)*** (-1.33) (-14.64)*** (-1.96)** 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) -1.0084 -0.0887 -1.4763 -4.2271 
 (-2.82)*** (-0.17) (-5.58)*** (-8.68)*** 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) 18.3925 1.2693 -0.9862 15.2761 
  (13.93)*** (2.63)*** (-2.13)** (7.03)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0449 -0.0008 0.0088 0.0781 
  (4.75)*** (-0.25) (2.41)** (3.80)*** 
Bank credit to private sector (PSC) 2.3553 -0.0848 0.1612 2.7793 
  (7.12)*** (-1.58) (4.02)*** (5.29)*** 
Real exchange rate (RXR) -4.9314 -0.0131 -0.2125 -6.8819 
  (-12.98)*** (-0.08) (-5.84)*** (-26.01)*** 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) 0.0347 -0.0024 0.0101 -0.0615 
  (4.46)*** (-0.81) (2.71)*** (-2.75)*** 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) 4.6614 0.1905 0.6862 4.8291 
  (71.91)*** (8.59)*** (72.01)*** (37.86)*** 
Constant term (constant) -157.9818 -7.6688 21.3176 -100.3526 
  (-12.40)*** (-2.71)*** (5.11)*** (-4.80)*** 
Wald 2
[10],  1.40e+06*** 18200.39*** 4.29e+06*** 454424.61*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
 -0.1065{0.915} -1.0463{0.295} -1.0233{0.306} -0.1202{0.904} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[431],  27.1849 31.4014  32.2858 21.5861 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
    REMPC_USA reports estimates where the USA is assumed as the host country  
for SSA migrants 
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Table A4.5: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
VARIABLES  PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST STATISTICS  
Fisher P-P chi-square Hadri HC z-stat LLC Adjusted t-stat Conclusion 
 At Level  At Level At Level  
REMPC 2.7415*** 
{0.0031} 
 37.9585*** 
[0.0000] 
 I(0) 
WREMPC 2.5115*** 
{0.0060} 
 38.1682*** 
[0.0000] 
 I(0) 
COMPPC 9.0253*** 
{0.0000} 
 n/a 
n/a 
 I(0) 
INS 4.0808*** 
{0.0000} 
 38.2215*** 
[0.0000] 
 I(0) 
lnY
h
 2.4244*** 
{0.0000} 
 49.0222*** 
[0.0000] 
 I(0) 
lnY
f
 -4.8303  23.2519*** -4.2924*** I(0) 
 {1.0000}  [0.0000] (0.0000)  
INF 25.8682***  n/a n/a I(0) 
 {0.0000}  n/a n/a  
lnPSC 0.6143  38.0580*** -1.5210* I(0) 
 {0.2695}  [0.0000] (0.0641)  
lnRXR -0.2351  30.8740*** -2.0439** I(0) 
 {0.5929}  [0.0000] (0.0205)  
RIR           25.3546***  11.6515***           I(0) 
               {0.0000}  [0.0000]   
Source: Author‟s computations  Note: Figures in brackets are respective probability values. ***/**/* significant  
    at 1/5/10 level statistical level respectively. Constant and trend included. n/a  
    means not applicable due to omitted data. 
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Table A4.6: Static Panel-Data Modelling of Migrant Remittance Inflows in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Fixed  
Effects (FE) 
Random GLS 
Effects (RE)  Robust FE  
Robust Random 
GLS (RE)
++
 
Institutional quality (INS) -0.6913 -0.5852 -0.6913 -0.5852 
 (-3.57)*** (-3.08)*** (-1.68)* (-1.58) 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) 17.6715 14.3954 17.6715 14.3954 
 (4.45)*** (4.16)*** (1.04) (1.08) 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) 36.9054 28.7328 36.9054 28.7328 
 (5.32)*** (4.79)*** (1.76)* (1.70)* 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.1267 0.1162 0.1267 0.1162 
 (1.12) (1.02) (1.08) (1.07) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 5.6051 6.1008 5.6051 6.1008 
 (3.69)*** (4.02)*** (1.75)* (1.73)* 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -9.6136 -7.1883 -9.6136 -7.1883 
 (-5.18)*** (-4.87)*** (-1.69)* (-1.88)* 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) 0.1577 0.1480 0.1577 0.1480 
 (1.34) (1.24) (1.34) (1.38) 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) 6.5054 7.9939 6.5054 7.9939 
 (3.14) *** (3.98) *** (1.65)* (2.40)** 
Constant term (constant) -447.9099 -354.5817 -447.9099 -354.5817 
 (-6.81)*** (-6.09)*** (-1.59) (-1.63) 
Number of observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Overall R
2
 0.0962 0.0998 0.0962 0.0998 
F-statistics 27.32{0.000}
***
 208.93{0.000}
***
 2.74{0.019}
**
 20.76{0.008}
***
 
Hausman_FE  -10.19
ᴥ 
n/a n/a
 
n/a 
Breusch-Pagan (B-P) statistics n/a   8618.63{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    robust z-statistics in ( ), probabilities in { }, ᴥ probabilities not available 
    n/a denotes not available or required, 
++ 
most efficient and reliable results  
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Table A4.7: Static Panel-Data Modelling of Workers‟ Remittance Inflows in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Fixed  
Effects (FE) 
Random GLS 
Effects (RE)  Robust FE
++
  
Robust Random 
GLS (RE)
 
Institutional quality (INS) -1.2893 -1.0818 -1.2893 -1.0818 
 (-5.50)*** (-4.84)*** (-1.39) (-1.32) 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) 16.0950 12.4477 16.0950 12.4477 
 (3.35)*** (3.24)*** (0.86) (0.99) 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) 43.8241 28.6914 43.8241 28.6914 
 (5.22)*** (4.31)*** (1.90)* (1.68)* 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0691 0.0558 0.0691 0.0558 
 (0.51) (0.41) (0.56) (0.49) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 5.3290 6.0171 5.3290 6.0171 
 (2.90)*** (3.34)*** (1.49) (1.52) 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -9.3396 -5.2262 -9.3396 -5.2262 
 (-4.17)*** (-3.30)*** (-1.65)* (-1.69)* 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) 0.0750 0.0626 0.0750 0.0626 
 (0.53) (0.44) (0.58) (0.54) 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) 4.5760 7.0209 4.5760 7.0209 
 (1.83)* (2.98)*** (0.96) (1.63) 
Constant term (constant) -512.0303 -354.8648 -512.0303 -354.8648 
 (-6.44)*** (-5.46)*** (-1.95)* (-1.87)* 
Number of observations 1078 1078 1078 1078 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Overall R
2
 0.0583 0.0631 0.0583 0.0631 
F-statistics 18.14{0.000}
***
 132.10{0.000}
***
 1.75{0.122} 11.61{0.170} 
Hausman_FE 29.49{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a n/a 
Breusch-Pagan (B-P) statistics n/a 4910.85{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    robust z-statistics in ( ), probabilities in { }, n/a denotes not available or required 
    ++ most efficient and reliable results based on Hausman test and B-P statistics 
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Table A4.8: Static Panel-Data Modelling of Compensation of Employees to SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Fixed  
Effects (FE) 
Random GLS 
Effects (RE)  Robust FE  
Robust Random 
GLS (RE)
++
 
Institutional quality (INS) 0.7327 0.6904 0.7327 0.6904 
 (5.59)*** (5.50)*** (1.15) (1.17) 
Home-country income (lnY
h
) 1.6016 0.8084 1.6016 0.8084 
 (0.61) (0.37) (0.18) (0.15) 
Host-country income (lnY
f
) -8.5768 -4.6367 -8.5768 -4.6367 
 (-1.82)* (-1.19) (-1.03) (-0.94) 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0910 0.0893 0.0910 0.0893 
 (1.19) (1.18) (1.01) (1.00) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 0.8000 0.8425 0.8000 0.8425 
 (0.79) (0.85) (0.46) (0.57) 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -0.3033 -1.2132 -0.3033 -1.2132 
 (-0.23) (-1.27) (-0.27) (-1.49) 
Real deposit interest rate (RIR) 0.1266 0.1251 0.1266 0.1251 
 (1.60) (1.59) (1.01) (1.01) 
Regulatory environment (D9_11) 3.2265 2.7448 3.2265 2.7448 
 (2.31)** (2.09)** (1.19) (1.18) 
Constant term (constant) 79.8442 50.1661 79.8442 50.1661 
 (1.79)* (1.33) (1.00) (0.87) 
Number of observations 970 970 970 970 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Overall R
2
 0.0202 0.0537 0.0202 0.0537 
F-statistics 6.66{0.000}
***
 54.35{0.000}
***
 0.74{0.656} 4.77{0.782} 
Hausman_FE    2.72{0.951} n/a n/a n/a 
Breusch-Pagan (B-P) statistics n/a 5724.30{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    robust z-statistics in ( ), probabilities in { }, n/a denotes not available or required 
    ++ most efficient and reliable results based on Hausman test and B-P statistics 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE IMPACT AND CAUSAL EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION ON 
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE INFLOWS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is devoted to exploring the causal effects and impact of financial liberalisation on 
official international remittance inflows in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This is motivated by the 
proposition that a less restricted and a more inclusive financial system has salutary 
consequences for remittance mobilisation through the formal financial system as banks and 
allied financial institutions enter into the international remittance market to make it more 
competitive, leading to high efficiency and a reduced cost on fund transfers. A sample of 13 
SSA countries for which relevant data are available was used. The study begins with 
background information in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 presents some selected stylised facts on 
international remittance inflows and financial liberalisation in SSA whilst Section 5.3 reviews the 
literature on financial liberalisation and financial resource mobilisation. In Section 5.4, the 
empirical models, methodology and issues related to data are discussed. The empirical results 
are presented and discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6, the last, discusses applicable policy 
guidelines. 
 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
While official remittances to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been increasing steadily over the 
past three decades coinciding with the implementation of financial liberalisation programmes, 
the sub-region has still remained the region that receives the least migrant remittances by any 
good measure (see Figure A3.2 in Chapter Three). But while SSA receives the least 
remittances through official channels, Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate that, in relative 
terms, SSA is the highest recipient of informal remittances because of the underdevelopment of 
the domestic financial sector. Earlier, Kapur (2004) reported that banks in industrialised 
economies79 facilitate the flow of remittances through official transfer channels by competing 
with the traditional non-bank remittance service providers. This suggests that a liberalised 
financial system which can motivate banks and other formal financial institutions to enter the 
global remittance market and compete with other formal remittance service providers such as 
                                                          
79
 These are also economies where financial markets are relatively developed with less financial repressive policies. 
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Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) might be a necessary condition if a country is to receive 
higher remittances through official channels. With low participation of banks in the international 
remittance market, the existing competition between MTOs and unregulated informal 
remittance-transfer service providers hardly enables SSA countries to mobilise optimal formal 
remittances. 
 
Although the financial system alone does not represent the entire official remittance channel as 
post offices80, mobile telecommunication service providers and international MTOs such as 
Western Union, MoneyGram, Vigo, and DolEx are equally recognised as official channels 
globally, low participation of domestic banks in the remittance market must be discouraged for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, increased competition in the remittance market as a result of 
higher bank participation is necessary in mobilising more remittances and in reducing the high 
commissions charged by the few existing official transfer agents. The few dominant MTOs that 
have market power in the absence of meaningful competition from banks tend to charge above 
what would have been the competitive market price on non-competitive remittance-corridors. 
Indeed, available data on charges on money transfers by the two leading MTOs in SSA 
(Western Union and MoneyGram) show that although there is a high degree of regional 
homogeneity in the cost structures, a considerable price variation exists among SSA countries, 
depending mainly upon  market size and competition on the remittance corridor81,82. 
 
Secondly, because MTOs and other non-bank remittance-transfer institutions do not 
intermediate83 in the financial system, the participation of banks and stock exchanges in the 
remittance market is vital to ensuring that remittances received are put into optimal use. 
                                                          
80
 In most SSA countries, post offices are only directly important in the local remittance market when rural-urban 
migrants purchase postal orders. And because typical post offices do not have branches outside their national 
borders, they act mainly as agents for MTOs in the international remittance market. And even though some 
households may receive remittances in the form of bankers‟ drafts through post offices, in this particular case, post 
offices can only be seen as performing their traditional function rather than as direct participants in the international 
remittance market. 
81
 This is based on accessible information on the websites of Western Union and MoneyGram and author‟s personal 
inquiries with these MTOs during the period, February 6-22, 2011, on remitting US$500 to selected SSA countries 
from France, Spain, Germany, Portugal, UK and the USA using Western Union and MoneyGram. From France, the 
least priced countries are Francophone West Africa, especially Mali, Senegal and Togo. From the UK and USA, the 
remittance corridors to Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, and Uganda, are 
among the least priced. Major price differences among recipient SSA countries are related to the primary minimum 
fee rather than the secondary percentage fees charged by the MTOs. 
82
 A similar observation was made by Suki (2007) on the US-LAC remittance corridor with prices relatively lower on 
the US-Mexico corridor largely due to differences in intensity of competition following increased participation of 
banks. 
83
 It must be said that in some SSA countries, for instance, SADC countries, post offices offer post-bank services 
where customers can deposit money, but these post offices are not licensed to give loans to customers. 
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Thirdly, increased bank participation can directly contribute to the elimination of dual exchange 
rate regimes as, unlike other agents, banks generally have foreign exchange departments and, 
hence, can convert remittances into local currencies using officially approved rates. Fourthly, 
increased bank participation can help solve the low degree of „bancarisation‟ and high financial 
exclusion syndromes in SSA. Fifthly, given its unique resilient and countercyclical character, 
remittances received through banks can be important to the „labour-exporting‟ country through 
securitisation of expected remittances as collateral. Ketkar and Ratha (2001; 2004) report that 
in the year 2001, the Central Bank of Brazil issued a 5-year bond valued at US$300 million and 
secured future remittances from Brazilian migrants in Japan. And, finally, because the 5-year 
bond issued by Banco do Brasil in the year 2001 earned an enviable BBB+ rating which is by 
far higher than the existing rating of Brazil‟s sovereign bond (Ketkar and Ratha, 2001), it can be 
said that receiving higher remittances through banks can improve the international credit rating 
of recipient countries. 
 
Thus,  there is certainly no doubt that the surest way to attract higher remittances to SSA 
through the formal channels and to make the most out of remittance inflows is to liberalise the 
domestic financial sector for higher competition so that formal financial institutions in SSA can 
be attracted to enter  the remittance market and compete with MTOs. The entry of banks and 
other formal financial institutions into the remittance market can boost openness, reduce 
remittance transmission costs, improve services, including quality standards, increase 
efficiency, and expand service options to both senders and receivers of remittances. However, 
unless the appropriate sequencing and pace are followed, financial liberalisation can be 
associated with a higher risk of financial fragility due to higher speculative behaviour of 
economic agents in response to changing trends in capital flows and fluctuations in the rates  of 
interest and exchange rates (Stiglitz, 1994; Mathieu, 1998). Nevertheless, unlike other forms of 
private external capital, international remittances are well-known not only to be risk-free, but 
also non-debt creating, non-volatile and possessing the finest shock-mitigating effects 
(Bugamelli and Paternò, 2008; Adenutsi, 2011). Notwithstanding the above, it would be 
erroneous to think that the mere pursuit of financial liberalisation programmes will cause an 
automatic inflow of international remittances. This is because, as noted in Chapter Two, the 
concept of financial liberalisation is multidimensional, with Abiad et al. (2010), for example, 
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identifying nine components84.  
 
Therefore, it can be argued that the implications of financial liberalisation for international 
remittance inflows through the formal financial system is contingent upon whether or not the 
deregulation of restrictions on capital inflows is accompanied by liberalisation of restrictions on 
capital outflows. If there are fewer restrictions on external capital inflows and outflows in a 
typical migrant-home country, there is a higher likelihood that international migrants will remit 
home using the formal financial system. One reason is that when a migrant finds it convenient 
to freely reallocate his/her portfolio investments from his/her home country to other parts of the 
world, a typical migrant-home country can receive higher remittances through the formal 
financial system as remittances driven by speculative motives increase. Another important 
aspect is whether or not, following financial liberalisation, real interest rates and interest rate 
spreads in a typical migrant-home developing country are above or below the world market 
rates. This is consistent with the self-interest investment theory underlying the flow of 
international remittances. According to this theory, when investment in migrant-home countries 
is relatively less risky and more rewarding, more non-altruistic remittances are received in the 
home country of migrants. 
 
Also, depending upon the extent to which financial liberalisation has led to increased financial 
efficiency as measured by reduced cost of international money transfers, increased access of 
residents to quality, innovative and reliable financial services and products with wider options 
for portfolio diversification, a country could receive more international remittances when 
migrants switch from informal remittance service providers to patronise the services of the 
formal financial institutions participating in the remittance market. This is also a natural 
possibility as the lower transaction cost of remitting alleviates the extra burden on remitters, 
especially migrants on low incomes and/or those who remit regularly. And, whether or not, the 
implementation of financial liberalisation policies in SSA will cause higher inflows of 
international remittances through the formal financial system, is dependent upon the trade-off 
between the risk exposure associated with increased financial openness and a host of many 
factors including the size of the unofficial remittances received; stock and legal status of 
                                                          
84
 These are specific reform policies on directed credit, reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, 
banking supervision, privatisation, international capital flows, aggregate credit ceilings, and security market 
development. Abiad et al. (2010), however, consider directed credit, reserve requirements and aggregate credit 
ceilings as complementary policies aimed at achieving the same specific purpose. 
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migrants; target recipients‟ access to convenient financial services; and the magnitude as well 
as the regularity of remittances. This is because even if total remittances (i.e. the sum of official 
and unofficial remittances) remain unchanged following the merits of financial liberalisation, 
holding all other factors constant, countries which hitherto received higher unofficial 
remittances are more likely to receive higher remittances through the formal financial system 
than those that traditionally received fewer unofficial remittances. In much the same manner, 
countries that traditionally receive more remittances by virtue of having a large stock of legal 
and working migrants in the Diaspora are more likely to receive even more remittances through 
the formal financial system if these countries adopt financial liberalisation programmes.  
 
As a result, though, in principle, the causal relationship between international remittances and 
financial liberalisation may be expected to be uni-directional (running from financial 
liberalisation to remittance inflows), because the policies implemented under financial 
liberalisation programmes are assumed to be deliberate and independent actions of the 
monetary authority of a country; a bi-directional causality cannot be ruled out entirely. Indeed, 
the impact of financial liberalisation on international remittance inflows can be positive, zero, or 
negative, depending upon the specific aspects of financial liberalisation which received the 
most (or domineering) policy reform attention. For instance, one does not expect a strong 
causal relationship between remittances and financial liberalisation if the financial reforms 
policy implemented is concentrated on reduction of direct reserve requirements and direct 
credit control rather than on promoting financial efficiency and competition through privatisation 
and relaxation of entry requirements. Although remittances may respond to these financial 
policy reforms in the long run, these policies can hardly have a direct short-run impact or causal 
effect on attracting remittances through the banking system. Therefore, since the impact and 
causal effects of financial liberalisation and international remittances remain theoretically 
unresolved, they should be seen as issues of empirical concern. 
 
To fill this research gap, six key research questions are imperative, holding all other factors 
constant, and with reference to SSA. 
i. What are the stylised facts about financial liberalisation and international remittance 
inflows? 
ii. Is there any causal relationship between financial liberalisation and international 
remittance inflows?  
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iii. If yes to (ii), then which specific policy component(s) under the financial liberalisation 
programme cause(s) international remittance inflows?  
iv. What is the impact of financial liberalisation on international remittance inflows?  
v. How does each specific policy component of financial liberalisation impact on 
international remittance inflows?  
vi. Does the impact of financial liberalisation on international remittances (if any), vary over 
time in response to the increasing implementation of the liberalisation policies? 
 
Consequently, the specific objectives of this chapter are six-fold. The first is to provide some 
stylised facts on the relationship between international remittances received and financial 
liberalisation in SSA. The second is to verify if there is any causal relationship between 
international remittance inflows and the broad index of financial liberalisation in SSA. The third 
is to trace the direction of any existing line of causality between each specific policy component 
of financial liberalisation programmes and international remittance inflows in SSA. Fourthly, it is 
to examine the overall impact of financial liberalisation on international remittance inflows in 
SSA. The fifth is to determine the policy-specific impact of financial liberalisation on 
international remittance inflows. The sixth is to verify if, with the passage of time and as the 
financial market became more and more liberalised, the impact of financial liberalisation on 
remittances increased.  
 
To achieve these objectives, 13 SSA countries for which relevant data are available from 1980 
to 2009 are analysed. This study is essential because, according to the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis, financial liberalisation is vital to the mobilisation of domestic resources and various 
forms of private external capital and, for that matter, international remittances. It is also 
imperative for policy making in SSA being the sub-region that receives the least remittances 
through official channels. This is because whilst Orozco (2004) reports that banks do not play 
any significant role in the remittance market, (specifically, not more than three per cent on the 
US-Mexico corridor85), Alberola and Salvado (2006) develop a notional model to prove that the 
presence of banks in the remittance market is crucial to receiving higher official remittances. 
 
 
                                                          
85
 This is one of the largest remittance corridors in the world. In fact, Mexico, with most of its migrants in the US, is 
the largest recipient of remittances in LAC, and the third in the world as at 2009 (see WDI, April 2011). 
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The motivation behind this study lies in the fact that it addresses some crucial aspects of the 
remittance literature, the causal linkages and direct effects of financial liberalisation on 
international remittances received through official channels, which have so far been ignored in 
empirical studies. In fact, apart from some attempts86 at exploring the impact of remittances on 
financial development indicators which are generally considered as measures of financial 
reforms outcome, the researcher is not aware of any previous work devoted to exploring the 
relationship between financial liberalisation and international remittance inflows. 
 
5.2 SELECTED STYLISED FACTS 
Table 5.1 shows the year in which SSA countries embarked upon financial liberalisation 
programmes. 19 out of the 38 countries listed in Table 5.1 fully embarked upon financial reform 
programmes in the 1980s.  
 
Table 5.1: Implementation of Financial Liberalisation in SSA 
Country Year of FLB Country Year of FLB 
Benin 1989 Malawi 1987 
Botswana⁺ 1989 Mali 1989 
Burkina Faso 1989 Mauritania 1990 
Burundi 1986 Mauritius⁺ 1981 
Cameroon 1990 Mozambique⁺ 1992 
Congo, DR 2001 Namibia⁺ 1991 
Congo Republic 1990 Niger 1989 
Cote d'Ivoire 1989 Nigeria⁺ 1987 
Central Africa Republic  1990 Rwanda 1994 
Chad 1990 Senegal 1989 
Ethiopia 1994 Seychelles⁺ 1984 
Gabon 1990 Sierra Leone 1991 
Gambia 1985 South Africa⁺⁺ 1980 
Ghana⁺ 1987 Sudan 1997 
Guinea 1996 Tanzania⁺ 1991 
Guinea-Bissau 1989 Togo 1989 
Kenya⁺ 1991 Uganda⁺ 1988 
Lesotho 1996 Zambia⁺ 1992 
Madagascar 1986 Zimbabwe 1993 
Source: Author, based mainly on various Central Bank reports and website information. 
+
(
++
) denotes that country is 
classified as having frontier (emerging) financial market respectively. Bold means the country is sampled for the 
empirical analysis reported in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
86
 See, for example, Aggarwal et al. (2006), Toxopeus and Lensink (2007), Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009), and 
Gheeraert et al. (2010). 
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Republic of South Africa is the first country within the sub-region to liberalise its financial 
market, and this was in 1980, whilst Congo DR was the latest to adopt the programme just 
about a decade ago. Despite the gradual abandonment of financial repressive policies in favour 
of liberalisation policies (see Table A5.7), most SSA still have underdeveloped financial 
markets today. According to IMF (2008a), as at 2007, the only emerging financial market in 
SSA was that of the Republic of South Africa, with only 12 countries within the sub-region 
(those marked + in Table 5.1) having frontier financial markets. 
 
Figure 5.1 reveals that even though countries with emerging and frontier markets have 
relatively more liberalised financial markets, they receive far less international remittances (in 
per capita or per migrant terms) compared with other countries within the sub-region that have 
underdeveloped financial markets (see also Table A5.6 for evidence).  
 
Figure 5.1: Remittances Received and Financial Liberalisation in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation. Note: lnREMPC and FLBI represent natural logarithm of remittances per capita (in 
US$) and financial liberalisation index respectively. F&E markets stands for frontier and emerging markets. 
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There can be three possible explanations for this revelation. First, whereas the analysis 
stretches over a 30-year period (i.e. 1980-2009), the IMF classification of financial markets was 
only done in 2007. This could imply that most of the countries classified as having frontier and 
emerging financial markets might have attained this status not too long ago. Second, only six 
countries with frontier financial markets (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Uganda) were included in this analysis because of lack of data on financial liberalisation index 
and/or international remittances on the other six frontier countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and Zambia). Incidentally, whilst Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Mauritius and Seychelles are among the traditional leading recipients of remittances per capita, 
Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania are among the very least recipients within the sub-region 
(see Figure 3.5 in Chapter Three). Third, it is possible that most of the international remittances 
received through official channels in countries with underdeveloped financial markets are not 
received through the financial system, which includes banks and the stock exchange, whilst 
FLBI is based on policy reforms in the banking sector and the stock market. 
 
One important observation that can be made from Figure 5.1 is that, although SSA countries 
with underdeveloped financial markets attracted more officially reported remittances per capita 
than their counterparts with frontier and emerging financial markets, over time, it is the latter 
group that is increasingly receiving more officially reported remittances per capita in relative 
terms. For example, from an average low of natural logarithmic value of -0.651 in the 1980s, 
SSA countries with frontier and emerging markets recorded a more than 200 percentage rise 
by the end of the 1990s; and a further rise in excess of 270 per cent in the 2000s over the 
reported figure in the 1990s. In similar natural logarithmic values, SSA countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets recorded a mere 50 per cent rise in remittances per capita in 
each successive decade. 
 
The relationship between international remittances received per capita and financial 
liberalisation (FLB) including its specific policy components are shown in Figure 5.2. Overall, 
international remittances are positively correlated with the degree of financial liberalisation. In 
countries with frontier and emerging financial markets, the positive correlation between 
international remittances and the various dimensions of FLB excluding policy on directed credit, 
reserve requirement and aggregate credit ceilings (DCRR), are stronger than in countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets (see also Table A5.5). 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
192 
 
Figure 5.2: 
Correlation between Remittances Received and Financial Liberalisation in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation.  Refer to Table 5.2 for meaning of IRC, EBC, BKS, PVZ, ICF and SMK. 
 
Correlation, however, only provides evidence of a possible contemporaneous relationship 
between a pair of variables, which does not necessarily suggest a direct relationship or 
causality between the pair of variables under consideration. For empirical evidence on the 
impact or the causal relationship between FLB or the specific FLB policies and international 
remittance inflows, a more rigorous statistical analysis, which is the object of this chapter, is 
required. 
 
5.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.3.1 Theoretical Literature  
A survey of the literature suggests that there are three main theories that are central to our 
understanding of the role a financial system can play in financial resource mobilisation. These 
are the Repressionist theory, the McKinnon-Shaw liberalist theory, and the Neostructuralist 
theory. 
 
5.3.1.1 The Financial Repression Theory 
The Financial Repression model dominated the financial and monetary policy formulation in 
both industrialised and developing economies prior to the mid-1970s (Fry, 1995). Advocates of  
financial repression, particularly, Hilferding (1910), Gesell (1911), Keynes (1936), Nicholas 
(1974), and Tobin (1965) express misgivings about the efficient role of the financial system in a 
capitalist economy and caution that without careful management of money supply, an economy 
is bound to suffer severe negative ramifications. This is because capital-intensive investment 
which is considered a desideratum in capital-constrained developing countries can only be 
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promoted at lower cost of capital, hence the need to allow the state to take better control over 
money supply. This proposition is based on the assumption that it is the government-regulated 
rather than the market-directed financial system that can best determine the type and volume 
of savings and investment that are desirable to promote social welfare, especially in developing 
countries where institutions are weak (Gerschenkron, 1962). Another justification given for 
financial repression is that the government is responsible for protecting borrowers against 
usury practices by moderating the free market determination of interest rates. Tobin (1965), 
and Giovannini and de Melo (1993) explain that financial repression ensures that interest rates 
are maintained below market rates, reduces the cost of servicing debts and enables 
governments to finance social development projects.  
 
Repressionists argue that in developing countries, in particular, where institutional constraints 
undermine government efforts to mobilise sufficient tax revenue to offset government 
expenditure, financial repression is the second best strategy (Fry, 1995). In his liquidity 
preference theory, Keynes (1936) demonstrates, among others, that because the relationship 
between speculative balances and interest rate is negative, in order to stimulate investment, it 
is important for policy makers to keep interest rates low and below the level that interest rates 
would have attained at full-employment. According to Keynes (1936), speculative demand for 
money increases when people expect the market value of alternative assets such as consols or 
government bonds that attract fixed coupon income or dividends to fall. Using his portfolio 
allocation model, Tobin (1965) corroborates the findings of the earlier contribution of Gesell 
(1911) by showing that welfare can be enhanced by a reduction in deposit interest rates, by 
taxing money as proposed by Gesell (1911), or by accelerating the rate of growth in monetary 
stock, thereby raising the rate of inflation. Various empirical studies such as those by Drazen 
(1981) and Fischer (1979a,b; 1981) confirm the practical validity of the Tobin model. However, 
some economists, notably McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), argue against the pursuit of 
financial repressive policies because it restricts financial institutions from being competitive in 
resource mobilisation and allocation. Repressive financial policies lead to holding large excess 
liquidity which limits the capacity of banks to create credit, and even to expand financial 
services to the wider population (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Fry (1989; 1993) shows that 
financial repression, rather than increasing capital inflows, increases current account deficit and 
accelerates accumulation of foreign debts. 
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The implication is that financial repression policies are by and large restrictive as far as 
competition in the financial system is concerned. Therefore, these repressive policies do not 
create the ideal competitive environment for financial institutions to adopt efficient, innovative 
and aggressive resource mobilisation strategies which could lead to the development of 
specialised products and services aimed at international migrants. In the absence of 
competition and privatisation, the few existing financial institutions which might offer remittance 
services could have the tendency of charging supernormal profits. 
 
5.3.1.2 The McKinnon-Shaw Financial Liberalisation Theory 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) dismiss the hitherto dominant Keynesian-structuralist 
proposition by identifying low private savings and investment, interest rate ceilings, high 
reserve requirements, high inflation tax, and direct credit control in favour of the state as the 
deleterious consequences of financial repression. Contrary to the repressionists‟ view, financial 
liberalists87 propose reliance on less discriminatory market forces for the free determination of 
interest rates in order to facilitate an efficient process of financial intermediation and capital 
mobility. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) observe that the savings and investment that take 
place under financially repressive regimes are not only inadequate but also of low quality. This 
is because the private sector is crowded-out, as the public sector has uncompetitive access to 
credit and other services provided by the banks; but, unlike the private sector, the public sector 
can save or invest in projects with low or negative rates of return. The McKinnon-Shaw theory 
implies the determination of interest rates by market forces; the abandonment of the fixed 
exchange rate regime; the relaxation of entry requirements in the formal financial market to 
boost competition; the elimination of directed and selective credit controls; the privatisation of 
state-owned banks to enhance efficiency, economies of scale and scope, the integration of 
informal financial markets into the formal financial system; the removal of artificial barriers to 
international capital mobility; and the establishment of vibrant capital markets.  
 
A positive real deposit interest rate is likely to stimulate voluntary private savings because 
banks now pay more attractive returns on deposits which can attract savings previously held in 
                                                          
87
 Although McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) are recognised as the scholars who formalised the intellectual 
debate in favour of financial liberalisation, Fry (1995) traces the call for less government intervention in the financial 
markets to the 17
th
 century and acknowledges Locke (1695), Smith (1776), Bentham (1787) and Schumpeter (1912) 
as the earliest proponents. 
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non-financial assets88 and outside the banking systems. Furthermore, Schumpeter (1912), 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and Bencivenga and Smith (1991) assert 
that the extent of financial intermediation in an economy is crucial for efficient resource 
mobilisation and allocation, and for dealing with moral hazards, adverse selection and issues 
related to transaction costs. Also, because financial liberalisation embraces foreign exchange 
deregulation and external account liberalisation, a country can benefit from higher inflows of 
external capital in response to improved international integration, interest rate equalisation and 
financial openness (Kapur, 1983; Mathieson, 1979; Fry, 1995). Further, under financial reforms, 
a country stands a better chance to correct its trade imbalances through foreign exchange 
adjustments, given the relative elasticity of imports and exports. Thus, the pursuit of financial 
liberalisation enables governments to deploy both monetary and exchange rate policies to 
attain external equilibrium. Levine and Zervos (1998) reason that, when the stock market is 
liberalised, more risk-sharing between domestic and foreign residents is expected to decrease 
equity premium; and increased capital inflows may also improve stock market liquidity whilst 
increased liquidity reduces the equity premium.  
 
Yet, using a 3-sector model involving households, firms, and the government, Akyuz (1995), 
demonstrates that while the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis may be applicable to raising financial 
savings through higher real deposit interest rates, total savings may decrease due to a shift in 
income from firms to renters, and even as lower tax revenue and higher interest payment on 
debt reduce government savings. With regard to remittances, Beine et al. (2011) contend that 
because remittances impact positively on macroeconomic stability and financial development, 
there is a high incentive for migrant-home countries to liberalise their financial sector in order to 
receive more remittances as a result of financial openness. 
 
5.3.1.3 The Neostructuralist Financial Theory 
Neostructuralists led by van Wijnbergen (1982; 1983), Taylor (1983), Buffie (1984) and 
Kohsaka (1984), reject the proposition of the liberalists, arguing that financial liberalisation can 
be counter-productive in developing countries because in these economies the role of informal 
financial institutions is crucial in financial resource mobilisation and allocation. These 
neostructuralists employed various theories including the cost-push inflation, mark-up pricing, 
                                                          
88
 For entrepreneurs and corporate institutions, this can take the form of holding foreign currencies, excess raw 
materials, inventories or intermediate goods whilst households may prefer the purchase of lands, gold and other 
forms of tangible wealth which can appreciate in value. 
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and the Keynesian-adjustment mechanism models to oppose the predictions of the McKinnon-
Shaw models. Essentially, the neostructuralists argue that because the liberalists failed to take 
into account the importance of curb markets in developing countries, their models represent “a 
serious lacuna” (Fry, 1995: 130). In the view of the neostructuralists, competitive financial 
markets cannot be effective in developing countries because of high market failures due to low 
levels of incomes, high fragmentation of the financial markets, and information asymmetry (van 
Wijnbergen, 1983; Taylor, 1983; Buffie, 1984; Kohsaka, 1984; Stiglitz, 1994; Ogaki et al. 1996). 
Furthermore, in the formal financial sector where commercial banks dominate, the bulk of 
mandatory reserve requirements89 constitute an important leakage in the circular flow of funds 
during the process of financial intermediation90. These reasons make curb financial markets 
essential in the mobilisation of household saving and credit extension, especially in rural 
communities where the largest proportion of the population of developing countries resides. 
 
Consequently, Taylor (1983), van Wijnbergen (1983), Buffie (1984) and Khosaka (1984) 
conclude that, practically, for developing countries in particular, the pursuit of financial 
liberalisation is likely to inhibit the rate of economic growth due to credit constraints because 
higher real interest rates increase the costs of production, reduce real wages, and cause 
stagflation. In fact, Stiglitz (1994) was very emphatic in suggesting that government intervention 
in the financial market should be considered as the better alternative towards achieving Pareto-
optimality conditions in developing countries, given the high incidence of market failures due to 
missing and incomplete information, credit and insurance markets, as well as oligopolistic 
tendencies which undermine perfect competition in the financial sector. However, government 
intervention in the allocation of critical resources such as finance can only be efficient where 
state institutions are strong as reflected in high levels of transparency and accountability. In 
SSA, in particular, the application of the neostructuralist model in achieving desirable results is 
doubtful because governments lack the capacity, integrity and public confidence to be 
entrusted with the leading role of allocating scarce financial resources equitably and without 
favour or without seeking egoistic and political interests. 
 
 
                                                          
89
 Even under financial liberalisation, these requirements may be high in developing countries because in low-
income countries, generally, the propensity to dissave is much higher than the propensity to save.   
90
 But Courakis (1984; 1986) proves that if demand for loans is highly interest-inelastic relative to the demand for 
deposits; equilibrium deposit rate rises as required reserve ratio increases; and the funds mobilised from required 
reserves are deposited with specialised development finance institutions other than commercial banks for lending 
that would not be undertaken by commercial banks, higher reserve requirements can generate higher deposits. 
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Additionally, the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis only calls for the removal of discriminatory 
repressive policies that distort financial prices, whilst encouraging governments to implement 
prudent policies that allow market forces to lead the efficient determination of resource 
allocation. Liberalists acknowledge the fact that perfect markets cannot occur in the real world; 
therefore, the McKinnon-Shaw theory should not be taken as advocating for the operation of 
perfect financial markets but a more competitive financial system based on the dictates of the 
market rather than the government. In fact, McKinnon (1981; 1984) cautions that financial 
liberalisation cannot succeed in developing countries without the role of the government 
because fiscal discipline is an important pre-requisite since budget deficits in these economies 
are often financed by taxing the financial system in a variety of ways. Furthermore, Chang and 
Jung (1984) challenge the significance and applicability of the neostructuralists theory on the 
grounds that, curb markets in developing countries are non-competitive, less developed and 
fragmented, and not as efficient as the neostructuralists might want the world to believe.  
 
Although, theoretically, the impact of financial liberalisation on savings mobilisation may be 
ambiguous, the fact remains that if the multidimensional integrated policies of financial 
liberalisation are pursued in a sound macroeconomic environment, the policies are likely to 
achieve their fundamental objectives. Where a well-implemented financial liberalisation 
programme leads to widening the scope of a financial system with higher access of the public 
to quality banking services, and creating an attractive saving and investment environment 
through higher opportunity for risk diversification and improved information symmetry, higher 
official remittances are likely to be received. This is because when the financial sector is 
repressed, migrants will be attracted to remit through unofficial channels that are not often 
liable to the payment of taxes or meeting other stringent obligations imposed by monetary 
authorities on the formal financial institutions91. Also, under a repressive financial environment, 
the official remittance market will be uncompetitive with the few dominant MTOs charging 
excessively high commissions with the aim of earning monopolistic rents as altruism makes the 
supply of remittances highly inelastic to transfer fees. Alberola and Salvado (2006) developed a 
2-period financial model to prove, without uncertainty, that when banks enter and compete in 
the remittance market, the commissions charged by MTOs on remittance transfers will fall and 
more official remittances can be received in migrant-home countries. 
 
                                                          
91
 World Bank (1989:67) observes that financial repression breeds emergence of vibrant informal financial markets 
(curb markets) that are not subject to any government regulation – be it “taxes, supervision or otherwise”. 
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5.3.2 Related Empirical Literature 
In a fixed effects panel data analysis of 104 developing countries over the period 1995-2003, 
Freund and Spatafora (2005) find that, in most developing countries and particularly those in 
SSA, the presence of a dual exchange rate regime and the high transfer fees on remittances 
(i.e. the sum of workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees and migrant transfers) 
charged by official money transfer institutions are the reasons why SSA countries receive lower 
official remittances and relatively higher informal remittances than countries from other regions. 
 
Beine et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between remittances and financial openness in a 
sample of 66 mostly developing countries from 1980 to 2005 using a dynamic generalised 
ordered logit model and a 2-step process similar to the 2-stage least squares method. 
Remittances were measured as the sum of workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees 
and migrant transfer as ratio of nominal GDP whilst financial openness (the dependent 
variable) was measured as a categorical variable according to the capital account openness 
indicator. In the midst of other explanatory variables (political regime, trade openness, and 
domestic financial development), it was found out that the impact of remittances on financial 
openness was positive and statistically significant, but financial openness had no impact on 
remittance inflows.  
 
Based on descriptive statistical indicators, Singh and Hari (2011) conclude that international 
remittances increased in India during the post-reforms era because of liberalisation and capital 
account convertibility. The study period was 1971-2008; and international remittances were 
proxied by the total migrant transfers. 
 
From the literature reviewed, it is clear that none of the underlying theories of financial 
liberalisation is self-sufficient for policy design towards attracting higher inflows of international 
remittances through official channels. What seems palpable, however, is that under a 
liberalised financial environment, there is a higher likelihood that financial institutions will 
compete to mobilise resources from internal and international sources. For instance, as 
competition in the financial market intensifies, banks are more likely to devise cost-saving 
strategies to attract remittances from international migrants, and more especially because 
domestic resource mobilisation might be difficult, given the low disposable household incomes 
in SSA. Indeed, the implementation of financial liberalisation policies in a stable 
macroeconomic environment as a step towards attracting higher international remittances 
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through official channels has been the most dominant policy recommendation from studies92 on 
the sub-region. Moreover, although the role of curb markets in financial intermediation could be 
important in developing countries, for which reason policies under financial liberalisation 
programmes in SSA should have been taken into account, information on informal financial 
sector is at best incomplete due to the fragmentation and low literacy level of participants. Also, 
through liberalisation, the domestic financial market is expected to be integrated whereby 
informal financial markets will be absorbed into the formal financial system. Furthermore, the 
motivation for this study is to encourage the flow of remittances through the formal financial 
system. And, because the financial sector policies being implemented in SSA since the 1980s 
have been based on the recommendations of the liberalist school (World Bank, 1994; Mathieu, 
1998), the analytical framework of this study is in line with the McKinnon-Shaw theory.  
 
Consistent with the McKinnon-Shaw theory, financial liberalisation is expected to cause a 
higher inflow of international remittances through official channels. Each specific financial 
liberalisation policy, probably with the exception of DCRR (directed credit, reserve 
requirements, and aggregated credit ceiling), is also expected to cause a higher inflow of 
official international remittances. Similarly, the direct impact of financial liberalisation or each 
specific financial liberalisation policy implemented is predicted to have a strong non-negative 
contemporaneous impact. Table 5.2 summarises the expected impact of financial liberalisation 
on international remittance inflows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92
 Some of these studies are Freund and Spatafora (2005), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Gupta, Pattillo and 
Wagh (2009), and Adenutsi (2011). 
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Table 5.2:  
Expected Impact of Financial Liberalisation Policies on International Remittance Inflows 
SPECIFIC 
FLB POLICY 
MAIN MOTIVATION FOR 
POLICY REFORM 
EXPECTED LONG-RUN IMPLICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL 
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES 
Interest rate 
liberalisation 
(IRC) 
Ensure real interest rates are 
competitive and attractive to 
induce higher private savings 
and efficient credit allocation 
Positive: As real deposit rates in SSA increase relative to the 
prevailing rates in migrant-host countries, more investment-
oriented remittances are likely to be received in SSA as migrants 
decide to save and invest at home rather than  abroad. 
Reduction in 
reserve 
requirements*  
Make more resources available 
to banks to create more money 
through higher extension of 
credit to potential borrowers 
especially the private sector 
Ambiguous: No direct effect on remittance inflows but if 
permanent migrants from whom the most remittances are 
received and who often remit more under sound macroeconomic 
conditions in their home countries see this as a sound economic 
policy, more remittances can be received. On the other hand, 
altruistic-driven remittances may fall when, with a reduction in 
reserve requirements, banks can now create more to ameliorate 
credit constraints. 
Reduction in 
directed credit 
control* 
Ensure efficient resource 
allocation such that projects with  
relatively lower risks and higher 
return attract the most credit 
from lending institutions 
Ambiguous: This depends on whether a country receives more 
or less altruistic remittances relative to non-altruistic remittances. 
Altruistic remittances increase with limited access to private 
sector credit, but non-altruistic remittances increase in response 
to sound macroeconomic policies which offer improved private 
sector investment opportunities. 
Privatisation 
of banks 
(PVZ) 
Make banks more profit-oriented 
through adherence to 
professional and innovative 
practices for efficient service 
delivery 
Positive: With higher professionalism, banks may expand to 
reduce the number of unbanked and offer more attractive 
products and services to different segments of the market and 
deliver services more promptly. Banks, therefore, are likely to 
become more competitive in the international remittance market. 
Relaxation of 
entry barriers 
(EBC) 
Promote competition among 
banks and enhance operational 
efficiency often necessitating 
expansion and strategic 
management even as banks 
take higher operational risks 
Positive: Competition breeds efficiency resulting in lower 
average cost in the long run, which enables banks to charge 
competitive commissions on international remittances and roll 
out innovative products and services to attract migrants to remit 
more through the banking system. 
Prudential 
regulation and 
supervision 
(BKS) 
Prevent predators from taking 
advantage of the financial 
system to exploit others, boost 
confidence among agents and 
moderate risk-taking under 
competitive environment 
Positive: With improved confidence in the financial system, 
migrants will patronise services offered by banks, and cease to 
remit through unofficial money transfer channels. 
External 
account 
liberalisation 
(ICF) 
Facilitate international capital 
mobility as a pre-condition for 
mobilising more financial 
resources from overseas. 
Positive: International migrants may find it easier to remit more 
funds to SSA at relatively reduced cost; recipients can 
conveniently receive remittances in preferred foreign currencies. 
Development 
of stock 
markets 
(SMK) 
Create more opportunities for 
portfolio risk diversification and 
access to longer-term corporate 
finance through equity capital 
Positive: As opportunity to diversify risk is improved and more 
investment products are made available, migrants are inclined to 
remit more for investment-driven motives. 
Source: Author.  Note: *combined as aggregate credit ceilings, directed credit and reserve requirement (DCRR) in 
Figure 5.2 as in Abiad et al. (2010) (see Chapter Two for details). 
 
5.4 EMPIRICAL MODEL, METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA ISSUES 
A set of two empirical models and analytical approaches were employed to achieve the 
objectives of this chapter. Each empirical model and methodological approach is briefly 
discussed below. 
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5.4.1 Empirical Panel Granger Non-Causality Model and Analytical Approach 
To test the causal relationship between international migrant remittance inflows and financial 
liberalisation in SSA between 1980 and 2009, the Granger non-causality panel-data modelling 
with fixed effects as proposed by Hurlin and Venet (2001), and Hurlin (2004) was adopted as 
consistent with Equations (5.1) and (5.2). 
, , , ,
1 0
ln lni t k i t k k i t k i t
k k
REMPC REMPC F
 
   
 
       (5.1) 
, , , ,
1 0
lni t k i t k k i t k i t
k k
F F REMPC
 
   
 
         (5.2) 
where lnREMPC denotes natural logarithm of international remittances per capita, F  is FLBI or 
any policy component of FLB such as directed credit, reserve requirement and aggregate credit 
ceilings (DCRR), interest rate control (IRC), banking sector entry requirements (EBC), banking 
supervision (BKS), privatisation of banks (PVZ), international capital flows (ICF), and security 
markets development (SMK).   is the optimal lag selected according to the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) with the log likelihood ratio and 
Durbin-Watson statistic playing a „judiciary‟ role in the event of a conflict between AIC and SIC. 
The individual countries in the panel are represented by i  and 1,2,.....,i N  so that 13N   
when the full sample analysis is conducted otherwise, either 7N  ; or 6N   when a sub-
sample involving only seven countries with frontier and emerging financial markets; or when the 
analysis is restricted to only the six countries with underdeveloped financial markets. The time 
period is t  and 1,2,....,t T  implying for the period 1980-2009, 30.T 
93 Each error term has 
two components (Baltagi, 2008), and hence can be decomposed into an unobservable country- 
and time-specific fixed component and a random disturbance component, where , , ,i t i t i t     
and , , ,i t i t i t     
in which case i  and i

 
are intercepts whilst ,i t  
and ,i t  
are the assumed 
independently and normally distributed residuals with ,( ) 0i tE   ; ,( ) 0i tE    
and finite 
heterogeneous variances 
2 2
, ,( ) ;  i t tE  
2 2
, ,( ) ;i t tE     1,....., .t T   
                                                          
93
 Based on the argument that only eight out of the 13 sampled countries initiated FLB programmes in the 1980s and 
that most of the countries adopted FLB programmes in the late-1980s (see Table 5.1), T was reduced to 20 in a 
second estimation of Equations (5.1) and (5.2). It is acknowledged that doing so in a panel setting of relatively small 
T (20) against a small N (13; 7; 6) in the presence of an optimal lag of 2 in a Granger-causality modelling reduced 
the degrees of freedom considerably which could adversely affect the reliability of the estimators reported in Table 
A5.3. 
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The F-statistic was used to trace the existence and direction of causality by testing the 
following alternative panel Granger non-causality hypotheses (HA) with respect to SSA: 
 
For Equation (5.1), 1 : 0,  [1, ];  [1, ] A kH k i N      and k 0,  [0, ];  [1, ]k i N      . 
For Equation (5.2), 2 : 0,  [1, ];  [1, ] A kH k i N      and k 0,  [0, ];  [1, ]k i N      . 
 
In testing for causality in a panel setting, it is important to pay attention to the question of 
heterogeneity which can be caused by permanent cross-sectional disparities especially in this 
particular case which involves a small cross-section ( )N  over a large time series ( )T  with N  
classified into two distinct sub-groups - frontier and emerging, and underdeveloped financial 
markets. Therefore, the estimation was carried out for each sub-group and the entire group. In 
doing so, it was ensured that the balance within the panel setting remained unchanged just as 
the lag order ( k ), so that the critical condition 5 2T k   proposed by Hurlin (2004) is not 
violated in any estimation. 
 
Prior to the estimation of the empirical models, the tests for panel stationarity and co-integration 
were conducted to address the concerns of spurious regression and to ensure that each 
estimated regression meets a long-run equilibrium condition. These issues are particularly 
relevant in situations where the panel structure is of large T  and as is in the case of this study, 
N T  with 0NT   becoming more and more robust in the sub-sample estimations. According 
to Kao (1999), it is possible to circumvent spurious regression by using panel data as panel-
data estimates give a consistent estimate of the true value of the parameter as both T  and N
approach infinity. However, Entorf (1997) proves that spurious regression can still manifest 
itself in fixed effects regressions when the true model involves independent random walks, with 
or without drifts, and more especially as T  and N remains finite. As is the practice in most 
panel data studies (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Hsiao and Hsiao, 20036), this study 
relied on more than one panel-data unit root test. The Breitung t-statistic (BT) test developed by 
Breitung (2000) and the Hadri Heteroskedasticity Consistent z-statistic (HHC) test by Hadri 
(2000) were used in determining the stationarity status of the variables. Where a conflict 
between the two aforementioned common-root tests surfaces, the Fisher Phillips-Perron 
(Fisher P-P) chi-square test of individual root was conducted to validate the results. BT and 
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HHC were used rather than the popularly used Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) test and Levin, Lin 
and Chu (LLC) test because IPS and LLC tests are less efficient as proven by many scholars 
including Maddala and Wu (1999), Breitung (2000), Maddala et al. (2000) and Baltagi (2008). 
Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) prove that the Breitung test outperforms the Hadri test. Yet, the 
HHC test statistic, which is a residual-based Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, has the speciality of 
taking into consideration issues of heteroskedastic consistency. The panel unit root test results 
reported in Table A5.1 reveal that all the variables are integrated of order zero. 
 
Since each variable under consideration is I(0), the issue of co-integration is no longer a 
serious concern. However, in order to erase any doubts and to reconfirm this principle, the 
Engle and Granger (1987) procedure was used to investigate if there is a long-run relationship 
between lnREMPC and FLBI; or lnREMPC and each of the components of FLBI in a bivariate 
analysis with an intercept as recommended by (Asteriou, 2006). For a decision to be taken on 
co-integration, the Johansen unrestricted co-integration rank (JUCR) tests for panel data based 
on both the trace statistic and the maximum Eigenvalue statistic would have to ideally validate 
the Engle-Granger 2-Step (EG2S) test, but even where JUCR failed to confirm EG2S, the 
existence of co-integration cannot be rejected because JUCR is more applicable to non-
stationary series (see Asteriou, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). In other words, given the I(0) status of all 
the variables under consideration, co-integration is only considered to be non-existent if both 
JUCR and EG2S consistently prove this. This is imperative because this study is interested in 
only the long-run FLB-impact and causal relationship with international remittances. As was the 
case in the EG2S procedure, a constant but no trend was included in the JUCR test with a lag 
interval of 1-4, typical of tests involving data of annual frequency. The results of co-integration 
tests reported in Table A5.2 suggest that a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between 
lnREMPC and FLBI as well as between lnREMPC and each component of FLBI. 
 
5.4.2 Empirical Static Panel Model and Methodological Approach 
In order to determine the impact of FLBI as well as the policy-specific impact of FLB on 
remittance inflows, a set of bivariate static panel models was analysed94. The general 
mathematical bivariate static panel-data model is of the form: 
 ,ln ( )it i tREMPC f F  1,2,...,      1,2,...,i N t T      (5.3) 
                                                          
94
 Severe multicollinearity among the various dimensions of the FLBI as reflected in the close similarity in the 
reported pairwise correlation coefficients (see Table A5.5) precludes this study from a multivariate analysis. 
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where both variables and all notations, except the notation for functional relationship ( )f , are 
as defined in Equation (5.2). Following from Equation (5.3), the specific empirical econometric 
model estimated is of the form: 
0 1 ,ln it i t itREMPC F            (5.4) 
where, in this case, 0  is a scalar; the two-way composite disturbance term takes the form, 
it i t it      , so that i  is the unobservable individual country-specific heterogeneity, t  
captures the unobservable individual-invariant time effect, with the random error term ( )it
accounting for the remaining non-systematic effects, for which reason 
2(0, ).it N    It is 
important to note that t  takes care of any time-specific effect, such as a structural change or a 
shock, that is not included in the estimated regression model (Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 
2008). The implication here is that, more explicitly, Equation (5.4) is actually of the form: 
0 1 ,ln it i t i t itREMPC F              (5.5) 
 
Consistent with the McKinnon-Shaw FLB hypothesis, it is expected a priori that when (5.5) is 
estimated, 1 0.   Unlike Equation (5.2), with Equation (5.5), it is possible to explore the long-
run contemporaneous effects of financial liberalisation on international remittances in SSA 
when the dynamic effects of remittances are discounted. Generally, Equation (5.5) can be 
estimated by pooled OLS, panel Fixed Effects (FE) or panel Random Effects (RE) models 
depending upon the assumptions made about the behaviour of i . 
 
Pooled OLS can only be appropriate with efficient and unbiased estimators if Equation (5.5) 
truly has a common constant because there are no differences among the sampled countries 
(N), in which case 0i  , implying: 
 0 1 ,ln it i t itREMPC F            (5.6) 
where it t it     as the time-variant effects it  in a strictly bivariate model is absorbed by the 
error term so that the empirical model is now reduced to a “one-way error component 
regression model” (Baltagi, 2008: 13). Thus, the common constant approach to estimating 
static panel-data models is best applicable under the hypothesis that the panel data under 
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consideration is a priori strictly homogenous to the extent that i  (in Equation 5.5) has no 
influence on the intercept 0( )  or the disturbance term ( )it . From experience, the validity of 
the assumption 0i   is a rare possibility, particularly for panel data with large N .  
 
Even though where 0i  , the i  terms can be rewritten as coefficients of a set of dummy 
variables designed to account for the belongingness of the cross-sectional unit i  and the 
modified model can then be estimated with the appropriate dummies to capture the effects of 
i ; this approach becomes complicated and impractical in large N  and even as N  . If i  
is correlated with F , failure to account for the effects of i  results in heterogeneity bias in the 
estimated model due to omitted variable(s). Under this circumstance, the variations in i  leads 
to serial correlation in it , where 
2( )it ijE    for t j , pointing to the fact that pooled OLS 
estimator would be inefficient with bias standard errors, requiring the adoption of either panel 
FE models or panel RE models according to the orthogonality of i .  
 
The panel FE model is appropriate where it is considered that each individual country has a 
fixed-effect resulting in parametric shifts of the estimated regression by the fixed value for each 
individual country. Mathematically, for an efficient panel FE estimator, Equation (5.6) must be 
of the form: 
 1 ,ln it i t itREMPC F            (5.7) 
where 0( )i     for 0i  , and where i  which is now absorbed into the common 
constant 0( )  varies according to individual countries (Greene, 2003). But where 
0i  , and 
the effects of i  is absorbed into a compound error term rather than the intercept, such that 
( )it it i     as in Equation (5.8), panel RE estimator rather FE estimator is more efficient and 
less biased in the presence of endogeneity.  
0 1 ,ln it i t itREMPC F            (5.8) 
Therefore, whereas in panel FE models i  is assumed as constant, in panel RE models, i  is 
assumed to be drawn independently from some probability distributions. The underlying 
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principle of panel RE models is that, there is an individual effect, which is random rather than 
fixed, and this effect may reflect omitted variables which are not fixed in nature (Maddala, 1971; 
Greene, 2003).  
 
A fixed effect can be determined from a selected sample, not a random sample obtained from 
experimental design. Hence, inferences are applicable to only the observed effects and not to 
the larger population. Another limitation of panel FE estimator is that it cannot be used to 
determine the effects of time-constant covariates as those covariates cancel out during the 
“within” transformation. A “within” estimator can be obtained from a typical FE model (Equation 
5.8) as follows: 
  
1(ln ln ) ( ) ( )ititit it it itREMPC REMPC F F          (5.9) 
where the mean of each variable is subtracted from that variable and the constant terms 
cancelled out. An alternative way to obtain the FE estimator from Equation (5.8) is to use the 
“between” approach, in which case each one lag rather than the mean of each variable is used 
as shown in Equation (5.10): 
1 1 1 1(ln ln ) ( ) ( )it it it it it itREMPC REMPC F F            (5.10) 
 
Panel RE is a variant of Generalised Least Squares (GLS) and it is used effectively when the 
error term of a given static panel model is heteroskedastic, i.e. 
2( )E     based on Equation 
(5.10). The basic assumptions that must hold for the panel RE estimator to be efficient include 
( ) ( ) 0it iE E   , 
2 2( )itE   , 
2 2( )iE   , ( ) 0it iE     for all t  and i , 
2 2 2( )itE       for 
t s , 2( )it isE     for t s , and most importantly, ( ) 0it iE F   for all t  and i  for RE 
estimator to be consistent, which was tested following the popularly used Hausman (1978) 
specification test and the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic. 
Panel RE modelling involves the combination of the panel FE “within” estimator and the FE 
“between” estimator, so that the RE estimator is the overall correctly-weighted average 
estimator of the FE “within” and the “between” estimators. 
 
Based on the results obtained in Chapter Four and the plausibility of a bi-causal relationship 
between remittances and financial liberalisation, it is quite certain that the presence of 
endogeneity in the bivariate empirical model (5.4) cannot be disregarded. Endogeneity in 
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empirical model (5.4) could arise from time effects ( )t  due to a systematic policy shock to F , 
simultaneity emanating from random shocks triggered by variations in F , measurement errors 
in reporting F , and very importantly, and unobserved heterogeneity due to model underfitting. 
It is well acknowledged in the remittance literature that measurement errors are severe (see 
Chapter Two). In Chapter Four, it was found that tougher regulations aimed at clamping down 
on using informal channels to remit following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US 
impacted positively and significantly on official remittance inflows in SSA. This implies that by 
not specifically accounting for time effects ( t ), the bivariate empirical models (5.6)-(5.10) 
cannot be exonerated from obvious endogeneity bias. Evidence that remittances can, under 
some circumstances, Granger-cause F (see Table 5.3) is a further indication that the 
Equations (5.6)-(5.10) are prone to severe problem of endogeneity. 
 
Considering the high possibility of endogeneity, it might seem obvious that the RE model 
should be used for this study. However, the study proceeded to estimate the empirical model 
by the three possible methods (pooled OLS, FE and RE) and selected the best model based on 
the Haumsan test and the Breusch-Pagan (B-P) test95. The Hausman specification test for the 
RE model, which was developed to test orthogonality of the random effects and the regressor, 
is based on the notion that under the hypothesis of no correlation, OLS in the Least Squares 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) model or FE model and GLS are equally consistent, but OLS 
estimator is less efficient96. The B-P Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test designed for evaluating 
reliability of random effects estimators derived from GLS is distributed as chi-square with one 
degree of freedom on the null hypothesis that 
2 0  , the alternative being 
2 0   (see 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) for further details). Using the overall index of financial liberalisation 
(FLBI), the Hausman test as well as the B-P test strongly confirm the RE model as the superior, 
hence producing the most efficient estimators (see Table 5.4). Specifically, the high B-P LM 
test statistic far exceeds the 99 per cent critical value for chi-square with one degree of 
freedom, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis in favour of RE model (Table 5.4). 
Similarly, except for the 1990-1999 model on SSA countries with underdeveloped financial 
markets, the Hausman test consistently endorsed the RE estimators as the most efficient 
(Table 5.4). Accordingly, the study proceeded to explore the impact of financial liberalisation on 
                                                          
95
 Because the estimated pooled OLS model could not produce an improved R
2
 (see Table A5.4), whilst the basic 
diagnostic tests including the F-statistic and Durbin-Watson test failed, it was not preferred over the panel models. 
96
 For further details on this test, see Hausman (1978) and Greene (2003). 
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international migrant remittance inflows in SSA based on the panel RE estimators rather than 
on the panel FE estimators. 
 
Finally, following the same estimation procedure outlined under 4.5.2.4 in Chapter Four, the 
„differential‟ student t-test was used to verify the incidence and degree of decade-based 
parameter evolution and instability for each of the relevant estimated decade-based models. 
 
5.4.3 Data Type, Description and Sources 
Data on financial liberalisation (see Table A5.8 for summary) was essentially obtained from 
Abdul Abiad and Thierry Tressel of the IMF who, together with Enrica Detriagiache, published 
“A New Database of Financial Reforms” in IMF Staff Papers, 57(2): 281-302 in the year 201097. 
Following Abiad et al. (2010), the author constructed the financial liberalisation index for the 
sampled countries for the most recent years, 2006-2009 which are covered by Abiad et al. 
(2010). International migrant remittances are the sum of workers‟ remittances and 
compensation of employees obtained from the April 2011 e-database and CD-ROM editions of 
World Bank‟s WDI and Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 (MRF-2011), and IMF‟s 
BoPS. For Tanzania and Uganda, missing published data on remittances for the period 1980-
1994 was filled in with estimates based on country-specific information obtained from country-
desk officials at the Headquarters of IMF and the World Bank in Washington, DC, USA. 
 
5.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.5.1 The Causal Effects of Financial Liberalisation on Remittance Inflows in SSA 
The main empirical panel Granger-causality results of this study are presented in Table 5.3. On 
the basis of the overall index (FLBI), the empirical results suggest that, generally, the pursuit of 
financial liberalisation programme Granger-causes higher international remittance inflows 
through official channels in SSA. This implies that for a typical SSA country to receive higher 
inflows of official remittances, the liberalisation of its financial market is a necessary condition. 
At 10 per cent level of statistical significance, it can be concluded that there is a reverse 
causality between financial liberalisation and international remittance inflows in SSA. The 
overall causal effect of financial liberalisation on international remittance inflows is only 
statistically significant for the 13 sampled SSA countries and the seven sampled SSA countries 
with frontier and emerging financial markets. Thus, in the case of the sampled SSA countries 
with underdeveloped financial markets, however, the overall causal effect of financial 
                                                          
97
 See Chapter Two for details on the procedures and main sources of raw data for this purpose. 
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liberalisation on international remittance inflows is statistically insignificant at the conventional 
statistical levels. 
 
Table   5.3: 
 Financial Liberalisation-Remittances Bivariate Panel Granger Non-Causality Results in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author. Note: 
‡
 is a model-specific optimal lag selected according to SIC, AIC and log likelihood.  
          REMPC here refers to migrant remittances per capita 
 
The specific financial liberalisation policies implemented in SSA which have so far Granger-
caused higher inflows of international remittances through official channels between 1980 and 
2009, in order of magnitude and statistical relevance, are policy reforms on stock market 
development (6.7773), interest rate deregulation (5.9720), and relaxation of entry barriers to 
promote competition in the banking industry (3.0587). In each of these cases, the causality 
direction is only one way – from the specific policy reform to remittance inflows. The effect of 
interest rate deregulation on international remittance inflows in SSA countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets is more robust compared to countries with frontier and 
emerging markets. The causal effect of relaxation of barriers to entry into the banking industry 
to allow for greater competition (EBC), although significant for the entire sample, is statistically 
insignificant for each specific sub-sample. 
 
Quite strikingly, although external account liberalisation does not Granger-cause increased 
remittance inflows in SSA, remittances received in the sub-region were necessary to cause 
elimination of policy constraints to international capital inflows. This holds for SSA countries 
with frontier and emerging financial markets but more importantly, for countries with relatively 
No. of Frontier & Emerging Others (underdeveloped) Full Sample (combined)
  Null Hypothesis: Lags‡ Obs F-statistic(F-prob.) Obs F-statistic(F-prob.) Obs F-statistic(F-prob.)
  FLBI does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 3.3233(0.04)** 168 1.0733(0.34) 364 5.0715(0.01)***
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause FLBI 2 196 2.6842(0.07)* 168 0.1451(0.87) 364 2.3481(0.10)*
  BKS does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 1.7021(0.19) 168 0.0249(0.98) 364 1.6752(0.19)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause BKS 2 196 3.0983(0.05)** 168 0.2006(0.82) 364 2.5310(0.08)*
  DCRR does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 0.9431(0.39) 168 0.6127(0.54) 364 0.8491(0.43)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause DCRR 2 196 0.0277(0.97) 168 1.5260(0.22) 364 0.5416(0.58)
  EBC does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 2.0624(0.13) 168 0.9141(0.40) 364 3.0587(0.05)**
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause EBC 2 196 0.3700(0.69) 168 0.1869(0.83) 364 0.4457(0.64)
  ICF does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 1.0574(0.35) 168 1.8263(0.16) 364 2.2426(0.11)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause ICF 2 196 2.5167(0.08)* 168 6.4845(0.00)*** 364 5.2644(0.01)***
  IRC does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 2.9737(0.05)* 168 4.3704(0.01)** 364 5.9720(0.00)***
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause IRC 2 196 1.2062(0.30) 168 0.5226(0.59) 364 0.4452(0.64)
  PVZ does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 0.4190(0.66) 168 0.7238(0.49) 364 1.3058(0.27)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause PVZ 2 196 1.3669(0.26) 168 0.6084(0.55) 364 1.8524(0.16)
  SMK does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 196 4.9066(0.01)*** 168 1.4194(0.24) 364 6.7773(0.00)***
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause SMK 2 196 0.2817(0.75) 168 0.8156(0.44) 364 0.8173(0.44)
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less developed financial markets. This finding seems to suggest that the more remittances 
received, the more policy makers in SSA are encouraged to relax restrictions of international 
capital inflows, probably, as a strategy to receive more remittances from abroad.  
 
The results imply that other FLB policies such as reforms on directed credit and reserve 
requirements, international capital flows, and privatisation have not caused increased flow of 
remittances through official channels to SSA. Whereas the composite index of financial 
liberalisation and specific FLB policies on stock market development and interest rate 
deregulation Granger-cause international remittance inflows in SSA frontier and emerging 
financial markets, so far it is only interest rate deregulation that Granger-causes higher inflow of 
remittances in SSA countries with underdeveloped financial markets. As far as financial 
liberalisation is concerned in SSA, FLB policy on stock market development is the main cause 
of remittance inflows in countries with frontier and emerging financial markets, whilst interest 
rate liberalisation is the most important cause of remittance inflows in countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets. These results seem to lend support to the self-interest 
economic motive and imply that higher returns on interest-bearing banking sector financial 
assets or reduced interest rate related charges on remittances are the first and foremost 
influencing factors that cause higher inflow of international remittances in SSA countries with 
relatively underdeveloped financial markets. Similarly, there is strong evidence for the self-
interest investment motive in the case of SSA countries with frontier and emerging financial 
markets where stock markets are relatively vibrant and with higher returns. There is also 
evidence of international remittances causing improved banking supervision in SSA; and more 
particularly in countries with frontier and emerging financial markets. 
 
5.5.2 Empirical Results on the Impact of FLB on International Remittances in SSA 
In Table 5.4, the empirical results of the overall impact of financial liberalisation as measured 
by FLBI, as well as the FLB policy-specific impact on international remittance inflows in SSA 
are presented. For the full sample of 13 SSA countries, the overall impact of financial 
liberalisation on international remittance inflows was zero in the 1980s, but this turned positive 
in the 1990s and the positive impact became even more robust, both statistically and 
economically in the 2000s. Specifically, when all other factors are held constant, a one unit 
increase in FLBI resulted in a 1.7241 and 5.2825 percentage increases in remittance inflows at 
10 and 5 per cent levels of statistical significance in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. As a 
sub-group, neither SSA countries with frontier and emerging markets nor other SSA countries 
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with underdeveloped financial markets recorded a statistically significant impact of FLBI on 
remittance inflows in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 2000s, the impact of FLBI on remittance 
inflows in SSA countries with frontier and emerging markets, and those with underdeveloped 
financial markets was positive and significant for both sub-groups. Whilst the positive impact in 
the 2000s of FLBI on SSA was economically more significant for countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets, for the entire post-reforms era, 1980-2009, the impact of 
FLBI on remittance inflows in SSA countries with frontier and emerging markets was relatively 
higher 3.8050 compared to 2.0804 for countries with underdeveloped financial markets (Table 
5.4). Taking into consideration the economic and the statistical significance of FLBI, it is 
apparent that between 1980 and 2009, there was a consistent increasing impact of financial 
liberalisation on remittance inflows in SSA; and this trend of impact is more consistent in 
countries with frontier and emerging financial markets than in other SSA countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets. 
 
Turning to the specific FLB policies implemented in SSA over the past three decades, it can be 
argued that with the exception of policies on entry requirements into the banking industry for 
competition (EBC), generally, in the 1980s, FLB impacted negatively on remittance inflows. 
More specifically, policies of banking supervision and regulations (BKS), and to some extent 
international capital flow deregulation (ICF) in the case of underdeveloped financial markets, as 
well as the privatisation of state-owned banks (PVZ) and stock market development (SMK) in 
the case of frontier and emerging markets, were deterrent to remittance inflows in SSA in the 
1980s. Thus, during the initial years of implementing FLB programmes in SSA, as far as 
remittance inflows were concerned, it was the countries with underdeveloped financial markets 
that, ironically, benefitted the most, and where reform policies on EBC, IRC, and SMK were the 
most productive. This might be due to the fact that most of the sampled countries are at 
similarly low levels of liberalisation in the 1980s, as these countries generally embarked upon 
FLB programmes in the late 1980s (see Table 5.1). 
 
Apart from an improved statistical significance on the impact of policies on directed credit, 
aggregate credit ceilings and reserve requirements (DCRR), SSA countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets failed to build on the initial gains made on the effects of FLB 
on remittance inflows during the 1990s. In the 1990s, besides DCRR, SSA countries with 
frontiers and emerging financial markets can only boast of having enjoyed higher positive 
impacts of two FLB-specific policies (BKS, and SMK) on remittance inflows when compared 
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with other SSA countries that have underdeveloped financial markets (Table 5.4). 
 
In the 2000s, it was countries with underdeveloped financial markets that received a more 
significant positive impact from FLBI and all the specific FLB-policy components except DCRR, 
on officially reported remittance inflows. Unlike in the 1980s and the 1990s, during the 2000s, 
FLB had a consistent positive impact on both categories of SSA countries. Apart from ICF in 
countries with frontier and emerging financial markets, each FLB-specific policy had a positive 
and more significant impact on remittance inflows in both categories of countries in the 2000-
2009 decade. During the 2000s, for the entire sample of 13 countries, in descending order of 
economic value, the FLB-specific policy effects are: IRC (0.8022), EBC (0.6580), SMK 
(0.6096), PVZ (0.6002), DCRR (0.5999), BKS (0.3780), and ICF (0.2005) (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4: 
Results of the Impact of Financial Liberalisation on International Remittance Inflows in SSA 1980-09 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation. Note: ***(**)* represent statistical significance at 1%(5%)10% respectively. 
      Constant term included in each estimation.  
      z-statistics in ( ); 2 -statistics in { }  
      All statistics based on robust standard errors.  
          ? means nonexistent (absorbed by constant term), n/a means not applicable 
          R
2
, Hausman‟s specification tests, and B-P tests are based on estimated 
      models involving FLBI
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-09 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-09 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-09
FLBI 0.0536 1.9421 3.7140 3.8050 7.5113 0.9393 9.8180 2.0804 2.5143 1.7241 5.2825 3.2078
(0.03)       (1.55)      (4.16)*** (3.11)*** (1.48)      (0.87)      (7.15)*** (1.96)** (1.00)      (1.90)* (3.51)*** (3.76)***
BKS -0.3598 0.9644 0.3278 1.1975 ? 0.1002 0.6067 0.6277 -0.3657 0.5760 0.3800 1.0140
(-30.77)*** (2.72)*** (2.06)** (3.91)*** n/a (0.74)      (2.66)** (2.48)** (-35.75)*** (2.14)** (2.52)** (4.49)***
DCRR -0.2120 0.6280 0.7638 0.9939 0.9579 0.3908 0.6236 0.5484 0.2983 0.5378 0.5999 0.7572
(-1.23) (2.12)** (2.12)** (2.35)** (1.38)      (3.85)*** (2.03)** (2.59)*** (0.67)      (2.90)*** (2.05)** (3.15)***
EBC 0.4367 0.1461 0.4566 0.7679 0.9111 0.1513 1.1286 0.4385 0.6545 0.1548 0.6580 0.6290
(0.68)       (1.58)      (31.73)*** (2.97)*** (8.02)*** (1.10)      (9.90)*** (2.22)** (1.77)* (2.00)** (3.08)*** (3.71)***
ICF 0.2837 0.1063 0.1578 0.6508 -2.4975 0.0155 0.5181 0.4130 -0.0341 0.1014 0.2005 0.6118
(1.25)       (0.58)      (1.36)      (3.50)*** (-17.49)*** (0.06)      (2.42)** (0.78)      (-0.09) (0.65)      (1.98)** (3.58)***
IRC 0.0190 0.2487 0.6093 0.5044 0.9042 0.2159 0.9025 0.4847 0.34 0.25 0.8022 0.6086
(0.10)       (1.38)      (3.26)*** (2.94)*** (1.88)* (0.71)      (5.15)*** (1.60)      (1.14)      1.60       (4.45)*** (3.46)***
PVZ -1.1064 0.2554 0.4325 0.7583 0.2436 -0.0592 0.7171 0.2949 -0.6792 0.1954 0.6002 0.5448
(-2.72)*** (1.00)      (7.96)*** (2.09)** (1.47)      (-0.24) (5.93)*** (1.68)* (-1.29) (1.03)      (5.66)*** (2.77)***
SMK -0.6466 0.5240 0.4547 1.4552 1.7788 0.0241 1.3075 0.7616 0.2926 0.2651 0.6096 1.2227
(-2.73)*** (1.66)* (5.45)*** (5.30)*** (20.26)*** (-0.12) (34.06)*** (2.12)** (0.38)      (1.32)      (3.48)*** (5.17)***
Overall R² 0.1265 0.0887 0.3920 0.3075 0.0505 0.3304 0.0950 0.1469 0.0693 0.1554 0.0681 0.2189
Obs 70 70 70 210 60 60 60 180 130 130 130 390
Groups 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 13 13 13 13
Hausman_FE 0.99 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.29 61.46 1.21 0.09 0.11 1.71 0.5 0.06
{0.32} {0.75} {0.94} {0.82} {0.59} {0.00}*** {0.27} {0.77} {0.74} {0.19} {0.48} {0.81}
B-P stat_RE 235.57 181.01 262.16 1290.65 201.70 172.75 211.25 1501.22 456.16 358.17 469.69 2786.03
{0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}*** {0.00}***
Frontier and Emerging Markets Underdeveloped Financial Markets Full Sample (Both Markets)
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For the group of 13 sampled SSA countries, since the adoption of FLB in the 1980s, holding all 
other determinants of remittance inflows constant, policy reforms on developing the stock 
market emerged as the most important (Table 5.4.1). Among the bank-based liberalisation 
policies, banking supervision and prudential regulation emerged the most economically 
significant. Other factors in descending order of economic significance are: DCRR (0.7572), 
EBC (0.6290), IFC (0.6118), IRC (0.6086) and PVZ (0.5448) (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4.1: 
 Financial Liberalisation-Remittance Impact by Rank of Economic Significance in SSA, 1980-09 
 
Source: Author based on Table 5.4. Note: 
n
 means not statistically significant.  
         1=first (most significant),……….., 7=seventh (least significant) 
 
The economic significance order of the specific FLB-policy impact on remittance inflows is 
virtually the same in SSA countries irrespective of the level of financial market development 
(Table 5.4.1). For example, the first five economically most important FLB policies (SMK, BKS, 
DCRR, EBC, and PVZ) that impact on the inflow of remittances in both categories of SSA 
countries are the same. And, while IRC and ICF are the sixth and seventh most important 
specific policies in SSA countries with frontier and emerging financial markets, these two FLB-
specific policies did not impact on the inflow of international migrant remittances in SSA 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets when the entire 30-year period is taken into 
consideration. This, notwithstanding, is the positive and significant effect of these two on 
migrant remittance inflows in the 13 SSA countries during the 2000s (see Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4.2 presents the results that investigate the statistical justification for the apparent 
changing impact of financial liberalisation on official international remittance inflows in SSA 
countries having frontier and emerging markets between 1980 and 2009. The empirical results 
suggest that there is consistent evidence that the estimated decade-based parameters are 
statistically different from one another lending further support to the hypothesis favouring a 
pattern of evolution across the three decades in SSA countries with frontier and emerging 
financial markets. The few cases in which this hypothesis could not hold consistently across 
decades concern some of the components of the financial liberalisation index, namely: entry 
barriers and pro-competition (EBC), international capital flows (ICF), privatisation of banks 
(PVZ) and stock market development (SMK).  
BKS DCRR EBC ICF IRC PVZ SMK FLBI-IMPACT
Frontier & Emerging 2 3 4 7 6 5 1 3.20776
Others (Underdeveloped) 2 3 4 6ⁿ 7ⁿ 5 1 2.08042
Full Sample 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 3.80504
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Table 5.4.2: 
Parameter Evolution and Instability Test Results in Frontier and Emerging SSA Financial Markets 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively.  
Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
 
With reference to column A-B, the estimated coefficients of the 1980-89 differ statistically from 
the corresponding estimated coefficients of 1990-99 for the overall financial liberalisation index 
(FLBI) and each of the components of FLBI, except EBC. Similarly, with the exception of ICF, 
PVZ and SMK, the computed t -statistics reported in column B-C of Table 5.4.2 point to the fact 
that the estimated coefficients of the 1990-99 decade are statistically different from the 
corresponding estimates of the 2000-09 decade. In a similar vein, the estimated parameters of 
the 1980-89 decade are statistically different from the corresponding parameter estimates of 
the 2000-09 decade as reported in column A-C of Table 5.4.2. 
 
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
FLBI 0.0536 1.9421 3.7140 2.8033 1.9890 -1.8885 -1.7719 -3.6604 -2.7497 -0.8612 -0.0469 1.7250
[1.7853] [1.2529] [0.8928] [0.9014] [0.6812] [0.5324] [0.3602] [0.8925] [0.8840] [0.3516] [0.5718] [0.2116]
{0.03} {1.55} {4.16}*** {3.11}*** {2.92}*** {-3.55}*** {-4.92}*** {-4.10}*** {-3.11}*** {-2.45}** {-0.08} {8.15}***
BKS -0.3598 0.9644 0.3278 1.9437 0.4003 -1.3241 0.6366 -0.6876 -2.3034 -0.9793 0.5641 -0.0725
[0.0117] [0.3545] [0.1591] [0.3202] [0.1067] [0.3428] [0.1954] [0.1474] [0.3085] [0.0343] [0.2478] [0.0524]
{-30.77}*** {2.72}*** {2.06}** {6.07}*** {3.75}*** {-3.86}*** {3.26}*** {-4.66}*** {-7.47}*** {-28.52}*** {2.28}** {-1.38}
DCRR -0.2120 0.6280 0.7638 0.4528 0.0039 -0.8400 -0.1358 -0.9758 -0.6648 0.1752 0.6240 0.7599
[0.1724] [0.2962] [0.3603] [0.2461] [0.1965] [0.1238] [0.0641] [0.1879] [0.0737] [0.0501] [0.0997] [0.1638]
{-1.23} {2.12}** {2.12}** {1.84}* {0.02} {-6.78}*** {-2.12}** {-5.19}*** {-9.02}*** {3.49}*** (6.26}*** {4.64}***
EBC 0.4367 0.1461 0.4566 0.2361 0.1465 0.2906 -0.3105 -0.0199 0.2006 -0.0900 -0.0003 0.3102
[0.6422] [0.0925] [0.0144] [0.1276] [0.2441] [0.5497] [0.0781] [0.6278] [0.5146] [0.0351] [0.1516] [0.2297]
{0.68} {1.58} {31.73}*** {1.85}* {0.60} {0.53} {-3.98}*** {-0.03} {0.39} {-2.56}** {-0.00} {1.35}
ICF 0.2837 0.1063 0.1578 0.3994 0.1651 0.1775 -0.0515 0.1260 -0.1157 -0.2931 -0.0588 -0.0073
[0.2270] [0.1832] [0.1160] [0.2481] [0.1162] [0.0438] [0.0672] [0.1110] [0.0211] [0.0649] [0.0670] [0.0002]
{1.25} {0.58} {1.36} {1.61} {1.42} {4.06}*** {-0.77} {1.14} {-5.48}*** {-4.52}*** {-0.88} {-30.45}***
IRC 0.0190 0.2487 0.6093 0.1497 0.0585 -0.2297 -0.3606 -0.5903 -0.1307 0.0990 0.1902 0.5508
[0.1900] [0.1802] [0.1869] [0.1062] [0.2249] [0.0098] [0.0067] [0.0031] [0.0838] [0.0741] [0.0447] [0.0380]
{0.10} {1.38} {3.26}*** {1.41} {0.26} {-23.48}*** {-54.02}*** {-189.96}*** {-1.56} {1.34} {4.26}*** {14.50}***
PVZ -1.1064 0.2554 0.4325 0.4600 0.2118 -1.3618 -0.1771 -1.5389 -1.5664 -0.2047 0.0436 0.2207
[0.4077] [0.2553] [0.0543] [0.5823] [0.0861] [0.1514] [0.2010] [0.3524] [0.1755] [0.3269] [0.1693] [0.0317]
{-2.72}*** {1.00} {7.96}*** {0.79} {2.46}** {-8.99}*** {-0.88} {-4.37}*** {-8.92}*** {-0.63} {0.26} {6.95}***
SMK -0.6466 0.5240 0.4547 0.9876 0.1718 -1.1706 0.0694 -1.1013 -1.6342 -0.4636 0.3522 0.2829
[0.2368] [0.3157] [0.0834] [0.2896] [0.1468] [0.0788] [0.2322] [0.1534] [0.0528] [0.0261] [0.1689] [0.0634]
{-2.73}*** {1.66)* {5.45}*** {3.41}*** {1.17} {-14.85}*** {0.30} {-7.18}*** {-30.97}*** {-17.79}*** {2.09}** {4.46}***
Overall R² 0.1265 0.0887 0.3920 0.0576 0.0539 0.1076 0.2404 0.2592 0.0921 0.0732 0.0713 0.2230
Obs 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Groups 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hausman_FE 0.99(0.32) 0.10(0.75) 0.01(0.94) 0.00(0.98) 0.02(0.89) -          -          -           -          -          -          -           
B-P Stat_RE 235.57*** 181.01*** 262.16*** 214.90*** 250.18*** -          -          -           -          -          -          -           
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-
Based Coefficient Stability Test 
Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient 
Stability Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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In columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E of Table 5.4.2, the inter-temporal evolution of the 
differences in the estimated decade-based coefficients involving the impact of financial 
liberalisation on international remittance inflows in SSA countries with frontier and emerging 
financial markets are reported. The only consistent statistical evidence of coefficient instability 
in the evolution throughout the study period, with reference to SSA countries with frontier and 
emerging financial markets, relates to DCRR (directed credit, reserve requirement and 
aggregate credit ceilings) and stock market development (SMK) components of the overall 
financial liberalisation index (FLBI). There is also an appreciably strong statistical evidence of 
consistency in the instability of the estimated decade-based coefficients associated with the 
impact of the overall financial liberalisation index (FLBI), banking supervision (BKS) and 
international capital flows (ICF) on international remittance inflows in SSA countries with 
frontier and emerging financial markets. In the case of FLBI and ICF, however, the coefficient 
instability test fails when the respective estimated decade-based coefficients of the 1990-99 
decade are compared with the corresponding estimates of the 1995-2004 overlapping decade. 
Finally, there is widespread evidence in favour of decade-based coefficient instability when the 
estimated parameters of the 2000-09 decade are compared with those of the 1995-2004 
decade as reported in column C-E of Table 5.4.2. 
 
Table 5.4.3 reports the results of the statistical inquiry into the estimated decade-based 
changing impact of financial liberalisation index (FLBI) and its components on international 
remittance inflows in SSA countries with underdeveloped financial markets. As in previous 
related cases, columns A-B, B-C and A-C report the results of the statistical differences of the 
estimated decade-based coefficients of 1980-89 and 1990-99, 1990-99 and 2000-09, as well 
as 1980-89 and 2000-09 respectively. The estimated results suggest that in the case of SSA 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets, when the corresponding estimated decade-
based coefficients of 1980-89 and 1990-99 are compared, the various estimated decade-based 
coefficients are statistically different from each other at the conventional statistical levels. A 
similar result was obtained when the respective estimated coefficients of 1990-99 and 2000-09 
decades are compared. The results, however, show that the estimated decade-based 
coefficients of DCRR (directed credited, reserve requirements, and aggregate credit ceilings) 
are statistically the same, implying that with reference to SSA countries having underdeveloped 
financial markets, the decade-based impact of DCRR on international migrant remittance 
inflows is statistically the same in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s. The empirical results of 
the statistical test on comparing the estimated decade-based coefficients of the 1980-89 
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decade to those of the 2000-09 decade show that besides FLBI, DCRR and interest rate 
control (IRC), the various components of FLBI actually impact on international remittance 
inflows differently in the 1980s and the 2000s as reported in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4.3:   
Parameter Evolution and Instability Test Results in Underdeveloped SSA Financial Markets 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively.  
Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
 
Again, with reference to the computed „differential‟ t-statistics reported in Table 5.4.3, it can be 
concluded that generally, the evolution of the estimated decade-based coefficients are not 
statistically stable over time except in the case of SMK and ICF, and to some extent entry 
barriers and pro-competition (EBC) and FLBI. The remaining decade-based coefficients exhibit 
inconsistent and isolated cases of stability in two out of the possible four estimations. The 
statistical evidence of relatively low and inconsistent parameter stability over time in SSA 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets might be due to the relative slow pace of 
financial liberalisation process in these countries especially during the early stages of economic 
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
FLBI 7.5113 0.9393 9.8180 0.8444 2.8612 6.5720 -8.8787 -2.3067 6.6669 0.5040 -1.9219 6.9568
[5.0752] [1.0796] [1.3731] [0.4352] [0.7569] [3.9956] [0.2935] [3.7021] [4.6400] [0.6444] [0.3227] [0.6162]
{1.48} {0.87} {7.15}*** {1.94}** {3.78}*** {1.64}* {-30.25}*** {-0.62} {1.44} {0.78} {-5.96}*** {11.29}***
BKS ? 0.1002 0.6067 0.1639 0.4466 ? -0.5065 ? ? -0.0387 -0.3464 0.1601
? [0.1354] [0.2281] [0.1389] [0.1861] ? [0.0927] ? ? [0.1939] [0.0507] [0.0420]
? {0.74} {2.66}*** {1.18} {2.40}** ? {-5.46}*** ? ? {-0.20} {-6.83}*** {3.81}***
DCRR 0.9579 0.3908 0.6236 0.1515 0.5358 0.5671 -0.2328 0.3344 0.8065 0.3106 -0.1450 0.0878
[0.6942] [0.1015] [0.3072] [0.0802] [0.1728] [0.5926] [0.2057] [0.3870] [0.6140] [0.0214] [0.0713] [0.1344]
{1.38} {3.85}*** {2.03}** {1.89}* {3.10}*** {0.96} {-1.13} {0.86} {1.31} {14.55}*** {-2.03}** {0.65}
EBC 0.9115 0.1513 1.1286 0.2101 0.2640 0.7602 -0.9773 -0.2171 0.7014 0.0779 -0.1127 0.8646
[0.1136] [0.1375] [0.1140] [0.0735] [0.1941] [0.0240] [0.0236] [0.0004] [0.0402] [0.0641] [0.0565] [0.0801]
{8.02}*** {1.10} {9.90}*** {2.86}** {1.36} {31.75}*** {-41.48}*** {-562.38}*** {17.47}*** {1.21} {-1.99}** {10.79}***
ICF -2.4975 0.0155 0.5181 0.4328 0.3631 -2.5130 -0.5027 -3.0156 -2.9303 -0.1967 -0.3477 0.1550
[0.1428] [0.2578] [0.2141] [0.2121] [0.1737] [0.1150] [0.0437] [0.0713] [0.0694] [0.0457] [0.0841] [0.0404]
{-17.49}*** {0.06} {2.42}** {2.04}** {2.09}** {-21.84}*** {-11.50}*** {-42.29}*** {-42.25}*** {-4.30}*** {-4.13}*** {3.84}***
IRC 0.9042 0.2159 0.9025 0.0042 0.7666 0.6884 -0.6867 0.0017 0.9000 0.1311 -0.5507 0.1360
[0.4810] [0.3040] [0.1752] [0.0848] [0.2808] [0.1769] [0.1288] [0.3057] [0.3962] [0.2192] [0.0232] [0.1055]
{1.88}* {0.71} {5.15}*** {0.05} {2.73}*** {3.89}*** {-5.33}*** {0.01} {2.27}** {0.60} {-23.69}*** {1.29}
PVZ 0.2436 -0.0592 0.7171 0.1538 0.1729 0.3028 -0.7763 -0.4735 0.0898 -0.1590 -0.2321 0.5442
[0.1657] [0.2465] [0.1209] [0.0999] [0.1081] [0.0808] [0.1256] [0.0448] [0.0659] [0.1467] [0.1385] [0.0128]
{1.47} {-0.24} {5.93}*** {1.54} {1.60}* {3.75}*** {-6.18}*** {-10.57}*** {1.36} {-1.08} {-1.68}* {42.37}***
SMK 1.7788 -0.0241 1.3075 -0.0736 0.5163 1.8029 -1.3316 0.4713 1.8524 -0.2345 -0.5404 0.7912
[0.0878] [0.2008] [0.0384] [0.2104] [0.1660] [0.1129] [0.1624] [0.0494] [0.1226] [0.0097] [0.0347] [0.1276]
{20.26}*** {-0.12} {34.06}*** {-0.35} {3.11}*** {15.96}*** {-8.20}*** {9.54}*** {15.11}*** {-24.30}*** {-15.55}*** {6.20}***
Overall R² 0.0505 0.3304 0.0950 0.1646 0.2625 0.1905 0.2127 0.0728 0.1076 0.2475 0.2965 0.1788
Obs 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Groups 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Hausman_FE 0.29(0.59) 61.46(0.00)*** 1.21(0.27) 0.65(0.42) 0.30(0.58) -            -            -             -           -             -             -             
B-P STAT-RE 201.70*** 172.75*** 211.25*** 213.17*** 203.41*** -            -            -             -           -             -             -             
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient Stability 
Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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reforms (see Abiad et al. 2010). It is also possible that a significant proportion of the officially 
reported remittances received in SSA countries with underdeveloped financial markets during 
the 1980s and the 1990s might have passed through other officially recognised channels such 
as the MTOs and post offices hence outside the banking system and the stock markets upon 
which the financial liberalisation index was developed. 
 
The results of the estimated decade-based coefficients evolution and stability tests on the 
impact of financial liberalisation on international remittances in 13 sampled SSA countries for 
which relevant data are available for a bivariate panel-data analysis are presented in Table 
5.4.4. More specifically, within the context of a bivariate panel-data analysis, the computed t-
statistics providing the statistical evidence for the changing impact of financial liberalisation on 
international remittance inflows in the 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09 decades are reported in 
columns A-B, B-C and A-C respectively of Table 5.4.4. 
 
The results reported in column A-B show that the impact of the overall index of financial 
liberalisation (FLBI), directed credit, reserve requirements and aggregate credit ceilings 
(DCRR), international capital flows (ICF), interest rate control (IRC) and stock market 
development (SMK) on international remittance inflows in the 1980-89 decade is not 
statistically different from the corresponding estimated coefficients reported for the 1990-99 
decade reported in Table 5.4. This might be due to the fact that most of the sampled SSA 
countries actually began the implementation of financial reform policies in the latter part of the 
1980s. Secondly, the pace of financial deregulation and reforms during the initial stages of 
implementation might be relatively slow. Apart from DCRR, in SSA, FLBI as well as each of its 
component indicators had a statistically different impact on international remittance inflows in 
1990-99 decade when compared with the corresponding estimated coefficients for the 2000-09 
decade as suggested by the computed „differential‟ t-statistics reported in columns B-C of Table 
5.4.4. There is substantial evidence that, both at the integrated and disaggregated levels, 
financial liberalisation impact on international remittance inflows in SSA differs statistically 
across the 1980-89 decade and the 2000-09 decade as shown in column A-C. 
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Table 5.4.4:  
Financial Liberalisation-Remittance Parameter Evolution and Instability Test Results in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively.  
Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
 
Considering the results of coefficient instability test reported in columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E 
of Table 5.4.4, it is quite obvious that apart from the estimated coefficients of ICF, none of the 
estimated decade-based coefficients exhibits a complete and consistent pattern of instability 
over the three decades. The overriding implication of this result is that although, generally, the 
impact of financial liberalisation on remittance inflows seems to vary from decade to decade, 
there is very little evidence in favour of instability among the estimated decade-based 
coefficients over the period 1980-2009. This might be due to the general slow pace of the 
liberalisation process in the early stages of the economic reforms and the fact that most of the 
officially reported remittances received in SSA during the 1980s and the 1990s might have 
been transferred through MTOs and post offices rather than the formal financial institutions 
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
FLBI 2.5143 1.7241 5.2825 1.9261 2.3444 0.7902 -3.5584 -2.7683 0.5882 -0.2020 -0.6203 2.9381
[2.5142] [0.9074] [1.5050] [0.5335] [0.5042] [1.6068] [0.5976] [1.0093] [1.9807] [0.3739] [0.4032] [1.0008]
{1.00} {1.90}** {3.51}*** {3.61}*** {4.65}*** {0.49} {-5.95}*** {-2.74}** {0.30} {-0.54} {-1.54} {2.94)***
BKS -0.3657 0.5760 0.3800 0.8911 0.4102 -0.9416 0.1960 -0.7456 -1.2567 -0.3151 0.1658 -0.0302
[0.0102] [0.2692] [0.1508] [0.1853] [0.0926] [0.2589] [0.1184] [0.1406] [0.1750] [0.0839] [0.1765] [0.0582]
{-35.75}*** {2.14}** {2.52}** {4.81}*** {4.43}*** {-3.64}*** {1.66}* {-5.30}*** {-7.18}*** {-3.75}*** {0.94} {-0.52}
DCRR 0.2983 0.5378 0.5999 0.2561 0.2716 -0.2395 -0.0621 -0.3016 0.0422 0.2817 0.2662 0.3283
[0.4452] [0.1854] [0.2926] [0.1133] [0.1275] [0.2598] [0.1072] [0.1526] [0.3319] [0.0721] [0.0579] [0.1651]
{0.67} {2.90}*** {2.05}** {2.26}** {2.13}** {-0.92} {-0.58} {-1.98}** {0.13} {3.91}*** {4.59}*** {1.99}**
EBC 0.6545 0.1548 0.6580 0.2272 0.2206 0.4996 -0.5032 -0.0036 0.4273 -0.0724 -0.0658 0.4374
[0.3697] [0.0774] [0.2136] [0.0817] [0.1511] [0.2923] [0.1362] [0.1561] [0.2880] [0.0043] [0.0737] [0.0625]
{1.77}* {2.00}** {3.08}*** {2.78}** {1.46} {1.71}* {-3.69}*** {-0.02} {1.48} {-16.81}*** {-0.89} {6.99}***
ICF -0.0341 0.1014 0.2005 0.4295 0.2237 -0.1356 -0.0991 -0.2346 -0.4637 -0.3281 -0.1222 -0.0232
[0.3791] [0.1561] [0.1013] [0.1746] [0.0956] [0.2230] [0.0548] [0.2778] [0.2045] [0.0185] [0.0605] [0.0057]
{-0.09} {0.65} {1.98}** {2.46}** {2.34}** {-0.61} {-1.81}* {-0.84} {-2.27}** {-17.69}*** {-2.02}** {-4.08}***
IRC 0.3379 0.2467 0.8022 0.1141 0.2949 0.0912 -0.5555 -0.4643 0.2238 0.1326 -0.0483 0.5073
[0.2964] [0.1542] [0.1803] [0.0731] [0.1705] [0.1422] [0.0261] [0.1161] [0.2232] [0.0810] [0.0163] [0.0098]
{1.14} {1.60} {4.45}*** {1.56} {1.73}* {0.64} {-21.28}*** {-4.00}*** {1.00} {1.64} {-2.96}** {51.79}***
PVZ -0.6792 0.1954 0.6002 0.1995 0.2006 -0.8746 -0.4048 -1.2794 -0.8787 -0.0041 -0.0052 0.3996
[0.5265] [0.1897] [0.1060] [0.1750] [0.0671] [0.3368] [0.0837] [0.4205] [0.3515] [0.0147] [0.1226] [0.0389]
{-1.29} {1.03} {5.66}*** {1.14} {2.99}*** {-2.60}** {-4.84}*** {-3.04}*** {-2.50}** {-0.27} {-0.04} {10.26}***
SMK 0.2926 0.2651 0.6096 0.7117 0.3056 0.0275 -0.3445 -0.3170 -0.4192 -0.4466 -0.0406 0.3039
[0.7699] [0.2008] [0.1752] [0.2039] [0.1092] [0.5691] [0.0257] [0.5947] [0.5660] [0.0031] [0.1951] [0.1845]
{0.38} {1.32} {3.48}*** {3.49}*** {2.80}** {0.05} {-13.43}*** {-0.53} {-0.74} {-143.60}*** {-0.21} {1.65}*
Overall R² 0.0693 0.1554 0.0681 0.0792 0.1353 0.1124 0.1118 0.0687 0.0743 0.1173 0.1454 0.1017
Obs 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Groups 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Hausman-FE 0.11(0.74) 1.71(0.19) 0.50(0.48) 0.18(0.67) 0.29(0.59) -            -           -           -           -            -             -              
B-P STAT-RE 456.16*** 358.17*** 469.69*** 438.26*** 458.71*** -            -           -           -           -            -             -              
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based 
Rolling Estimated 
Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient Stability 
Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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such as banks and stock markets. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As SSA countries with underdeveloped financial markets received more official remittances 
than the SSA countries with frontier and emerging financial markets, it is implied that most of 
the officially reported remittances received in SSA between 1980 and 2009 were transferred 
through other officially approved channels other than the banking system and the stock market. 
This is evidence that SSA banks are not active participants in the international remittance 
market; leaving MTOs mainly Western Union and MoneyGram to be enjoying monopolistic 
advantages. Under this circumstance, given the altruistic nature of remittances and the demand 
for MTO services on official remittances, international money transfer might be highly price-
inelastic enabling these MTOs to charge higher fees on remittance transfers in a bid to earn 
supernormal profits on the major SSA remittance-corridors. The low participation of banks in 
the remittance market might be due to mistrust of banks and the relative superior efficiency of 
MTOs, at least, in connection with the speed, coverage, precision and reliability of the service 
offered. The low participation of SSA banks may also be due to the existence of structural and 
systemic constraints to competitive conditions such as poor financial infrastructure, 
inappropriate legal and regulatory framework, and lack of convenient access to banking 
services.  
 
In contrast to MTOs, the few SSA banks that have offshore facilities to facilitate cross-border 
payment systems can be described not only as generally inefficient and unreliable, but also 
costly due to lack of automated direct links for retail transfers. This is why effecting a single 
remittance transfer to a typical SSA country through the banking system often involves a multi-
stage series of network correspondent bank transactions that do not only increase the total cost 
of remitting but also delay the time taken for the target recipient to receive the funds 
transferred. The forefront position of SSA bourses in attracting official remittances should not 
be taken for granted as, unlike SSA banks, the majority of these stock exchanges are part of 
the global capital markets and have online facilities. Clearly, SSA banks are not taking 
advantage of financial liberalisation policies pursued in the sub-region to attract more 
remittances strategically. In other words, even though the implementation of FLB programme is 
necessary, it is not in itself sufficient to attract more remittances through the formal financial 
system. 
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The results of this study imply that the underlying objectives have been achieved and the 
answers to the specific research questions posed have been provided. The main answers are 
that, by the stylised facts, SSA countries with frontier and emerging financial markets are, in 
relative terms, more likely to receive more remittances through the formal financial system 
when compared with other SSA countries with underdeveloped financial markets. Generally, 
financial liberalisation Granger-causes international remittance inflows with a low statistical 
evidence for a reverse causal effect. Policies on the stock market development Granger-
caused higher inflows of remittances than the financial liberalisation policies on the banking 
system. On the impact of financial liberalisation, and each of the specific reform policies 
implemented under the programme, the findings of this study provide the affirmation that the 
overall and specific policy impact of financial liberalisation on remittance inflows is positive and 
that this impact is more significant in countries with frontier and emerging financial markets 
than in other SSA countries where financial markets are underdeveloped. The statistical and 
economic significance of the effects of financial liberalisation and each of its specific polices on 
international remittance inflows have been generally increasing over time. 
 
It is, therefore, recommended that, in order to attract more official remittances to SSA through 
the formal financial system, domestic banks should devise strategies to enter into the lucrative 
remittance market and compete away supernormal profits earned by MTOs. This will reduce 
the cost of remitting on the official remittance-corridors of SSA, and encourage migrants to 
patronise the services offered by banks in the international remittance market. More 
specifically, by the evidence of the empirical results and best practices elsewhere, it is 
suggested that SSA banks should: 
 
i. Introduce differentiated services and develop remittance-products through technological 
innovation. Innovative products, online and automation in payment systems are 
necessary to reduce the cost of handling small cross-border money transfers. Although 
this may require huge capital investment, banks must appreciate the substantial long-
term benefits from such an investment project mainly because remittance inflows, which 
are less negatively affected by economic downturns, can cushion banks in periods of 
recession. Consequently, SSA banks should develop the payment systems that can 
directly communicate across borders or even develop products that can use existing 
payment systems such as credit cards and/or ATM products. 
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ii. Open overseas branches and offer more offshore services to residents at home to 
facilitate payments and receipts of remittances internationally. With an effective network 
system, it should be possible to develop and extend the internal electronic proprietary 
payment systems to all branches including overseas branches, and complement this 
payment system with an account-to-account collection and delivery system. Through 
this, remittances deposited in overseas branches should be easily and readily 
accessible to target recipients at home at relatively low transaction costs. 
 
iii. Through further liberalisation of the financial market, promote competition that breeds 
financial innovation both in terms of products and services. One aspect of the 
competitive landscape of which banks can take advantage is to target migrants as 
customers by offering relatively low costs on remittance services whilst aiming at 
making reasonable gains from other supporting services offered, using remittances as 
leverage. Examples include providing relevant information on investment opportunities 
at home, offering mortgages and housing loans, and assisting migrants in planning for 
their retirement and in insuring their valuable assets. 
 
iv. Establish bilateral and multilateral partnerships and networks with one another not 
excluding rural and community banks, and with post offices and foreign banks, in order 
to build an efficient and reliable national and international payment systems among 
collaborating banks and institutions, in a manner that will make banks appear more 
visible and conveniently accessible in the remittance market at home and overseas. In 
order to succeed in the long run, SSA banks must focus on strategic partnerships, 
networks, and negotiated alliances and franchises similar to the models used by large 
multinationals, so as to enable them to overcome the challenges of high operational 
costs and the geographic fragmentation of the remittance markets. 
 
Meanwhile, because stock markets tend to be the most important channel through which SSA 
migrants remit (with reference to the impact on official remittances received), it is hereby 
suggested that policy makers should design policies aimed at further enhancing electronic 
trading via stock market automation, and improving financial literacy on the role of stock 
markets as well as the regional and international integration of SSA stock markets among 
migrants and potential recipients of remittances. In SSA countries where stock markets do not 
currently exist or are underdeveloped, regionalisation of capital markets could be of 
tremendous benefit in this regard.  
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Table A5.1: Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST STATISTICS  
Breitung t-stat  Hadri HC z-stat  Fisher P-P chi-square Conclusion 
 At Level 1
st
 Difference At Level At Level  
BKS -1.4719* 
{0.0705} 
 4.5862*** 
(0.0000) 
 I(0) 
DCRR -1.5026* 
{0.0665} 
 4.8241*** 
(0.0000) 
 I(0) 
EBC -2.5113*** 
{0.0060} 
 6.6481*** 
(0.0000) 
 I(0) 
FLBI -2.5523*** 
{0.0054} 
 3.5286*** 
(0.0002) 
 I(0) 
ICF -2.7046*** 
{0.0034} 
 5.4839*** 
(0.0000) 
 I(0) 
IRC -0.2735 -3.8695*** 5.6366*** -2.5925*** I(0) 
 {0.3922} {0.0001} (0.0000) [0.0048]  
lnREMPC -0.3146 -7.2297*** 6.0585*** 46.2448*** I(0) 
 {0.3765} {0.0000} (0.0000) [0.0086]  
PVZ -2.9646***  7.0261***  I(0) 
 {0.0015}  (0.0000)   
SMK -2.9011***  5.8985***  I(0) 
 {0.0019}  (0.0000)   
Source: Author‟s computations  Note: Figures in brackets are respective probability values. 
***
/
**
/
*
 significant  
              at 1/5/10 level statistical level respectively. Constant and trend included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5.2: Results of Panel Co-integration Tests 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively. 
            Constant no trend included the HHC test for the EG2S and the JUCR tests. 
Explanatory Variable Resid_Mean t-stat(t-prob.) Hypothesis Trace stat 5% Critical Value Max-Eigen stat 5% Critical Value
BKS 1.76E-16 6.0950(0.00)*** None 7.824 15.4947 6.8273 14.2646
At most 1 0.9967 3.8415 0.9967 3.8415
DCRR 6.38E-17 6.9910(0.00)*** None 22.9069*** 15.4947 17.2493** 14.2646
At most 1 5.6576** 3.8415 5.6576** 3.8415
EBC 3.60E-16 6.7017(0.00)*** None 30.5906*** 15.4947 22.1948*** 14.2646
At most 1 8.3957*** 3.8415 8.3957*** 3.8415
FLBI 1.48E-16 4.5307(0.00)*** None 19.5899** 15.4947 12.6661* 14.2646
At most 1 6.9238*** 3.8415 6.9238*** 3.8415
ICF 1.40E-16 5.5711(0.00)*** None 20.9139*** 15.4947 15.7397** 14.2646
At most 1 5.1742** 3.8415 5.1742** 3.8415
IRC 1.84E-16 6.8417(0.00)*** None 29.1684*** 15.4947 23.2101*** 14.2646
At most 1 5.9582** 3.8415 5.9582** 3.8415
PVZ 1.21E-16 7.3991(0.00)*** None 17.1967** 15.4947 14.3087** 14.2646
At most 1 2.8880* 3.8415 2.8880* 3.8415
SMK 2.32E-16 7.6376(0.00)*** None 16.3152** 15.4947 13.5167** 14.2646
At most 1 2.7985* 3.8415 2.7985* 3.8415
Engel-Granger 2-Step (EG2S) Johansen Unrestricted Cointegrating Rank (JUCR) Test
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Table A5.3:  
Financial Liberalisation-Remittances Bivariate Panel Granger Non-Causality Results in SSA, 1990-2009 
 
Source: Author.  Note: 
‡
 is a model-specific optimal lag selected according to SIC, AIC and log likelihood.  
           REMPC here refers to migrant remittances per capita 
 
 
No. of Frontier & Emerging Others (underdeveloped) Full Sample (combined)
  Null Hypothesis: Lags‡ Obs F-statistic(F-prob.) Obs F-statistic(F-prob.) Obs F-statistic(F-prob.)
  FLBI does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 0.6587(0.52) 108 0.3249(0.72) 234 0.9785(0.38)
  lnREMPC does not Grangercause FLBI 2 126 1.3263(0.27) 108 0.6783(0.51) 234 1.5404(0.22)
  BKS does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 0.9363(0.40) 108 0.3499(0.71) 234 0.0353(0.97)
 lnREMPC does not Granger cause BKS 2 126 2.8622(0.06)* 108 0.0039(0.99) 234 2.6058(0.08)*
  DCRR does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 0.0587(0.94) 108 0.1765(0.84) 234 0.2054(0.81)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause DCRR 2 126 3.5036(0.03)** 108 2.7280(0.07)* 234 0.5508(0.58)
  EBC does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 1.0642(0.35) 108 0.2385(0.78) 234 0.7132(0.49)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause EBC 2 126 0.6269(0.54) 108 0.1116(0.45) 234 0.1287(0.88)
  ICF does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 0.2254(0.80) 108 0.2937(0.75) 234 0.3627(0.70)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause ICF 2 126 0.7919(0.46) 108 0.8024(0.45) 234 1.7068(0.18)
  IRC does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 0.2709(0.76) 108 2.1224(0.13) 234 0.1639(0.85)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause IRC 2 126 0.6033(0.55) 108 2.0724(0.13) 234 1.1212(0.33)
  PVZ does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 0.0687(0.93) 108 0.0971(0.91) 234 0.5578(0.57)
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause PVZ 2 126 1.5406(0.22) 108 0.4279(0.65) 234 1.8102(0.17)
  SMK does not Granger cause lnREMPC 2 126 6.7021(0.00)*** 108 2.4403(0.09)* 234 8.1991(0.00)***
  lnREMPC does not Granger cause SMK 2 126 0.2721(0.76) 108 1.7109(0.19) 234 1.2681(0.28)
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Table A5.4: Empirical Modelling Robustness Test for Impact of Financial Liberalisation on International Remittances in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation.  Note: ***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% respectively. 
         Constant term included for each estimation.  z-statistics  in ( ); t-statistics in [ ]; with both statistics based on robust 
         standard errors. R
2
, Hausman‟s specification tests, and B-P tests are based on estimated models involving FLBI 
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-09 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-09 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-09
FLBI 3.6820 3.5006 3.1291 3.4454 2.3926 1.6491 5.4055 3.2042 2.5143 1.7241 5.2825 3.2078
[3.68]*** [4.90]*** [4.05]*** [9.38]*** [0.89] [1.83]* [3.35]*** [3.75]*** (1.00)       (1.90)* (3.51)*** (3.76)***
BKS 0.4944 0.3764 0.0116 0.7655 -0.3805 0.5811 0.3903 1.0170 -0.3657 0.5760 0.3800 1.0140
[1.99]** [1.37] [-0.06] [6.67]*** [-32.89]*** [2.15]** [2.44]** [4.50]*** (-35.75)*** (2.14)** (2.52)** (4.49)***
DCRR 1.7848 0.6545 -0.2647 0.8952 0.2239 0.5347 0.7274 0.7547 0.2983 0.5378 0.5999 0.7572
[5.21]*** [3.10]*** [-1.24] [8.39]*** [0.51] [2.86]*** [2.11]* [3.13]*** (0.67)       (2.90)*** (2.05)** (3.15)***
EBC 0.6418 0.3831 0.6431 0.7135 0.6572 0.1426 0.6597 0.6267 0.6545 0.1548 0.6580 0.6290
[5.15]*** [2.66]*** [4.80]*** [8.58]*** [1.55] [1.88]* [2.99]*** [3.67]*** (1.77)* (2.00)** (3.08)*** (3.71)***
ICF 0.8364 0.6059 0.4618 0.8612 -0.0597 0.0819 0.1845 0.6048 -0.0341 0.1014 0.2005 0.6118
[2.35]** [4.03]*** [3.35]*** [8.63]*** [-0.15] [0.53] [1.65] [3.60]*** (-0.09) (0.65)       (1.98)** (3.58)***
IRC 0.0155 0.2669 0.0928 0.4512 0.3481 0.2459 1.0198 0.6111 0.3379 0.2467 0.8022 0.6086
[0.11] [1.89]* [0.54] [5.66]*** [1.14] [1.56] [5.9e04]*** [3.34]*** (1.14)       (1.60)       (4.45)*** (3.46)***
PVZ 0.2089 0.8137 0.5567 0.6942 -1.0075 0.1333 0.6023 0.5407 -0.6792 0.1954 0.6002 0.5448
[1.46] [5.94]*** [4.35]*** [9.09]*** [-2.07]** [0.78] [5.67]*** [2.74]*** (-1.29) (1.03)       (5.66)*** (2.76)***
SMK -0.0362 0.2963 0.2516 0.6928 0.3141 0.2636 0.6379 1.2312 0.2926 0.2651 0.6096 1.2227
[-0.10] [1.22] [1.46] [5.74]*** [0.40] [1.32] [3.48]*** [5.16]*** (0.38)       (1.32)       (3.48)*** (5.17)***
Overall R² 0.0693 0.1554 0.0681 0.2189 0.0693 0.1554 0.0681 0.2189 0.0693 0.1554 0.0681 0.2189
Obs 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390
Groups 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Panel Fixed Effects Panel Random Effects
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Table A5.5: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients of Financial Liberalisation Indicators and 
Remittances in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation 
 
 
Frontier & Emerging Markets
lnREMPC DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
lnREMPC 1.0000
DCRR 0.3313 1.0000
IRC 0.4095 0.7183 1.0000
EBC 0.4864 0.4909 0.3691 1.0000
BKS 0.4534 0.6472 0.6308 0.5485 1.0000
PVZ 0.5165 0.6644 0.6412 0.4420 0.6769 1.0000
ICF 0.4202 0.3280 0.5639 0.5069 0.5040 0.4928 1.0000
SMK 0.4242 0.6776 0.5697 0.5084 0.6616 0.6686 0.4541 1.0000
FLBI 0.5546 0.8132 0.8319 0.6922 0.8344 0.8377 0.7042 0.8058 1.0000
Others (underdeveloped)
lnREMPC DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
lnREMPC 1.0000
DCRR 0.5318 1.0000
IRC 0.2008 0.6158 1.0000
EBC 0.3761 0.5886 0.5952 1.0000
BKS 0.1142 0.6124 0.7271 0.5423 1.0000
PVZ 0.3636 0.5853 0.5811 0.8485 0.5939 1.0000
ICF 0.3303 0.4288 0.6677 0.5953 0.5723 0.5568 1.0000
SMK 0.1319 0.5765 0.4762 0.5959 0.6570 0.5401 0.4020 1.0000
FLBI 0.3833 0.7831 0.8237 0.8760 0.8059 0.8681 0.7330 0.7207 1.0000
Full Sample (frontier & emerging plus underdeveloped)
lnREMPC DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
lnREMPC 1.0000
DCRR 0.4226 1.0000
IRC 0.2932 0.5965 1.0000
EBC 0.4178 0.5116 0.4573 1.0000
BKS 0.3188 0.6005 0.6608 0.5439 1.0000
PVZ 0.4347 0.5991 0.6193 0.6309 0.6471 1.0000
ICF 0.3939 0.3592 0.5496 0.5102 0.5102 0.4920 1.0000
SMK 0.2817 0.5516 0.5786 0.5316 0.6581 0.6203 0.4023 1.0000
FLBI 0.4679 0.7620 0.8236 0.7698 0.8255 0.8513 0.6898 0.7717 1.0000
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Table A5.6: Descriptive Statistics of Financial Liberalisation Indicators and Remittances Data 
 
Source: Author‟s computation 
Frontier & Emerging Markets
LNREMPC DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
 Mean 0.6158 1.3119 1.9619 2.1381 0.8095 1.5333 1.1095 1.1048 0.4747
 Median 1.2544 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5238
 Maximum 4.1897 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.9643
 Minimum -4.4361 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Std. Dev. 2.0608 0.8917 1.3725 1.0871 0.8869 1.2301 1.0317 0.8741 0.2772
 Skewness -0.8828 0.0418 -0.6326 -0.7686 0.7521 -0.0770 0.6709 0.3990 -0.2940
 Kurtosis 3.0062 1.6321 1.4831 2.0667 2.5435 1.4172 2.3320 2.4388 1.8857
 Jarque-Bera 27.2761 16.4347 34.1403 28.2972 21.6219 22.1298 19.6563 8.3283 13.8896
 Probability 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0155 0.0010
 Sum 129.3189 275.5000 412.0000 449.0000 170.0000 322.0000 233.0000 232.0000 99.6905
 Sum Sq. Dev. 887.5945 166.1952 393.6952 246.9952 164.3810 316.2667 222.4810 159.6952 16.0577
 Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Others (underdeveloped)
lnREMPC DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
 Mean 1.0645 1.5833 1.2889 1.8944 0.6389 1.2444 1.2278 0.6611 0.4066
 Median 1.2571 1.8750 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4226
 Maximum 4.7948 2.5000 3.0000 3.0000 2.0000 3.0000 2.0000 2.0000 0.7500
 Minimum -4.3811 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Std. Dev. 1.6961 0.8954 0.9542 1.1458 0.6666 1.1415 0.6415 0.5610 0.2330
 Skewness -0.4526 -0.3459 -0.0231 -0.3291 0.5605 0.1443 -0.2432 0.1038 -0.2380
 Kurtosis 3.2633 1.5871 1.8926 1.5384 2.2915 1.5162 2.3231 2.2833 1.6592
 Jarque-Bera 6.6659 18.5619 9.2136 19.2728 13.1909 17.1370 5.2114 4.1758 15.1825
 Probability 0.0357 0.0001 0.0100 0.0001 0.0014 0.0002 0.0739 0.1239 0.0005
 Sum 191.6162 285.0000 232.0000 341.0000 115.0000 224.0000 221.0000 119.0000 73.1905
 Sum Sq. Dev. 514.9460 143.5000 162.9778 234.9944 79.5278 233.2444 73.6611 56.3278 9.7199
 Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Full Sample (frontier & emerging plus underdeveloped markets)
lnREMPC DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
 Mean 0.8229 1.4372 1.6513 2.0256 0.7308 1.4000 1.1641 0.9000 0.4433
 Median 1.2554 1.0000 2.0000 3.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.4881
 Maximum 4.7948 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.9643
 Minimum -4.4361 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Std. Dev. 1.9120 0.9025 1.2425 1.1198 0.7964 1.1973 0.8745 0.7774 0.2597
 Skewness -0.8038 -0.1314 -0.2109 -0.5565 0.7944 0.0389 0.4611 0.6351 -0.2059
 Kurtosis 3.3650 1.5594 1.4238 1.7528 2.8286 1.4566 2.5955 3.0992 1.8569
 Jarque-Bera 44.1603 34.8452 43.2616 45.4029 41.4942 38.8065 16.4811 26.3740 23.9900
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
 Sum 320.9352 560.5000 644.0000 790.0000 285.0000 546.0000 454.0000 351.0000 172.8810
 Sum Sq. Dev. 1422.0570 316.8359 600.5744 487.7436 246.7308 557.6000 297.4974 235.1000 26.2271
 Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390 390
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Table A5.7: Degree of Financial Liberalisation in Contemporary SSA, 2005-2009 
 
Source: Abiad et al. (2010) and author‟s own computation based on various Central Bank reports and IMF‟s World 
Economic Financial Survey Reports 
 
 
 
Ccode Country Name Year DCRR IRC EBC BKS PVZ ICF SMK FLBI
1 Burkina Faso 2005 2.50 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.595238 
1 Burkina Faso 2007 2.50 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.595238 
1 Burkina Faso 2009 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.642857 
2 Cameroon 2005 2.50 1.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.595238 
2 Cameroon 2007 2.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.642857 
2 Cameroon 2009 2.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.642857 
3 Côte d'Ivoire 2005 2.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.642857 
3 Côte d'Ivoire 2007 2.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 0.642857 
3 Côte d'Ivoire 2009 2.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.690476 
4 Ethiopia 2005 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 0.380952 
4 Ethiopia 2007 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.428571 
4 Ethiopia 2009 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 0.523810 
5 Ghana 2005 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 0.666667 
5 Ghana 2007 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 0.761905 
5 Ghana 2009 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 0.904762 
6 Kenya 2005 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 0.714286 
6 Kenya 2007 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 0.714286 
6 Kenya 2009 1.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.738095 
7 Madagascar 2005 1.75 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.750000 
7 Madagascar 2007 1.75 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.750000 
7 Madagascar 2009 1.75 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.750000 
8 Mozambique 2005 2.50 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.6904762
8 Mozambique 2007 2.50 3.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.738095 
8 Mozambique 2009 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.785714 
9 Nigeria 2005 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.785714 
9 Nigeria 2007 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 0.833333 
9 Nigeria 2009 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 0.833333 
10 Senegal 2005 2.50 2.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.690476 
10 Senegal 2007 2.50 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.738095 
10 Senegal 2009 2.50 2.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.738095 
11 South Africa 2005 2.25 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.869048 
11 South Africa 2007 2.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 0.916667 
11 South Africa 2009 2.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.964286 
12 Tanzania 2005 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.785714 
12 Tanzania 2007 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.785714 
12 Tanzania 2009 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.785714 
13 Uganda 2005 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.761905 
13 Uganda 2007 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.761905 
13 Uganda 2009 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 0.809524 
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Table A5.8: Data Description, Measurement and Sources 
Variable Notation Description, Measurement and Main Source(s) 
Dependent Variable 
Remittances per 
capita 
REMPC Migrant remittances defined as the sum of workers‟ remittances plus 
compensation of employees received divided by total population. It was the 
natural logarithmic form of REMPC denoted as lnREMPC that was used. 
Source: Author‟s computation based mainly on WDI, BoPS and MRF-2011. 
Explanatory Variables 
Financial 
liberalisation index 
FLBI
+
 Financial liberalisation comprising the normalised index of BKS, DCRR, 
EBC, ICF, IRC, PVZ and SMK on a zero to one scale. Source: Abiad et al. 
(2010) and author.  
Bank supervision and 
prudential regulation 
 
BKS
+
 
Policies on the adoption of a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basel 
standard, independence of monetary authorities, and the degree of effective 
bank supervision through on-site and off-site supervision, and coverage of 
supervision by monetary authorities. Source: Abiad et al. (2010) and author. 
Reduction in directed 
credit, aggregate 
credit ceilings, and 
reserve requirements 
 
 
DCRR
+/0/-
 
Policies on degree of restrictions on reserve requirements, minimum 
amount of credit that must be channelled to certain state priority sectors, 
mandatory credit supply to certain sectors at subsidised rates, and 
aggregate credit ceilings including bank-specific credit ceilings imposed by 
the Central Bank. Source Abiad et al. (2010) and author. 
Relaxation of entry 
barriers  
EBC
+
 Policies on the extent to which government allows new banks and foreign 
banks to enter into the domestic financial market, restrictions on branching, 
and the freedom banks have to engage in a wide range of activities. 
Source: Abiad et al. (2010) and author. 
International account 
liberalisation 
 
ICF
+
 
Policies on exchange rate system unification, restrictions on capital inflows, 
and restrictions on capital outflows. Source: Abiad et al. (2010) and author. 
Interest rate 
deregulation  
 
IRC
+
 
Degree to which deposit rates and lending rates are separately free from 
government control set or subject to a binding ceiling or floor. Source: 
Abiad et al. (2010) and author. 
Privatisation of banks  
PVZ
+
 
Degree of privatisation of banks coded according to the proportion of 
privately-owned bank assets to state-owned bank assets. Source: Abiad et 
al. (2010) and author. 
 
Securities market 
reforms 
 
SMK
+
 
Policies such as introduction of auctioning of treasury bills or the 
establishment of a security commission towards the development of 
securities markets; and the extent to which the equity market is open to 
participation of foreign investors. Source: Abiad et al. (2010) and author. 
Source: Author‟s compilation. Note: The a priori sign is indicated by +/- by the notation column of each variable. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
A dynamic panel-data model covering 36 SSA countries was estimated following the system 
GMM estimation procedure to explore the direct long-run impact of remittances on economic 
growth. Under the assumption that the effects of remittances on economic growth could vary 
over time in response to the macroeconomic policy environment in remittance-recipient 
countries, a decade-based analysis was undertaken. This chapter further explores the possible 
size-effects of international migrant remittances on economic growth in SSA over the past three 
decades, 1980-2009. The section that follows presents the background whilst Section 6.2 
presents selected stylised facts. Section 6.3 outlines the theoretical framework and reviews the 
empirical literature on remittance inflows and economic growth. In Section 6.4, the empirical 
model, methodological approach, and data issues are presented. The estimated results are 
presented and analysed in 6.5 before the concluding remarks and policy recommendations are 
outlined in Section 6.7. 
 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
Consistent with increasing international migration of active labour from the developing world to 
the advanced economies in recent years, there has been an upsurge and a continuous flow of 
migrant remittances to the developing world of which sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a part. 
Without any immediate aspirations for a narrowing income gap between the advanced world 
and the developing world in this era of increasing elimination of trade barriers under the tenets 
of globalisation, the South-North trend in international migration is set to continue unabated.  
 
From a mere US$2.05 billion in 1970, global migrant remittance inflows increased to US$36.69 
billion in 1980, US$68.38 billion in 1990, US$131.49 billion in 2000, US$274.54 billion in 2005 
and to US$416.12 billion in 2009. During this same period, SSA received US$0.02 billion, 
US$1.40 billion, US$1.88 billion, US$4.64 billion, US$9.42 billion and US$20.75 billion 
respectively. As at 2009, the global official inflows of migrant remittances had emerged as the 
                                                          
 A paper based on this chapter and titled “The Impact of International Remittances on Economic Growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa,” was presented at ESSA bi-annual conference, September 5-7, 2011, Cape Town, South Africa. 
 A related published paper by the author is: “Financial Development, International Migrant Remittances and 
Endogenous Growth in Ghana,” Studies in Economics and Finance, 28(1): 68-89. 
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second largest source of external capital (second only to foreign direct investment (FDI)). By 
the end of 2009, global remittance inflows accounted for 3.39 per cent of goods exports, 35.76 
per cent of FDI and as much as 326.30 per cent, which implied more than thrice the volume of 
overseas development assistance (ODA). This trend can also be discerned in the case of SSA, 
as officially reported remittances received by the sub-region represents 8.03 per cent of goods 
exports, 71.31 per cent of FDI and 46.62 per cent of ODA as of 2009. Globally, from 36 
countries in 1980, the number of countries that received migrant remittances representing at 
least one per cent of their GDP increased to 58 in 1990, and 81 in the year 2000, with a further 
rise to 96 countries by the end of 2009. Of this figure, 25 countries, including four from SSA98, 
received remittances representing more than 10 per cent of their GDP by the end of 2009. This 
could just be one of the key reasons why the implications of international remittances in 
recipient countries have become increasingly important as far as economic policy research, 
design and implementation are concerned in recent years.  
 
Apart from the persistent positive growth trend, migrant remittance inflows are known to exhibit 
a unique feature which clearly distinguishes it from other forms of external capital received by 
developing countries. Remittances are clearly the least volatile form of external capital (see 
Figure 3.1). It can be inferred from the remittance literature99 that because the flow of 
remittances is largely influenced by the altruistic feelings of migrants and, for this reason 
altruism underlies all other motives behind remittance inflows, these private transfers, unlike 
other forms of capital, often increase in response to harsh economic conditions and crises 
afflicted by shocks in migrant-home countries. Another distinguishing feature of altruistic 
remittances is that they do not often involve the recipient in any financial risk or cost as they are 
often directly associated with smoothing the consumption of the target recipient. 
 
The theoretical role of remittances in enhancing long-run economic growth in migrant-home 
developing countries is not straightforward. From a theoretical standpoint, it can be argued that 
because remittances are used mainly for consumption smoothing and investment in land and 
other non-tradable assets such as construction or redevelopment of private residential 
apartments100 which do not directly generate income, remittance-recipient countries could be at 
risk of suffering from the Dutch disease. In this case, the inflows of remittances can actually 
                                                          
98
 SSA countries that received 10 per cent or more of remittances as a percentage of GDP in year 2009 are Lesotho 
(26.23 per cent), Gambia (10.88 per cent), Togo (10.75 per cent) and Senegal (10.64). 
99
 See, for instance, Johnson and Whitelaw (1974), Stark and Lucas (1988), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), World 
Bank (2006a,b), Acosta et al. (2008a), Barajas et al. (2009), Mundaca (2009), and Fayissa and Nsiah (2011). 
100
 See Chapter Four for cross-country evidence on the uses of migrant remittances. 
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inhibit long-run economic growth as export earnings fall due to a significant reduction in 
international competitiveness of small-open and import-dependent remittance-recipient 
countries, which are traditionally exporters of primary products. The World Bank (2006a), 
however, downplays the Dutch disease effects associated with remittance inflows as a serious 
concern on the basis that increases in remittances are gradual. As remittance inflows can 
exacerbate international dependency, intensify emigration syndrome and reduce labour 
productivity through moral hazards in recipient countries, some scholars including Wiest 
(1984), Chami et al. (2005), and Kapur (2004) contend that, theoretically, remittances can 
impair long-run growth in developing countries.  
 
On the reverse side of the argument is the positive role of remittances in enhancing long-run 
economic growth as these funds are considered as additional income to boost household 
consumption, and private investment and thereby create job opportunities through increased 
output expansion in capital-constrained migrant-home countries. In this context, by financing 
private consumption and entrepreneurial activities, remittances can help increase 
manufacturing output through increased aggregate demand and, hence, higher private 
investment resulting in increased demand for labour for industrial output expansion. This 
suggests that remittances carry along with them some positive multiplier effects and optimistic 
externalities, so that by helping to reduce income volatility, minimise credit market failures and 
smooth consumption in low-income migrant-home countries, they also help stabilise 
macroeconomy which is favourable for attracting private investment. Bugamelli and Paternò 
(2008) and Chami et al. (2009) find evidence for an automatic output volatility mitigating the 
element of remittances in remittance-recipient countries. Another important positive effect of 
remittances is its potential to ameliorate BoP problems which can improve the international 
credit rating of remittance-recipient countries that can, in the long run, affect both the 
magnitude and trend in government spending on the provision of public goods and the type of 
infrastructure that can crowd-in private investment.  
 
The arguments above imply that the effect of remittances on long-run growth is purely an 
empirical issue in the absence of a theoretical consensus. Unfortunately, however, conclusions 
from various empirical findings buttress the theoretical controversy surrounding the long-run 
growth impact of remittances as findings range widely from negative, zero, positive and to 
conditional effects. For instance, Stark and Lucas (1988), Chami et al. (2005), Lee (2008) and 
Karagöz (2009) conclude from various studies that the impact of remittances on economic 
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growth is negative. IMF (2005), Baldé (2009) and Barajas et al. (2009) find a zero effect of 
remittances on economic growth. Other studies including those by Stark and Lucas (1988), 
Faini (2006a), Catrinescu et al. (2006), Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009), Ziesemer (2008; 2009), 
and Adenutsi (2011), however, find a direct positive impact of remittances on growth. In 
connection with indirect or conditional effects of remittances on economic growth, Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Fajnzylber and López (2007) find a substitutability relationship between 
remittances and financial development, such that, remittances promote long-run growth in 
countries with poorly developed financial markets and where liquidity constraints are most 
severe. 
 
Previous studies, however, suffer from various technical deficiencies. One fundamental 
limitation associated with previous studies relates to the poor definition and arbitrary 
measurement of international migrant remittances (see Table A6.11 in the Appendix). In this 
study, migrant remittances are measured to include only the two relevant current account 
components (workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees) because migrants‟ 
transfers do not flow frequently, and even when they do flow, they are mostly received by the 
returnee migrants themselves101. Furthermore, remittances as a ratio to GDP is not likely to 
yield reliable results as the issue of factor productivity is brought into question, especially in a 
typical cross-country study. Another important problem with previous studies is that they fail to 
provide an insight into the possible changing impact of remittances on economic growth in 
remittance-recipient countries. Some previous studies also try to model the impact of 
remittances on growth through an ad hoc indirect mechanism. This study recognises the fact 
that the channels through which remittances can affect growth could be many102 and cannot be 
adequately addressed in one particular empirical study; hence, the need to rather concentrate 
on how remittances can directly affect growth either contemporaneously or asynchronously as 
the macroeconomic environment evolves in response to the implementation of financial 
liberalisation policies. These problems are addressed in this study using 36 SSA countries. 
 
 
                                                          
101
 For further clarifications, see Chapter Two of this dissertation which has been particularly devoted to definition 
and measurement of key concepts, including remittances. 
102
 For example, remittances can indirectly affect growth through human capital development in terms of improved 
access to healthcare or higher skills acquisition which are essential for higher labour productivity, financial 
development by augmenting domestic savings to improve credit extension, increased aggregate demand through 
consumption of manufactured goods, increased government expenditure on provision of critical infrastructure as 
government revenue increases from import tariffs and consumption tax such as the Value Added Tax (VAT). 
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Consequently, the principal research questions addressed in this chapter are: 
 
i. Do international remittances have a consistent and direct impact on long-run growth 
since the inception of financial liberalisation programmes in SSA? Overall, is the impact 
of remittances on economic growth contemporaneous or asynchronous? 
 
ii. Are there any direct impact variations of remittances on long-run growth based on the 
rate of economic growth in remittance-recipient SSA countries? If yes, which category 
of SSA countries is more likely to benefit from international remittances in this regard? 
 
Accordingly, with reference to SSA, the related specific objectives of this chapter include: 
i. To estimate the direct impact of international migrant remittance inflows on economic 
growth in the long run. 
 
ii. To examine if the direct impact of international migrant remittance inflows on economic 
growth is contemporaneous or asynchronous. 
 
iii. To determine if the impact of migrant remittance inflows on economic growth evolves 
over time in response to macroeconomic environment since the implementation of 
financial liberalisation programme three decades ago. 
 
iv. To verify the existence and impact of economic growth size-effects of international 
migrant remittances in remittance-recipient countries. 
 
The achievement of the above-stated research objectives is very important in a number of 
ways. First and foremost, in terms of scope (both time span and country inclusiveness), it 
represents the most comprehensive empirical study on the remittance-growth relationship in 
SSA. Besides, the decade-based impact analysis alongside the overall period analysis makes 
this study not only a novelty but also the most detailed in examining the effects of remittances 
on economic growth. Thus, the findings of this study, among other things, reveal the time-
varying effects of remittances on economic growth in SSA; and this plays a crucial role in the 
quest for the appropriate policy formulation for contemporary „labour-exporting‟ SSA countries. 
Furthermore, an insight into the economic growth size-effects of remittances is crucial in 
designing specific relevant pro-growth policies for SSA countries with similar growth features. 
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6.2 SELECTED STYLISED FACTS  
One of the underlying reasons why the impact of migrant remittances on economic growth 
should not be expected to be consistent across the developing world is that these developing 
regions differ widely regarding net remittance inflows, but given the problems related to data, 
the implications of remittances are often analysed based on what has been received rather 
than on the net inflows. In Figure 6.1, it is shown that, notwithstanding the fact that developing 
economies are net recipients of remittances (see Figure A6.1), these developing economies 
differ widely in terms of the proportion of remittances paid relative to remittances received (see 
Figure 6.1). For example, between 1980 and 2009, the amount of remittances paid by SSA to 
the rest of the world constituted as much as 53.36 per cent of the total remittances received by 
the sub-region compared to only 4.30 per cent and 8.16 per cent in the case of South Asia 
(SAS) and LAC. Over the same period, the Middle East and North Africa (MNA) paid 15.83 per 
cent of the remittances received to the rest of the world, East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) paid 
17.21 per cent, whilst Europe and Central Asia paid as much as 47.44 per cent of their 
remittances. Thus, ideally, if country-based data were readily available, it would have been 
more relevant and appropriate to use net remittance inflows when analysing the effects of 
remittances on economic growth. Indeed, in a comparative study between LAC and SSA 
countries, Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009) show that although remittances have positive effects on 
economic growth in both regions, the impact is more robust in LAC. 
 
Figure   6.1: Total Inflows and Outflows of Remittances in Developing Economies, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation based on WDI (April 2011) 
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The cyclicality of remittance inflows in SSA is shown in Figure 4.1, with the evidence pointing to 
the fact that remittances were pro-cyclical in the 1980s and the 2000s but countercyclical in the 
1990s. The cyclicality of remittance inflows shows the likely use to which remittances might 
have been put and, hence, the potential changing impact of migrant remittances on growth in 
SSA over the past three decades. For example, during the periods when migrant remittances 
were pro-cyclical, it is most likely that the self-interest motive might have dominated the 
motives behind remittance inflows, implying a higher likelihood of using remittances to finance 
income-generating projects, which have a higher positive multiplier effect on an economy than 
when remittances were countercyclical with higher likelihood of being spent on consumer 
goods. Chami et al. (2005) and Barajas et al. (2009) show that when remittances are 
countercyclical, they are also counterproductive and, hence, cannot have a direct positive 
impact on growth. In Table 3.1, it is shown that, actually, SSA as a sub-region recorded its 
lowest real per capita income and worst general macroeconomic performance in the 1990s 
over the past three decades. 
 
Figure 6.2: 
Correlation between Remittances and Key Macroeconomic Indicators in SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s based on WDI (April 2011).         Note: Cor_ denotes correlation, RGDPPC denotes real GDP per  
              capita. PPP stands for purchasing power parity 
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The unique cyclicality of migrant remittance inflows brings to the fore the likely endogeneity103 
problems that are associated with estimating growth models involving remittances. 
Unfortunately, many previous studies (see Table A6.11) failed to account for this endogeneity 
problem whilst modelling remittances on economic growth and this has obvious negative 
implications for the results obtained. Remittances received between 1980 and 2009 had a 
significant positive correlation with other non-debt capital inflows and core macroeconomic 
performance indicators such as investment rate and the level of real per capita income as 
shown in Figure 6.2. Here, it is also shown that it is migrant remittances per capita, which is the 
best available proxy for remittances per migrant that reasonably correlate with investment and 
general economic performance measured by real GDP per capita. This suggests that the 
conclusions from studies that used remittances as a ratio of GDP rather than remittances per 
migrant could be misleading, especially because in terms of remittances as percentage of GDP 
or exports, SSA emerges as one of the leading recipients in the world today, although the sub-
region is, in fact, the least recipient in terms of actual volume (Table A6.1) and per migrant (see 
Figure 3.3). Table A6.1 also shows that, as a percentage of official development assistance 
(ODA), SSA was the least recipient as at 2009, implying that the sub-region, compared to other 
developing economies, remains the sole dependant on foreign aid. 
 
6.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theoretical framework and the empirical literature of the effects of international migrant 
remittances on economic growth are presented in this section. 
 
6.3.1 Theoretical Framework 
In line with the theoretical contributions of Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Barajas et al. 
(2009), this study appeals to the endogenous growth model to evaluate the impact of 
international migrant remittances on economic growth in SSA. The inspiration for operating 
within this theoretical framework is based on the emphasis of the endogenous growth model on 
the role of knowledge which is measurable by the stock of the quality of human capital 
available rather than mere population size often determined by the quantity of human capital 
available. The application of the endogenous growth model to verify the potential effects of 
remittances on long-run growth is logical in view of the fact that, in per capita terms, it is the 
                                                          
103
 Given the altruistic dominance behind remittance inflows, countries with unfavourable economic conditions and 
negative external shocks often receive more remittances than those with sound governance and higher growth 
prospects. See Clarke and Wallsten (2004), Kapur (2004) and Yang (2005) for evidence. 
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quality rather than quantity of human capital that is more relevant since the country with the 
largest number of migrants is not necessarily the leading recipient of remittances per capita or 
remittances per migrant.   
 
Furthermore, the endogenous growth framework has been adopted because it is the best 
known model that adequately addresses the shortcomings of the famous neoclassical growth 
model proposed by Solow (1956). Prior to the famous contributions of Solow (1956; 1957), it 
was the classical aggregate production function proposed by Cobb and Douglas (1928) that 
dominated the analytical framework of models on economic growth. Although Solow‟s 
neoclassical growth model made a significant contribution to empirical analysis of economic 
growth and development through its emphasis on the direct link between investment in tangible 
assets and growth, it has some limitations. First, it has been argued that the steady-state 
growth in per capita income envisioned by Solow (1956) will only remain an illusion without 
exogenous technical progress as capital accumulation is subject to diminishing returns (Romer, 
1986; Barro, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Secondly, the 
neoclassical growth model as proposed by Solow (1956) failed to explain what it means by 
technical progress and how it will be achieved and sustained in the long run (Romer, 1986; 
Barro, 1990). Another widely cited criticism of the neoclassical growth model is the narrow 
definition of capital accumulation to include investment in tangible assets only without any 
value placed on intangible assets (Romer, 1986; 1990; Lucas 1988; Barro, 1990; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991).  
 
In addressing the shortcomings in the neoclassical growth model, the endogenous growth 
school makes room for technological knowledge that emphasises the incentives driving 
innovation, invention and creativity as the main pillars around which sustainable economic 
growth evolves. For instance, Romer (1986; 1990), Lucas (1988), Barro (1990), and Rebelo 
(1991) argue for economic growth models wherein the rate of growth of an economy is 
endogenously determined because it is related to the elements of total factor productivity. The 
endogenous growth models predict self-sustaining growth with exogenous technical progress in 
an economy in the long run. This growth rate may occur because, in the long run, tastes and 
preferences, state of technology104, income distribution, governance and institutional 
                                                          
104
 Technological advancement often endogenously generates positive externalities such that the production function 
exhibits increasing returns to scale due to the presence of spill-over effects associated with knowledge generation 
and/or education (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Stokey, 1991). 
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arrangements are not likely to be static in the real world. Therefore, as long as international 
migrant remittances received in developing countries can affect any of these factors, (for 
instance, income distribution, technological advancement, and preferences), in the long run, 
they can have not only level-effects but also growth-size effects on the economies of migrant-
home countries. 
 
The potential impact of international remittance inflows on long-run economic growth can be 
determined within the context of the simple generic endogenous AK-technology model 
proposed by Rebelo (1991) in which aggregate output is a constant-returns function of the 
aggregate capital stock. The aggregate capital stock is physical capital stock plus human 
capital stock including current state of knowledge, so that the aggregate output ( )Y  of a closed 
economy is assumed to be dependent on the stock of capital (K) which includes physical 
assets accumulated ( )kK and human capital as well as the stock of knowledge ( ).hK  
 ( ) ( , )k hY f K f K K         (6.1) 
where 
1
N
i
i
Y Y

 , 
1
N
i
i
K K

 , and N is the number of firms in the economy under consideration. 
 
Following Cobb and Douglas (1928), the mathematical expression of the AK production 
function in Equation (6.1) takes the form: 
 0 0 k hY A K A K K
           (6.2) 
where A0 is the total factor productivity (TFP) which is a function of the stock of knowledge
105; K 
is the investment in both physical assets and human capital; whilst 
kK and hK  are components 
of K representing the investment in physical assets and human capital accumulation 
respectively. 
 
Each component of K (i.e. physical and human capital stock including knowledge) is 
reproducible with identical technologies (Pagano, 1993). This is why the simple endogenous 
AK model does not assign any productive role to labour (L) and other non-reproducible factor 
                                                          
105
 According to the learning-by-investing hypothesis proposed by Arrow (1962), it is assumed that at any time t, 
technology is endogenously generated by (0 1)t tA M
    where Mt, the stock of experience at time t is a 
function of previous investment undertaken by various firms in the productive sector of an economy in which it is 
assumed that, for convenience, the rate of depreciation of physical assets is zero. 
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inputs106 because what is assumed relevant to the production process is the quality of adjusted 
labour, which is the human capital that is accumulated as each new successive generation is 
assumed to be more knowledgeable than the one before (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 
1991; Pagano, 1993). 
 
Equation (6.2) can be specified in its intensive form when both sides are divided by the labour 
force L under the assumption of constant returns to scale, hence Equation (6.3) 
 y Ak          (6.3) 
where A  is the average or marginal productivity of capital; Y Ly   representing output per 
labour; and  k hK KK L L Lk     measuring capital-labour ratio.  
 
A typical closed economy has both a demand side (consumption) and a supply side 
(production), since the goods produced in this economy are either consumed or saved which 
then augments the existing stock of capital. Also, as in the Keynesian national income 
determination, capital market equilibrium condition requires that gross savings (S) equates 
gross investment ( )I . However, it is known from real world experience that a proportion of the 
savings given as a leakage of 1   is incurred in the process of converting savings into 
investment (Pagano, 1993). Accordingly, it can be shown, as in Equation (6.4) that tS equals 
tI at any particular time t: 
 (1 )     t t t t t t t t tS S I S S S I S I               (6.4)  
Thus, in excess of consumption (C), the evolution of capital stock due to production efficiency 
is given as: 
 1 (1 )t t tI K d K           (6.5) 
where d  is the rate of depreciation of physical capital, which if equated to zero for 
convenience sake, 1t t tI K K  . 
 
                                                          
106
 In fact, even if the production function were assumed to take an expanded form of 
( , ) ( , , )k hY f K L f K K L  so that
1
k hY AK K L
     , where L denotes labour input,106 because the 
Rebelo (1991) endogenous AK production function assumes constant returns to scale, 1   as 1  
 
which implies that 
1 0 1L L     , hence 
0( , ) )Y f K L A KL   
is actually 
0( )Y f K A K  . 
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The Demand Side of the Product Market - the Household Sector 
According to Bond and Wang (1996), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997; 2003), consumption is 
analysed with households maximising an inter-temporal utility function (U) that has a constant 
elasticity of substitution and, hence, takes the form of Equation (6.6): 
   1( ) 1t t tU c c           (6.6) 
where tc is the per capita consumption, whilst 0 1  is the factor to consider in making 
decisions on inter-temporal substitution in consumption at time t. 
 
Sena and Fontenele (2004) specify the dynamic optimisation problem of a representative agent 
as: 
 Maximise  1
0
( ) ( ) /(1 ) rtt t tU c c e dt
 

        (6.7) 
 subject to the budget constraint t t tk Ak c   
where k is the change in the capital-output ratio; r is the discount rate that connotes the 
constant rate of time preference considered by the household sector in making decisions 
between present consumption and future consumption of wealth which includes remittances 
received.  represents a relative risk aversion coefficient such that a rise implies a faster 
proportionate rate of decline in the utility derived from consuming remittances at the present 
time rather than saving them. 
 
To set up the stage for solving Equation (6.7), the present-value Hamiltonian maximisation 
problem required is given as: 
 
(1 ){ /(1 )} ( )C t t t tH c u Ak c
           (6.8) 
which, according to Sena and Fontenele (2004: 6), yields Equations (6.9 - 6.11) as, “the three 
maximum principle conditions”, obtained by taking the first-order conditions of Equation (6.8) as 
follows: 
 0
C
t
H
c

           (6.9) 
 
C
t
H
Kt tu u r

          (6.10) 
 t t tk Ak c           (6.11) 
where t denotes the present-value shadow price of per capita household income. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
241 
 
Subsequent to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Sena and Fontenele (2004) derived the optimal 
steady-state per capita consumption growth rate (Equation (6.12)) by taking the logarithm and 
the time derivative of Equation (6.9) and using the result of Equation (6.10). 
 / ( ) /
tc t t
g c c A r           (6.12) 
where 0
tc
g  as long as A r since 0 1  . 
 
The Supply Side of the Product Market - the Business Sector 
It is in the business sector of an economy that investment actually takes place through the 
inflow of non-altruistic remittances (here, the remittances received in excess of present 
consumption). Taking the logarithm and the time derivative of both sides of the third 
Hamiltonian optimality condition represented by Equation (6.11), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997), and Sena and Fontenele (2004) show that, in the long run, per capita capital growth 
equals the long-run per capita consumption; and this is positive and constant along the 
discount rate r as specified in Equation (6.13). 
 / /
tk t t t t
g k k c c          (6.13) 
This implies that in the long run, all positive rates of growth are equal and constant over time in 
a closed economy where leakages are equal to injections; given that firms are rational and, 
hence, only spend on good quality projects even as consumers spend on locally produced 
goods and services. 
 
The Equilibrium – the „Complete Economy‟ Balanced Growth Rate 
For a steady-state growth rate of an autarky economy that is in a long-run equilibrium, the 
demand side (consumption) and the supply side (production) must equal each other. This 
requires that: 
   or  
t t t t t t ty k c y k y c
g g g g g g g      since  0
t tk c
g g    (6.14) 
when the market of each product in this economy is cleared. Here, 
ty
g represents the long-run 
growth rate in per capita output of the economy which is directly commensurate to the rate of 
growth in „quality‟ investment by firms or the rate of growth in household consumption of locally 
produced goods and services in a two-sector closed economy setting. 
 
From Equation (6.3), it can be shown that, taking logarithm of both sides,  
 / /
ty t t t t
g y y k k          (6.15) 
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hence, the optimal steady-state growth rates107 of this economy are: 
 / / / ( ) /
ty t t t t t t
g y y k k c c A r           (6.16) 
Likewise, from Equations (6.15) and (6.16), the long-run steady-state growth rate of this 
economy is: 
   t
t t
I
y tY
g A A s          (6.17) 
where Ss
Y
  is the gross saving rate also the long-run marginal or average propensity to 
save, which is inversely related to the discount rate r ; and where it is assumed that 0d  . 
Equation (6.16) is, thus, essentially the same as Equation (6.17). From Equation (6.17) it is 
apparent that remittances received can influence the long-run economic growth rate through an 
increase in the saving rate s (or the rate of investment), the proportion of remittances saved or 
invested  , and the social marginal productivity of capital, A . Besides, as shown in Equation 
(6.16), altruistic remittances consumed by the household sector can equally stimulate 
economic growth in the long run through increased aggregate demand for locally produced 
goods. It is also important to re-emphasise the fact that the extent to which non-altruistic 
remittances can contribute to long-run growth is dependent upon the quality of the investment 
to which these funds are put by the business sector. 
 
The underlying assumptions for the application of this model in the context of this study are: 
 
i. International migrant remittances are received as „additional income‟ by households and 
firms in developing countries. 
 
ii. Remittances received are either to fulfil altruistic objective or self-interest investment 
motive, and altruistic remittances in excess of settlement of „contractual‟ family debt108, 
are spent on consumables such as food, shelter, clothing, transportation, potable water, 
electricity, telecommunications and other basic necessities of modern life. Self-interest 
investment-driven remittances are spent on income-generating goods in the form of 
savings and mainly investment which include stocks, bonds, fixed deposit, treasury bills, 
                                                          
107
 This is closely related to the well-known Keynesian macroeconomic accounting approach to national income 
determination in which output, income and expenditure equal one another in a closed-economy setting. The 
implication of Equation (6.16) is that irrespective of the use to which remittances are put they can stimulate long-run 
growth in a migrant-home country that has no foreign sector and government. 
108
 Especially for migrants under implicit social contract with members of their family or “sponsors” who e ither 
financed their education / training or their travelling abroad, or both. 
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working capital, education, vocational training, and healthcare. Therefore, the 
household sector is assumed to be recipients of altruistic remittances whereas the 
business sector is assumed to be the recipients of non-altruistic remittances. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that some altruistic remittances can be saved or invested for 
future consumption, at least, in a bid to realise the precautionary motive for holding 
money. 
 
iii. Altruistic migrant remittances are received essentially for the sake of smoothing the 
consumption pattern of the recipient household, whilst non-altruistic remittances are, to 
all intents and purposes, meant for financial gains through saving and investment. 
 
iv. The opportunity cost associated with using international migrant remittances to finance 
private sector led investment projects is not higher than the real cost of borrowing from 
a financial institution in the migrant-home country where capital is relatively scarce. 
 
v. Any saved remittances end up in the formal financial system where financial 
intermediaries in the migrant-home countries are efficient enough to swiftly convert 
short-term liabilities to medium and long-term financial assets, such that there is no time 
lag for this conversion. Thus, in other words, saved remittances behave just like other 
forms of non-altruistic remittances received outside the formal financial system because 
international migrants or their representatives at home decide to invest directly. 
 
vi. The necessary condition for a country to receive remittances from abroad is to move out 
of autarky to an open economy with the government playing a key role in formulating 
policies and regulations on international migration based on the notion that migrants 
with the appropriate travel documents are more likely to get decent jobs and remit 
home. 
 
One important implication of the fundamental assumptions of the theoretical framework is the 
necessity to make crucial modifications to the simple AK endogenous growth model proposed 
by Rebelo (1991). Thus, in this study, following the theoretical contributions of Barro (1990), 
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), government spending and international trade are 
introduced to augment the model specified in Equation (6.17). Another implication of these 
assumptions is that because an open-economy case with the role of a government is assumed 
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in this study, the potential effect of remittances on economic growth rate can no longer be seen 
as definitely positive, but as dependent upon whether or not altruistic remittances are spent on 
locally produced consumables rather than on imported consumables; and, whether or not 
government expenditure finances critical public infrastructure that crowds-in the private sector 
rather than crowd-out the private sector. All in all, from a theoretical viewpoint, the impact of 
remittances on economic growth can be dependent upon the crucial fundamental features of 
the migrant-home country as can be reflected in the rate of economic growth. In other words, 
theoretically, the impact of remittance inflows on economic growth can either be negative, zero, 
or positive in a typical migrant-home developing country possibly depending on the unique 
characteristics of the recipient economy.  
 
The ultimate impact of remittances on economic growth is not straightforward because in as 
much as remittances have the potential of spurring long-run growth, they can equally exert a 
negative impact on productivity through the problem of moral hazards in developing countries 
(Stark and Levhari, 1982; Lipton, 1980; Chami et al. 2005; 2009). In a contribution to the 
formulation of remittances-growth theory, Barajas et al. (2009) posit that the effects of 
remittances on economic growth are transmitted through three main channels – capital 
accumulation, labour force growth and TFP growth -  none of which has a one-directional 
potential impact on long-run growth in remittance-recipient countries. The contributions of 
Barajas et al. (2009) are not novel as they are essentially parallel to an earlier contribution by 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) who identify two broad channels109 through which remittances 
can affect economic growth in remittance-recipient countries. The theoretical contributions of 
both Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Barajas et al. (2009) are consistent and juxtaposed to 
the tenets of the endogenous growth model. 
 
On the potential positive effects of migrant remittances on long-run growth through capital 
accumulation, Barajas et al. (2009) do not disagree with earlier propositions by Stahl and 
Arnold (1986), Massey et al. (1998), and de Haas (2003) that remittances can contribute to 
growth by reducing macroeconomic volatility, liquidity and productive investment constraints; 
raising real income levels, and minimising balance of payments problems in developing 
countries. Besides, remittance inflows help to narrow the trade gap, control external debt, 
                                                          
109
 These are the „liquidity constraint 1: entrepreneurship‟ and liquidity constraint 2: human capital‟. Each of these 
theories has various cases under it that shows how remittances can potentially affect economic growth in the long 
run (see Rapoport and Docquier, 2006 for further details). The recent work by Barajas et al. (2009) is, however, an 
adequate representation of Rapoport and Docquier (2006). 
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facilitate debt servicing, increase credit worthiness, and increase the supply of foreign 
exchange in remittance-recipient countries (Adenutsi, 2011). Remittances may also reduce the 
cost of borrowing in capital constrained remittance-recipient countries as demand for credit 
from the private sector reduces and has a high potential for reducing profit margin and the 
default risk component of quoted lending rates by banks and other financial intermediaries. All 
these can enhance long-run growth in remittance-recipient countries.  
 
However, the potential positive impact of remittances on economic growth in recipient countries 
can only manifest itself if remittances are less altruistic hence saved or spent mainly on „quality‟ 
investment goods rather than on imported consumables. One important fact is that many 
developing countries are import dependent and, therefore, spending remittances on consumer 
goods is likely to result in a leakage rather than an injection of funds into the income flow of 
remittance-recipient countries. Indeed, it is conceivable that when remittances become 
permanent income transfers, they are very likely to be spent mainly on the consumption of 
leisure and imported consumer goods110 rather than being spent on investment goods, though 
this is an unlikely event in the long run if migrants behave rationally.111 However, if altruistic 
remittances are spent on locally made consumables, they can engender long-run growth 
through a higher demand for manufactured goods leading to an increased demand for factor 
inputs by local industries as firms expand production to meet the increased domestic demand 
and even target the export market. This can also culminate in higher wages and deposit 
interest rates, with the potential of reducing further migration and boosting private sector 
savings and investment, which can ultimately entice migrants and recipients of remittances to 
save or to invest in migrant-home countries thereby increasing the positive multiplier effects of 
remittances. Barajas et al. (2009) again argue that the remittances-growth channel through 
capital accumulation could suffer undesirable consequences by destabilising the 
macroeconomy of a financially developed remittance-receiving economy, where remittances 
act as substitutes rather than complements of credit allocation by the financial sector.  
 
                                                          
110
 Even when remittances are spent on imported goods and leisure, the receipt of remittances can expand the tax 
net in migrant-home countries, enabling governments of these low-income countries to mobilise more resources for 
redistribution especially through provision of critical social infrastructure that can crowd-in the private sector to boost 
growth. 
111
 A rational migrant will not continue to remit without expecting a positive impact of remittances on the lives of the 
recipients since the continuous inflow of remittances, whether, altruistic or self-interest, is based on mutual trust that 
guarantees the interest and satisfaction of both parties through strong social ties. No rational migrant who derives 
utility from remitting will continue to remit large funds home when social ties between him/her and the family back 
home become weak or the trust and confidence that the remitter has in the target recipient have diminished. 
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As a country cannot receive international migrant remittances without losing the services of a 
proportion of its labour force to the outside world, it is argued that international migration drains 
developing countries of highly trained and skilled labour and capital by crowding-out the 
domestic production of tradable goods in the brain-drained underdeveloped economy (Lipton, 
1980; Taylor, 1984; Rubenstein, 1992; Ahlburg; 1991). Thus, migrant remittances, apart from 
deepening the foreign dependency mentality of developing countries112, can also cause higher 
inequality among households and macroeconomic instability in the form of inflation through 
excess demand for consumables and relative deficit in the domestic production capacity of 
developing countries (Adenutsi, 2011). In a contribution, Barajas et al. (2009) re-emphasise the 
remittances-growth nexus through labour force participation in economic activities in 
remittance-recipient countries where remittances may act as substitutes for wages earned from 
being engaged in economic activities, through the moral hazard problem. Chami et al. (2005; 
2008) assert that there is a high possibility of this moral hazards problem occurring because 
migrants remit under asymmetric information having been separated from their family by 
distance, and with limited chances of monitoring and enforcing compliance of how remittances 
should be used. Therefore, recipients of remittances can divert these funds to spending on 
leisure and unproductive activities, thereby reducing labour participation in remittance-recipient 
countries in the long run. Nevertheless, since social ties and trust underlie the motivation of a 
migrant to remit, a rational remitting migrant is not likely to continue remitting if there is lack of 
reliable information on the uses of remittances because migrant remittances are often sent for 
specific known purposes. 
 
According to Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Barajas et al. (2009:7), the effects of 
remittances on growth through TFP in a remittance-recipient economy are dependent upon a 
variety of factors as this channel is transmitted through the efficiency of domestic investment as 
well as through the effects on the size of the domestic productive sectors that generate a set of 
„dynamic productive externalities‟. If remittances are invested rather than spent on consumer 
goods, then these funds may affect the efficiency of investment in recipient countries based on 
the informational advantage or disadvantage of the migrant or the person acting on his/her 
behalf in this capacity (Barajas et al., 2009). Therefore, if the migrant or his/her investor agent 
does not have more adequate financial literacy and relevant investment information than the 
domestic financial intermediaries, then the altruistic remittances rather than a capital inflow 
                                                          
112
 In countries where remittances form a significant proportion of national output, governments may become 
complacent and less aggressive in implementing pro-growth economic policies by over-relying on remittances. 
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intermediated by domestic financial intermediaries will reduce the efficiency of domestic 
investment (Barajas et al. 2009). Again, remittances can reduce capital productivity when the 
agents of migrants or the direct beneficiaries of remittances decide to invest in riskier projects 
than they would have normally done if these funds were not considered as risk-free transfers. 
 
Furthermore, remittances have the potential of affecting the formal financial system of the 
recipient economies in financial resource allocation since remittance inflows most often 
increase the volume of funds that flow through the formal financial system (Aggarwal et al. 
2006). This can promote financial market development and, hence, higher economic growth 
through increased economies of scale in financial intermediation (Barajas et al. 2009). But 
substantial inflows of international remittances can also result in equilibrium real exchange rate 
appreciation, a recipe for Dutch disease infestation which implies less international 
competitiveness of export commodities of the remittance-recipient country which can impact 
negatively on long-run growth in the migrant-home developing economies.  
 
From the theoretical viewpoint, therefore, it is apparent that the impact of remittances on the 
long-run economic growth is indeterminate and likely to depend on the amount of non-altruistic 
remittances received, the unique features and the macroeconomic policy environment of a 
migrant-home developing country. These distinctive features of the migrant-home country can 
be very many113 but, often, they collectively reflect in the long-run growth rate of an economy 
and level of economic development. For instance, the underdevelopment of financial markets, 
low private sector savings and investment, high income inequality, protracted fiscal deficit due 
to excessive government spending, and import dependency, which result in economic 
stagnation, are common characteristics of developing countries (Todaro and Smith, 2002; 
Thirlwall, 2011).  
 
Accordingly, the focus of this chapter is to examine the direct impact of international migrant 
remittances on long-run economic growth, and to investigate the possible presence and impact 
of the economic growth rate size-effect of international remittance inflows in SSA. 
 
 
 
                                                          
113
 For example, the degree of financial development, income inequality, dependency on imports, quality of labour 
force, and government policy can influence the pace of economic growth. 
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6.3.2 Empirical Literature on International Remittance Inflows and Economic Growth 
Recent years have seen a growing interest in investigating the effects of international 
remittance inflows on the economic growth of developing countries. Between the year 2003 
and 2011 alone, this author has come across as many as 30 empirical studies (see Table 
A6.11 in the Appendix) on the relationship between remittances and economic growth in 
migrant-home countries. The majority of these empirical studies (24 out of 30) involved cross-
country/panel studies whilst the remaining six were devoted to country-specific studies. Of the 
24 cross-country/panel studies, 12 of which only four114 (Baldé, 2009; Kagochi et al., 2010; 
Lartey, 2010; Singh et al., 2010) were strictly devoted to SSA, were regional-based. Thus, 
cross-country/panel studies on the impact of remittances on the economic growth in SSA are 
not only relatively scarce, but also relatively recent. 
 
Apart from Ziesemer (2008; 2009) who went as far back as 1960 and covered the period, 1960-
2003, hence 44 years, cross-country/panel studies that covered the most time period normally 
ranged between 1970 and early 2000s (see Table A6.11). Most of these studies115 were 
generally on developing countries and not restricted to regional studies. With reference to 
regional cross-country/panel studies on SSA countries, the study period covered ranged 
between 17 years (as in Kagochi et al., 2010) and 25 years (as in Baldé, 2009). So far, only the 
study by Baldé (2009) covered the 1980s (specifically, 1980-2004) as all other related studies 
exclusive to SSA as a sub-region covered 1990/91-2007/08. Of the empirical literature 
reviewed, Lartey (2010), and Singh et al. (2010) who analysed 36 SSA countries in their 
various studies, compared to six by Kagochi et al. (2010) and 29 by Baldé (2009), represent 
the most inclusive cross-country/panel studies on SSA as a sub-region in terms of the number 
of sampled countries. Therefore, with 36 SSA countries over the period, 1980-2009, the 
empirical findings from this study on the effects of remittances on economic growth are the 
most comprehensive in terms of coverage (both time and country) on SSA as a sub-region. 
 
From Table A6.11, it is observed that 23 out of the 30 empirical studies reviewed used 
international remittances as a ratio of nominal GDP (REMGDP), whilst in three other studies, 
the logarithm of gross international remittances was used. In the remaining four studies (those 
by Fayissa and Nsiah, 2008; 2010; 2011; Siddique et al., 2010) remittances per capita 
                                                          
114
 This is exclusive of the studies by Fayissa and Nsiah (2008) on 37 African countries, and Ahortor and Adenutsi 
(2009) in a comparative study involving 31 small-open developing countries from LAC (16) and SSA (15). 
115
 This is exclusive of Garcia-Fuentes and Kennedy (2009) on 14 LAC countries from 1975 to 2000; and Mundaca 
(2009) on 25 LAC countries between 1970 and 2002. 
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(REMPC) were used, but, unlike this study, none of these authors explained the motivation 
behind the choice of REMPC over REMGDP. The justification for using remittances per capita 
rather than remittances as a ratio of nominal GDP is provided in Chapter Three. 
 
With regard to the composition of what constitutes international remittances, 13 of the studies 
summed up the three commonly used components – workers‟ remittances, compensation of 
employees, and migrant transfers; while in eight other studies, remittances were defined as 
comprising only workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees. Also, seven of the 30 
empirical studies summarised in Table A6.11 defined international remittances as gross private 
capital transfers comparable to the broadest definition of international remittances (see Chapter 
Two); while in the four remaining studies, workers‟ remittances were used to represent 
international migrant remittances. With the exception of Barajas et al. (2009), practically no 
previous study gave academically justifiable explanations for the choice or inclusion of the 
specific components of the remittances data, as decisions on what to include or to exclude from 
the determination of migrant remittances were based merely on easy access to data on 
remittances and the manner of reporting by the source institution concerned. For example, the 
World Bank reports only workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees as components 
of remittances in its WDI, but the IMF also reports the third component (migrant transfers) in its 
BoPS.  With the exception of Adenutsi (2011), all previous authors who measured remittances 
as the sum of workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees were those who 
coincidentally used the remittance data from the WDI and not the BoPS. In this study, the 
narrow definition of international remittances as the sum of workers‟ remittances and 
compensation of employees is used based on the explanations provided in Chapter Two. 
 
The conclusions from various empirical studies suggest that the direct impact of remittances on 
long-run economic growth is mixed even though the majority of the results favour a positive 
impact (see Table A6.11). The obvious controversy in the literature on remittances has been 
whether or not remittances have a direct or an indirect positive impact on long-run economic 
growth. In various empirical studies, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), Chami et al. (2005), 
Fajnzylber and López (2007), Jongwanich (2007), Barajas et al. (2009), and Singh et al. 
(2010), it was found out that remittances do not have a direct positive growth-impact, or as in 
some cases, directly retard economic growth. However, the conclusions from many other 
studies including those by León-Ledesma and Piracha (2004), Glytsos (2005), Lucas (2005), 
World Bank (2006b), Calderón et al. (2008), Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009), Catrinescu et al. 
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(2009), Jayaraman et al. (2009), Mundaca (2009), Rao and Hassan (2009) and Ziesemer 
(2009) show that remittances do have a direct positive impact on long-run growth, except that 
the direct impact is marginal in most cases. Other studies that found a direct positive impact of 
remittances on economic growth include those by Lartey (2010), Adenutsi (2011), Ahmed et al. 
(2011), and Fayissa and Nsiah (2011). 
 
One thing that appears quite clear from the studies that fail to find a direct (positive) impact of 
remittances on economic growth is that even where remittances failed to have direct (positive) 
impact on growth, they do have a significant positive impact on most of the factors in the 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models. For instance, IMF (2005), Fajnzylber and López 
(2007), Jongwanich (2007), Fayissa and Nsiah (2008), Le (2008) and Chami et al. (2009) show 
that even where remittances are injurious to growth, they do impact positively on other growth-
enhancing factors like investment in physical assets and human capital accumulation, improved 
institutions, macroeconomic stability, and financial development through higher savings and in 
making more funds available for credit expansion. 
 
The general conclusion from the various empirical studies on SSA as a sub-region point to the 
fact that the direct effect of remittances on economic growth is mixed. While Baldé (2009) 
found no direct impact, Kagochi et al. (2010) found a positive impact on SSA countries with 
relatively higher GDP per capita but no impact on SSA countries with lower GDP per capita. 
Lartey (2010) found direct positive impact of remittances on economic growth in SSA, but 
Singh et al. (2010) found a significant negative impact. These previous studies on SSA as a 
sub-region, however, suffer several defects especially with regard to the appropriate contextual 
definition and measurement of international remittances discussed in Chapter Two, and sample 
representativeness. For example, the results obtained by Kagochi et al. (2010) can be 
misleading in view of the fact that only six SSA countries with relatively vibrant and advanced 
financial markets116 and relatively higher levels of income were analysed. Again, given the 
fundamental macroeconomic disparity across the sampled countries, as shown in Chapter 
Five, parameter estimates from pooled OLS may be inefficient, biased and unreliable. 
Moreover, none of these previous authors defined and measured international remittances in 
per capita terms or as the sum of workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees. Unlike 
this study, previous studies explored only the contemporaneous effects of international 
                                                          
116
 See Table 5.1 and Adenutsi et al. (2012) for evidence. 
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remittances on economic growth in SSA. However, as shown in this study,117 at least in the 
case of SSA, restricting empirical analysis of the potential remittance impact on growth to 
contemporary effects of remittances is, at best, an underestimation. 
 
Apart from Lartey (2010), previous regional studies on SSA measured economic growth as 
logarithm of real per capita GDP and not the growth rate in real per capita GDP. It is important 
to emphasise that, in a cross-country/panel study, using logarithm of real per capita GDP as a 
measure of economic growth cannot be as appropriate as using the real per capita GDP growth 
for two main reasons. First, since the former invariably measures income level which can 
remain fairly high (in comparison with what is recorded in low-income countries) during periods 
of global recession as was evident in the 2007-2009 credit crunch, even though the 
industrialised countries with higher real per capita GDP suffered the heaviest recession and the 
lowest growth rates, the real per capita GDP of these countries was still far higher than the real 
per capita GDP of developing countries. Second, there are instances when a low-income 
country can record a higher growth rate above the real per capita growth recorded in a high-
income country due to a number of reasons given by proponents118 for the catch-up effect. 
 
It can be seen from the literature reviewed that remittances can affect economic growth either 
directly or indirectly through a variety of mechanisms including quality of institutions, 
macroeconomic stability, human capital accumulation, investment physical capital, and 
financial development. However, this indirect influential behaviour is not unique to international 
remittances. For instance, when remittances, just like domestic financial resources, are saved 
but these savings are not translated into quality investment, remittances cannot be blamed for 
undermining economic growth. In many developing countries where default risks are high, 
financial institutions try to avoid extending credit to Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises 
(SMEs), self-employees and informal sector workers. Under this scenario, even if financial 
development improves by way of higher credit extension to the private sector, and yet the 
beneficiaries are mostly formal sector employees who are not entrepreneurs, improved private 
sector access to bank credit may not impact positively on economic growth as a result of low 
private investment. Similarly, investment in human capital development is theoretically pro-
growth, but the effect of human capital accumulation on long-run growth could only be positive 
when measures are put in place to employ the educated to perform skill-related jobs in the 
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 Compare the results reported in Table A6.8.1 and Table A6.9 with those reported in Table 6.1 for evidence. 
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 These include Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Lucas (1990), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
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domestic economy. In situations where remittances were found to have no direct 
contemporaneous impact but an indirect impact on long-run economic growth, it is plausible 
that remittances could have a direct asynchronous effect on long-run growth. It is for this 
reason that this study does not restrict itself to exploring only the direct contemporaneous 
contribution of remittances to economic growth in SSA. 
 
6.3.3 A Brief Literature Review on Other Potential Determinants of Economic Growth 
Thus, far, available studies show limited and often contradictory evidence of the impact of 
remittances on economic growth. Theoretically, the effect of the traditional sources of growth 
has remained purely an empirical concern given the somewhat contentious theoretical 
prediction of the potential impact of each of these determinants of economic growth. Therefore, 
in order to provide both theoretical and empirical foundation for the empirical results of this 
study that under some circumstances might be considered as counter-intuitive, a brief review of 
the literature on the potential impact of the traditional sources of economic growth is presented 
below. 
 
6.3.3.1 Investment (INV) 
Classical and neoclassical economists led by Smith (1776), Domar (1947), and Harrod (1948) 
identify capital accumulation and productive investment as an important factor in the process of 
long-run economic growth. In an apparent support of this proposition, proponents of 
endogenous economic growth theories including Barro (1990), and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) argue that capital (broadly defined as ideas (or knowledge), learning by doing and 
human capital accumulation) is a sine qua non for long-run growth through the steady-state 
growth rate (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; 1990). The endogenous growth theory further predicts 
that despite the reality of the law of diminishing returns, marginal factor productivity can be 
increased through investment. A typical instance is where massive commercialisation, 
diversification, industrialisation, and technological progress financed through productive capital 
investments increase total factor productivity and long-run economic growth. Nonetheless, it is 
not theoretically illogical or counter-intuitive to predict a non-positive relationship between 
capital investment and economic growth especially in the developing world. The reason is that 
the extent to which capital investment can contribute positively to economic growth is 
dependent upon the quality of the investment which is easily undermined by information 
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asymmetry, corruption119, low quality human resources, and unfavourable political and 
macroeconomic environments in low-income countries. In other words, theoretically, high 
investment ratio does not necessarily guarantee economic growth since the magnitude, the 
quality and the productivity of investment in a stable socio-political and ideal macroeconomic 
policy environment are necessary pre-conditions. Thus, to a very large extent, the existence of 
appropriate policy, political and social infrastructure is crucial determinants of the effectiveness 
of investment in enhancing growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; 
Fafchamps and Schündeln, 2013). In addition, because macroeconomic risk and geopolitics 
can influence the performance of private investment, it is conceivable that the potential 
contribution of investment to economic growth can be influenced by the relative dominance of 
private over public ownership strategic assets and firms and the quality of relevant investment 
information available.  
 
Contrary to popular views and conclusions from majority of related previous studies, empirical 
evidence from studies conducted by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), and Hall and Jones 
(1999) suggests that capital accumulation is not a primary source economic growth. 
 
6.3.3.2 Government Expenditure (GXP) 
As the largest consumer of final goods and services in a money economy, a government has 
the option to implement its fiscal policy through a deliberate action on its level of expenditure. In 
a typical endogenous growth framework, Rebelo (1991) demonstrates how economic policy 
including government expenditure, a key fiscal policy instrument, can affect the rate of long-run 
economic growth. According to the endogenous growth economists especially Barro (1990), 
King and Rebelo (1990), Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995), the share of public 
expenditure in output or the composition of expenditure and taxation affects the steady-state 
growth rate. As has been the tradition in most import-dependent developing countries, 
however, unwarranted government expenditure on final goods and services leads to low public 
sector saving and investment, low exports and high imports with undesirable implications for 
price hikes and exchange rate depreciation culminating in less growth, at least, in the short run. 
In fact, excessive government consumption can distort market outcomes and ultimately 
depress economic growth. It is for this reason that governments in developing countries have 
been under pressure from the Bretton Woods institutions and the international donor 
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 In the developing world like SSA, the undesirable impact of corruption on the quality of capital investment is most 
common and severe within the public sector. 
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community to implement austerity measures as a means of stabilising the macroeconomic 
environment for sustained accelerated long-run growth. However, higher government 
expenditure devoid of corrupt practices on locally produced final goods and services can 
expand the market size of the domestic economy thereby accelerating long-run growth. In 
various empirical studies, Landau (1983), Grier and Tullock (1987), Barro (1991), Ghura 
(1995), and Fölster and Henrekson (1999; 2001) observe that government expenditure is 
negatively correlated with economic growth, whilst Kormendi and Meguire (1985) find no 
empirical relationship. In sharp contrast, Aschauer (1990), Engen and Skinner (1992), Kelly 
(1997), Knoop (1999), and Alexious (2007) find out that government expenditure has a robust 
positive impact on growth. 
 
6.3.3.3 Openness to International Trade (OPN) 
The fundamental liberalist argument is that openness to international trade has a potential 
positive implication for long-run growth, since openness enables countries to allocate resources 
more efficiently by promoting large-scale production, industrial research, innovative product 
development and entrepreneurial activities arising from international competition and easier 
access to larger product and capital markets globally. Additionally, openness to world trade can 
enhance international capital flows thereby increasing financial openness and financial depth 
which in turn facilitate financial development necessary for economic growth (Obstfeld, 1994). 
In the opinion of Grossman and Helpman (1991), Romer (1993), and Barro and Sala-í-Martin 
(1995), countries that are more open have a greater opportunity to catch up with leading 
technologies of the rest of the world as market size for both finished and intermediate goods 
expands. Enlarged market size raises research and development which is subject to increasing 
returns to scale, hence economic growth.  
 
On the other hand, openness to international trade compels local industries to face higher 
foreign competition usually resulting in domestic industries of capital-constrained developing 
countries losing their market share at home leading to capacity underutilisation and 
retrenchment thereby impeding economic growth. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2000; 2005) develop a 
theoretical model whereby there is an inverse relationship between openness to trade and 
country size. Feenstra (1996) asserts that if intermediate goods are not traded, the integration 
effect of trade openness can hardly be beneficial to smaller countries. Chang et al. (2009) point 
out that openness promotes the efficient allocation of resources through comparative 
advantage, allows dissemination of knowledge and technological progress, and encourages 
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competition in domestic and international markets. In contrast, Krugman (1994), and Rodrik 
and Rodriguez (2001) argue that the effect of trade openness on growth is doubtful. 
 
Depending upon which indicator is used to proxy trade openness, some empirical studies, 
including Levine and Renelt (1992), Harrison (1996), Sala-í-Martin (1997), and Rodrik and 
Rodriguez (2001) inter alia conclude that a negative relationship exists between trade 
restrictions and economic growth. Yanikkaya (2003), however, finds that although trade 
openness is positively correlated with growth, contrary to popular view, trade restrictions 
positively and significantly affect economic growth in most developing countries. Thus, the 
trade openness-growth nexus is basically an empirical question and has been extensively 
interrogated in both theoretical and especially empirical studies with majority of the studies 
finding a strong and statistically significant positive impact of trade openness on economic 
growth. Notable among these studies are Dollar (1992), Lee (1993), Islam (1995), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Harrison (1996), Vamvakidis (1999), Frankel and Romer (1999), Greenaway et 
al. (2002), Lee et al. (2004), Salinas and Aksoy (2006), Foster (2008), Kneller et al. (2008), 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008), Chang et al. (2009), Kim (2011), Ulaşan (2012), Mercan et al. 
(2013). 
 
6.3.3.4 Human Capital Accumulation (HCA) 
Despite the microeconomic theoretical consensus on the crucial contributory role of human 
capital on growth (Barro, 1990; 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992), macroeconomic empirical findings of 
the impact of human capital accumulation on economic growth are mixed. This may be due to 
the fact that the availability of institutions and socially accountable governance, job-related 
skills, access to job, and social infrastructure play a crucial role in determining the quality of 
human capital which subsequently affects long-run growth. Besides, the quality of education, 
retention of the educated workforce in the domestic economy and work ethics within the formal 
sector have a direct impact on labour productivity, hence the contribution of human capital to 
economic growth. Indeed, there are a host of macro-level studies that found weak, no, or 
negative impact of human capital on growth as reported by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Islam 
(1995), and Caselli et al. (1996). Quite recently, Bils and Klenow (2000), Bond et al. (2001), 
Pritchett (2001), Easterly (2001), Easterly and Levine (2001), and Kumar (2006) reaffirm the 
non-positive contribution of human capital to growth. Fedderke (2005) provides empirical 
evidence in favour of positive impact of the quality but not the quantity of human capital 
accumulation on total factor productivity growth. Meanwhile, Temple (1999a) and Krueger and 
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Lindahl (2001) argue that educational stock is only positively associated with economic growth 
if the initial educational endowment of a country is relatively low. 
 
What some may perceive as a counter-intuitive result of the impact of human capital in terms of 
education on economic growth might be due to the fact that education could have a lag rather 
than contemporaneous effect. Also, human capital proxies, including education stock is, to a 
large extent, subject to measurement errors (de la Fuente and Domenech, 2002).  
 
6.3.3.5 Rate of Inflation (INF) 
Inflation is the proxy for economic uncertainty and investment risk and, therefore, has the 
potential of discouraging private investment in the form of non-altruistic remittances. Romer 
(2006) argues that, among other things, a high variability of inflation can suppress long-term 
investment since this can be regarded as a signal of government malfunctioning that is capable 
of eroding potential capital/investment gains. According to Temple (1999b), high inflation is 
accompanied by exchange rate volatility, political instability and other undesirable factors that 
impede economic growth. Cukierman et al. (1993), Fischer (1993) and Gillman et al. (2002) 
obtain a negative relationship between inflation and growth. Conclusions from several other 
studies, including Ghosh and Phillips (1998), and Nell (2000) show that whether or not inflation 
promotes or undermines economic growth depends upon the rate of inflation as admittedly, an 
inflation rate beyond a certain threshold can jeopardise growth. 
 
More specifically, Fischer (1993) in a cross-country study comprising both developing and 
industrialised countries established a negative non-linear relationship between inflation and 
economic growth, noting that inflation only hampers economic growth after 40 per cent 
threshold. Hasanov (2010) based on 2001-2009 annual data established a non-linear 
relationship between inflation and growth rate at a 13 per cent threshold above which inflation 
became injurious to the economic growth prospects in the Azerbaijani economy. Having 
controlled for unit roots and co-integration, Umaru and Zubairu (2012) revealed that in the case 
of Nigeria it is GDP growth rate that Granger-caused inflation and not inflation Granger-causing 
economic growth. Mallik and Chowdhury (2001) find out that the relationship between 
economic growth and the rate of inflation is positive and statistically significant for Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. In this study, it was further established that the sensitivity of 
growth to changes in inflation rates was smaller than that of inflation to changes in growth 
rates. By these results, it was suggested that although moderate inflation promotes growth, 
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faster growth rate absorbs into inflation by overheating the economy. In a panel of 124 
countries comprising advanced and developing countries, Bick et al. (2009) find a threshold of 
two per cent for the industrialised countries and 17 per cent for developing countries. In the 
case of Brazil over the 1980-1995 period, Faria and Carneiro (2001) find that the impact on 
inflation on economic growth was negative in the short run but in the long run, inflation does not 
affect growth, a results which seems to validate the super-neutrality theory of money. 
Meanwhile, Wai (1959), Bhatia (1960), Dorrance (1963), and Sidrauski (1967) found no 
evidence for a relationship between inflation and economic growth, whilst De Gregorio (1993 
and Saaed (2007) find a negative relationship in their respective studies. 
 
6.3.3.6 Bank Credit to the Private Sector (PSC) 
There seems to be not much controversy that a relationship exists between finance and 
economic growth. Both theoretically and empirically, what seems to be the debate has been the 
direction of the causality, and the degree and type of impact of this relationship under different 
macroeconomic conditions. Some scholars including (Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1912; 
Hicks, 1969; Miller, 1998) argue that finance is a major contributor to growth while others such 
as Robinson (1981) suggest that growth leads financial development and Lucas (1988) shows 
that finance is over-stressed in explaining growth. In a theoretical contribution, Patrick (1966) 
identifies a contrasting two-way hypothesis suggesting that the finance-growth causality is 
either supply-leading or demand-following. In line with this postulation, a causal relationship 
that runs from the indicators of financial development such as private sector credit allocation to 
economic growth is described as supply-leading because it is believed that the activities of the 
financial institutions increase the supply of financial products and services that stimulates 
economic growth. In a similar fashion, when higher growth of an economy results in an 
increase in the demand for financial products and services, often necessitating higher 
competition and innovation within the financial sector hence financial development, then the 
demand-following hypothesis is said to have prevailed. In the presence of high degree of 
financial repression and weak financial sector via high-level of non-performing loans, high 
information and transactions costs that inhibit financial deepening and the lagging behind of 
financial reforms, financial development may not necessarily promote long-run growth, at least, 
contemporaneously. In other words, bank credit to the private sector may not enhance the 
prospects of economic growth in economies with high level of macroeconomic imbalances and 
uncertainty, limited participation of the private sector in the productive sectors of the economy, 
weak institutional environment, low labour productivity and widespread rent-seeking activities. 
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In effect, bank credit to the private sector can have a conflicting effect on economic growth 
depending essentially upon the cost, volume and how the credit facility is used. In the finance-
growth literature, it is hypothesised that if credit expansion to the private sector is enhanced in 
a competitive financial market environment this can lead to higher investment in economically 
viable projects thereby stimulating private sector-led growth in the long run (McKinnon, 1973; 
Shaw, 1973; King and Levine, 1993). Rajan and Zingales (1998) observe that business 
enterprises receiving the majority of their operational funding from financial institutions do not 
expand normally in the economies which are financially developed. Similarly, financial 
development resulting in credit reallocation (or redistribution of finances) is a driving force 
behind high industrial growth rates (Fisman and Love, 2003; 2004; Hartmann et al. 2007). 
Indeed, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) attribute the robust economic breakthroughs and the 
enviable achievements of high performers and newly-emerging industrialised countries such as 
China and India of the 21st Century to reallocation of quality financial resources from lesser to 
higher productive sectors of their economies by financial intermediaries. 
 
The aforementioned prospects of finance enhancing growth notwithstanding, the potential 
capacity of private sector credit to stimulate the desired economic growth is dependent upon a 
variety of factors including the amount, terms and the cost of the credit, the quality of the 
investment, and the policy environment. When the private sector is given adequate credit 
facility at relatively low cost under favourable terms of repayment in a stable and an 
investment-friendly political and macroeconomic environment, there is a higher likelihood that 
bank credit to the private sector will boost growth rather than when the contrasting conditions 
prevail. In fact, recent developments in the global financial front seem to suggest that there is a 
high conditional probability that private sector lending boom can lead to financial crises. 
 
Habibullah and Eng (2006) following the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation technique 
analysed the causal relationship between financial development and economic growth in a 
panel of 13 Asian developing countries. The results, which is consistent with previous causality 
studies by Calderón and Liu (2003), Fase and Abma (2003), and Christopoulos and Tsionas 
(2004) confirm the Schumpeterian hypothesis of financial development promoting growth. In a 
related study, the IMF (2008) in its Global Financial Stability Report noted a statistically 
significant impact on credit growth on GDP growth. Specifically, the IMF reports that a credit 
squeeze and a credit spread evenly over three quarters in USA will reduce growth by about 0.8 
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per cent and 1.4 per cent points year-on-year respectively assuming no other supply shocks to 
the system. 
 
In a panel study, Favara (2003) finds that the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth is at best weak; and revealing further that there is no indication that finance 
spurs growth and in some specifications, the relationship is puzzlingly negative. The results 
obtained by Favara (2003) further suggest that financial development does not have a first-
order effect on economic growth; the link between them is not linear and if the dynamic 
specification and slope heterogeneity across countries are taken into account, the effect is 
substantially negative.  
 
In the case of Turkey, Kar and Pentecost (2000) observe that when bank deposit, private 
sector credit or domestic credit ratios are alternatively used as a proxy for financial 
development, causality runs from economic growth to financial development, suggesting that 
economic growth leads financial development. Meanwhile, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) 
observe that bi-directional causality is possible. From a study involving 16 less developed 
countries, they find a bi-directional causality in six countries, reversal causality in six countries, 
while there was no evidence of a causal relationship in the case of South Africa. Shan and 
Jianhong (2006) also find a bi-directional relationship in the case of China. Abu-Bader and Abu-
Qarn (2008) for Egypt for the period 1960-2001 within a trivariate VAR framework, used four 
different measures of financial development (ratio of M2/GDP, (M2-M1)/GDP ratio, ratio of bank 
credit to the private sector to GDP, and the ratio of credit issued to private sector to total 
domestic credit). The empirical results show that a bi-directional exists between financial 
development and economic growth, and the indicators of financial development stimulate 
growth through investment and economic efficiency. Arcand et al. (2012) reveal that there is a 
threshold effect of 80-90 per cent above which the contribution of financial development to 
economic growth is negative. 
 
In an empirical study on the relationship between financial development and economic growth 
in Egypt based on 1974-2002 data, Bolbol et al. (2005) report that the effect of bank-based 
indicators on total factor productivity was negative unless these indicators are interacted with 
per capita income. Ayadi et al. (2013) using data from 1985-2009 find that credit to the private 
sector and bank deposits are negatively associated with economic growth, which affirms 
deficiencies in credit allocation in the north or south Mediterranean countries. After controlling 
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for stock market development, Naceur and Ghanzouani (2007) report that banking sector 
development indicators negatively impact on economic growth in 11 selected Middle East and 
North African countries based on 1979-2003 annual panel data following dynamic modelling. 
 
Other examples of studies that find a positive impact of financial development on economic 
growth include Goldsmith (1969) in a cross-country study involving countries where there are 
no appropriate financial structure and/or infrastructure. For 77 countries, King and Levine 
(1993) confirm the results of Goldsmith (1969).  Also, Beck et al. (2000), Rioja and Valev 
(2004a,b) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) for a sample of countries in a panel data 
framework. These conclusions seem to be the case especially in middle and high-income 
countries. 
 
6.3.3.7 Broad Money to GDP Ratio (M2/GDP) 
Financial market development is an important ingredient for economic growth and development 
(Hicks, 1969; Fry, 1995). Developed financial systems have efficient financial markets that 
provide a better platform for monitoring operations and projects undertaken by financial 
intermediaries, information and the safety net necessary for lowering transaction costs, and 
channelling savings towards new and quality investments, thus leading to economic growth 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 1991; Bencivenga and Smith, 1991, Blackburn and 
Hung, 1996). Nevertheless, a negative impact of financial development proxied by M2/GDP is 
not impossible under some circumstances. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) observe that 
where financial repression exists or where financial liberalisation process is too fast and 
characterised by a poor regulatory environment, the development of the banking sector can 
lead to lower savings and investment rate, thereby impeding growth. In fact, Lartey (2010) 
obtained a similar result. 
 
6.3.3.8 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
This is one of the traditional sources of private external capital in the developing world. It 
usually comprises the transfer of modern technology and (new) knowledge to enable the 
recipient country to exploit the experience for an accelerated growth and sustainable 
development. The macroeconomic impact of FDI is not automatically positive but primarily 
dependent upon the nature and scope of FDI in terms of the scale, beneficiary sector, 
concentration of local firms in the sector, duration of business and many other secondary 
conditions (Manning and Shea, 1989). In much the same manner, Lipsey et al. (1994), Epstein 
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(1999), and Vo (2004) assert that FDI is favourable to economic prosperity only if the 
appropriate conditions such as adequate absorptive capacity and quality human capital exist in 
the beneficiary target country. Also of importance in determining the impact of FDI in the host 
country are the capacities of domestic enterprises to face and hold out to foreign competition, 
abundance of projects and market gaps that cannot be filled up by domestic entrepreneurs in 
the host country (ibid). A host of empirical studies including Blomström et al. (1996), 
Borensztein et al. (1998), and de Mello (1999) found evidence of a positive impact of FDI on 
economic growth. 
 
From various empirical studies, Bengelsdijk et al. (2008) find that unlike in the case of 
developed countries, FDI has no significant impact on developing countries. Jackman (1982), 
Akinlo (2004), Carkovic and Levine (2005), and Schneider (2005) find no relationship between 
FDI and economic growth in LDCs. In related empirical studies, Bos et al. (1974), Rothgeb 
(1984), Saltz (1992), Kholdy (1995), Mencinger (2003), Durham (2004), and Darrat et al. 
(2005), find a negative effect of FDI on growth in host developing or non-OECD countries. 
 
6.3.3.9 Institutional Quality (INS) 
Hall and Jones (1999), Kaufmann et al. (2003) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) argue that good 
institutions stimulate economic growth and development whilst poor institutions impede growth 
and development. Weak institutions breed corruption, and corruption creates an unstable and 
unsafe business environment (Gray et al. 2004) because of increased selectivity, inequality and 
the opacity of the rules for the outsiders. Lack of confidence in the domestic political system, 
weak institutions and bad governance normally breed macroeconomic instability arising from 
economic mismanagement, direct unproductive rent-seeking economic activities, and public 
sector corruption especially in the form of public funds (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Hermes and 
Lensink, 2001; Lensink et al. 2000). Similarly, Owens (1987), North (1981; 1990), Sen (1999), 
and Todaro and Smith (2002) posit that quality institutions arising from political, economic and 
social rights and freedom coupled with transparent governance and security are a necessary 
condition for long-run economic growth and development. The contribution of the state of 
institutions on growth may not be significant in the short run because Acemoglu et al. (2001; 
2002; 2005) argue that the influence of institutions on growth is more of long term rather than 
short term. Resnick and Birner (2006) express uncertainty about the role of institutions in the 
growth and the development process of an economy. 
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Persson et al. (2000) developed a theoretical model that shows how strong institutions in terms 
of good parliamentary system, a proxy for participatory democracy enhance effective public 
spending, and invariably good economic performance. This theory has been corroborated in 
empirical studies undertaken by Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Knack 
(2000), Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2005), Dollar and Kraay (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2003; 
2004), Glaeser et al. (2004), and Rodrik et al. (2004). 
 
6.3.3.10 Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
Given the high dependency of SSA countries on the outside world for donor support (see 
Chapter Three), it is of crucial relevance to include overseas development assistance or aid 
(ODA) in a growth model of a typical developing country to capture the impact of official 
external assistance on growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2003). Proponents of 
foreign aid, notably Chenery and Strout (1966), Papanek (1973), Levy (1988) and Islam (1995), 
argue that ODA is crucial to the growth process of developing countries. However, Heller 
(1975) and Boone (1994) argue that foreign aid cannot be a propeller of domestic savings and 
economic growth in developing countries. 
 
Theoretical arguments against foreign aid include dependency mentality (Kanbur, 2000), 
privates sector crowding-out effects (Bauer, 1976; Krauss, 1983), worsening bureaucratic 
quality (Knack and Rahman, 2007), weakening governance (Knack, 2000; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2007), and lowering international trade competitiveness through the Dutch 
disease effects (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Chenery and Strout (1966) caution against 
over-reliance on foreign aid by arguing that foreign aid can be detrimental and counter-
productive to growth mainly because the potential contribution of aid to production and 
investment, hence growth, is dependent upon the absorption capacity of the aid-recipient 
country to make good use of the aid. Factors that enhance the absorptive capacity of foreign 
aid include existing infrastructure, availability of skilled labour, the institutional and 
administrative capacity of national and local governments. 
 
On the reverse side of the argument, Sachs et al. (2004) and Sachs (2005a,b) maintain that 
foreign aid is beneficial to low-income countries and actually advocate for more aid to the 
developing world because aid is the most surest means by which escaping poverty traps in 
low-income countries is possible. In another contribution to the literature, Easterly (2007a,b) 
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argue that history does not favour the effectiveness of aid in promoting economic growth, 
hence more aid carry undesirable consequences for growth in aid-recipient countries. 
 
While microeconometric studies on the impact of foreign aid on economic growth are clear and 
generally positive, macroeconometric studies are generally inconclusive; perhaps, due to the 
paradoxical micro-macro conflicting outcomes in empirical studies, which can be attributed to 
well-known measurement errors and aggregation problems. 
 
Some macro-level studies, including Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Clemens et al. (2004), 
Dalgaard et al. (2004) and Moreira (2005) find foreign aid as a positive determinant of 
economic growth in aid-recipient countries. In an empirical contribution, Burnside and Dollar 
(2000: 847) observe that foreign aid has “a positive impact on economic growth in developing 
countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies, but has little effect in the presence of 
poor policies.” The findings by Burnside and Dollar (2000) have been validated by Collier and 
Dollar (2001; 2002),and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that foreign aid only works effectively on 
growth in aid-receiving countries with “good policies.” In many ways, these results have since 
influenced some donor countries to be increasingly and conditionally allocating aid to 
developing countries that perform well and/or have good policies. Having investigated the 
impact of foreign aid on economic growth in 71 aid-receiving countries using annual data from 
1960 to 1997, Karras (2006) concludes that the impact of foreign aid on economic growth is not 
only positive, but also significant, permanent and sizeable. Similarly, Hansen and Tarp (2000; 
2001) point out that a positive aid-growth link exists even under favourable economic 
conditions in aid-receiving countries. 
 
In other related studies, Boone (1994; 1996), Easterly et al. (2004), and Easterly (2005) 
conclude that the foreign aid-growth relationship is neutral in various empirical contexts. Bobba 
and Powell 2007) find a negative impact of foreign aid on economic growth. 
 
6.4 EMPIRICAL MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES 
6.4.1 The Empirical Model and Methodology 
From the literature reviewed, stylised facts and the theoretical framework presented above, it is 
obvious that remittances are likely to correlate with many traditional determinants of growth in 
different ways. This is a recipe for a severe endogeneity problem that poses a challenge when 
there is an attempt to analyse the impact of remittances on economic growth using a 
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macroeconometric technique. Among the possible panel-data estimation techniques involving 
large cross-sections ( )N  and small time period ( )T , a dynamic model following the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure is recommended (see Chapter Four). This 
study, therefore, used the system GMM procedure suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) to 
estimate an empirical dynamic panel-data model, with the dimension ( 36)N   and ( 10)T   for 
decade-based analysis, and 36 30N T   for overall period analysis. The empirical model in 
its general form is specified as Equation (6.18). 
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,ln ln ln lni t i t i t i t i t i t i tgrowth growth INV GXP OPN REMPC Z               
       ,t i i t
   
        
 (6.18) 
where economic growth is measured by an annual percentage change in real per capita GDP 
in US$ which signifies improvements in productivity120; investment (INV) measured as the ratio 
of gross fixed capital formation to GDP; trade openness (OPN), government expenditure 
(GXP), and REMPC represents migrant remittances per capita proxied by the sum of workers‟ 
remittances and compensation of employees121 as a ratio of population. Central government 
final consumption expenditure (GXP) as a percentage of nominal GDP was introduced to 
capture the role and size of government (Barro, 1990). Considering the important role of the 
trade sector in endogenous growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991), openness to international 
trade (OPN) was proxied by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of nominal GDP 
was included in the model. The elements of the matrix Z  are the set of principal control 
variables. The original elements of Z  are foreign direct investment, official development 
assistance, bank credit to the private sector, broad money ratio, human capital accumulation, 
inflation, real exchange rate, and institutional quality. Initial growth rate is included so as to 
capture the possibility of the absolute common convergence phenomenon122 among the 
sampled countries. 
 
The subscripts i  and t  are the country and time identities respectively whilst t  and i
  are the 
time-specific and country-fixed effects respectively, and   is the specific significant lag 
                                                          
120
  This also denotes economic efficiency and the long-run output expansion rate of material production. It captures 
the extent to which economic production rises in relation to increases in population size of a country. 
121
 Workers‟ remittances are funds transferred back home by permanent migrants whilst compensation of employees 
are the funds sent home by migrants who are temporarily resident (less than 12 months) abroad. 
122
 See Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), Swan (1956), Koopmans (1965), Baumol (1986), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) for justification; even though the unconditional convergence hypothesis may not necessarily hold in a panel 
study involving countries with wide structural disparities in terms of technological advancement, saving rate, rate of 
depreciation, and population growth as shown in Aghion and Howitt (1997), Gaulier et al. (1999), and Barro (2003). 
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operator on INV and REMPC following the accelerator principle123, such that 0 4  . The 
idiosyncratic disturbance term ( )  which is assumed to be normally distributed with a constant 
variance and zero mean, takes into account the unobserved time-variant factors that can 
influence economic growth. Equation (6.18) is a semi-log endogenous growth model. Thus, the 
empirical model of this study states that economic growth in country i  at year t  is determined 
by initial growth, government expenditure ratio, openness to international trade, current and 
past rates of investment and remittances and other orthodox growth determinants contained in 
Z . In line with the endogenous growth theory, the a priori signs are 2 3 4, , 0    ; but for the 
other coefficients, their signs are indeterminate a priori although the expected sign of 5  is 
skewed towards positive, because for the most part of the period under study, migrant 
remittance inflows in SSA were pro-cyclical.  
 
The system GMM estimation procedure adopted in this study yields more efficient, precise and 
reliable estimators than the first-difference GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
deviations GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) as noted in Chapter Four. The merits 
of the system GMM (sys-GMM) over the other alternative estimation techniques for a panel 
setting of this nature are thoroughly discussed in Chapter Four (see also Blundell and Bond, 
1998; Behr, 2003; Baltagi, 2008).  
 
In order to obliterate any such misgivings concerning the reliability of the results for the entire 
period when N can be thought of as reasonably large, the time series properties of each of the 
variables were investigated, using the Fisher Phillips-Perron (Fisher P-P) chi-square test and 
the Hadri Heteroskedasticity Consistent (HHC) z -test. In the event of a conflict between the 
Fisher P-P statistic and the HHC statistic, the study employed the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) 
adjusted t  test124. The panel unit root test results presented in Table A6.5 show that each 
variable is integrated into order zero, hence the estimated model is co-integrated125, and the 
                                                          
123
 An implication of this theory is that the effect of (private) investment and, for that matter, self-interest investment-
driven remittances on economic growth is less likely to be instantaneous. 
124
 A concise discussion of these panel unit root tests is presented in Chapter Four. 
125
 Note that the problem of co-integration relates to trended time series of a particular non-zero order that can 
potentially create problems in empirical econometrics if the linear combination of these variables does not yield a 
stationary residual. Therefore, in models exclusively involving I(0) time series, the problem of co-integration does not 
arise (Engle and Granger, 1987; Gujarati, 1995; Asteriou, 2006). 
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empirical results obtained from the long-run equilibrium relationship are not econometrically 
spurious126. 
 
To verify if migrant remittances received have a long-run size-effect on economic growth, 
according to the growth rates among the 36 sampled SSA countries, an expanded Equation 
(6.18) was re-estimated127 to include a median-dummy variable. This median-dummy variable 
(MDV) is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if in a particular time period t , the 
growth rate of a country i  exceeds the median growth rate of the sampled countries; otherwise 
it takes the value of zero. In other words, ,1,  i t medianMDV if growth growth  , and 
0,   .MDV if otherwise  A statistical significance of the estimated parameter corresponding to 
MDV indicates evidence of size-effect of remittances within the sample requiring a further 
investigation of the nature of this bias. Therefore, where MDV is statistically significant, the 
study proceeds to the third-stage of estimation, in which MDV-remittance interactive effect was 
explored to evaluate how remittances received impacted on economic growth in SSA countries 
where the economic growth rate exceeds the median-level of the sampled group of countries. 
The corresponding expanded second-stage and third-stage estimated models are specified as 
Equation (6.19) and Equation (6.20) respectively:  
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,ln ln ln lni t i t i t i t i t i t i tgrowth growth INV GXP OPN REMPC                
       7 , ,i t t i i t
MDV     
       
 (6.19) 
 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,ln ln ln lni t i t i t i t i t i t i tgrowth growth INV GXP OPN REMPC                
       7 , ,i t t i i t
MDV      
       
 (6.20) 
where the elements in matrix   are the „final‟ set of explanatory variables that emerged from 
the original set of control variables contained in matrix Z  in Equation (6.18); MDV  is the 
median-dummy variable defined above, and MDV  is the interaction of MDV and migrant 
remittances per capita in the exact empirical context as in Equation 6.18. The computed 
median values of economic growth are 0.414481 for 1980-89; 0.881176 for 1990-99; 2.181857 
                                                          
126
 If a stationary or an I(0) combination exists, time series is said to be co-integrated and a long-run equilibrium 
relationship of the variables exists. 
127
 Augmenting Equation (6.18) with the introduction of MDV does not affect the original panel structure in which
N T . 
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for 2000-09; and 1.315342 for the overall study period, 1980-09. All other variables in 
Equations (6.19) and (6.20) are defined under Equation (6.18) and Table A6.2 in the Appendix. 
 
Finally, for the overall study period, 1980-2009, static panel-data models were estimated to 
provide further empirical evidence on the relationship between migrant remittance inflows and 
economic growth in SSA. Both the conventional and the robust static panel-data Fixed (within) 
Effects (FE) and Random GLS Effects (RE) models were estimated. In this econometric 
exploration, decade-based estimations were not carried out essentially because as explained 
under 4.5.2 in Chapter Four, static panel-data modelling of the issue at stake cannot be the 
most appropriate in terms of the efficiency and reliability of the estimators within the confines of 
this particular analysis. Certainly, the estimates from the static panel-data models are not 
expected to necessarily confirm those obtained from system dynamic GMM estimations. 
Clearly, in the event of the anticipated conflict in results, it is the robust two-step sys-GMM 
results that are relied upon to inform policy imperatives. 
 
6.4.2 Data Sources and Description 
Unless otherwise specified in Table A6.2, the annual panel data used in this study were 
collated from the April 2011 Edition of World Development Indicators (WDI) published by the 
World Bank and World Economic Outlook (WEO) published by the IMF. The list of countries 
included in the analysis is presented in Chapter One. Economic growth is measured as an 
annual growth rate in real GDP per capita in a typical migrant-home SSA country. In the 
absence of available data on capital stock, investment in physical capital (INV) measured by 
gross fixed capital formation as a ratio to GDP was used. Gross fixed capital formation 
comprises the monetary value of land improvements, plant, machinery and equipment 
purchases, construction of roads, railways, and other infrastructure like schools, hospitals, 
offices, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Government 
expenditure (GXP) was proxied by central government final consumption spending as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. Openness to international trade (OPN) was proxied by the sum of 
exports and imports as a percentage of nominal GDP. Openness measures based on trade 
flows and trade dependent ratio are by far the most commonly used in empirical studies as 
shown in the works of Frankel and Romer (1999), Irwin and Tervio (2002), Frankel and Rose 
(2002), Dollar and Kraay (2004), and Squalli and Wilson (2011). 
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Secondary school enrolment used as a proxy for human capital development (HCA) was 
introduced into the model as a key determinant of growth in order to be consistent with the 
models that appeal to endogenous growth theory (see Romer, 1986, 1990; Lucas, 1988; Barro, 
1990, 1991; World Bank, 2006b; Calderón et al. 2008). Private sector credit (PSC) is the stock 
of claims by deposit money banks and other financial institutions on the private sector as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. Broad money ratio (M2/GDP) was measured as broad money as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the net inflows of investment, being the sum of equity capital, 
reinvestment of profits, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, to acquire long-term 
management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, 
expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP128. Rate of inflation (INF) is the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer acquiring a basket of basic essential goods and 
services in an economy. Official development assistance (ODA) is the disbursement flows (net 
of repayments) from official donors to a country as a percentage of nominal GDP. Institutional 
quality was included among the control variables so as to assess the effects of governance on 
economic growth. This variable was proxied by polity2 index (which ranges from -10 for low 
democratic governance to +10 for high democratic governance and strong institutions) was 
obtained from Marshall and Jaggers (2011) who developed this index. Real exchange rate was 
also included in the initial set of control variables. In the final estimation, however, institutional 
quality and real exchange rate were excluded, based on the efficiency test of the empirical 
model. The set of explanatory variables129 included in the empirical model has been the most 
popularly used in empirical growth modelling involving remittances (see Table A6.11). The 
statistical description and the bivariate correlation coefficients of the dataset are presented in 
Table A6.3 and Table A6.4 respectively. 
 
6.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
First and foremost, in Table A6.10, the estimated results of the impact of migrant remittance 
inflows on economic growth within the context of static panel-data modelling of 36 SSA 
countries over the period 1980-2009 are presented. Based on the Hausman specification test 
conducted on the empirical Fixed (within) Effects (FE) and the Random GLS Effects (RE) 
models, the empirical results of the FE model were relied upon. The Breusch-Pagan statistic, 
                                                          
128
 This is how FDI (net inflows) reported in WDI is defined by the World Bank. 
129
 See Table A6.2 for the „final‟ set of the explanatory variables used in the estimated model. 
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however, shows that the reported standard errors of the conventional FE and RE empirical 
models are not homoscedastic. Accordingly, alongside the estimated conventional FE and RE 
models, robust heteroskedasticity-corrected versions of the empirical static FE and RE models 
were estimated and reported in Table A6.10 as robust FE and robust RE respectively.  
 
Therefore, with reference to the reported static panel-data modelling of the impact of migrant 
remittances on economic growth, the estimated results of the robust FE are deemed the most 
efficient and reliable in the context of this study. The estimated empirical robust FE results 
show that, consistent with the dynamic panel-data estimation by sys-GMM reported in Table 
6.1, migrant remittances have a significant positive asynchronous impact on economic growth 
in SSA between 1980 and 2009. Although, in comparison with dynamic panel-data modelling, 
the empirical results from the robust static panel-data model estimations are less reliable 
because of the omission of dynamic effects and the presence of endogeneity bias, the results 
suggest that for the overall period 1980-2009, human capital accumulation had a significant 
positive impact on economic growth, whereas bank credit to the private sector, and broad 
money to GDP ratio inhibited growth in SSA.  The computed 
2R of 0.0531 suggests that the 
explanatory power of the estimated robust static FE panel-data model is merely 5.31 per cent 
leaving as much as 94.69 per cent of the total variations in economic growth in SSA 
unexplained. Invariably, this gives further evidence of the inappropriateness of static panel-data 
estimation in the context of this particular analysis. More importantly, the main empirical results 
of this chapter which are based on dynamic panel-data estimations following sys-GMM in 
determining the impact of migrant remittances on economic growth in SSA are presented in 
Table 6.1. 
 
The Sargan test for the hypothesis that the estimated growth model and the over-identifying 
conditions are correctly specified and valid is upheld at one per cent level of statistical 
significance. The Arellano-Bond test statistic suggests that there are no second-order serial 
correlations in the first-differenced disturbances at the conventional levels of statistical 
significance. The Wald statistic confirms that, for each of the estimated sys-GMM, the 
explanatory variables jointly explained the variations in the rate of economic growth in SSA 
over the past three decades. Based on the robustness of the model performance diagnostic 
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tests130, the findings of this study as presented in Table 6.1 (cf. Table A6.8.1 in the Appendix) 
also show that the direct impact of migrant remittances on long-run growth is not 
contemporaneous, but with a one-year lag131. 
 
Table 6.1: Estimated Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
Initial economic growth (growth_1) -0.1027 -0.2159 1.3386 0.1000 
  (-4.83)*** (-30.41)*** (4.54)*** (1.24) 
Investment (lnINV_1) -5.5122 1.0946 -2.8670 0.9692 
  (-3.90)*** (1.68)* (-2.33)** (1.81)* 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -1.2861 2.0337 -0.8103 -11.1898 
 
(-0.88) (1.77)* (-1.54) (-2.46)** 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 6.3826 1.1837 0.8309 13.0927 
  (3.44)*** (0.74) (0.67) (3.02)*** 
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC_1) 1.0378 0.6717 -0.1917 1.9733 
  (3.64)*** (3.91)*** (-0.68) (2.50)** 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) 1.8855 3.2674 -1.9897 -5.0397 
  (1.64)* (2.63)*** (-2.23)** (-1.50) 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0053 0.0723 -0.0959 -0.0023 
  (-0.92) (4.74)*** (-5.72)*** (-0.40) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 0.1995 -2.5885 1.6250 -2.4258 
  (0.24) (-3.04)*** (1.71)* (-1.36) 
Broad money to GDP ratio (lnM2/GDP) -1.5905 -9.3526 -2.4518 -11.9825 
  (-4.72)*** (-8.35)*** (-2.28)** (-2.80)*** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.3246 -0.0899 0.0819 -0.1072 
  (6.20)*** (-4.51)*** (2.43)** (-1.99)** 
Constant term 2.6847 11.0032 20.2703 30.6042 
  (1.00) (1.78)* (6.12)*** (2.07)** 
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 54 54 54 444 
Wald 2
[10],  1337.39*** 22377.75*** 403.15*** 79.89*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
 
0.3336{0.739} -1.2508{0.211} 0.9028{0.367} 0.2574{0.797} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],   [43], 29.6174 [43], 23.4327 [43], 24.7495 [433], 21.7956 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
                                                          
130
 Generally, the reported statistics and probabilities of the Wald
2 , Arellano-Bond order-2 tests and Sargan tests 
are more robust for the estimation involving the asynchronous impact of remittances on economic growth (Table 6.1) 
than the results involving the contemporaneous impact of remittances on growth (Table A6.8.1). 
131
 In fact, comparing the results in Table 6.1 to those reported in Table A6.9, both remittances and investment are 
more asynchronous than contemporaneous. 
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The empirical results show that between 1980 and 2009 migrant remittances received had a 
significant positive impact of 1.9733 on long-run economic growth in SSA, but the size of this 
impact varies over time in response to some macroeconomic fundamentals. In the 1980s and 
the 1990s, previous year remittances impacted positively on long-run growth, whilst in the 
2000s, the remittances had a negative but statistically insignificant impact on growth in SSA. 
These findings are in spite of the facts that since the implementation of financial liberalisation 
programmes in SSA in the 1980s, international remittance inflows have been increasing 
steadily (see Figure 3.2) and remittance inflows in SSA were somewhat countercyclical in the 
1990s compared to the pro-cyclical trend of the 1980s and the 2000s (see Figure 4.1).  
 
More specifically, the results show that a one percentage rise in per capita international migrant 
remittances received between 1980 and 1989 had a 1.0378 positive impact on the real per 
capita GDP growth rate in SSA. Between 1990 and 1999, a similar rise in the receipt of per 
capita international migrant remittances had a 0.67171 impact on economic growth rate in 
migrant-home SSA countries. In more recent years (i.e. 2000-2009), however, the ordinary 
effect of international remittances on economic growth rate in SSA countries is statistically 
zero. The results of the decade-by-decade analysis show that, even though international 
migrant remittances had a significant positive impact on economic growth in SSA between 
1980 and 2009, the impact of remittances on SSA countries as a group has been declining 
over the years132. These results seem to suggest that a mere policy switch towards the 
implementation of financial liberalisation programmes alone may not be adequate to maximise 
the impact of international remittances on economic growth in SSA. 
 
Overall, in descending order of the magnitude in terms of economic significance, other 
important macroeconomic factors that contributed to economic growth in SSA between 1980 
and 2009 are international trade openness, broad money to GDP ratio, government 
expenditure, investment in physical assets and FDI. By implication, the general contributions of 
human capital accumulation, private sector credit and the rate of inflation to economic growth in 
SSA between 1980 and 2009 were statistically insignificant.  
 
                                                          
132
 This declining trend is similar to the contemporaneous impact of remittances on economic growth in SSA 
reported in Table A6.8.1. 
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Specifically, the empirical results show that trade openness and investment impacted positively 
on economic growth over the 30-year period. On the average, a one per cent increase in 
openness to international trade and investment to GDP ratio resulted in approximately 13.09 
per cent and 0.97 per cent rise in economic growth in SSA. Therefore, holding all other factors 
constant, over the past three decades, migrant remittances emerge as the second most 
important contributor to economic growth in SSA. Over the same period, however, increases in 
broad money, government expenditure and FDI were harmful to economic growth in SSA. In 
the case of GDPM /2 ratio, this could be attributed to the inherent limitations associated with 
its measurement, a measurement problem more pronounced in the developing world because 
of the excessive dominance of the currency in circulation )( 1M  over quasi money, hence 
measuring degree of monetisation rather than financial development (see 7.2.2.4 for further 
details).  
 
The finding that government expenditure to GDP ratio undermines economic growth in SSA 
should not be considered counter-intuitive since majority of sampled SSA countries are import-
dependent, implying that the governments of these SSA countries might have spent more on 
imported consumables rather than locally-produced goods and services. Again, high level of 
public sector corruption could lead to over-invoicing and financial loss to the state by way of 
over-payment of bills for the purchase of final goods and services by the government. 
 
The negative contribution of FDI could be a reflection in the high participation of foreigners in 
the retail markets of most SSA countries rather than investment in the valued-added productive 
sectors of the FDI-receiving economy. In other words, on the average, net FDI inflows have not 
been effective in contributing to economic growth in SSA over the past three decades, probably 
due to the low absorptive capacity of the recipient SSA countries. 
 
The results of the statistical test verifying the extent to which the estimated decade-based 
coefficients of the empirical growth model evolve over time across the three decades are 
presented in columns A-B, B-C and A-C of Table 6.2. Column A-B of Table 6.2 reports the 
results on how the estimated coefficients of the 1980-89 decade differ statistically from the 
corresponding estimated coefficients of the 1990-99 decade. The results on the extent to which 
the estimated decade-based coefficients of 1990-99 and 2000-09 are statistically different, are 
reported in column B-C. In column A-C of Table 6.2, the results of the extent to which how the 
estimated coefficients of 1980-89 decade are statistically different from the corresponding 
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estimated coefficients of the 2000-09 decade are reported. The null hypothesis that there is no 
statistical difference between any pair of the corresponding estimated decade-based 
coefficients to signify evolution in the empirical growth model across the three decades is 
rejected with 95 per cent statistical confidence. In other words, statistically, international 
migrant remittances just like the other explanatory variables in the empirical growth model had 
statistically significant decade-based changing impact on economic growth in SSA between 
1980 and 2009. 
 
With reference to columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E of Table 6.2, there is also a robust statistical 
evidence that the reported differences among the estimated decade-based coefficients of 
international migrant remittances are consistent providing further evidence for parameter 
instability over time between 1980 and 2009. Furthermore, the instability of the estimated 
decade-based coefficients of the other explanatory variables are statistically significant and 
generally consistent except in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI) as reported in 
columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E of Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Results of Decade-Based Parameter Evolution and Instability Tests for Impact of Migrant Remittances on Growth in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation  */**/*** denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively.  
Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
A B C D E
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
Initial economic growth (growth_1) -0.1027 -0.2159 1.3386 -0.2428 0.0559 0.1132 -1.5544 -1.4413 0.1401 0.0269 -0.2717 1.2827
[0.0213] [0.0071] [0.2948] [0.0208] [0.0248] [0.0142] [0.2877] [0.2736] [0.0005] [0.0137] [0.0177] [0.2700]
{-4.83}*** {-30.41)*** {4.54}*** (-11.70)*** {2.25}** {7.99}*** {-5.40}*** {-5.27}*** {274.61}*** {1.97}*** {-15.33}*** {4.75}***
Investment (InINV_1) -5.5122 1.0946 -2.8670 1.0883 -0.0833 -6.6067 3.9616 -2.6451 -6.6005 0.0063 1.1779 -2.7837
[1.4134] [0.6515] [1.2305] [0.9804] [0.8332] [0.7618] [0.5789] [0.1829] [0.4329] [0.3289] [0.1817] [0.3973]
{-3.90}*** {1.68}* {-2.33}** {1.11} {-0.10} {-8.67}*** {6.84}*** {-14.46}*** {-15.25}*** {0.02} {6.48}*** {-7.01}***
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -1.2861 2.0337 -0.8103 -6.1741 3.8095 -3.3198 2.8440 -0.4758 4.8881 8.2078 -1.7758 -4.6198
[1.4614] [1.1490] [0.5262] [1.3751] [1.1440] [0.3124] [0.6228] [0.9353] [0.0863] [0.2261] [0.0050] [0.6178]
{-0.88} {1.77}* {-1.54} {-4.49}*** {3.33}*** {-10.62}*** {4.56}*** {-0.51} {56.61}*** {36.30}*** {-355.87}*** {-7.48}***
Trade openness (lnOPN) 6.3826 1.1837 0.8309 1.6063 5.6055 5.1989 0.3529 5.5517 4.7763 -0.4226 -4.4218 -4.7746
[1.8554] [1.5997] [1.2401] [1.3613] [0.9389] [0.2558] [0.3595] [0.6153] [0.4941] [0.2384] [0.6607] [0.3012]
{3.44}*** {0.74} {0.67} {1.18} {5.97}*** {20.33}*** {0.98} {9.02}*** {9.67}*** {-1.77}** {-6.69}*** {-15.85}***
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC_1) 1.0378 0.6717 -0.1917 -0.0862 0.3459 0.3661 0.8634 1.2295 1.1240 0.7579 0.3258 -0.5376
[0.2851] [0.1718] [0.2819] [0.3916] [0.2402] [0.1133] [0.1101] [0.0032] [0.1065] [0.2198] [0.0684] [0.0417]
{3.64}*** {3.91}*** {-0.68} {-0.22} {1.44} {3.23}*** {7.84}*** {380.65}*** {10.55}*** {3.45}*** {4.76}*** {-12.89}***
Human capital accoumulation (lnHCA) 1.8855 3.2674 -1.9897 -0.2258 -3.9252 -1.3819 5.2571 3.8752 1.8475 3.2294 3.2662 -1.9909
[1.1497] [1.2424] [0.8922] [2.2578] [1.6919] [0.0927] [0.3501] [0.2575] [1.1081] [1.0154] [0.4495] [0.7997]
{1.64}* {2.63}*** {-2.23}** {-0.10} {-2.32}** {-14.91}*** {15.01}*** {15.05}*** {1.67}* {3.18}*** {7.27}*** {-2.49}**
Rate of Inflation (INF) -0.0053 0.0723 -0.0959 0.0380 0.0012 -0.0775 0.1681 0.0906 -2.0235 -1.9460 1.5548 1.3867
[0.0057] [0.0152] [0.0168] [0.0115] [0.0110] [0.0095] [0.0015] [0.0110] [0.0057] [0.0038] [0.0042] [0.0058]
{-0.92} {4.74}*** {-5.72}*** {3.32}*** {0.11} {-8.16}*** {110.61}*** {8.22}*** {-354.07}*** {-514.13}*** {366.69}*** {240.74}***
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 0.1995 -2.5885 1.6250 2.0182 -1.4825 2.7880 -4.2135 -1.4255 0.4253 -2.3628 1.3367 5.5502
[0.8313] [0.8515] [0.9503] [0.7106] [0.5573] [0.0202] [0.0988] [0.1190] [0.1207] [0.1408] [0.2942] [0.3929]
{0.24} {-3.04}*** {1.71}* {2.84}*** {-2.66}** {138.02}*** {-42.65}*** {-11.98}*** {3.53}*** {-16.77}*** {4.54}*** {14.12}***
Broad money to GDP ratio (lnM₂/GDP) -1.5905 -9.3526 -2.4518 -0.9019 -4.1919 7.7622 -6.9009 0.8613 -0.6886 -8.4508 -5.1608 1.7401
[0.3370] [1.1201] [1.0753] [1.2355] [0.9570] [0.7831] [0.0447] [0.7384] [0.8985] [0.1154] [0.1630] [0.1183]
{-4.72}*** {-8.35}*** {-2.28}** {-0.73} {-4.38}*** {9.91}*** {-154.24}*** {1.17} {-0.77} {-73.25}*** {-31.65}*** {14.71}***
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.3246 -0.0899 0.0819 0.1707 -0.0307 0.4145 -0.1718 0.2427 0.1539 -0.2606 -0.0592 0.1126
[0.0524] [0.0199] [0.0337] [-5.5682] [-0.0740] [0.0324] [0.0138] [0.0187] [5.6205] [5.5881] [0.0939] [0.1077]
{6.20}*** {-4.51}*** {2.43}** {3.72}*** {-0.67} {12.78}*** {-12.47}*** {13.01}*** {0.03} {-0.05} {-0.63} {1.05}
Constant term 2.6847 11.0032 20.2703 4.7133 -2.4543 -8.3185 -9.2671 -17.5856 -2.0286 6.2900 13.4575 22.7246
[2.6847] [6.1816] [3.3121] [5.2369] [4.4088] [3.4969] [2.8695] [0.6274] [2.5523] [0.9446} [1.7989] [1.0705]
{1.00} {1.78}* {6.12}*** {0.90} {-0.56} {-2.38}** {-3.23}*** {-28.03}*** {-0.79} {6.66}*** {7.48}*** {21.23}***
Number of observations 319 322 324 324 322 320.5 323 321.5 321.5 323 322 323
Number of groups 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Number of instruments 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Wald statistic 1337.39*** 22377.75*** 403.15*** 2448.41*** 3832.23*** 11857.57*** 11390.45*** 870.27*** 1892.90*** 12413.08*** 13104.99*** 2117.69***
A-B 2ⁿᵈ-order autocorrelation test 0.334(0.74) -1.251(0.21) 0.903(0.37) -0.044(0.96) -0.626(0.53) -            -            -            -            -            -            -              
Sargan over-identifying restrictions 29.617(0.93) 23.433(0.99) 24.750(0.99) 19.542(0.99) 22.211(0.99) -            -            -            -            -            -            -              
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient Stability 
Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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In Table 6.3, the results as to whether international migrant remittances received have a size-
effect on long-run growth in SSA migrant-home countries with varying rates of economic growth 
are presented133. The results show that, indeed, between 1980 and 2009, international migrant 
remittances had a significant economic growth rate size-effect on SSA. This is based on the 
one per cent level statistical significance of MDV reported in Table 6.3. The results further show 
that although in the 1980s it was SSA countries with relatively lower growth rates that 
benefitted more from the receipt of international remittances as far as the impact on economic 
growth was concerned, this trend has since the 1990s switched in favour of SSA countries with 
relatively higher economic growth rates. Yet, the overall positive impact of international 
remittances on economic growth in SSA between 1980 and 2009 was about 1.9733 (Table 
6.1), but for SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates, the impact was 0.8897 (Table 
6.3). 
 
Table 6.3: Estimated Results of Remittance-Growth Size-Effect on SSA, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: *** denotes significant at 1 per cent. Diagnostic tests in italics apply to 
estimated MDV-Remittance Interactive model only. 
 
The results in Table 6.3 reveal that between 1980 and 1989, international migrant remittances 
received in SSA had no significant impact on economic growth in migrant-home SSA countries 
with relatively higher growth rates. Therefore, given that, for the entire sample of 36 SSA 
countries, the impact of international migrant remittances on economic growth was most 
statistically significant during the 1980-1989 period (see Table 6.1), it can be concluded that it 
was SSA countries with relatively lower growth rate that benefited from the positive impact of 
remittances on economic growth during that era (i.e. the early years of financial liberalisation). 
In other words, between 1980 and 1989, „labour-exporting‟ SSA countries with relatively higher 
growth rates did not benefit from the impact of migrant remittances on economic growth. 
                                                          
133
 The complete estimated results on the existence of size-effect are reported in Table A6.6 whilst the impact of this 
size-effect on countries with growth rates above the median growth rate of the sub-region is presented in Table A6.7. 
Type of Dummy Effect 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009
Independent Dummy 8.2954 (12.25)*** 6.0315 (16.62)*** 4.8045 (23.99)*** 6.5931 (22.11)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive -0.0459 (-0.13) 0.4973 (3.56)*** 0.9131 (9.50)*** 0.8897 (4.51)***
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037
Number of groups 36 36 36 36
Instruments 55 55 55 445
Wald ( χ²₁ ₁) 487.15 *** 13680.52 *** 2918.34*** 98.70
***
Arellano-Bond Test 0.3896{0.6968} -1.1889{0.2345} 0.6677{0.5043} 0.3944{0.6933}
Sargan Test (χ² ₍₀₎ ) [43],  30.9076 [43],  22.5484 [43],  23.0167 [433],  27.9407
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Between 1990 and 1999, remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates 
had a significant share amounting to 0.4973 (Table 6.3) of the entire sample impact of 0.6717 
(Table 6.1). Thus, contrary to the 1980s, it is a typically „labour-exporting‟ SSA country with a 
growth rate above the median growth rate of the sub-region in the 1990s that profited more 
from maximising the growth-impact of remittances during that recessionary era. This implies 
that migrant remittances can still stimulate economic growth during hard times such as periods 
of regional economic recession. This is possible in a less import-dependent country when 
remittance-recipient households become less luxurious and patronise more locally produced 
goods even as the propensity of saving or directly investing remittances fall due to the  higher 
cost of living.  
 
An important finding in this chapter is that, in very recent years (the 2000s), it is only 
remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively higher economic growth rates that benefitted 
from maximising the positive impact of migrant remittances on economic growth. Whereas the 
overall impact of international remittances on economic growth in SSA was statistically 
insignificant with some potential of inhibiting growth during the 2000s (Table 6.1), in migrant-
home SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates, remittances impacted positively and 
significantly on growth, the magnitude of which is 0.9131 (Table 6.3). One possible explanation 
for this finding is that, unlike in the past, in the 2000s, migrant remittance flows to SSA 
countries have become relatively more pro-cyclical and this trend emanates more from the less 
altruistic workers‟ remittances than from compensation of employees (see Figure 4.2). Further, 
in determining the cyclical behaviour of migrant remittances as shown in this study, it is the 
growth in remittance inflows instead of the actual receipts that exhibits the factual cyclicality in 
remittance inflows in SSA.  
 
On the other hand, for the 30 sampled SSA countries, international remittances had no 
contemporaneous effect on economic growth over the entire study period; and the 
contemporaneous effect of remittances on economic growth was positive, negative, and zero in 
the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s respectively (see Table A6.8.1). Consistent with the estimates 
from the asynchronous model, the results in Table A6.8.2 show that the contemporaneous 
growth rate size-effect of remittances has since the 1990s favoured SSA countries with 
relatively higher growth rates. Even in the 1990s when the general contemporaneous impact of 
international remittances on growth was -0.5616 (Table A6.8.1), remittances had a 0.9085 
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(Table A6.8.2) contemporaneous impact on remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively 
higher rates of economic growth. Similarly, during the 2000s, the contemporaneous impact of 
remittances on economic growth in migrant-home SSA countries with relatively higher growth 
rates was 1.0131 (Table A6.8.2) even when the contemporaneous impact on the entire sample 
was statistically zero (A6.8.1). Besides, between 1980 and 2009, at one per cent level of 
statistical significance, the contemporaneous impact of international remittances on economic 
growth in remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates in any 
particular year was 1.1934 (Table A6.8.2), although for both categories of the sampled 
countries, the impact was statistically zero (Table A6.8.1). 
 
Evidently, the long-run impact of international migrant remittances on economic growth in SSA 
is not automatic. Migrant-sending SSA countries with relatively higher rates of growth at any 
point in time have a better chance of benefiting more from remittances in terms of growth 
prospects. In other words, although generally during the 2000-2009 decade international 
remittances may not necessarily impact significantly on economic growth in the 36 sampled 
countries, they contributed to substantial growth in remittance-receiving SSA countries with 
relatively higher growth rates. It is, thus, noted that between 1980 and 2009, at worst, 
international remittances had no impact on economic growth in SSA. Unquestionably, a close 
examination of the trend in the changing impact of remittance inflows on economic growth 
shows their continuous rising positive impact on growth in high-growth „labour-exporting‟ SSA 
countries since the implementation of financial liberalisation programme in the 1980s.  
 
Overall, the findings of this study invalidate the widely held view that remittances are anti-
growth in low-income countries where the propensity to consume is high. To the extent that, in 
more recent years, the positive impact of remittances on long-run growth is more pronounced 
in remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively higher real per capita GDP growth rates, 
this finding contradicts earlier conclusions drawn by Chami et al. (2005), Jongwanich (2007), 
Barajas et al. (2009), and Karogöz (2009) that remittances are deterrent to economic growth in 
developing countries. An important source of this contradiction is the fact that unlike in previous 
studies, this study analysed the impact of remittances on real per capita GDP growth rate, and 
not the logarithm of real per capita GDP (as in Barajas et al. (2009) and Karagöz (2009)), which 
is commensurate with income status, or a group of countries classified as low-income countries 
(as in Chami et al. (2005) and Jongwanich (2007)). Thus, unlike in those previous related 
studies, this study took recognition of the fact that, in line with the cyclicality character of 
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international remittance inflows, it is the actual growth rate rather than mere income level of 
remittance-receiving country that is more relevant in understanding the implications of 
remittances for economic growth in an empirical context. The reason is that while developing 
(or low-income) countries are the major recipients of international remittances (see Figure A6.1 
and Table A6.1), economic growth can occur in any economy at one time or the other, 
irrespective of its income level. For example, a developing country like Ghana recorded a real 
GDP per capita growth 12.42 per cent in 2011 which is far higher than the growth rate of OECD 
countries in that year even though the logarithm of Ghana‟s real per capita GDP is far lower 
than that of the OECD countries for that same year. Again, these aforementioned previous 
studies just like Baldé (2009) and Singh et al. (2010) that found negative or no direct impact of 
remittances on economic growth failed to take cognisance of the fact that the direct effects of 
international remittances on economic growth could be asynchronous and not merely 
contemporaneous as proven by this study. 
 
The findings of this study, however, confirm the results obtained from a host of previous studies 
including the World Bank (2006b), Ramirez and Sharma (2008), Acosta, Baerg and 
Mandelman (2009), Ahortor and Adenutsi (2009), Catrinescu et al. (2009), Mundaca (2009), 
Kagochi et al. (2010), Lartey (2010), Cooray (2012), and Shera and Meyer (2013). Thus, with 
the exception of Baldé (2009) and Singh et al. (2010) the findings of this study are generally 
consistent with all known previous studies on SSA and other regions of the developing world.  
 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study explored the impact of international migrant remittance inflows on long-run economic 
growth in SSA over the period, 1980-2009. The analysis was carried out for the overall study 
period and for each of the three past decades, 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009. 
Consistent with the underlying objectives, both the contemporaneous and asynchronous effects 
of remittances were explored. Finally, the implications of international remittance inflows for 
economic growth based on the economic growth size-effects of SSA since the inception of 
financial liberalisation programmes in the sub-region were analysed. 
 
The general conclusion from this study is that when international migrant remittances are 
properly measured and the economic growth model is correctly specified and instrumented to 
reduce the well-known endogeneity problems associated with remittance inflows, the overall 
impact of international remittances on long-run growth in SSA is significantly positive and 
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consistently more asynchronous. Thus, the impact of remittances on economic growth in SSA 
is less contemporaneous and varies over time in consistency with the macroeconomic policy 
environment during the liberalised regime. Generally, international migrant remittances had a 
higher positive impact on economic growth in SSA in periods when remittances were pro-
cyclical as was the case in the 1980s and the 2000s than during the 1990s when remittances 
were countercyclical to economic growth. This implies there is no significant evidence that 
remittances retard economic growth in SSA. At worst, the impact of remittances on economic 
growth was found to be statistically insignificant. Given the general decreasing positive impact 
of remittances on economic growth in the 36 sampled countries but, at the same, the 
increasing positive impact of remittances on the sampled countries with relatively higher growth 
rates, it is important to note that although the pursuit of financial liberalisation programme in 
SSA is indispensable to attracting more official remittances into the sub-region, this is not a 
sufficient condition for remittances to have a consistent positive impact on economic growth in 
migrant remittance-receiving SSA countries. It is a must for remittance-receiving SSA countries 
to implement other pro-growth strategies in order to optimise the remittance-growth potential. 
 
Conceivably, the most persuasive evidence revealed by this study is the fact that, as far as the 
implications for long-run economic growth are concerned, international migrant remittances 
have considerable size-effects in SSA countries. The results have shown that in remittance-
receiving SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates at any point in time, the impact of 
international remittances on economic growth was both statistically and economically robust, 
and this positive impact has been increasing steadily over time. The results imply that, with 
reference to SSA, the automatic economic growth and macroeconomic stabilisation effects of 
international remittances that existed in the past, have gradually faded away. Consequently, in 
contemporary SSA, it is only migrant remittance-receiving countries with relatively higher 
growth rates that have the prospects of maximising the potential contribution of international 
migrant remittances on economic growth in the long run, provided that these countries can 
mobilise substantial remittances through official channels. Therefore, in spite of the broad 
positive impact of international remittances on economic growth in SSA, it can still be 
economically suicidal for policy makers in SSA to live under unguided optimism of remittances 
serving as an automatic macroeconomic stabiliser and a growth stimulant in recipient countries 
irrespective of macroeconomic fundamentals. 
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The findings from this study imply that even though it is imperative for remittance-receiving 
SSA countries to implement well-coordinated and effective policies geared towards attracting 
optimal remittances through official routes to stimulate economic growth, this may not be 
sufficient unless policy makers support these efforts with the implementation of other pro-
growth policies. In view of this, in addition to the remittance attraction strategies espoused in 
the preceding chapters, the following policy recommendations are made towards maximizing 
the economic growth potentials of international remittance inflows in SSA. 
 
i. Strategic policy measures must be put in place to stabilise the macroeconomy, and 
create an investment climate that encourages the private sector to invest more in high 
profit-yielding projects. Under this condition, more international migrants are likely to 
invest directly in profitable projects at home while, at the same time, recipients of 
remittances may now find it more lucrative to save and invest a higher proportion of the 
remittances received, rather than consume these funds instantly. In this regard, 
monetary and fiscal policy coordination aimed at low and stable rates of inflation, 
exchange rate stability, and financial policy transparency are highly recommended. 
 
ii. Complementary policies such as stronger institutions for good governance and reduced 
public sector corruption which can reduce „wasteful‟ government spending are required. 
These policies are imperative because excessive government spending can crowd-out 
the private sector and subsequently retard economic growth whilst government 
spending on critical social infrastructure and services such as the construction of roads, 
extension of electricity and telecommunication services can crowd-in the private sector 
to boost investment in the productive sectors of the economy. This means that it is 
remittance-receiving SSA countries that can boost the confidence of international 
migrants through good governance, stronger institutions and reasonable government 
spending that are likely to maximise the growth potentials of international remittances 
received. 
 
iii. There is the need for trade and industrial policies that are aimed at reducing over-
dependency on imports of basic necessities in the form of food and clothing that can be 
locally produced. This also requires modernisation of production techniques to uplift the 
quality of locally produced goods. This is because the spending of international 
remittances on imported consumables rather than on locally produced goods tends to 
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reduce the growth potential of remittances in migrant-home countries. Specific policies 
that can be implemented for this purpose include the introduction of special subsidies or 
tax holidays for local industries; the advancement of pro-competition policies; private-
public sector ownership of strategic capital-intensive industries; and the establishment 
of venture capital funds to provide easy access to medium-term enterprise credit. Other 
relevant policies include the establishment of special funds and institutions for the 
conduct of industrial innovatory research towards a permanent transformation and 
revitalisation of local industries and SMEs as well as regionalisation and globalisation. 
 
iv. Policies on financial development towards higher efficiency of financial institutions when 
playing their intermediation role can stimulate long-run economic growth through the 
saving rate and the social marginal productivity of invested international remittances in 
SSA. Therefore, it is important to provide an enabling environment through improved 
information symmetry and financial market deregulation that will give financial 
institutions the confidence and the incentive to switch private sector credit allocation 
from the consuming household sector to the investing business sector. 
 
v. Finally, to maximize the growth potentials of international remittance inflows in SSA, it is 
imperative for policy makers to put measures in place to make use of the available 
human capital and to mitigate the tendency of international remittances to become an 
incentive for further migration of skilled labour. This is important because remittances 
received in youthful and aged populated countries are more likely to be spent on 
imported consumables when the remittance-recipient countries are not capable of 
producing adequate basic necessities locally. Excessive spending of international 
remittances on imported consumables will increase the dependency of the migrant-
sending SSA country and worsen its macroeconomic vulnerability to adverse external 
shocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
282 
 
APPENDIX 6 
 
Figure A6.1: Global Outlook of Migrant Remittances Received and Paid, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Author based on WDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  A6.1: 
Global Inflows of Migrant Remittances and Major Forms of External Capital (as of 2009)
 
Source: Author based on WDI (April 2011 Edition) 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Paid Received Net Received
World Developing Countries
Remittances
(US$ billions) GDP Export of Goods FDI ODA
World 416.12          0.75       3.39                 35.76     326.30   
Developing Economies 307.65          1.88       0.08                 0.86       2.42       
East Asia and Pacific 85.79            1.36       4.91                 84.58     834.64    
Europe and Central Asia 36.02            1.41       5.38                 41.81     444.67    
Latin America and the Caribbean 56.59            1.43       8.12                 73.85     621.62    
Middle East and North Africa 33.44            3.22       n/a 120.44    246.10    
South Asia 75.06            4.45       35.63                195.40    523.72    
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.75            2.49       8.03                 71.31     46.62     
Remittances as a percentage of:
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Table A6.2: Data Description, Measurement and Sources 
VARIABLE NOTATION DESCRIPTION, MEASUREMENT AND MAIN SOURCES 
Dependent Variable 
Economic growth  growth Annual percentage change rate in real per capita GDP (in constant US$). 
Source: WDI. 
Explanatory Variables* 
Investment in 
physical assets 
lnINV
+/-
 Gross fixed capital formation as a ratio to nominal GDP. Source: WDI and 
WEO. 
Government 
expenditure 
lnGXP
+/-
 Central government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of 
nominal GDP. Source: Author based on WDI, IFS and WEO.  
Openness to 
international trade 
lnOPN
+/-
 Sum of exports and imports as a percentage of nominal GDP. Source: 
Author‟s computation based on WDI and WEO. 
Remittances per 
capita lag one 
lnREMPC_1
+/-
 Lag one of the sum of workers‟ remittances and compensation of 
employees as ratio of population. Source: WDI, BoPS, MRF-2011 CD-
ROMs and e-databases and estimates based on country-specific 
information obtained from country-desk officials of the IMF and the World 
Bank. 
Human capital 
accumulation 
lnHCA Net enrolment ratio of children of official school age based on International 
Standard Classification of Education 1997 who enrolled in post-primary 
school relative to the population of the corresponding official school age. 
Source: WDI. 
Inflation rate  INF
+/-
 Rate of growth in annual average of consumer price index. Source: WDI 
and author based on IFS and WEO. 
Broad money to 
GDP ratio 
lnM2/GDP
+/-
 Sum of currency outside banks, demand deposit other than those of the 
central government, and time, savings and foreign currency deposits of 
resident sector other than the central bank as ratio of GDP. Source: WDI 
and author based on IFS and WEO. 
Domestic credit to 
private sector  
lnPSC+
/-
 Total domestic credit to the private sector by the financial system as a ratio 
of nominal GDP. Source: WDI, Africa Development Indicators (ADI), and 
the Central Bank website of selected sampled countries. 
Foreign direct 
investment 
FDI
+/-
 Net inflows of investment, being the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
profits, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, to acquire long-term 
management interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than 
that of the investor, expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP. Source: 
Author based on WDI and WEO. 
Source: Author based on April 2011 editions of WDI, ADI, WEO and IFS were primarily used. Note: The a priori sign 
is indicated by 
+/-
 by the notation column of each variable. Only final explanatory variables are included in Table 
A6.2, thus excluding control variables that were dropped from the final estimated model. ln preceding a variable 
means that variable is in its natural logarithmic value. 
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Table A6.3: Descriptive Statistics of Dataset 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6.4: Bivariate Correlation of Variables                                                                                             
 
Source: Author‟s estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLE Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
growth 1080 0.9829 5.4418 -52.2019 37.8386
lnINV_1 1044 2.9077 0.4786 -3.1397 4.3398
lnGXP 1080 2.6623 0.4265 0.2683 3.9985
lnOPN 1080 4.1373 0.5579 1.8954 5.5232
lnREMPC_1 1044 1.4404 2.2497 -6.1374 5.7400
lnHCA 1080 3.1584 0.7503 0.8774 4.7694
INF 1078 13.5133 22.2021 -100.0000 200.0260
lnM2GDP 1080 3.1085 0.6503 -2.7186 4.7652
lnPSC 1080 2.6018 0.8090 -1.2469 5.1301
FDI 1074 2.3102 4.3904 -28.6243 36.1138
growth lnINV_1 lnGXP lnOPN lnREMPC_1 lnHCA INF lnM2GDP lnPSC FDI
growth 1.0000
lnINV_1 0.1258 1.0000
lnGXP 0.0083 0.3226 1.0000
lnOPN 0.0905 0.4137 0.3952 1.0000
lnREMPC_1 0.1826 0.2796 0.2652 0.4579 1.0000
lnHCA 0.1060 0.2136 0.2512 0.5300 0.3789 1.0000
INF 0.0022 -0.1641 -0.2470 -0.2696 -0.2756 -0.2804 1.0000
lnM2GDP 0.0159 0.2035 0.2370 0.3143 0.3938 0.4615 -0.1674 1.0000
lnPSC -0.0092 0.3103 0.3254 0.3435 0.3849 0.3827 -0.3039 0.5291 1.0000
FDI 0.1340 0.2765 0.0994 0.3633 0.2601 0.2667 -0.1180 0.1764 0.0489 1.0000
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Table A6.5: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
VARIABLES  PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST STATISTICS  
Fisher P-P chi-square Hadri HC z-stat LLC Adjusted t-stat Conclusion 
 At Level  At Level At Level  
growth
 
59.1524*** 
{0.0000} 
 3.7901*** 
[0.0001] 
 I(0) 
lnINV 5.4517***  32.2079***  I(0) 
 {0.0000}  [0.0000]   
lnGXP 5.8323***  33.3928***             I(0) 
               {0.0000}  [0.0000]   
lnOPN 9.0605***  23.7910***  I(0) 
 {0.0000}  [0.0000]   
lnREMPC 2.7415*** 
{0.0031} 
 37.9585*** 
[0.0000] 
 I(0) 
lnHCA   -0.7845 
{0.7836} 
 44.0794*** 
[0.0000] 
-4.4781*** 
(0.000) 
I(0) 
INF 25.8682***  n/a n/a I(0) 
 {0.0000}  n/a n/a  
lnM2/GDP   0.2765  36.2907*** -3.5126 I(0) 
 {0.3911}  [0.0000] (0.0002)***  
lnPSC             0.6143  38.0580*** -1.5210* I(0) 
 {0.2695}  [0.0000] (0.0641)  
FDI         18.8927*** 
       {0.0000} 
 n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
        I(0) 
Source: Author‟s computations  Note: Figures in brackets { }, [ ], and ( ) are probability values of chi-square,  z- 
statistics, and  t-statistics  respectively.  
***
(
*
) significant  at  1%(10%) level 
respectively. Constant and trend included except LLC. Where applicable (in 
Fisher P-P and LLC tests), optimal lag 2 was included. n/a means not applicable 
due to missing data. 
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Table A6.6: 
Estimated Impact of Median-Dummy Variable (MDV) on Growth in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
Initial economic growth (growth_1) -0.1118 -0.2259 0.1031 -0.0573 
  (-5.01)*** (-18.79)*** (3.98)*** (-1.24) 
Investment (lnINV_1) -5.8496 -3.3227 -1.8533 0.3504 
  (-6.55)*** (-0.53) (-1.11) (0.50) 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) 0.3866 3.5794 -0.1456 1.1172 
 
(0.28) (1.84)* (-0.31) (0.52) 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 2.2973 -4.3048 -0.2780 0.4241 
  (3.37)*** (-3.17)*** (-0.34) (0.20) 
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC_1) 0.0609 0.8970 -0.0551 -0.1670 
  (0.34) (2.72)*** (-0.15) (-0.27) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) 1.5868 2.2190 -0.5793 1.6318 
  (1.91)** (1.73)* (-0.55) (0.71) 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0001 0.0927 -0.0925 0.0211 
  (0.01) (7.40)*** (-6.44)*** (4.15)*** 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 2.2357 -2.3794 0.1257 -1.8981 
  (1.88)* (-1.44) (0.15) (-0.98) 
Broad money to GDP ratio (M2/GDP) -1.7864 -6.0046 -3.1372 -1.2747 
  (-3.16)*** (-2.79)*** (-4.26)*** (-2.05)** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) -0.0042 0.0681 0.0135 -0.0416 
  (-0.12) (2.38)** (0.45) (-1.68)* 
Median Dummy (MDV) 8.2954 6.0315 4.8045 6.5931 
  (12.25)*** (16.62)*** (23.99)*** (22.11)*** 
Constant term -2.7333 22.2861 19.3791 -4.1941 
  (-0.44) (4.02)*** (6.67)*** (-0.72) 
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 55 55 55 445 
Wald 2
[11],  1285.81*** 6103.88*** 6057.29*** 1026.37*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
 
0.7679{0.443} 1.2097{0.226} 1.9954{0.046}** 0.7918{0.429} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],   [43], 17.7359 [43], 21.2452 [43], 27.0407 [433], 28.0675 
     
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
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Table A6.7: 
Median Dummy Variable-Remittances Interactive Effect on Economic Growth in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
Initial economic growth (growth_1) -0.1135 -0.2181 0.1252 -0.0313 
  (-3.50)*** (-25.35)*** (4.27)*** (-0.85) 
Investment (lnINV_1) -5.9107 2.1314 -2.0687 1.2177 
  (-3.73)*** (3.57)*** (-2.82)*** (2.69)*** 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -1.5255 -0.4817 -0.0918 1.1936 
 
(-0.73) (-0.22) (-0.26) (0.50) 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 5.5104 0.0932 1.2389 4.4187 
  (3.00)*** (0.07) (1.11) (1.65)* 
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC_1) 0.8088 0.1352 -0.5921 0.3572 
  (2.35)** (0.57) (-2.03)** (0.49) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) -1.5177 4.8085 -1.5728 -0.2881 
  (-1.07) (3.47)*** (-1.28) (-0.18) 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0022 0.0884 -0.1001 0.0123 
  (-0.30) (6.24)*** (-6.81)*** (2.54)** 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 1.3965 -1.5441 0.8751 -1.9582 
  (1.02) (-1.61)* (0.96) (-1.28) 
Broad money to GDP ratio (M2/GDP) -1.5213 -12.3836 -2.9902 -1.1578 
  (-3.09)*** (-8.03)*** (-3.52)*** (-0.50) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.2657 -0.0808 0.0258 -0.0165 
  (3.03)*** (-2.72)*** (1.27) (-0.45) 
MDV-Remittance Interactive Effect -0.0459 0.4973 0.9131 0.8897 
  (-0.13) (3.56)*** (9.50)*** (4.51)*** 
Constant term 3.8045 20.9344 16.9125 -15.6067 
  (0.76) (3.91)*** (4.25)*** (-1.78)* 
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 55 55 55 445 
Wald 2
[11],  487.15*** 13680.52*** 2918.34*** 98.70*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
 
0.3896{0.697} -1.1889{0.235} 0.6677{0.504} 0.3944{0.693} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],   [43], 30.9076 [43], 22.5484 [43], 23.0167 [433], 27.9407 
     
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
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Table A6.8.1: The Contemporaneous Impact of Remittances on Growth in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
Initial economic growth (growth_1) -0.0874 -0.1901 0.1150 -0.0720 
  (-3.95)*** (-15.16)*** (3.89)*** (-1.25) 
Investment (lnINV_1) -4.2215 1.7371 -2.6489 1.3823 
  (-3.11)*** (3.40)*** (-2.01)** (2.49)** 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -1.4266 3.0085 -0.4708 -1.9675 
 
(-1.10) (1.65)* (-0.88) (-0.54) 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 5.6675 0.7993 1.4759 3.5264 
  (3.57)*** (0.81) (1.05) (1.22) 
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC) 1.1778 -0.5616 0.0559 -0.3161 
  (4.48)*** (-2.65)*** (0.19) (-0.44) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) -1.8469 8.0193 -2.2491 3.0523 
  (-1.79)* (4.63)*** (-2.39)** (0.91) 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0037 0.0797 -0.0816 0.0057 
  (-0.66) (6.13)*** (-4.41)*** (1.16) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 0.5825 -3.0861 1.3957 -2.2319 
  (0.60) (-3.39)*** (1.16) (-2.30)** 
Broad money to GDP ratio (lnM2/GDP) -1.4102 -10.1077 -2.6217 -5.2225 
  (-2.49)** (-4.41)*** (-2.31)** (-2.62)*** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.2780 -0.0841 0.0597 -0.0197 
  (8.08)*** (-3.99)*** (1.68)* (-0.72) 
Constant term 0.3041 -1.3404 17.2455 0.5389 
  (0.09) (-0.16) (4.62)*** (0.05) 
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 54 54 54 444 
Wald 2
[10],  408.59*** 14059.59*** 543.44*** 54.99*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
 
0.4235{0.672} -0.9508{0.342} 0.7934{0.428} -0.1369{0.891} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],   [43], 24.3549 [43], 22.0945 [43], 22.4493 [433], 23.9006 
     
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
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Table A6.8.2: Contemporaneous Size-Effect of Remittances on Growth in SSA, 1980-2009 
Type of Dummy Effect 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009 
Independent MDV 9.2427 (16.14)*** 6.4127 (18.96)*** 4.8690 (4.15)*** 6.1316 (17.91)*** 
MDV-Remittance Interactive  0.5061 (1.78)* 0.9085 (5.46)*** 1.0131 (9.76)*** 1.1934 (7.28)*** 
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037 
Number of groups 36 36 36 36 
Instruments 55 55 55 445 
Wald (χ²₁₁) 681.36*** 8901.23*** 1551.25*** 169.96*** 
Arellano-Bond Test 0.4941{0.6212} -0.8531{0.3936} 0.6988{0.4847} 0.2100{0.8336} 
Sargan Test (χ²₍₀₎) ₍₄₃₎, 25.1545 ₍₄₃₎, 21.0542 ₍₄₃₎, 24.0050 ₍₄₃₃₎, 19.4533 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: *(***) denotes significant at 10(1) per cent. Diagnostic tests in italics apply 
to estimated MDV-Remittance Interactive model only. 
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Table A6.9: 
Robustness Test Results of Contemporaneous Investment and Remittances on Growth in SSA 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-2009 
Initial economic growth (growth_1) -0.0529 -0.1923 0.1351 0.0275 
  (-1.79)* (-11.86)*** (4.36)*** (0.64) 
Investment (lnINV) 2.2876 0.3664 0.8885 -0.6420 
  (1.16) (0.52) (0.67) (-0.40) 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -3.0070 2.0886 -0.3621 -4.0264 
 
(-1.52) (1.01) (-0.66) (-1.76)* 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 3.8383 -0.7285 0.8229 7.7684 
  (1.48) (-0.62) (0.72) (2.47)** 
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC) 1.1634 -0.5997 -0.1911 -0.2465 
  (3.14)*** (-3.29)*** (-0.94) (-0.30) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) 2.3937 8.2896 -2.5539 -1.4554 
  (1.54) (7.06)*** (-2.26)** (-0.57) 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0086 0.0705 -0.0981 0.0047 
  (-1.32) (5.58)*** (-5.49)*** (1.19) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) -2.8983 -3.5998 1.1131 -2.2459 
  (-2.49)** (-2.25)** (0.92) (-1.65)* 
Broad money to GDP ratio (lnM2/GDP) -1.7036 -9.8037 -3.2262 -3.2760 
  (-4.61)*** (-4.43)*** (-3.11)** (-2.79)*** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.2175 -0.0625 0.0717 -0.0612 
  (4.74)*** (-2.66)*** (1.96)* (-1.74)* 
Constant term -4.0003 10.1952 12.6526 2.5215 
  (-0.51) (1.05) (2.90)*** (0.24) 
Number of observations 319 322 324 1037 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 54 54 54 444 
Wald 2
[10],  732.83*** 13071.66*** 996.58*** 190.85*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
 
0.2166{0.829} -1.1533{0.249} 0.8176{0.414} 0.3800{0.704} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],   [43], 22.0898 [43], 23.4782 [43], 24.5138 [433], 26.4248 
     
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
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Table A6.10: 
Static Panel-Data Modelling of Remittances on Economic Growth in SSA, 1980-2009 
  
Fixed  
Effects (FE) 
Random 
Effects (RE)  Robust FE
++
  
Robust Random 
GLS (RE) 
Investment (lnINV_1) 1.8083 1.8498 1.8081 1.8489 
  (3.93)*** (4.51)*** (1.65) (1.93)** 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -0.7649 -0.7251 -0.7649 -0.7251 
 
(-1.25) (-1.56) (-1.06) (-1.35) 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 1.6326 -0.3114 1.6326 -0.3114 
  (2.53)** (-0.71) (1.69)* (-0.53) 
Migrant Remittances (lnREMPC_1) 0.4521 0.4718 0.4521 0.4718 
  (2.91)*** (4.87)*** (2.04)** (5.03)*** 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) 1.3334 0.7129 1.3334 0.7129 
  (2.49)** (2.28)** (2.34)** (2.34)** 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0023 0.0058 0.0023 0.0058 
  (0.26) (0.71) (0.12) (0.41) 
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) -0.9280 -0.6566 -0.9280 -0.6566 
  (-2.46)** (-2.38)** (-2.35)** (-2.09)** 
Broad money to GDP ratio (lnM2/GDP) -1.0436 -0.5993 -1.0436 -0.5993 
  (-2.77)*** (-1.79)* (-4.41)*** (-2.44)** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) 0.0342 0.0655 0.0342 0.0655 
  (0.74) (1.52) (0.70) (1.27) 
Constant term -8.3100 -0.7598 -8.3100 -0.7598 
  (-2.51)*** (-0.39) (-2.47)** (-0.39) 
Number of observations 1037 1037 1037 1037 
Number of groups (N) 36 36 36 36 
Overall R
2
 0.0531 0.0740 0.0531 0.0740 
F-statistics     7.74{0.000}***   25.49{0.003}***     8.23{0.000}*** 123.26{0.000}*** 
Hausman_FE  25.00{0.003}*** n/a n/a n/a 
Breusch-Pagan (B-P) statistics n/a 2.09{0.074}* n/a n/a 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    robust z-statistics in ( ), probabilities in { }, n/a denotes not available or required 
    
++ 
most efficient and reliable results based on Hausman test and B-P statistics 
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Table A6.11: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth 
Author(s), Year Case Study Study 
Period 
Model & Estimation 
Method 
Variables Included  Key Finding(s) 
Solimano (2003) LAC countries 
with country-
based evidence 
from Bolivia and 
Ecuador 
1987-2002 Single equation country 
specific modelling by 
OLS 
Dependent: GDP per capita growth rate 
Explanatory: Logarithm of GDP, investment proxied by 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)/GDP, logarithm of 
terms of trade (ToT) change lag 1, government 
consumption/GDP, logarithm of ratio of 
remittances/GDP lag 1. 
Remittances promote long-run growth in 
both Bolivia and Ecuador 
Chami et al. 
(2005) 
113 developing 
countries 
1970-1998 Panel Fixed Effects 
(FE) and panel 
Random Effects (RE) 
instrumental variable 
modelling 
Dependent: Annual growth in real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE)/GDP, changes in 
remittances/GDP ratio. Control variables: Investment 
proxied by (GFCF)/GDP, inflation, net private capital 
inflows/GDP, regional dummies 
Remittances are countercyclical in nature 
and with a negative impact on economic 
growth. 
IMF (2005) 101 developing 
countries 
1970-2000 
(non-
overlapping 
5-year 
annual 
average) 
Pooled single equation 
bivariate model 
estimated by OLS 
Dependent: Real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP ratio  
Impact of remittances on long-run growth 
is not statistically significant. 
World Bank 
(2006a) 
67 developing 
countries 
1991-2005 Unspecified Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: Logarithm of: Initial GDP per capita, 
remittances (WR+CE)/GDP, secondary school 
enrolment ratio capturing human capital, private sector 
credit/GDP ratio, political risk, openness, inflation, real 
exchange rate overvaluation, government 
consumption/GDP, time dummies 
Consistent positive relationship between 
remittances and economic growth, both 
when investment was present and absent 
from the model. But in the absence of 
investment, the contribution of 
remittances to economic growth became 
small. 
Jongwanich 
(2007) 
17 developing 
Asia-Pacific 
countries 
1993-2003 Panel Fixed Effects 
model and dynamic 
model by system GMM 
Dependent: Annual growth of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: Initial real GDP per capita growth, 
logarithm of remittances (WR+CE+MT), human capital 
development, logarithm of investment (GFCF)/GDP at 
time t and t-1, logarithm of government 
consumption/GDP, logarithm of openness, CPI-based 
inflation. 
Remittances have direct negative impact 
on economic growth, but it impacts 
positively on growth indirectly through 
investment in physical assets and human 
capital accumulation. 
Fayissa and 
Nsiah (2008) 
37 African 
countries 
1980-2004 Simple log-log linear 
using dynamic panel-
data model following 
GMM. Robustness FE 
and RE model 
Dependent: Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita  
Explanatory: (Natural logarithm of) remittances 
(WR+CE) per capita, GFCF/GDP, secondary school 
enrolment, foreign aid (AID/GDP), foreign direct 
investment (FDI/GDP), terms of trade, political rights, 
initial level of real GDP per capita 
Remittances promote growth in countries 
where the financial sector is 
underdeveloped as they serves as an 
alternative source of investment finance 
and helping overcome liquidity 
constraints 
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Le (2008) 49 selected 
countries 
1970-2005 
(5-year 
period) 
Dynamic panel-data 
model. Single equation 
OLS with pooled data 
and Panel Fixed Effects 
2-Stage Least Squares 
(FE2SLS) instrumental 
variable (IV) models 
robustness check 
Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP per capita 5-year 
annual average. Also, average annual 5-year real GDP 
per capita growth  
Explanatory: Initial real GDP per capita growth, trade 
openness measured as exports (X) plus imports (M) as 
a ratio of GDP, remittances (WR+CE+MT) as a ratio of 
GDP, quality institutions from polity IV project, and 
vector of other variables including religious affiliation, 
and education. 
Institutions foster growth but remittances 
hamper economic growth. 
Ramirez and 
Sharma (2008) 
23 Latin 
American 
countries 
1990-2005 Panel Unit Root and 
Panel Co-integration 
test using Fully-
Modified OLS 
approach. 
 
Two main estimations: 
With and without 
financial development 
Dependent: Changes in logarithm of real GDP per 
capita 
Explanatory: Logarithm of remittances/GDP ratio, and a 
set of control variables that include fixed capital 
formation/GDP, openness, labour force, M2/GDP and 
domestic credit/GDP. 
With financial development, remittances 
have higher positive impact on growth 
than without the presence of financial 
development. In both cases (i.e. with or 
without financial development), the 
impact of remittances on upper-middle 
income group is more positive than it is 
the case of lower income group. 
Ziesemer (2008) 50 poor 
developing 
countries 
(i.e. countries 
with GDP per 
capita less than 
US$1200 (in 
2000 prices) 
1960-2003 Dynamic panel-data 
models and system 
GMM 
Dependent: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) GDPt-5, literacy rate, 
ODA/GDP, logGFCF/GDP(-x), interest rate, remittances 
(WR)/GDP, labour force, world GDP proxied by GDP of 
USA 
Remittances enhance savings, public 
expenditure on education and growth, but 
reduce tax revenues and emigration. 
Taking into account direct and indirect 
effects of remittances on levels and 
growth rates of GDP per capita, it was 
found that remittances impact positively 
on economic growth, investment and 
literacy rates. 
Acosta, Baerg 
and Mandelman 
(2009) 
10 LAC 
countries 
Longitudinal 
survey data 
(average 
period: 2000-
2004) 
Dynamic panel-data 
model using GMM 
Dependent: Logarithm of per capita income 
Explanatory: Logarithm of initial per capita income, 
remittances (WR+CE+MT) but with some exceptions 
where two or less components are used. Control 
variables include average years of secondary school 
education for male population, and for the female 
population, price of investment goods relative to that of 
the USA. All explanatory variables used are of one lag.  
Remittances promote long-run growth. 
Ahortor and 
Adenutsi (2009) 
31 small-open 
developing 
countries from 
LAC (16) and 
SSA (15) 
1986-2006 Dynamic panel-data 
model using system 
GMM 
Dependent: Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: Initial growth, remittances (WR+CE+MT+ 
other current transfers)/GDP, investment (GFCF)/GDP, 
human capital measured as secondary school 
enrolment, openness (X+M)/GDP, logarithm of CPI as 
Generally remittances have positive 
impact on long-run growth in small-open 
developing countries. The impact is more 
robust in LAC than SSA. 
Contemporaneously, remittances 
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proxy for inflation, government spending/GDP positively affect growth with higher 
impact in LAC. In dynamic terms, 
remittances retard growth, but with 
overall positive impact 
Baldé (2009) 29 SSA 
countries 
1980-2004 
(3-year 
moving 
average 
data) 
Unbalanced 
panel 
Panel 2SLS IV 
estimation technique 
Dependent: Natural logarithm of average of 3-year GDP 
per capita 
Explanatory: Natural logarithm of initial GDP per capita, 
remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP, ODA/GDP, population 
growth rate, trade openness (X+M)/GDP, secondary 
school enrolment for human capital formation, 
government consumption/GDP, inflation, investment 
(GFCF)/GDP and political stability 
Remittances do not have a direct positive 
impact on economic growth 
Barajas et al. 
(2009) 
84 developing 
and emerging 
countries 
receiving 
remittances 
1970-2004 
(5-year 
period 
average) 
Pooled OLS IV and FE-
IV 
Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) initial growth, remittances 
(WR)/GDP denoted as REMGDP, REMGDP
2
, 
REMGDP*M2/GDP interaction, and average growth rate 
in top-20 trading partners. Control variables: logarithm 
of trade/GDP, FDI/GDP, fiscal balance/GDP, population 
growth rate, and M2/GDP;  political risk 
At best, remittances have no effect on 
economic growth in the long run, 
probably because poor institutions do not 
make remittances to be channelled to 
growth-enhancing projects 
Catrinescu et al. 
(2009) 
162 developing 
countries 
1970-2003 
(unbalanced 
panel data) 
Dynamic panel-data 
modelling in the context 
of GMM 
Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) real GDP per capita lag 1, 
remittances (WR+CE)/GDP with control variables as 
gross capital formation/GDP, gross domestic 
savings/GDP, net private capital inflows/GDP, inflation 
rate and regional dummies 
Remittances have a weak impact positive 
impact on long-run growth, but the 
positive impact improves in the presence 
of sound macroeconomic policies and 
institutions. 
Garcia-Fuentes 
and Kennedy 
(2009) 
14 LAC 
countries 
1975-2000 
(overlapping 
5-year 
moving 
average) 
Panel Random Effects 
(RE) 2SLS with pooled 
OLS and RE for 
robustness 
Dependent: Growth of output per worker  
Explanatory: Human capital stock (HCAP), human 
capital growth, remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP defined 
as (REMGDP), HCAP*REMGDP interaction, growth 
rates of HCAP and physical capital plus control 
variables including time dummies, investment/GDP, 
government consumption/GDP, and inflation 
Remittances positively impact on human 
capital development but directly deter 
economic growth. Also, there is 
significant positive effect of the 
interaction between human capital and 
economic growth. Thus, the impact of 
remittances on growth is dependent upon 
the level of human capital development 
Giuliano and 
Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) 
100 developing 
countries 
1975-2002 
(5-year 
annual 
average 
data) 
System GMM with 
Pooled OLS and FE 
models for robustness 
test 
Dependent: Logarithm of per capita GDP 
Explanatory: Logarithm of Initial level of GDP per 
capita, remittances (measured according to country-
specific reporting data)/GDP ratio defined as 
(REMGDP), financial development proxied by M2/GDP, 
domestic credit/GDP), bank deposits/GDP, and bank 
loans/GDP. Control variables include trade openness, 
Remittances impact positively on long-
run growth in countries with less 
developed financial systems by serving 
as an alternative finance of investment 
and entrepreneurial activities to 
overcome credit constraints. In the 
absence of financial development, 
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human capital growth rate denoted by secondary 
school enrolment, government fiscal balance/GDP, 
investment/GDP rate, inflation, and population growth 
rate 
remittances alone do not have a positive 
impact on economic growth. Remittances 
have a positive impact on growth at both 
the median and the mean level of 
financial development, but their impact 
becomes zero and eventually turns 
negative in countries with developed 
financial systems above the 75
th
 per 
centile of the sample distribution 
Jayaraman et al. 
(2009) 
Samoa 1981-2008 Single equation 
Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) 
bounds testing model 
Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP  
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) remittances 
(WR+CE+MT)/GDP, private sector credit/GDP, 
exports/GDP 
Remittances have a direct significant 
positive impact on economic growth 
Karagöz (2009) Turkey 1970-2005 Single equation double 
logarithmic model using 
OLS estimation 
procedure 
Dependent: Logarithm of GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) initial GDP per capita, 
remittances (all private transfers implying WR+CE+MT+ 
other current transfers)/GDP, FDI/GDP, exports/GDP 
Remittances impact negatively on 
economic growth whilst exports and 
domestic investment are positive 
determinants of economic growth. 
Mundaca (2009) 25 LAC 
countries.  
 
1970-2002 Dynamic panel data 
following first-difference 
GMM. 
Full sample as 
estimated alongside 
three sub-samples 
categorised as: (i) large 
recipients relative to 
GDP; (ii) low, lower 
middle & upper middle 
income but with large 
receipts of remittances 
but poorest; and (iii) 
Central American 
countries.  
Dependent: Annual growth of output per capita 
Explanatory: Initial output growth rate, logarithm of 
investment proxied by (GFCF) per capita, remittances 
measured as WR/GDP ratio at time t-1, indicators of 
financial development at time t-1 (here main emphasis is 
on bank private sector credit (PSC)/GDP. Human 
capital development measured as literacy rate among 
adults aged 15 years and above. 
 
Initial estimation involved on three explanatory 
variables: investment, initial growth and remittances. 
The long-run impact of remittances on 
economic growth is positive and 
significant in all four groups (full sample, 
and three sub-samples) analysed. 
Expansion of financial services to citizens 
of remittance recipient countries should 
lead to better use of remittances and 
boost long-run growth.   
Rao and Hassan 
(2009) 
40 highest 
remittance-
recipients as of 
1970-2006 
(unbalanced 
panel) 
Dynamic panel-data 
modelling following 
system GMM 
Dependent: Growth of GDP per worker proxied by GDP 
divided by labour force 
Explanatory: Financial development proxied by 
Remittances have positive growth effects 
although the impact is small. 
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2007 of which 9 
are from SSA
134
  
M2/GDP, PSC/GDP), government expenditure/GDP, 
investment/GDP rate, remittance (WR+CE+MT)/GDP, 
inflation (GDP deflator), real effective exchange rate 
(REER), and human capital 
Ziesemer (2009) 96 countries that 
received 
remittances of at 
least US$1 in 
2003 
1960-2003 Dynamic panel-data 
model using GMM 
Dependent: 5-year logarithm differences in GDP per 
capita (i.e. logGDPPCt-logGDPPCt-5) 
Explanatory: Logarithm of lagged dependent variables, 
literacy rate (-5), logGFCF/GDP, logGFCF/GDP(-5), 
remittances (WR)/GDP, logarithm of labour force 
Poorer countries (those with less than 
US$1200 (2000) GDP per capita have 
greater positive impact of remittances on 
long-run growth. Savings react much 
more strongly than investment, with 
remittances reducing amounts of debts 
incurred and debt service paid. 
Fayissa and 
Nsiah (2010) 
18 Latin 
American 
countries 
1980-2005 
(unbalanced 
panel data) 
Dynamic panel-data 
model one-step GMM. 
Pooled OLS, FE and 
RE for robustness 
Dependent: Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Natural logarithm of) remittances 
(WR+CE) per capita, tertiary school enrolment, 
GFCF/GDP, FDI/GDP, ODA/GDP, other official 
flows/GDP, trade openness, economic reform index, 
exchange rate fluctuations 
Remittances have significant positive 
effects on economic growth in Latin 
America where the financial system is 
less developed. 
Kagochi et al. 
(2010) 
6 SSA countries 
(Botswana, 
Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, South 
Africa, 
Swaziland) 
1991-2007 Pooled OLS Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) Remittance (WR+CE+MT), 
GFCF per capita, population growth rate, human capital 
(proxied by life expectancy and education) 
Remittances are a positive determinant 
of economic growth in countries where 
GDP per capita is high, but in low GDP 
per capita countries, their effect is zero. 
Lartey (2010) 36 SSA 
countries 
1990-2008 Dynamic panel-data 
models within 2-step 
system GMM 
framework 
Dependent: Annual growth of GDP per capita 
Explanatory: Remittance (WR+CE+MT)/GDP, private 
sector credit/GDP), deposit money bank assets/GDP, 
government expenditure/GDP, inflation (GDP deflator 
based), FDI, trade openness, terms of trade, population 
growth rate (all in logs except GDP growth and inflation) 
Remittances have positive impact on 
economic growth just as the interaction 
effect of remittances and financial depth 
Morton et al. 
(2010) 
Largest 20 
remittance 
recipients as of 
2008 
1980-2008 Descriptive statistics 
and trend analysis 
alongside correlation 
coefficient 
Dependent: Real GDP per capita growth rate. Also, 
absolute real GDP per capita and annual GDP growth 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE)/GDP ratio, poverty 
headcount ratio (US$2 per day PPP as percentage of 
population), income share lowest 20 per cent of 
population, gross domestic savings, final consumption 
expenditure/GDP, capital formation growth rate, CPI, 
Remittances reduced poverty but 
aggravated income inequality. Traditional 
factors such as physical capital 
formation, human capital formation and 
good governance are found to be crucial 
determinants of growth. 
                                                          
134
 These SSA countries are Ethiopia (2 per cent), Kenya (5.4 per cent), Mali (3.3 per cent), Mauritius (2.9 per cent), Mozambique (1.3 per cent), Nigeria (6.7per cent), Rwanda (1.9 
per cent), Senegal (8.5 per cent), Sierra Leone (9.4 per cent), and Uganda (7.2 per cent). Figures in brackets are the remittances ratio to GDP in each sampled country in 2007 cited 
by authors. Conspicuously missing from the list of SSA countries are traditionally well-known largest remittance-recipients like Lesotho, Cape Verde, Gambia and Sudan. 
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literacy rate and population growth rate. 
Siddique et al. 
(2010) 
Bangladesh, 
India and Sri 
Lanka 
1976-2006 Granger-causality 
under VAR framework 
Dependent: Annual GDP per capita growth 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE+MT) per capita 
Remittances Granger-cause economic 
growth in Bangladesh. In Sri Lanka, the 
causal relation is bi-directional, whereas 
there exists no causal relationship in the 
case of India 
Singh et al. 
(2010) 
36 SSA 
countries 
1990-2008 Double log panel FE 
and panel FE 2SLS 
Dependent: Logarithm difference of real GDP per capita 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) Initial growth, remittances 
(WR+CE+MT)/GDP, M2/GDP, domestic credit/GDP, 
population growth, government expenditure/GDP, 
openness, terms of trade, political risk, real exchange 
rate, REMGDP*institutions and REMGDP*financial 
development 
Remittances have direct negative impact 
on economic growth, but countries with 
higher quality institutions have better 
potential for harnessing the contribution 
of remittances to growth 
Adenutsi (2011) Ghana 1987(3)-
2007(4) 
Dynamic equilibrium-
correction mechanism 
model, unrestricted co-
integration model and 
Granger-causality test 
Dependent: Natural logarithm of real GDP 
Explanatory: Natural logarithm of initial real GDP, 
secondary school enrolment as proxy for human capital 
formation, investment (GFCF/GDP), remittances 
(WR+CE)/GDP, and financial development indicators 
(M2/GDP and bank credit to private sector as ratio of 
total bank credit). Control variables include government 
expenditure/GDP, openness to trade (X+M)/GDP, 
exchange rate, CPI-based inflation, AID and FDI 
Although remittances generally promote 
economic growth in the short run and in 
the long run, their impact is low and lower 
in the long run. In the short run, there is a 
stronger lagged impact of remittances on 
growth. There is no causality between 
credit to the private sector remittance 
inflows, but a bi-directional causality 
exists between remittances and M2/GDP 
Ahmed et al. 
(2011) 
Pakistan 1976-2009 ARDL modelling by 
OLS 
Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP 
Explanatory: (Logarithm of) remittances 
(WR+CE+MT)/GDP, M2/GDP, government 
expenditure/GDP, dummy for natural calamity 
(earthquake) 
Remittances have both short-run and 
long-run significant positive impacts on 
economic growth. 
Fayissa and 
Nsiah (2011) 
64 countries 
from Africa (29), 
Asia (14) and 
LAC (21) 
1985-2007 Panel Unit-Root tests, 
co-integration model 
and Panel Fully-
Modified OLS 
(PFMOLS)  
Dependent: Logarithm of real GDP per capita  
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE) per capita, 
economic freedom, capita-labour ratio (GFCF/labour 
force), economic openness 
Remittances have significant positive 
impact on growth in all three regions as 
well as in the full sample as a group 
Cooray (2012) Six South Asian 
countries (India, 
Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Maldives, 
Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka) 
1970-2008 Dynamic panel-data 
modelling by sys-GMM. 
Also, OLS and FE 
Model 
Dependent: Natural log of output per capita 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP ratio, 
human capital development proxied by secondary 
school enrolment, government expenditure as ratio of 
GDP, openness proxied by (X/GDP), FDI/GDP, polity 
index by Marshall & Jaggers for institutional quality 
Remittances are found to have a direct 
significant positive impact on economic 
growth. Remittances also have significant 
positive interactive effects on growth 
through educational levels and financial 
sector development 
Source: Author‟s compilation from various sources. Note: WR, CE and MT denote workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees and migrants‟ transfers respectively as defined in 
Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL-IMPACT OF REMITTANCES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter verifies whether or not international remittance inflows contribute to various 
aspects of economic development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The aspects of economic 
development outcomes covered in this study are those related to poverty, income inequality, 
labour market, human welfare and development, and financial development. In the case of 
financial market development, an attempt was made to investigate whether remittances had 
varying impact on SSA countries over time as the pursuit of financial liberalisation programme 
progressed. Consequently, the background information on the relevance of this chapter is 
presented in Section 7.1. This is followed by the review of the theoretical and the empirical 
literature on remittance inflows and economic development in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 
discusses the econometric issues as related to the analytical framework and the empirical 
model. This section also outlines issues related to the data used for the empirical analysis. In 
Section 7.4, the empirical results are presented and discussed, whilst Section 7.5 concludes 
with policy implications and recommendations. 
 
7.1 BACKGROUND 
Arguably, international migration and its consequential effects on the economic transformation 
of migrant-home countries have received the most attention from academics, policy makers 
and researchers in the area of development economics and finance in this era of globalisation. 
The upsurge of research interest in international migrant remittances, in particular, is not too 
surprising given the magnitude and stability in the positive growth trend. There is one other 
important reason why a lot of policy research on the implications of remittances for economic 
development might have overtaken related studies on other forms of development finance 
since the recognition of remittances as an alternative source of development finance. Unlike all 
other forms of development finance, remittances can have a direct impact on the disintegrated 
levels of a remittance-receiving economy. Consequently, from the theoretical perspective, the 
direct linkages of international remittances and economic development can be explored at 
three possible levels – micro, meso, and macro.  
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At the micro level, remittances are a major source of additional income for sustenance and 
capital for financing small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) in remittance-receiving 
households. Unlike aid, remittances flow directly to individual households and institutions; and 
unlike loans they attract no direct interest and financial repayment obligations. Besides 
contributing to increased consumption in the short run by empowering recipients to settle food, 
clothing, shelter, healthcare, funerals and festival bills and so on, remittances can engineer 
longer term development processes through investment in education, skills training, land, 
housing, and SMEs. At the meso level, local communities can benefit from social development 
projects such as the construction of roads, schools, and hospitals as well as the supply of 
educational materials and healthcare equipment, initiated and funded by overseas-based 
associations of native migrants. Associations of migrants can also mobilise funding through 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other development-oriented organisations in 
support of important social projects such as vaccination against communicable diseases and 
the provision of potable water in their local communities back home. Accordingly, besides the 
indirect trickling down effects, families without international migrants can also benefit directly 
from international migration at the meso level. 
 
At the macro level, international remittances are an essential source of foreign exchange, as 
they inject substantial foreign capital into an economy which may help remittance-receiving 
countries to stabilise the macroeconomy through reduction in balance of payments (BoP) 
problems and budget deficits. On the reverse side, remittances may contribute to destabilising 
the macroeconomy of the receiving countries by sparking inflation through excess demand and 
worsening BoP problems in import-dependent small-open economies. Meanwhile, remittance 
inflows are also generally countercyclical as they increase during economic downturns; hence, 
they contribute significantly to accommodating various forms of negative natural and 
macroeconomic shocks in migrant-home countries. For instance, global evidence has 
consistently shown that remittance inflows have always increased in disaster and conflict 
inflicted countries (Clarke and Wallsten, 2004; Yang, 2007; Yang and Choi, 2007). Besides, 
remittance inflows have consistently remained the most resilient form of private external capital 
during global financial crises and violent conflicts in migrant-home developing countries.135 In 
this sense, international remittances represent a more stable source of poverty reduction than 
other forms of capital inflows, at least, at the macro level. And as available statistics suggests, 
                                                          
135
 The World Bank estimates that in disaster-afflicted Haiti remittances represent about 17 per cent GDP in 2001, 
while in some areas of war-torn Somalia, they accounted for up to 40 per cent of GDP in the late 1990s. 
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international remittances are more equally spread across developing countries than other forms 
of foreign capital.  
 
It can, thus, be said that depending upon the structure of the economy of a migrant-home 
country, remittances can play a direct role in the economic development of a country through 
increased consumption of the basic needs of life, job creation, financial market development, 
human capital development, poverty alleviation, and economic empowerment. Remittances do 
not only directly affect the various units of the economy of the remittance-recipient economy, 
but they also have the potential to influence migrant-home countries indirectly in a number of 
ways. Remittances received in excess of present consumption can be saved which could then 
put financial institutions in a better position to expand credit at a relatively reduced cost. This, in 
turn, can lead to higher job creation and poverty reduction. In fact, such private investments 
can even attract additional investment, either by decreasing the risks of specific projects for 
private investors, or by establishing business networks and openings that promise new 
business opportunities for private financial institutions and multinational companies. Despite 
these, from theoretical perspective, the implications of migrant remittances on labour 
productivity and income inequality are far from being universally conclusive when the issue of 
moral hazards, further migration of highly-trained labour, and the socioeconomic background of 
migrants are broadly considered. In this respect, at the macro level, the extent to which 
migrants remittances can impact on any specific developmental outcomes in a migrant-home 
economy can be seen as being dependent upon some macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
Following from the above, an analysis of the effects of remittances at each level – micro, meso, 
and macro – should provide the best and the most comprehensive insight into the actual direct 
effects of migrant remittances on economic development in migrant-home countries. However, 
achieving such an objective seems impossible across countries in the absence of accurate and 
reliable micro- and meso-level data in the sampled countries. Accordingly, the focus of this 
study is to explore the implications of remittances for economic development at the macro 
level, based on the principle that the micro and meso effects of remittances on economic 
development will, in the long run, reflect at the macro level. Meanwhile, empirical studies on the 
impact of remittances on developmental outcomes have been far from being conclusive, 
irrespective of the level of the analyses (see Table A7.1), justifying the theoretical stance that, 
at any level of empirical analysis, migrant remittance inflows can have both forward and 
backward linkages to the development prospects of migrant-home countries. 
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This study, therefore, seeks to contribute to filling this research gap by providing answers to the 
following research questions within the context of SSA: 
 
i. Do migrant remittances reduce poverty headcount, poverty gap and poverty severity?  
 
ii. What is the impact of migrant remittance inflows on income inequality? 
 
iii. What is the impact of migrant remittances on human welfare and development 
outcomes such as educational attainment and life expectancy? 
 
iv. How do migrant remittance inflows affect labour market outcomes with reference to 
labour productivity, labour participation and unemployment? 
 
v. To what extent do migrant remittances promote financial market development? And, 
does the impact of remittances on financial market development change over time as 
the pursuit of policies under the financial liberalisation programme progresses? 
 
vi. Do migrant remittances have a universal impact on various aspects of economic 
development in all categories of countries? Otherwise, which category of countries 
benefit the most from receiving international migrant remittance inflows as far as 
economic development is concerned? 
 
Finding the appropriate answers to each of the above-stated questions constitutes the 
underlying objective of this chapter. Nevertheless, with respect to SSA, the specific objectives 
that this chapter seeks to achieve are: 
 
i. To determine the impact of international migrant remittance inflows on poverty. 
 
ii. To examine the impact of international migrant remittance inflows on income inequality. 
 
iii. To evaluate the effects of international migrant remittance inflows on human welfare 
and development outcomes viz. human development indicators, educational attainment 
and life expectancy. 
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iv. To determine the impact of migrant remittance inflows on labour market outcomes such 
as labour productivity, labour participation, and unemployment. 
 
v. To evaluate the impact of migrant remittance inflows on financial development. 
 
vi. To examine if, in each case (i.e. objectives i-v), the developmental-impact of migrant 
remittance inflows change over time as financial liberalisation policies are implemented. 
 
vii. To verify if, in each particular case (i.e. objectives i-v), the developmental-impact of 
migrant remittance inflows has a size-effect and, if so, estimate the impact of the size-
effect on economic development with particular reference to each specific indicator of 
economic development. 
 
This study is important because the recent euphoria concerning the upsurge of international 
migrant remittances has attracted an appreciable number of empirical studies on the possible 
implications of remittances for economic development across the developing world of which 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a part. To date, comprehensive macroeconomic policy options for 
the developmental-impact of migrant remittances have not been studied in any systematic way. 
For instance, the negative effects of remittances on one developmental outcome (say, (lower) 
labour participation) could be due to the positive effects of remittances on another 
developmental outcome (say, (higher) educational attainment)136. 
 
7.2 THE LITERATURE ON REMITTANCE INFLOWS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
7.2.1 Theories of the Developmental-Impact of International Migrant Remittances 
Theoretically, three main schools of thought can be identified concerning the possible long-run 
impact of international remittances on „labour-exporting‟ developing countries. These schools of 
thought are the remittance-optimistic developmental, the remittance-pessimistic structural 
dependence and the transnational-migrant remittance based on the theories of international 
migrant migration137. The theories of international migration are being applied to international 
remittance flows because of the absence of an existing specific theory on international migrant 
                                                          
136
 This can happen when remittances are used to finance the education and training of children of school going age 
who were hitherto out of school due to poverty, and are compelled to work for income in support of their families. 
137
 The main theories of international migration are the migration optimism (also known as the developmentalist and 
neoclassical school of the 1950s and 1960s), the migration pessimism (or the historical structural dependency 
school of the 1970s and 1980s) and the migration pluralism (or the New Economics of Labour Migration and 
Livelihood School) which has been dominating the approaches to analysing the effects of international migration 
since the 1990s (de Haas, 2007). 
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remittances in the context of economic development from a macroeconomic perspective. In 
connection with this, it is important to note that even though it is generally known that migration 
is a pre-requisite for receiving migrant remittances, it is also possible that the desire for 
receiving remittances can influence international migration. Actually, there is evidence138 to 
show that the receipt of migrant remittances in developing countries can engender further 
migration139 to the industrialised world. 
 
From the viewpoint of the developmentalist school, international remittances have a strong 
potential to accelerate economic development processes in both industrialised „labour-
importing‟ countries and non-industrialised „labour-exporting‟ countries, as large scale South-
North migration is adequately compensated for by large scale North-South migrant remittances 
leading to international factor price equalisation. In other words, labour is transferred from 
capital-constrained developing countries where labour is abundant and, often in excess supply, 
hence relatively cheaper, to labour-constrained industrialised countries where capital is in 
abundant and, often in excess supply hence relatively cheaper. Proponents, notably, 
Kindleberger (1965), Beijer (1970), Penninx (1982), and Stark et al. (1997) of this neoclassical-
inclined doctrine argue that, all other things remaining equal, international migration can, 
therefore, lead to an increase in global production of goods and services, especially as 
technological knowledge, attitudes, modernisation, information, rational and democratic ideas 
are also transferred to developing countries. For instance, international remittances can 
contribute positively to the removal of production and investment constraints, raising real 
income levels, and lessening, if not solving the perennial BoP problems of developing 
countries. In addition, remittances can help to narrow the trade gap, control external debt, 
facilitate debt servicing, reduce exchange rate volatility and accumulate foreign exchange. The 
developmentalist school also argues that the emergence of migration on the global scene is 
aiding the industrialised countries in increasing production at a faster rate than it would have 
been possible without access to cheap labour from developing countries. Therefore, 
international migration has a two-sided positive impact on the global economy. On the side of 
the „labour-importing‟ industrialised countries, increased supply of labour as a result of 
immigration reduces the cost of hiring labour, whilst on the side of the „labour-exporting‟ 
                                                          
138
 See, for example, Cox and Jimenez (1992) for Peru, and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) for Pakistan. 
139
 This can happen in two possible ways: (i) When sponsored migrants under implicit social contract with their 
sponsors (often their families) are obliged to remit in order to finance another family member (see Poirine, 1997; 
Brown and Poirine, 2005). (ii) When non-migrant families, upon seeing the life-transforming impact of remittances on 
the families of a migrant, decide to sponsor a family member to go abroad for the purpose of receiving remittances. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
304 
 
developing countries, the emigration of „excess‟ labour reduces the supply of labour, thereby 
increasing the cost of hiring labour towards equilibrium in the international labour market. 
 
Besides the direct positive effects of international remittances on socioeconomic development, 
the developmentalist school also contends that even when migrants fail to return home they 
often contribute to financing development projects in their native communities either personally 
or through their involvement in the activities of charitable organisations in countries where they 
are permanently resident (Massey et al. 1998). Furthermore, from the experiences gained from 
abroad, returnee migrants often act as agents of positive social change in governance, 
innovation and entrepreneurship in their home countries. Consequently, in the long run, 
developing countries stand to gain from the migration of their nationals who would otherwise 
have been unemployed or underemployed and lowly paid at home. This benefit comes directly 
through remittances, and indirectly through other afore-stated channels such as donations, 
social work, skills and knowledge transfers. 
 
The remittance-pessimistic structural dependence school that emerged in the 1970s following 
the global economic decline with industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment as a 
result of the 1973 oil crisis contends that international migration drains underdeveloped 
migrant-home countries of skilled labour. The remittance-pessimist school further argues that 
international migration crowds-out domestic production of tradable goods in the brain-drained 
underdeveloped economy. This school of thought does not see how the negative effects of 
brain drain can adequately be compensated for by the receipt of international remittances. The 
remittance-pessimistic theorists (Almeida, 1973; Bhagwati, 1976; Lipton, 1980; Reichert, 1981; 
Taylor, 1984; Rubenstein, 1992) argue that international migration only reinforces the 
underdevelopment syndrome of developing countries through lower production capacity and 
over-dependency, as remittances received are not adequate compensation for the lost labour 
efforts in developing countries.  
 
More specifically, remittance-pessimists contend that it is the industrialised countries that stand 
to gain more in international migration through access to cheap labour, and high taxation on 
migrant earnings and even commissions on transferring remittances. In effect, the low wages 
paid to migrants in industrialised economies are not sufficient to help in narrowing the 
development gap between the North and the South. Worst of all, even when remittances are 
received in large amounts, there are very good reasons to predict that, given the abysmally low 
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incomes and widespread poverty in developing countries, it is difficult or impossible to avoid 
conspicuous consumption and put remittances into productive use (Lipton, 1980; Entzinger, 
1985; Lewis, 1986). This can include remittances being “wasted” on housing, family debt 
settlement, land purchase, land and chieftaincy litigations, transportation, funerals, festivals, 
financing conflicts, leisure, and other non-productive goods and services. In this case, 
remittances can destabilise the macroeconomy by way of demand-pull inflation (Russell, 
1986a,b; Appleyard, 1989; Rubenstein, 1992), with higher trade deficit in developing countries 
which are predominantly net importers of essential goods. Furthermore, it is argued that higher 
remittance inflows may aggravate higher income inequality as the very poorest cannot afford to 
send a family member abroad (Lipton, 1980; Stahl, 1982). The tendency for further migration is 
also high when more remittances are received in low-income countries. Another possible 
negative consequence of higher inflow of remittances in the household is the moral hazard 
problem when recipients reduce work efforts (Chami et al. 2005); and at the national level, 
governments of developing countries may also over rely on these funds rather than 
implementing sustainable pro-growth economic policies. 
 
Subsequent to the more recent emergence of the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
paradigm as proposed by Stark, (1978; 1991), Stark and Bloom (1985), Taylor (1999), Bracking 
(2003), Carling (2004) and Robinson (2004) it is possible to identify a third school of thought, 
the transnational-migrant remittance school based on the concept of pluralism. This school 
sought to reconcile the two strictly divergent perceptions on the outcome of international 
migration by focusing on how remittances together with socioeconomic networks, link local and 
global development processes (Levitt, 2001). This approach does not restrict itself to 
considering financial remittance flows alone, but also takes into account the flow of goods, 
services and new ideas that impact on the broader social fabric and structures of the 
economies of both „labour-importing‟ and „labour-exporting‟ countries (Datta et al. 2006). By 
taking a balanced view of the implications of international migration, the transnational migrant-
remittance school focuses on how remittances are embedded within an emerging structure 
where various economic, social, institutional and even political transactions occur. This neo-
liberalist functionalist ideology relates migration decisions with the impact of migration to 
collective household survival and the pursuit of income and/or initial capital for productive 
investment as a means of insuring against both income and production risks at the household 
level (Stark, 1978; 1991; Taylor, 1999; Stark and Levhari, 1982). This is the fundamental 
reason why remittances are seen as being beneficial at the household level with positive spill-
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overs to the national economy; as with increased disposable incomes, effective demand for 
industrial goods and services increase, and this, in turn, stimulates domestic production 
(Skeldon, 2002; Ratha, 2003). Higher remittance inflows may also result in the increased 
vibrancy of domestic capital markets and the expansion of productive infrastructure (Ballard, 
2004).  
 
According to Vertovec (1999), the transnationally adopted identities and connections between 
international migrants and migrant households in home countries can lead to radical 
modernisation of telecommunication infrastructure such as cellular networks, telephone, 
internet, and satellite, as migrants remit through globalised banking systems. Therefore, the 
transnational-migrant remittance school hypothesis is essential to the understanding of the 
framework within which migrants remit as it does not only take cognisance of how remittances 
reinforce and create inequality and differentiation, but it also recognises the fact that these 
private transfers have various degrees of positive social effects and, hence, have a huge 
potential to contribute to poverty alleviation and socioeconomic transformation (Ballard, 2004; 
Carling, 2004). It is probably due to the broad inclusiveness of the transnational-migrant 
remittance theory inferred from the NELM doctrine that explains its dominance in analytical 
studies over the past two or three decades (see Table A7.1). The quest to follow the pluralist 
dimension of the popular transnational-migrant remittance theory explains the underlying 
analytical macroeconometric framework of this chapter. 
 
7.2.2 Literature Review on Effects of Remittances and Developmental Outcomes 
In addition to the summary of reviews of the impact of remittances on economic development 
reported in Table A7.1, in this section, a classified approach has been adopted to review 
empirical studies on the effects of international remittances on poverty, income inequality, 
human capital development and financial market development.   
 
7.2.2.1 Effects of International Remittances on Poverty and Income Inequality 
From both theoretical and empirical literature, it seems that there is less controversy 
concerning the positive effects of remittances on poverty in migrant-home countries than the 
possible conflicting effects on income inequality. The main theoretical debate centres on the 
fact that it is only households with relatively higher incomes that can afford to finance the cost 
of international migration. Therefore, international migrant remittances can widen income 
inequality in migrant-home countries (Lipton, 1980; Stahl, 1982). This poses a serious 
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challenge to policy makers, given that inequality is often a determinant of poverty140 as it 
indirectly undermines long-run growth by reducing motivation for optimal labour productivity 
and, hence, can result in the perpetuation of the poverty cycle. 
 
Adams (1991), in a micro-level study based on a survey of 1000 households in rural Egypt, 
using income data from households with and without migrants to determine the effects of 
remittances on poverty, income distribution and rural development, observes that migrant 
remittances were important in alleviating poverty. For a sample of 77 developing countries over 
the period 1980-2008, the UN (2011) obtained a similar poverty-alleviating impact of 
remittances. However, Adams (1991) concludes that despite the direct poverty-mitigating 
effects of international remittances, they also contributed to inequality in the distribution of 
income. Chimhowu et al. (2004) provide evidence in support of the view that remittances do 
increase inequality at a national level, but internationally they transfer resources from 
developed to developing countries, thereby contributing to reducing income inequality across 
countries. Analogous to these inequality-aggravation findings is the result obtained by 
Rodriguez (1998) on Philippines.  
 
In contrast, inequality-reducing effects of remittances were found by Barham and Boucher 
(1998) for Nicaragua; Adams (2006) in the case of Ghana; and the World Bank (2007) for 
households in East European and former Soviet Union countries. Gustafsson and Makonnen 
(1993) reveal that in Lesotho, migrant remittances do not only reduce poverty but they actually 
decrease income inequality. For Mexico, Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda (2007) find that 
remittance-recipient households are less likely to be poor, based on the National Household 
Survey Data on income and expenditure for year 2002. Evidence from various cross-country 
studies including those by Adams and Page (2005), Spatafora (2005), Acosta et al. (2008b), 
Shafiq et al. (2012) and Orzell (2013) lend support to the fact that remittances directly reduce 
poverty; whilst many more studies including those by Stark et al. (1986), Taylor (1992), 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), and Unger (2005) show that remittances directly reduce 
inequality. 
 
7.2.2.2 Effects of International Remittances on Labour Market Outcomes 
The question as to whether remittances affect labour market outcomes is very important 
because migrant remittances are received at the cost of losing the participation of the emigrant 
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 See Table A7.1 for evidence on empirical models on poverty. 
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in the home-country labour market. It is also known that remittances can directly affect the 
labour market in a number of ways including: (i) job creation when remittances are driven by 
the investment motive; (ii) job creation through market expansion when remittances are spent 
on locally produced goods and services; and (iii) higher economic inefficiency which increases 
the unemployment rate (especially of the other factors of production) through reduced output 
level due to brain drain. International remittances can also affect the labour market indirectly, 
through moral hazard effects, because when they are received in „satisfactory‟ amounts and 
become permanent incomes, they can reduce productivity and participation of labour. 
Theoretically, the extent to which remittances (as compensation for losing the services of a 
migrant at home) can affect the labour market of the migrant-home country is dependent upon 
the degree of friction in the domestic labour market in question.  
 
According to Pond and McPake (2006), almost a quarter of the new overseas trained 
physicians that registered with the National Health Services of the United Kingdom between the 
years 2002 and 2003 came from SSA alone. The large-scale emigration of skilled professionals 
has created high job vacancies in some key sectors in many SSA countries, but it is common 
knowledge that developing countries like those in SSA have high rates of graduate 
unemployment and underemployment141,142. Based on survey data on the city of Managua in 
Nicaragua, Funkhouser (1992) finds that international remittances lead to about five per cent 
reduction in the labour force participation of women, as well as by 2.1 per cent of men. At the 
same time, however, remittances increase the probability of self-employment by 1.2 per cent 
among men and 1.1 per cent among women. Hanson (2007), based on the 2000 population 
census survey, obtains similar results for Mexico where remittances reduce female labour 
supply relatively more than in the case of male remittance recipients. 
 
In Zambia and Zimbabwe, just like in Ghana, Bach (2006) finds that the annual rate of attrition 
in public health employment due to emigration ranges between 15 per cent and 40 per cent. In 
another empirical work, Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009) find that, on the average, 20 per cent 
of SSA tertiary educated population above 15 years of age are employed in OECD countries 
compared with less than 10 per cent for South Asia. And within SSA, Angola, Guinea-Bissau 
and Mozambique have expatriation rates in excess of 50 per cent of their tertiary educated 
                                                          
141
 Bhagwati (1976) argues that brain drain can have a detrimental effect on economic development of migrant-
sending countries because even where skilled labour is unemployed, their social marginal impact is not necessarily 
zero as they could move inland the countryside, where they would have been employed productively. 
142
 However, the issue of underemployment and rural unemployment as is the common case in contemporary SSA 
can neutralise Bhagwati‟s argument. 
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population. Of the top-10 countries with the highest emigration rate of tertiary educated 
population, six are from SSA alone.143 Strangely, with the exception of Mauritius, none of these 
six SSA countries mentioned as having exported the most educated migrants is a major 
recipient of remittances in terms of actual volume or in relative terms. This seems to confirm 
earlier conclusions by Steiner and Velling (1994) and Rodriguez and Horton (1995), that the 
educational level of migrants has no impact on the amount of funds transferred in the form of 
remittances144. However, even if remittances are spent on domestically produced consumables, 
they are expected to carry substantial positive multiplier effects on employment that can 
manifest in the labour market. Increased demand for domestically produced goods and 
services, increased retail activities and small-scale industrialisation, hence, higher demand for 
factor inputs, are some of these positive effects. Also, Ratha (2003) finds that the negative 
effects of brain drain are largely offset by inward migrant remittances. It is, therefore, important 
to explore the extent to which remittances have been able to impact on labour market 
outcomes in SSA as a sub-region. 
 
7.2.2.3 Effects of International Remittances on Human Development and Welfare 
From the typology of the uses of remittances (see Chapter 4), it is clear that migrant 
remittances in excess of daily consumption expenditure are spent on financing education, 
vocational training and improved access to quality healthcare services, each of which promotes 
the development of human capital. This implies that remittances could contribute directly to 
reducing income constraints that limit maximum human capital investment for optimal labour 
productivity. Human capital accumulation is central to the economic development prospects of 
a country through higher labour productivity and greater prospects of reducing dependency 
ratios and breaking the seemingly perpetuating cycle of poverty. However, the effects of 
remittances on human capital development seem ambiguous in the face of international 
migration because: (i) it is active labour with relevant skills that can be attracted to compete 
more favourably in the international labour market, and are therefore the most likely to jump 
onto the exodus wagon; (ii) skilled labour can only contribute meaningfully to economic 
development of their native countries if they are gainfully employed and retained in a skilled 
                                                          
143
 These are Guinea-Bissau (70.4 per cent), Angola (53.8 per cent), Mozambique (52.3 per cent), Mauritius (50.3 
per cent), Gambia (42.4 per cent), and Burundi (35.0 per cent). And among the top-20 countries, 75 per cent are 
SSA countries (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2009 based on OECD, Trends in International Migration Database, 2006). 
144
 Possible explanations for this are: (i) migrants with higher levels of education might not necessarily be coming 
from poor homes where remittances are much more needed to augment meagre family incomes; and (ii) educated 
migrants are more likely to have residential status, given the quality of their skills and, hence, are more likely to 
reunite with their families in the foreign country when compared with their illiterate counterparts. 
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related profession in the home country; and (iii) even where highly skilled citizens migrate into 
the Diaspora, they are not necessarily the highest remitters (Rodriguez and Horton, 1995). 
 
Conclusions from empirical studies have been largely unanimous on the fact that migrant 
remittance inflows directly promote human capital development in migrant-home countries. For 
instance, in Zimbabwe, although households with migrants abroad tend to have less cultivated 
lands, these remittance beneficiary households also tend to have a higher level education than 
their non-remittance receiving counterparts (de Haan, 2000). Duryea et al. (2005) find 
significant evidence for lower incidence of infant mortality when female participation in the 
labour market was reduced upon receipt of remittances. This is likely to result from a higher 
time allocation to maternal care. Using the case of Philippines, Yang (2004) shows that 
reduced labour force participation is associated with increased school attainment among 
Pilipino children aged between 17 and 21 years in remittance-recipient households. Cox-
Edwards and Ureta (2003) also find that remittances directly and instantaneously reduce 
school dropout rate in El Salvador. For Mexico, López-Córdova (2005) confirms earlier results 
by Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) that in remittance-
recipient homes, illiteracy rates are lower among boys and girls of school going age and 
teenagers. For a group of Latin American countries, Acosta et al. (2008b) obtain a similar result 
whereby migrant remittances enhance educational attainment even when counterfactual 
scenarios of migration without remittances, and, no migration and, hence, no remittances were 
taken into account. 
 
With regard to the direct role of remittances in promoting human capital accumulation through 
higher access to improved healthcare system in developing migrant-sending countries where 
public healthcare is inefficient and pro-rich in the absence of an effective universal health 
insurance system, international evidence has shown that remittances have been most useful. 
In Mexico, for instance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) report that remittances received 
directly increase healthcare expenditure by households, and that these expenditures are more 
responsive to increases in remittances than non-remittance incomes. Duryea et al. (2005) 
conclude from an empirical study on Mexico that migrant remittances have a direct positive 
impact on reducing infant mortality through higher mother-child time allocation, increased 
access to improved housing conditions and potable water. Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005) 
also find international remittances to have reduced child mortality rate and increased birth 
weight of infants from remittance-receiving households in Mexico. Similarly, from a study 
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carried out on Mexican municipalities, López-Córdova (2005) reports that as more remittances 
are received, infant mortality declines. In the case of 11 Latin American countries, Acosta et al. 
(2008b) also discover that remittances contribute substantially to improvements in health 
indicators. To provide an insight into the empirics of the effects of migrant remittances on 
human development and welfare in SSA, this chapter explores the implications of international 
remittances received for both dimensions – educational attainment and life expectancy as well 
as integrated human welfare. 
 
7.2.2.4 Effects of International Remittances on Financial Market Development 
The large volume and strong stability in the inflow of migrant remittances offer remittance-
receiving developing countries a good opportunity to develop their financial sector in order to 
attract more official inflow of these funds from their citizens residing abroad. A financial sector 
is considered as developed if financial intermediaries can more freely and efficiently provide 
quality and reliable payments mechanism, facilities for financial resource mobilisation and 
credit allocation, information symmetry, liquidity and risk mitigation (Pagano, 1993; World Bank, 
2005). Essentially, McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Fry (1995), Kar and Pentecost (2000), and 
the  World Bank (2005) consider financial development to be  a consequence of financial 
liberalisation since the pursuit of financial repressive policies undermines the scope and pace 
of financial development.  
 
Theoretically, migrant remittances can either substitute or complement the role of the financial 
sector in resource mobilisation and allocation depending upon the level of financial 
development in migrant-home countries. According to the substitutability hypothesis of 
remittances, the restricted access of the private sector to the formal sector credit in low-income 
countries where credit markets are imperfect and the financial sector is underdeveloped can be 
partially offset by higher inflows of remittances (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). The inflow of 
high international remittances allows recipients to invest in high return investment projects 
despite the difficulties in accessing bank credit. Besides, it is this credit constraint awareness 
that compels migrants to remit more funds home in excess of family consumption and to 
potential investors who lack the collateral assets to access credit from the formal financial 
market. Therefore, in the case of the substitutability hypothesis, there is an inverse relationship 
between financial development (FDV) and international remittance inflows, such that, if 
( , )FDVfREMPC  and 0 1 2FDV REMPC  , then 1FDV REMPC 
 

, but 
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1
ˆ 0  ; where 1ˆ  and   denote estimated 1  and other macroeconomic determinants of FDV 
respectively; and when any possible reverse causality between FDV and REMPC is ignored. 
 
On the contrary, the complementarity hypothesis of remittances holds when higher international 
remittance inflows and a higher degree of financial development foster each other. According to 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), in economies where capital market imperfections are limited 
and access to credit is readily available, and where potential investors can rely on the financial 
sector; remittances can be counter-productive and have moral hazard effects. On the one 
hand, a country receives more international remittances because of a higher degree of financial 
development, which results in higher financial sophistication and reduced transaction costs 
associated with remittance inflows. In other words, the propensity to remit through the formal 
financial system increases as the financial sector of the migrant-home country develops and 
there is higher access to quality financial services and innovative financial products at 
competitive prices. On the other hand, higher inflows of international remittances stimulate the 
incentive of formal financial institutions, including the monetary authorities, to implement 
prudent legal and institutional reforms to boost remittance inflows as well as enhance the 
productive uses of remittances received. Accordingly, higher levels of financial development 
help migrants to remit more, and in turn, a significant inflow of remittances contributes to the 
development of the domestic financial system in many ways, but, in particular, financial 
inclusion (Terry and Wilson, 2005). For the complementarity hypothesis of remittances to be 
valid with respect to how remittances contribute to financial development in migrant-home 
countries, it is expected that, once it is established that, in general, ( , )FDVfREMPC , 
and, specifically, 0 1 2FDV REMPC  , then 1ˆ 0.FDVREMPC
 
  
 
The World Bank (2005) asserts that financial development can be determined from five main 
dimensions. These are the ability of financial intermediaries to provide savings facilities for 
resource mobilisation, credit allocation and the monitoring of borrowers, payment mechanisms, 
risk mitigation, and liquidity services (World Bank, 2005). There are a set of indicators for each 
of these aspects of financial development, as shown in Table 7.1. 
 
Of the numerous indicators of financial development, this study adopts only two measures – 
broad money to GDP ratio and private bank credit as ratio of GDP – due mainly to data 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
313 
 
limitations on the other indicators in the sampled countries; and for the sake of comparability 
with a majority of previous related studies. 
 
Table 7.1: Functions of Financial System and Financial Sector Development Indicators 
Function Key Indicators 
Provision of savings 
facilities for resource 
mobilisation 
 Broad money (M2) to GDP 
 Ratio of bank deposits to GDP 
 Proportion of population with bank accounts 
 Total number of bank branches 
 Population per bank branch 
 Distribution of branches and other outlets 
 Household and corporate holdings of non-bank financial assets  
Credit allocation and 
monitoring of 
borrowers 
 Private sector bank credit as ratio of GDP 
 Ratio of bank loans to bank deposits 
 Volume of finance raised from the issuance of bonds and money market instruments 
Provision of 
payments 
mechanism 
 Proportion of payments (volume and value) made with different payment instruments 
 Number of days for clearing cheques 
 Number and distribution of clearing centres 
Risk mitigation  Ratio of insurance premiums to GDP 
 Number of insurance and derivative products and services available 
 Insurance and derivative products held as a ratio of population 
Provision of liquidity 
services 
 Interest rate spread 
 Interest rate structure 
 Prices of basic financial services  
Source: Author based on World Bank (2005) 
 
Broad money to GDP: According to the World Bank (2005: 20), “the overall extent of financial 
savings can be ascertained by examining the level and trends in the ratio of broad money to 
GDP”. Broad money is recorded as M2 or M3 in the standing of money supply by monetary 
authorities, although data on M3 is relatively scarce in many developing countries. This 
indicator, specifically 2( / )M GDP , which is the standard and most commonly used indicator of 
financial sector development (World Bank, 1989; Kar and Pentecost, 2000) may, however, 
inflate the real size and depth of the financial sector if currency (M1) constitutes a high 
proportion of broad money (De Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; World Bank, 2005). When 
currency outside the banking system constitutes a larger proportion of broad money, then the 
use of broad money as a ratio to nominal GDP merely measures the degree of monetisation 
rather than financial development. Cash-based economies, a common feature of 
underdeveloped financial systems, automatically have a higher degree of monetisation in the 
absence of other sophisticated financial instruments. Accordingly, De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995), suggest the use of less liquid forms of monetary aggregates (i.e. M2 or M3) as a proxy 
for financial sector development. However, the problem of monetisation could still be present if 
M2 or M3 is measured as M1 plus quasi money, which indeed is the case, taking into 
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consideration the vertical composition of money supply as recorded in the Balance Sheets of 
Central Banks. In this case, it would have been more appropriate to use (M2 or M3 minus M1) as 
a ratio of GDP to measure FDV in highly monetised SSA countries. Yet, data on M1 over the 
study period, 1980-2009, is lacking in most of the sampled SSA countries. In spite of the 
limitation of 2 /M GDP  as an indicator of FDV, it continues to enjoy a popular patronage in 
empirical studies. Some of the recent studies that used 2 /M GDP  in the remittance literature 
include those of de Leon-Manlagnit (2006), Drinkwater et al. (2006), Shahbaz et al. (2007), 
Ebeke and Le Goff (2009), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009), 
and Adenutsi (2011). 
 
Bank credit to private sector as a ratio to GDP: According to Kar and Pentecost (2000: 6), this 
“is one of the five most commonly used proxies for financial development” to evaluate the 
extent of financial intermediation by banks. Bank credit to private as a ratio to GDP is 
considered as a more direct measure of financial intermediation when compared with domestic 
credit/GDP ratio because the former directly captures the proportion of credit extended by 
banks to finance productive private-sector investment projects. In other words, bank credit to 
government agencies and state institutions are excluded from the computation of this indicator. 
The underlying theory is that the private sector, unlike the public sector, is more efficient in 
utilising debt capital because the private sector is confronted with more stringent loan 
repayment obligations, a higher quest for entrepreneurial success and an intrinsic desire to 
avoid perpetual dependency on debt capital. Notwithstanding the fact that this indicator 
exclusively measures credit directed at the private sector, one major limitation145 of this 
indicator is that it does not suggest how bank loans to the private sector are actually utilised. 
Financial development is expected to culminate in raising returns on investment and reducing 
the cost of capital and the risk of investment by ameliorating information symmetry, reducing 
information and transactions cost, and facilitating risk management (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Wurgler, 2000). However, this indicator does not provide information related to these aspects of 
financial development (Levine et al. 2000). All the same, private sector credit to GDP enjoys 
extensive patronage in empirical studies as shown in Table A7.1 in the Appendix. 
 
                                                          
145
 Another critical drawback for using this indicator of financial development for countries in SSA is that many of the 
countries in the sub-region included credit to public enterprises as part of private sector claims, especially before as 
well as in the earlier years of economic reforms. Meanwhile, during those years, it was state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) that received the majority of the credits extended by banks, the majority of the banks which were also state 
owned (various SSA Central Bank reports). 
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So far, conclusions from available empirical studies have been quite unanimous on the direct 
positive impact of migrant remittance inflows on financial development in remittance-recipient 
countries (see Drinkwater, 2006; Acosta et al., 2008a; Shahbaz et al., 2007; Gheeraert et al. 
2010; Gani and Sharma, 2013), with this impact often turning more robust in countries with 
lowly-developed financial markets as implied by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009). 
 
The financial development strategies that developing countries can adopt to attract a higher 
inflow of official remittances include lowering the cost of international funds transfers, widening 
financial services to advance financial inclusion; providing offshore banking facilities; and rolling 
out innovative financial products with diversified risks. Meanwhile, Acosta, Baerg and 
Mandelman (2009) show that well-developed financial markets of remittance-recipient countries 
can be important in channelling remittances into productive uses in migrant-home countries. It 
is for this reason that examining the impact of remittances on financial development should be 
seen as vital to the understanding of the development prospects of migrant remittance inflows 
in SSA as a region where the majority of the countries have underdeveloped financial markets.  
 
7.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA ISSUES 
7.3.1 Analytical Framework and Empirical Model 
An important methodological challenge related to modelling the effects of migrant remittances 
on economic development outcomes is endogeneity bias that could arise from reverse 
causality, omitted variable bias and migrants‟ self-selection bias of target recipients. In addition, 
remittance inflows do not only affect the socioeconomic welfare of direct recipients but also 
non-migrant households, the business sector, the local community, and the nation as a whole. 
To circumvent this problem, it is important to adopt an econometric approach where it is 
possible to overcome endogeneity in the empirical model. Analysts who take serious 
cognisance of this problem often use either instrumental variable techniques or dynamic panel-
data modelling especially where the data dimension is of a larger cross-section over time 
series146. Of these two approaches, dynamic panel-data modelling by Generalised Method of 
Moment (GMM) dominates the empirical studies of recent years and even where the two 
approaches are used for robustness tests, conclusions have been based mainly on results from 
GMM estimators147. Therefore, to estimate the macroeconomic impact of remittance inflows on 
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 See Table A7.1 for details. 
147
 See, for example, Aggarwal et al. (2006), Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006), Acosta et al. (2008a,b), Acosta, 
Baerg and Mandelman (2009), Jongwanich (2007), Gyimah-Brempong and Asiedu (2009), and Adenutsi and Ahortor 
(2010). 
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economic development in SSA, this study relies on a dynamic panel-data modelling by system 
GMM148.  
 
Each estimated model has remittances incorporated into an otherwise standard endogenous 
growth-type economic development model149 with motivation from the transnational-migrant 
remittance paradigm. This is because, as noted in Section 7.2, within the context of the 
transnational-migrant remittance theory, it is possible to explore the effects of remittances on a 
wide array of developmental outcomes from both the migrant-pessimist and the migrant-
optimist perspectives. Also, because economic development is a multi-dimensional concept150, 
there can be many developmental outcomes, but consistent with the afore-stated objectives, 
the study restricts itself to analysing the impact of remittances on poverty (headcount, gap, 
severity), income inequality, three indicators of labour market outcomes, three indicators of 
human capital development and welfare, and two indicators of financial development. The 
choice of each indicator was based essentially on the popularity in empirical studies and data 
availability. 
 
The general empirical dynamic panel-data model is specified as Equation (7.1), which states 
that any measure of economic development outcome ,( )i tE  in country i  at time t  is explained 
by the initial level of the specific measure of the economic development outcome in question 
, _1( ),i tE current remittances per capita which also connotes remittances per capita151 received 
in a sampled in country ,( )i tR
 
plus a set of other possible macroeconomic determinants of E . 
Mathematically, it is specified that: 
 
, , 1,12,3, , lnlnlnit it it it ittiiteconmicdevlopmenEERZ    (7.1) 
where the regressand,E , denotes a measure of economic development outcome of interest; 
,  ,R Z ,t  i  and ,i t  are as previously defined in Chapter Six. However, Z  now contains 
additional control variables such as annual GDP growth rate as a proxy for business cycle, 
literacy rate, real lending rate, and real GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP). 1,
                                                          
148
 The relative superior qualities of system GMM over alternative GMM estimation techniques of dynamic panel-
data models are well discussed in Chapter Four of this dissertation. 
149
 See Chapter Six for details of endogenous growth model. 
150
 See Todaro and Smith (2002), and Thirlwall (2011). 
151
 For the justification of this analogy, see Chapter Three. 
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2  and 3

 being the corresponding parameter estimates of 
,E R  and .Z  The notation ln  
preceding R  and Z signifies natural logarithm; and all control variables previously used in 
Chapter Six remain as defined and as to whether they are in natural logarithmic or algorithmic 
forms, specific details are provided in Tables A7.2 and A7.6 in the Appendix. Although, both 
intuitively and by anecdotal evidence, Z  may contain a wide array of potential explanatory 
variables, Perotti (1996), Acosta et al. (2008a,b) and Acosta, Baerg and Mandelman (2009) 
offer a reasonable justification for selecting regressors within the context of economic growth 
model152,153. Beyond the underlying theoretical relevance, a further justification for adopting this 
approach of choosing the regressors is to make room for comparability of results with previous 
related studies, and at the same time satisfying the condition of parsimonious approach to the 
empirical modelling. This is important because apart from estimations involving financial 
development indicators, for all other estimations, the number of observations reduced 
drastically particularly due to unavailability of annual data154 in the 36 sampled countries. It is 
expected a priori that migrant remittances have poverty-mitigating effects and impact positively 
on human welfare, school attainment and life expectancy, but with regard to income inequality, 
financial development and labour market outcomes, the a priori effects are indeterminate. 
 
Similar to the approach used in Chapter Six, a three-step estimation procedure was used to 
determine the impact of migrant remittances on a given economic development outcome at 
step one; investigate the presence or absence of discriminatory impact of remittances on the 
given developmental outcome at step two; and, given that this size-effect exists, estimate the 
impact on the relevant group at step three. In doing so, a median-dummy variable (MDV) was 
introduced as an additional variable in the „final‟ parsimonious empirical model at the second-
step estimation. In step three, MDV was replaced with the MDV-remittance interactive variable 
in the empirical model for re-estimation. With the exception of the empirical unemployment 
model, MDV takes the value of one if in a particular time period t , E  of a country i  exceeds 
the median E ; otherwise it takes the value of zero (see Table A7.3). 
 
Consistent with previous chapters, for the empirical models involving annual panel data over 
the entire study period, 1980-2009 and for the 36 sampled SSA countries, static panel-data 
                                                          
152
 This has been the norm in macro level cross-country panel-data studies. For examples, see Table A7.1. 
153
 Here, the study choice of regressors is those of the endogenous growth model as espoused in Chapter Six. 
154
 Only 5-year average data are available for socioeconomic development variables such as indicators of poverty, 
inequality, human welfare and development indicators (excluding school enrolment) and labour market outcomes. 
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models were estimated to, among other things, demonstrate that, indeed, dynamic panel-data 
modelling outperforms the former. In pursuit of this objective, it is only the empirical models 
determining the impact of migrant remittance inflows on the two selected financial development 
indicators namely bank credit to the private sector and broad money to GDP ratio that were 
subjected to this compelling exercise. For each of these financial development indicators, both 
the conventional and heterokesdasticity-corrected robust Fixed (within) Effects (FE) and GLS 
Random Effects (RE) models were estimated. Based on the econometric issues discussed 
under 4.5.2 in Chapter 4, the results of the estimated robust static panel-data parameters are 
not expected to confirm the parameter estimates from the two-step sys-GMM estimators from 
the empirical dynamic panel-data models in either case. 
 
7.3.2 Data Issues 
The empirical analysis of this chapter encompasses 36 sampled SSA countries listed in 
Chapter One of this dissertation. However, in some specific cases, the sample size was 
reduced due to constraint on relevant data. For instance, in the case of empirical poverty and 
inequality models, only 34 countries (excluding Mauritius and Sudan) were analysed. For this 
same reason, the number of countries was further reduced to 27 (excluding Congo Republic, 
Côte d‟Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal and Togo) in the 
estimation involving the rate of unemployment. 
 
With the exception of educational attainment proxied by secondary school enrolment and 
financial development indicators, annual panel-data on most of the developmental outcome 
variables at the centre of analysis in this chapter are scarce over the study period, 1980-2009. 
In this respect, in estimating the impact of remittances on human welfare and human capital 
development outcomes, poverty, inequality, and labour market outcomes, rather than using 
annual panel data as was done in the case of financial development, a 5-year non-overlapping 
average data was used. Using non-overlapping 5-year average data reduces the time 
dimension of the panel data from 30 to 6 for the overall study period as there are only two 
observations per decade. With the panel-data dimension still having the structure of N T , 
when the sys-GMM estimation technique is executed on the empirical dynamic model in which 
36N   and 6T  as a result of the 5-year non-overlapping averaging of data, the efficiency of 
system estimators was not compromised155. 
                                                          
155
 Even where N was reduced to 27 in the unemployment model due to data constraint, the system GMM was still 
applicable because T=6. 
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In line with previous related studies (see Table A7.1), poverty headcount ratio and poverty gap 
index which measure the incidence and depth of poverty respectively, and squared poverty gap 
index as a proxy for poverty severity are the indicators of poverty used in this study whilst the 
Gini index was used to measure income inequality. Human development index (HDI) 
representing the geometric mean of three normalised indices of life expectancy, knowledge and 
education156, and living standards as measured in natural logarithm of gross national income at 
PPP was used as a proxy for general human welfare status. Secondary school enrolment was 
used as a measure for educational attainment, whilst life expectancy was used as a narrow 
measure for human welfare. Unemployment rate, labour force participation rate and labour 
productivity rate were used to measure labour market outcomes. The definition, specific 
measurement and main source of the dependent variables and explanatory variables not 
previously used in this study as explanatory variables are outlined in Table A7.6 in the 
Appendix. Unless otherwise specified, each variable is in its natural logarithmic form. 
 
7.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
7.4.1: The Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Income Inequality in SSA 
The empirical results on the impact of international migrant remittances on poverty and income 
inequality in SSA are reported in Table 7.2. As can be seen in Table 7.2.1, the study further 
shows that the poverty-alleviating effects of remittances differ across SSA countries, using the 
group median-level indicators of poverty as a reference point. From Table 7.2, it is shown that a 
one percentage increase in remittances per migrant received in SSA reduces poverty in terms 
of incidence, gap and severity by 0.0217, 0.0292 and 0.0584 respectively. 
 
With statistically significant estimated coefficients of 0.0452, 0.0750 and 0.1500 for poverty 
headcount, poverty gap and poverty severity respectively reported in Table 7.2.1, this study 
reveals that when the incidence of poverty by any of the three measures is above the median 
level (see Table A7.3), official remittances received aggravate poverty in migrant-receiving 
countries, at least, internationally157. Thus, although generally, remittances alleviate poverty in 
SSA, in migrant remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively high probability incidence of 
poverty, remittances actually aggravate poverty.  
                                                          
156
 Knowledge is proxied by adult literacy rate with two-thirds weighting, whilst primary, secondary and tertiary gross 
school enrolment which captures education, takes one-third weighting. 
157
 Note that the poverty line used in this study is based on international caloric requirements based on PPP. 
Therefore remittances can actually reduce poverty at national levels in both categories of countries (which is outside 
the scope of this study), but not in terms of comparative international landscape (as revealed by this study). 
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Table 7.2: Impact of Remittances on Poverty and Inequality in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Code Time variable: Year (5-year average) 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  
Poverty 
Headcount 
Poverty  
Gap 
Poverty 
Severity 
Income 
Inequality 
Initial Dependent variable (•t-1) 1.0506 0.8323 0.8323 0.9112 
  (31.51)*** (7.21)*** (7.21)*** (11.22)*** 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) -0.0217 -0.0292 -0.0584 -0.0014 
  (-3.04)*** (-2.07)** (-2.07)** (-0.27) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) ……….. -0.3216 -0.6432 -0.0334 
  ……….. (-5.14)*** (-5.14)*** (-2.06)** 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) -0.0305 -0.0748 -0.1496 0.0742 
  (-0.55) (-2.18)*** (-2.18)*** (2.85) 
Investment in physical assets (lnINV) 0.0862 -0.1702 -0.3405 0.0680 
  (1.73)* (-2.20)** (-2.20)** (2.77)*** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) -0.0178 ……….. ……….. ……….. 
  (-3.30)** ……….. ……….. ……….. 
Official development assistance (lnODA) 0.0195 0.0671 0.1342 -0.0200 
  (0.82) (1.93)* (1.93)* (-2.97)*** 
Trade openness (lnOPN) -0.1351 0.0417 0.0834 -0.1359 
  (-1.80)* (0.42) (0.42) (-2.88)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0012 0.0005 0.0092 ……….. 
  (-2.22)** (0.71) (0.71) ……….. 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) 0.2993 0.6133 1.2266 ……….. 
 (4.10)*** (5.49)*** (5.49)*** ……….. 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) 0.0159 0.0354 0.0707 -0.0290 
 (0.53) (0.61) (0.61) (-1.76)* 
Business cycle (BZC) ……….. ……….. ……….. -0.0090 
 ……….. ……….. ……….. (-5.75)*** 
Institutional quality (INS) ……….. ……….. ……….. 0.0035 
 ……….. ……….. ……….. (1.23) 
Constant term -0.5860 0.2443 0.4885 0.4926 
  (-1.03) (0.30) (0.30) (1.39) 
Number of observations 169 169 169 175 
Number of groups 34 34 34 36 
Number of instruments 25 25 25 25 
Wald 
2
[ ],   [11],17667.07*** [11],2518.00*** [11],2518.00*** [10],596.03*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
      -5.186{0.604}       0.7467{0.455}    0.7467{0.455} -0.0169{0.987} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[13],               16.0871      20.0526*  20.0526* 11.4428 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics are in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
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This may be due to the fact that, in SSA, the poorest countries in terms of real GDP per capita, 
such as Burundi, Congo Republic, Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda, receive the least official 
remittances per capita (see Figure 3.5). Besides, even in the 2000-2009 decade when SSA 
received its highest amount of migrant remittances, no country could receive even up to US$1 
per day, as Cape Verde (the highest recipient) received only US$249.88 per annum. This 
seems to justify the apprehension of remittance-pessimists that severely poor families would 
normally not have the means to sponsor migrants to high-income countries in order to receive 
migrant remittances. 
 
To the extent that remittances generally have a direct and instantaneous poverty-mitigating 
effect on SSA, the findings of this study are consistent with the results obtained in related 
previous studies including those of Adams and Page (2005), López-Córdova (2005), Acosta et 
al. (2006), Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh (2009), Kalim and Shahbaz (2009), Gubert et al. (2010), 
UN (2011), Shafiq et al. (2012) and Orzell (2013). 
 
Table 7.2.1: Comparative Analysis of Remittance Effects on Poverty and Inequality in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: **(***) denote statistical significance at 5(1) per cent respectively 
          2-step robust z-statistics in ( ); z-probabilities in { } 
 
At the conventional levels of statistical significance, it can be concluded that remittances did not 
contribute significantly to equalising incomes in „labour-exporting‟ SSA countries during the 
1980-2009 period (Table 7.2). From Table 7.2.1, it is shown that migrant remittances received 
actually aggravate poverty and income inequality in SSA countries with relatively higher levels 
of poverty and income inequality. Thus, the potential poverty and income-equalising effects of 
migrant remittance inflows are a preserve advantage for only remittance-receiving SSA 
countries with relatively lower poverty and income inequality.  
 
To a large extent, this result is consistent with the findings of Nguyen (2008) and Ekebe and Le 
Goff (2009) that although remittances reduce poverty, they are less inequality-mitigating. This 
Type of Dummy Effect Poverty Headcount Poverty Gap Poverty Severity Income Inequality
Independent Median 0.1415 (2.83)*** 0.2620 (4.73)*** 0.5240 (4.73)*** 0.1388 (6.27)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive 0.0452 (2.67)** 0.0750 (4.40)*** 0.1500 (4.40)*** 0.0357 (4.09)***
Number of observations 169 169 169 175
Number of groups 34 34 34 36
Instruments 26 26 26 25
Wald (χ²₍₀₎) [12],  9448.46*** [12],  1240.28*** [12],  1240.28*** [11],  486.67***
Arellano-Bond Test -0.8852{0.3760} 0.7114{0.4769} 0.7114{0.4769} 0.1813{0.8561}
Sargan Test (χ² ₁₃) 12.5386 18.8135 18.8135 11.5240
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finding, however, is in contrast with the findings by Acosta et al. (2008a) for 10 LAC countries 
and that of Gubert et al. (2010) for Mali; that, remittances either reduce or have no effects on 
income equality. Differences in sampled countries, period of study and the level of analysis 
could be the source of this variation. For example, this is a purely macro-level study unlike in 
the case of Acosta et al. (2008a) and Gubert et al. (2010) that are micro-level studies. 
 
7.4.2 The Impact of Remittances on Labour Market Outcomes in SSA 
The empirical results on the implications of remittance inflows for labour market outcomes in 
SSA are presented in Table 7.3. Contrary to the trepidation of the remittance-pessimistic 
structural dependence view, the findings of this study show that in SSA between 1980 and 
2009, international migrant remittance inflows did not impair labour market outcomes, as they 
contributed directly to reducing the unemployment rate. The estimated results (see Table 7.3) 
show that a 100 per cent increase in international migrant remittances per capita had an 
approximately -1.67 per cent impact on unemployment rate in the 27 sampled SSA countries. 
Although this finding may seem to suggest that the direct unemployment-reducing impact of 
international migrant remittances is economically low, it is important to note that international 
remittances are the second most important only after trade openness in reducing 
unemployment rate in SSA between 1980 and 2009.  
 
Even more striking is the fact that between 1980 and 2009, the direct effect of international 
remittance inflows was even more important than government expenditure when it comes to 
solving the perennial unemployment problem in SSA. One possible explanation for this finding 
is that whereas international remittance inflows are directly and instantaneously beneficial to 
the private sector, as a result of bad governance and weak institutions, a colossal amount of 
government spending over the period was not pro-poor or was due to public sector corruption 
and debt servicing which culminated in crowding-out the private sector. 
 
For the 36 sampled SSA countries, the impact of international remittance inflows on labour 
market participation was both economically and statistically insignificant. Similarly, between 
1980 and 2009, international migrant remittances did not have any significant impact on labour 
productivity in SSA (Table 7.3). More specifically, in Table 7.3, it is shown that, on the average, 
international remittances had no moral hazard effects with reference to labour force 
participation and productivity, given that, the estimated coefficients of -0.0002 and 0.0046 
respectively, are not only low but also statistically insignificant even at 10 per cent. 
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Table 7.3: Impact of Remittances on Labour Market Outcomes in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year (5-year average) 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
   Unemployment 
Labour 
Participation 
Labour 
Productivity 
Initial Dependent variable (•t-1)  0.4472 0.7878 0.7579 
   (17.62)
*** 
(18.12)
*** 
(13.24)
*** 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC)  -0.0167 -0.0002 0.0046 
   (-2.02)
** 
(-0.48) (0.54) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA)  0.0082 0.0047 0.0640 
   (0.13) (2.08)
** 
(2.44)
** 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP)  0.0364 0.0076 0.1046 
   (1.03) (2.26)
** 
(2.77)
*** 
Investment in physical capital (lnINV)  ……….. ……….. 0.1248 
   ……….. ……….. (4.92)
*** 
Institutional quality (INS)  0.0071 0.00199 -0.0023 
   (0.81) (2.41)
** 
(-1.50) 
Trade openness (lnOPN)  -0.1313 ……….. -0.1117 
   (-3.64)
*** 
……….. (-2.50)
** 
Rate of inflation (INF)  ……….. -0.0002 -0.0016 
   ……….. (-3.10) (-2.80)
*** 
Government expenditure (lnGXP)  0.1977 ……….. -0.2170 
  (2.33)
** 
……….. (-6.65)
*** 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR)  ……….. 0.0057 -0.0636 
  ……….. (2.99)
*** 
(-4.03)
*** 
Business cycle (BZC)  0.0270 ………. ………. 
  (6.98)
*** 
………. ………. 
Official development assistance (lnODA)  ……….. ……….. 0.0194 
  ……….. ……….. (1.55) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI)  ……….. ……….. 0.0035 
  ……….. ……….. (1.80)
* 
Constant term  0.8263 0.8578 1.6949 
   (2.61)
** 
(4.52)
*** 
(4.29)
*** 
Number of observations  132 179 179 
Number of groups  27 36 36 
Number of instruments  22 21 26 
Wald 
2
[ ],    [8],1093.41
*** 
[7],1310.25
*** 
[12],3193.04
*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
      -1.1477{0.251}   0.1721{0.863} 0.6324{0.527} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[13],                        12.5546       18.9955 14.3350 
                0.483    0.123   0.351 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
 
The results in Table 7.3.1 show that the unemployment-solving effect of remittances did not 
prevail when the unemployment rate of an SSA country in any particular year fell below the 
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median level for the sampled SSA countries during the period under study. There is statistical 
evidence of a size-effect in relation to unemployment rate. The implication here is that, over the 
30-year period, the unemployment-reducing effects of migrant remittances received are merely 
to the benefit of SSA countries with relatively higher unemployment rates. 
  
Table 7.3.1: Comparative Analysis of Remittance Effects on Labour Market Outcomes 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: **(***) denotes statistical significance at 5(1) per cent respectively 
          2-step robust z-statistics in ( ); z-probabilities in { } 
 
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of the „autonomous‟ effects of MDV on 
the rates of labour participation and labour productivity, (0.0105 and 0.1211 respectively), 
provide evidence of size-effect of remittances on labour market outcomes (Table 7.3.1). In this 
case, if received in larger amount, migrant remittances can have the potential of inducing 
higher rates of productivity in countries with higher rates of labour productivity, but for countries 
with lower rates of labour productivity the impact of remittances is zero. And, whereas in 
migrant-receiving SSA countries with labour market participation rates above the median level 
of the group, remittances have positive but statistically insignificant impact, in the case of 
countries with lower rates of participation, the impact is negative but statistically insignificant. In 
effect, it is only SSA countries with higher rates of labour participation that stand the chance of 
benefitting more from international remittances received as the amount received increases. The 
result that migrant remittances do not negate labour market outcomes confirms those obtained 
by Drinkwater et al. (2006) for 19 developing countries and Orrenius et al. (2010) for Mexican 
states. 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Dummy Effect Unemployment Labour Participation Labour Productivity
Independent Median -0.4691 (-3.70)*** 0.0105 (5.26)*** 0.1211 (3.25)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive -0.0133 (-0.49) 0.0006 (0.77) 0.0176 (2.77)
Number of observations 132 180 179
Number of groups 27 36 36
Instruments 23 22 27
Wald (χ²₍₀₎) [11],  1609.80*** [8],  1287.00*** [13],  2683.23***
Arellano-Bond Test -1.1557{0.2478} 0.2109{0.8329} 0.7514{0.4524}**
Sargan Test (χ² ₁₃) 12.6260 18.3883 14.6549
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7.4.3 The Impact of Remittances on Human Welfare and Development in SSA 
The empirical results on the impact of international remittance inflows on human welfare and 
human capital development in SSA are reported in Table 7.4.  
 
Table 7.4: Human Development and Welfare Impact of Remittances in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year (5-year average) 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  
Human 
Welfare 
Educational  
Attainment 
Life  
Expectancy 
Initial Dependent variable (•t-1) 0.8624 0.8686 0.7291 
  (19.96)*** (13.43)*** (32.89)*** 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) 0.0203 0.0427 0.0060 
  (4.43)*** (2.81)*** (2.24)** 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) 0.0384 0.0525 ……….. 
  (3.13)*** (2.02)** ……….. 
Investment in physical capital (lnINV) 0.0173 ……….. 0.0167 
  (1.11) ……….. (1.73)* 
Institutional quality (INS) 0.0034 0.0157 ……….. 
  (2.71)*** (3.52)*** ……….. 
Trade openness (lnOPN) -0.0343 0.0027 ……….. 
  (-1.67)* (0.07) ……….. 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0010 -0.0049 ……….. 
  (5.66)*** (-2.83)*** ……….. 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) 0.0191 ……….. -0.0023 
 (1.05) ……….. (-0.15) 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) 0.0100 0.0547 0.0031 
 (2.32)** (2.88)*** (1.52) 
Business cycle (BZC) 0.0014 ………. 0.0098 
 (1.96)** ………. (16.42)*** 
Real lending rate (RLR) ……….. -0.0038 ……….. 
 ……….. (-2.69)*** ……….. 
Official development assistance (lnODA) ……….. ……….. 0.0194 
 ……….. ……….. (2.71)*** 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) ……….. 0.0002 -0.0015 
 ……….. (0.08) (-1.45) 
Constant term -0.4601 -0.1282 1.0163 
  (-5.25)*** (-0.51) (11.07)*** 
Number of observations 177 171 176 
Number of groups 36 36 36 
Number of instruments 24 23 22 
Wald 
2
[ ],   [10],17893.81***
 
[9],4225.10***
 
[8],2299.28***
 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2): 
                     -1.3212{0.186}           -2.3683{0.018}       -1.3154{0.188} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: 
2
[ ],           21.1125* 18.4159            16.8539 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics are in ( ), z-probabilities in { }  
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The findings of this study suggest that, in SSA, international remittance inflows have significant 
positive effects on overall human welfare, educational attainment and life expectancy; with an 
impact magnitude of about 0.0203 per cent, 0.0427 per cent and 0.0060 per cent respectively, 
in response to a one percentage rise in remittances per capita (Table 7.4). The empirical 
results show that, generally, international remittances received in SSA between 1980 and 2009 
contributed positively to promoting human welfare (or socioeconomic wellbeing), educational 
attainment, and life expectancy. These remittance-developmental effects, however, vary 
according to the level of development in remittance-recipient countries (see Table 7.4.1). 
 
As far as the positive effect of remittances on socioeconomic development is concerned, the 
findings of this study are consistent with related previous studies by Adenutsi and Ahortor 
(2010) for 31 developing countries from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and SSA and 
Adenutsi (2010a,b) for selected SSA countries. On the positive direct impact on schooling, the 
results of this study confirm earlier results obtained by Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) for El 
Salvador, and Ponce (2008) for Ecuador, in various household survey studies. Again, the 
results of the direct positive impact of remittances on life expectancy are consistent with those 
obtained by Ajayi et al. (2009) for 38 SSA countries based on 2007 data. 
 
In Table 7.4.1, it is shown that the positive impact of remittances on human welfare is more 
beneficial to SSA countries with relatively higher indices of human development (HDI). In the 
case of educational attainment, the positive impact of remittances was only beneficial to SSA 
countries with relatively lower level of educational attainment, as the impact of remittances on 
educational attainment is actually negative (-0.0159) in migrant-sending SSA countries with 
higher levels of attainment. With reference to life expectancy, the MDV-remittance interactive 
effect suggests that over the past three decades, it is remittance-receiving SSA countries with 
relatively higher life expectancy that benefited more from the direct positive impact of migrant 
remittances. 
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Table 7.4.1: Comparative Analysis of Remittance Effects on Human Development and Welfare 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation  Note: **(***) denotes statistical significance at 5(1) per cent 
            2-step robust z-statistics are in ( ); z-probabilities are in { } 
 
 
7.4.4: The Impact of Remittances on Financial Development in SSA 
7.4.4.1: The Impact of Remittances on Bank Credit to the Private Sector 
Overall, migrant remittances did not impact on private sector credit allocation in SSA between 
1980 and 2009. However, the results from the decade-by-decade analysis suggest that migrant 
remittances exert a direct and a significant positive impact on bank credit allocation to the 
private sector under sound macroeconomic policy environment, with this impact increasing 
over time as SSA countries pursued financial liberalisation programme over the past three 
decades. The results in Table 7.5.1 suggest that, in the 1980s and 2000s, a percentage rise in 
international remittances per capita led to increased private sector credit allocation by banks by 
0.0429 per cent and 0.0684 per cent respectively in SSA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Dummy Effect Human Welfare Educational Attainment Life Expectancy
Independent Median 0.1045 (6.34)*** 0.0577 (6.23)*** 0.0537 (4.79)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive 0.0126 (2.52)** -0.0159 (-2.42)** 0.0146 (3.66)***
Number of observations 177 171 176
Number of groups 36 35 36
Instruments 25 24 23
Wald (χ²₍₀₎) [11],  20805.06*** [10],  4287.92*** [9],  1381.19***
Arellano-Bond Test -1.3035{0.1924} -2.4975{0.0125}** -1.3199 {0.1869}
Sargan Test (χ² ₁₃) 20.9558 18.8594 21.1165
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Table 7.5.1: Impact of Remittances on Private Sector Bank Credit in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009 
Initial private sector credit (lnPSC_1) 0.5577 0.7830 0.9892 0.7850 
  (26.13)*** (13.65)*** (47.66)*** (28.20)*** 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) 0.0429 -0.0350 0.0684 0.0085 
  (7.14)*** (-6.50)*** (8.68)*** (1.09) 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) 0.2062 0.2643 -0.0161 0.3153 
  (6.64)*** (3.98)*** (-1.00) (5.94)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0015 -0.0020 0.0035 -0.0010 
  (-10.69)*** (-6.91)*** (4.17)*** (-2.08)** 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -0.0232 0.2611 0.0407 0.0183 
 (-1.22) (5.83)*** (7.74)*** (1.04) 
Real lending rate (RLR) -0.0004 0.0045 0.0037 0.0024 
 (-0.10) (13.26)*** (6.59)*** (8.95)*** 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 0.0742 -0.1762 -0.1105 -0.0704 
 (1.92)* (-4.30)*** (-5.37)*** (-3.99)** 
Constant term -0.5467 -1.3059 0.3440 -1.5033 
  (-3.41)*** (-3.53)*** (2.31)** (-3.86)*** 
Number of observations 275 298 312 952 
Number of groups 33 35 35 35 
Number of instruments 51 51 52 441 
Wald 
2
[7],  35196.80*** 3216.39*** 10012.35*** 2740.95*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
      -1.3473{0.178}    -0.1804{0.857}   -1.2995{0.194} -0.8380{0.402} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],         [43], 17.7853 [43], 27.6982        [43], 27.1016 [433], 29.8626 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics are in ( ), z-probabilities are in { } 
 
During the turbulent times of the 1990s (see Table 3.1), however, migrant remittance inflows 
impacted negatively (-0.0350) on bank credit allocation in SSA probably because during this 
era, migrant remittances were instantaneously spent on consumables rather than saved to 
enable banks create more money. In fact, it was shown in Adenutsi et al. (2012) that official 
remittances per capita and domestic savings are highly and positively correlated in SSA, a 
coefficient of 0.867 over the period 1980-2009. Even though correlation does not necessarily 
imply causation, it is evident from this study that when gross domestic savings as a percentage 
of GDP were relatively high at 22.23 and 23.50 in the 1980s and 2000s respectively (see Table 
3.1), remittances impacted more and positively on private sector credit allocation (Table 7.5.1). 
However, when gross domestic savings ratio declined to 14.48 per cent in the 1990s (Table 
3.1), the impact of remittances on credit allocation turned negative and with lower coefficient. 
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Table 7.5.1.1 provides statistical justification for the decade-by-decade changing impact of 
international migrant remittances on bank credit to the private sector in SSA over the past three 
decades – 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-09. Indeed, in columns A-B, B-C and A-C of Table 
7.5.1.1, the statistical significance of the computed „differential‟ z-statistics affirms the rejection 
of the null hypothesis at one per cent level of statistical significance that the corresponding 
estimated decade-based coefficients are not statistically different from one another. With the 
exception of real lending rate, this conclusion actually holds for all other determinants of bank 
credit to the private sector as reported in Table 7.5.1. The computed „differential‟ z-statistics 
associated with real lending rate reported in columns A-B and A-C of Table 7.5.1.1 shows that 
the estimated coefficient of real lending rate for the 1980-89 decade is not statistically different 
from the corresponding estimates for the 1990-99 decade and the 2000-09 decade 
respectively. 
 
From the computed z-statistics reported in columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E of Table 7.5.1.1, it 
can be concluded that, generally, the variations in the estimated decade-based parameters of 
migrant remittances are statistically stable over time. Thus, there is instability in the decade-
based parameter estimates reported in Tale 7.5.1. Apart from a few violations like initial private 
sector credit and trade openness (as reported in column B-D), real GDP per capita PPP (with 
reference to column B-E) and government expenditure and real lending rate (as reported in 
column C-E), there is a substantially significant statistical evidence for coefficient instability 
over time for each of the explanatory variables. Therefore, it can be concluded that, on the 
average, the estimated decade-based coefficients of migrant remittance inflows on bank credit 
to the private sector in SSA are evolving and the evolution is instable across the three decades, 
1980-89 1990-99 and 2000-09. 
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Table 7.5.1.1: Results of Parameter Evolution and Instability Tests for Impact of Migrant Remittances on Private Sector Credit in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation  */**/*** denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively.  
Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( ) 
A B C D E
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-09 1985-1994 1995-2004
Initial private sector credit (lnPSC_1) 0.5577 0.7830 0.9892 0.7256 0.8917 -0.2254 -0.2061 -0.4315 -0.1680 0.0574 -0.1086 0.0975
[0.0213] [0.0574] [0.0207] [0.0176] [0.0209] [0.0360] [0.0366] [0.0006] [0.0037] [0.0398] [0.0364] [0.0002]
{26.13}*** {13.65}*** {47.66}*** {41.22}*** {42.58}*** {-6.25}*** {-5.63}*** {-731.37}*** {-44.91}*** {1.44} {-2.98}** {513.26}***
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) 0.0429 -0.0350 0.0684 0.0000 0.0115 0.0779 -0.1034 -0.0255 0.0429 -0.0350 -0.0465 0.0569
[0.0060] [0.0054] [0.0079] [0.0040] [0.0038] [0.0006] [0.0025] [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0041]
{7.14}*** {-6.50}*** {8.68}*** {0.01} {3.04}*** {123.63}*** {-41.36}*** {-13.64}*** {21.34}*** {-25.36}*** {-29.24}*** {13.91}***
Real GDP per capita  (InY_PPP) 0.2062 0.2643 -0.0161 0.4641 0.2466 -0.0581 0.2804 0.2223 -0.2579 -0.1998 0.0177 -0.2627
[0.0311] [0.0664] [0.0160] [0.0157] [0.0375] [0.0353] [0.0503] [0.0149] [0.0154] [0.0507] [0.0289] [0.0214]
{6.64}*** {3.98}*** {-1.00} {29.54}*** {6.58}*** {-1.64}* {5.57}*** {14.87}*** {-16.80}*** {-3.94}*** {0.61} {-12.29}***
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0015 -0.0020 0.0035 -0.0027 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0055 -0.0049 0.0012 0.0007 -0.0017 0.0038
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0008] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0002] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0006]
{-10.69}*** {-6.91}*** {4.17}*** {-8.58}*** {-1.49} {3.73}*** {-10.15}*** {-7.10}*** {7.29}*** {34.00}*** {-19.11}*** {5.97}***
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -0.0232 0.2611 0.0407 0.1832 0.0213 -0.2843 0.2204 -0.0639 -0.2064 0.0779 0.2397 0.0193
[0.0190] [0.0448] [0.0053] [0.0367] [0.0260] [0.0257] [0.0395] [0.0138] [0.0177] [0.0081] [0.0188] [0.0208]
{-1.22} {5.83}*** {7.74}*** {4.99}*** {0.82} {-11.04}*** {5.58}*** {-4.63}*** {-11.68}*** {9.65}*** {12.78}*** {0.93}
Real lending rate (RLR) -0.0004 0.0045 0.0037 0.0054 0.0039 -0.0048 0.0008 -0.0041 -0.0058 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0002
[0.0036] [0.0003] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0033] [0.0002] [0.0030] [0.0032] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0002]
{-0.10} {13.26}*** {6.59}*** {12.67}*** {10.78}*** {-1.48} {3.50}*** {-1.34} {-1.82}** {-10.22}*** {18.00}*** {-1.18}
Trade openness (lnOPN) 0.0742 -0.1762 -0.1105 -0.1608 -0.0102 0.2504 -0.0657 0.1848 0.2350 -0.0154 -0.1660 -0.1004
[0.0387] [0.0410] [0.0206] [0.0177] [0.0207] [0.0023] [0.0204] [0.0181] [0.0210] [0.0233] [0.0203] [0.0001]
{1.92}** {-4.30}*** {-5.37}*** {-9.11}*** {-0.49} {108.88}*** {-3.22}*** {10.21}*** {11.18}*** {-0.66} {-8.19}*** {-772.08}***
Constant term -0.5467 -1.3059 0.3440 -2.4567 -1.6032 0.7592 -1.6499 -0.8907 1.9100 1.1508 0.2973 1.9472
[0.1603] [0.3699] [0.1476] [0.1810] [0.2969] [0.2096] [0.2224] [0.0127] [0.0207] [0.1889] [0.0730] [0.1493]
{-3.41}*** {-3.53}*** {2.31}** {-13.57}*** {-5.40}*** {3.62}*** {-7.42}*** {-69.91}*** {92.18}*** {6.09}*** {4.07}*** {13.04}***
Number of observations 275 298 312 289 308 286.5 305 293.5 282 293.5 303 310
Number of groups 33 35 35 34 35 34 35 34 34 35 35 35
Number of instruments 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Wald statistic 35196.80*** 3216.39*** 10012.35*** 25567.30*** 12671.59*** 19206.8*** 6614.37*** 22604.58*** 30382.05*** 14391.85*** 7943.99*** 11341.97***
A-B 2ⁿᵈ-order autocorrelation test -1.347(0.18) -0180(0.86) -1.300(0.19) -1.374(0.17) 0.574(0.57) -            -            -           -           -           -           -           
Sargan over-identifying restrictions 17.785(0.99) 27.700(0.97) 27.102(0.97) 20.915(0.99) 28.602(0.95) -            -            -           -           -           -           -           
A-C
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient 
Stability Test Results
C-EB-EB-DA-DA-B B-C
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Table 7.5.1.2 reveals that, under favourable macroeconomic conditions, SSA countries with 
relatively higher levels of financial development measured in terms of private sector credit 
stand a better chance to develop their financial systems through higher remittance inflows. 
During periods of harsh economic conditions, the negative impact of migrant remittances on 
private sector credit allocation is higher (-0.0376) in countries with fairly developed financial 
markets than in those with relatively underdeveloped financial markets, given that, for the entire 
group, the impact was 0.0350. The finding that remittances directly contribute to financial 
development as far as private sector credit allocation is concerned, confirms the results 
obtained in previous studies notably those of Aggarwal et al. (2006), Shahbaz et al. (2007), 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009), Ambrosius (2011), and Gani and Sharma (2013). 
 
Table 7.5.1.2: Comparative Analysis of Remittance Effects on Private Sector Credit in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: *** denotes statistical significance at 1 per cent respectively 
      2-step robust z-statistics are in ( ); z-probabilities are in { } 
 
As a final point, a mere academic exercise was undertaken to show that empirically, in 
comparison with robust static panel-data modelling, the estimated robust dynamic panel-data 
modelling of the impact of migrant remittance inflows on financial development in SSA over the 
period 1980-2009 actually produced more convincing results. The static panel-data version of 
the estimated impact of migrant remittance inflows on bank credit to the private sector in SSA 
over the period, 1980-2009, is reported in Table A7.4 in the Appendix. Static panel-data FE and 
RE models were estimated and the Hausman test was performed to select the estimated FE 
model as the better of the two in the empirical context of this estimation. When the Breusch-
Pagan test for heteroskedasticity was carried out, it was revealed that, at 10 per cent level of 
statistical significance, the standard errors of the estimated conventional models are not 
homoscedastic, hence the need to re-estimate and rely upon heteroskedasticity-corrected 
robust estimations. By implication, the most reliable and efficient estimated result among the 
class of empirical static panel-data estimations in this very context is the estimated robust FE 
Type of Duumy Effect 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009
Independent MDV 0.2718 (17.55)*** 0.1522 (9.73)*** 0.1955 (11.32)*** 0.2065 (12.33)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive 0.0455 (3.31)*** -0.0376 (-2.81)*** 0.0753 (7.46)*** 0.0350 (6.86)***
Number of observations 275 298 312 952
Number of groups 33 35 35 35
Instruments 52 52 52 442
Wald ( χ²₈ ) 34185.29*** 2321.43*** 4212.82*** 2881.88***
Arellano-Bond Test -1.3538{0.1758} -0.3827{0.7019} -1.0641{0.2873} -0.7925{0.4280}
Sargan Test (χ² ₍₀₎ ) [43], 22.1234 [43], 27.6027 [43], 27.6188 [443], 29.5662
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model reported in Table A7.4. The reported 
2R of 0.2365 implies that the empirical robust FE 
model estimating the impact of migrant remittance inflows on private sector credit in SSA has 
an overall explanatory power only 23.65 per cent. Thus, the overall performance of the 
empirical robust FE static panel-data model perform very poor since the percentage of the 
residuals sum of squares to the total sum of squares is as much as 76.35. The reported z -
statistics of the robust FE estimation show that, in SSA, migrant remittances, rate of inflation, 
and government expenditure do not explain bank credit to the private sector whilst trade 
openness and real GDP per capita PPP do positively impact on private sector credit. To a 
reasonable extent, the results of the robust FE static panel-data estimation (as reported in 
Table A7.4) validate the results of the two-step sys-GMM dynamic panel-data estimation 
(reported in Table 7.5.1) as far as the impact of remittance inflows on private sector credit is 
concerned for the overall period, 1980-2009 as in both cases, though with contradictory signs, 
migrant remittances do not statistically influence bank credit allocation to the private sector in 
SSA. 
 
7.4.4.2 The Impact of Remittances on 2 /M GDP  in SSA 
Table 7.5.2 presents the result of a consistent positive trend of the impact of remittances on 
2 /M GDP  as a complementary indicator of financial development over the past three decades. 
In the early years of the adoption of financial liberalisation programmes (i.e. in the 1980s), the 
impact of a 100 percentage rise in migrant remittances per capita on 2 /M GDP  was 
approximately negative 5.16 per cent. The impact of remittances on 2 /M GDP  turned positive 
(3.41 per cent) in the 1990s and this positive impact became even more robust (4.08 per cent) 
in the 2000s. Therefore, it can be concluded that the contribution of migrant remittances to 
financial development when measured as 2 /M GDP , was increasingly positive and robust in 
SSA between 1980 and 2009. 
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Table 7.5.2: Impact of Remittances on Broad Money-GDP Ratio in SSA, 1980-2009 
Group variable: Country Code Time variable: Year 
Two-Step Estimation by Blundell-Bond System Dynamic Panel-Data Procedure 
  1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1989-2009 
Lagged dependent variable (lnM2/GDP _1) 0.6088 0.5812 0.8990 0.6884 
  (37.65)*** (25.61)*** (18.45)*** (12.73)*** 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) -0.0516 0.0341 0.0408 0.0058 
  (-4.94)*** (8.06)*** (5.39)*** (2.34)** 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) -0.1847 0.0814 0.0166 0.1316 
  (-4.62)*** (4.32)*** (0.55) (3.92)*** 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) 0.4234 0.0403 -0.2401 0.0446 
  (7.05)*** (1.65)* (14.19)*** (0.83) 
Official development assistance (lnODA) -0.0228 0.0135 0.0121 0.0175 
  (-1.00) (1.55) (2.15)** (2.84)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0056 -0.0007 0.0025 0.0015 
  (6.08)*** (-2.72)*** (7.48)*** (5.23)*** 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -0.1558 0.2322 0.0652 0.1016 
 (-3.04)*** (11.33)*** (16.52)*** (1.93)* 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) 0.0621 -0.0109 -0.0043 0.0254 
 (3.54)*** (-0.87) (-0.33) (2.15)** 
Real lending rate (RLR) 0.0135 0.0028 0.0068 0.0064 
 (9.05)*** (10.01)*** (17.72)*** (25.79)*** 
Constant term -1.1817 0.0500 1.4746 -0.2946 
  (-2.40)** (0.19) (4.15)*** (-1.03) 
Number of observations 266 298 312 942 
Number of groups 32 35 35 35 
Number of instruments 53 53 53 443 
Wald 
2
[9],  328835.92*** 7618.21*** 2337.83*** 3042.13*** 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-difference errors (order 2):   
    -0.9692{0.332}    -1.5505{0.121}   -1.8405{0.066}
* 
-1.0435{0.296} 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions:   
2
[ ],   [43], 18.4130   [43], 29.0973   [43], 28.5025 [433], 27.0762 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10/5/1 per cent respectively 
    2-step robust z-statistics in ( ), z-probabilities in { } 
 
 
In a similar fashion, remittance-receiving SSA countries within the sub-region with relatively 
higher levels of liquidity received an overall higher impact of 0.0207 remittances over the entire 
study period (Table 7.5.2.1), compared to the general impact of 0.0058 for the full sample 
(Table 7.5.2). This also holds for the most recent decade, 2000-2009. Nevertheless, in the 
early years of financial liberalisation, the impact on remittances on SSA countries with relatively 
higher levels of 2 /M GDP  was lower (-2.98 per cent and 1.90 per cent for the 1980s and the 
1990s respectively) than the average impact of -5.16 per cent and 3.41 per cent for the entire 
sampled 36 SSA countries.  
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Table 7.5.2.1: Comparative Analysis of Remittance Effects on Broad Money-GDP Ratio in SSA
 
Source: Author‟s estimation Note: *(***) denotes statistical significance at 10(1) per cent respectively 
         2-step robust z-statistics in ( ); z-probabilities in { } 
 
The finding that migrant remittances generally impact positively on 2 /M GDP  is in consonance 
with the results obtained in earlier related studies reviewed in this study (see Table A7.1). 
 
In Table 7.5.2.2, the results of the statistical differences and stability of the estimated decade-
based coefficients of the impact of migrant remittances on broad money as a ratio of GDP 
(M2/GDP) in SSA are reported. Columns A-B, B-C and A-C report the „differential‟ z-statistics of 
the statistical differences between the estimated coefficients of 1980s and 1990s, 1990s and 
2000s, and 1980s and 2000s respectively. Under the working hypothesis that the estimated 
decade-based coefficients truly differ from each other statistically when the computed 
„differential‟ z -statistics centre further away from zero, the results suggest that the estimated 
decade-based coefficients are actually different from each other at five per cent level of 
statistical significance. Thus, international migrant remittance inflows have a decade-based 
changing impact on M2/GDP in SSA between 1980 and 2009. In fact, for the period 1980-2009, 
the changing impact of the other determinants of M2/GDP as reported in Table 7.5.2 generally 
holds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Dummy Effect 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009
Independent Dummy 0.2258 (3.50)*** 0.1349 (9.03)*** 0.1710 (9.71)*** 0.1950 (6.54)***
MDV-Remittance Interactive -0.0298 (-4.50)*** 0.0190 (4.90)*** 0.0513 (8.27)*** 0.0207 (4.40)***
Number of observations 266 298 312 942
Number of groups 32 35 35 35
Instruments 54 54 54 444
Wald ( χ²₁₀ ) 36401.62 *** 9001.79*** 11688.22*** 11632.52***
Arellano-Bond Test -1.0068{0.3140} -1.4279{0.1533} -1.6676{0.0954}* -1.0420{0.2974}
Sargan Test (χ² ₍₀₎ ) [43], 18.5894 [43], 28.9679 [43], 26.7313 [443], 22.2294
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Table 7.5.2.2: Results of Parameter Evolution and Instability Tests for Impact of Migrant Remittances on Broad Money Supply in SSA 
 
Source: Author‟s estimation  */**/*** denotes significant at 10/5/1 per cent statistical levels respectively.  
Standard errors in [ ], z-statistics in { }, 2 probabilities in ( )
A B C D E
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1985-1994 1995-2004
Lagged dependent variable (lnM₂/GDP) 0.6088 0.5812 0.8990 0.1661 0.9227 0.0276 -0.3178 -0.2902 0.4428 0.4151 -0.3414 -0.0236
[0.0162] [0.0227] [0.0487] [0.0061] [0.0318] [0.0065] [0.0260] [0.0326] [0.0101] [0.0166] [0.0091] [0.0169]
{37.65}*** {25.61}*** {18.45}*** {27.30}*** {29.02}*** {4.24}*** {-12.2}*** {-8.91}*** {43.88}*** {24.99}*** {-37.52}*** {-1.40}
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) -0.0516 0.0341 0.0408 -0.0239 0.0020 -0.0857 -0.0067 -0.0924 -0.0277 0.0581 0.0321 0.0388
[0.0105] [0.0042] [0.0076] [0.0041] [0.0060] [0.0062] [0.0033] [0.0029] [0.0063] [0.0001] [0.0017] [0.0016]
{-4.94}*** {8.06}*** {5.39}**** {-5.83}*** {0.34} {-13.809}*** {-2.00)** {-32.14}*** {-4.37}*** {460.95}*** {18.52}*** {24.23}***
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) -0.1847 0.0814 0.0166 -0.2430 0.1778 -0.2661 0.0648 -0.2013 0.0583 0.3244 -0.0964 -0.1612
[0.0400] [0.0188] [0.0302] [0.0195] [0.0258] [0.0212] [0.0113] [0.0098] [0.0205] [0.0007] [0.0069] [0.0044]
{-4.62}*** {4.32}*** {0.55} {-12.45}*** {6.90}*** {-12.58}*** {5.72}*** {-20.50}*** {2.85}** {470.12}*** {-13.89}*** {-36.72}***
Real GDP per capita  (lnY_PPP) 0.4234 0.0403 -0.2401 -0.1948 -0.1756 0.3832 0.2804 0.6636 0.6182 0.2350 0.2159 -0.0645
[0.0601] [0.0244] [0.0169] [0.0148] [0.0246] [0.0356] [0.0075] [0.0431] [0.0453] [0.0096] [0.0002] [0.0077]
{7.05}*** {1.65}* {-14.19}*** {-13.15}*** {-7.14}*** {10.75}*** {37.43}*** {15.38}*** {13.66}*** {24.48}*** {1199.28}*** {-8.41}***
Official development assistance (lnODA) -0.0228 0.0135 0.0121 -0.0151 0.0082 -0.0363 0.0014 -0.0348 -0.0077 0.0285 0.0053 0.0039
[0.0228] [0.0087] [0.0056] [0.0120] [0.0038] [0.0141] [0.0031] [0.0172] [0.0107] [0.0034] [0.0048] [0.0017]
{-1.00} {1.55} {2.15}** {-1.25} {2.13}** {-2.58}** {0.46} {-2.03}** {-0.72} {8.52}*** {1.09} {2.20}**
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0056 -0.0007 0.0025 0.0041 0.0005 0.0063 -0.0032 0.0031 0.0015 -0.0048 -0.0012 0.0020
[0.0009] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000]
{6.08}*** {-2.72}** {7.48}*** {25.40}*** {1.33} {9.37}*** {-40.13}*** {5.20}*** {1.91}** {-53.67}*** {-10.67}*** {67.87}***
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -0.1558 0.2322 0.0652 0.0909 0.0244 -0.3880 0.1671 -0.2210 -0.2467 0.1413 0.2079 0.0408
[0.0513] [0.0205] [0.0039] [0.0112] [0.0200] [0.0307] [0.0166] [0.0473] [0.0401] [0.0093] [0.0005] [0.0160]
{-3.04}*** {11.33}*** {16.52}*** {8.15}*** {1.22} {-12.62}*** {10.09}*** {-4.67}*** {-6.15}*** {15.13*** {392.20}*** {2.55}**
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) 0.0621 -0.0109 -0.0043 -0.1896 0.0059 0.0730 -0.0066 0.0665 0.2518 0.1787 -0.0169 -0.0103
[0.0175] [0.0125] [0.0132] [0.0124] [0.0099] [0.0050] [0.0006] [0.0044] [0.0051] [0.0001] [0.0026] [0.0032]
{3.54}*** {-0.87} {-0.33} {-15.24}*** {0.60} {14.61}*** {-10.97}*** {15.10}*** {49.27}*** {1624.64}*** {-6.36}*** {-3.16}***
Real lending rate (RLR) 0.0135 0.0028 0.0068 0.0071 0.0040 0.0107 -0.0039 0.0068 0.0064 -0.0043 -0.0011 0.0028
[0.0015] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0012] [0.0001] [0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0001]
{9.05}*** {10.01}*** {17.72}*** {35.18}*** {14.38}*** {8.77}*** {-39.30}*** {6.04}*** {4.93}*** {-53.63}***{-1140.00}*** {27.90}***
Constant term -1.1817 0.0500 1.4746 5.4343 0.8237 -1.2318 -1.4246 -2.6564 -6.6160 -5.3842 -0.7736 0.6510
[0.4924] [0.2634] [0.3553] [0.1521] [0.2416] [0.2290] [0.0920] [0.1370] [0.3402] [0.1112] [0.0218] [0.1138]
{-2.40}** {0.19} {4.15}*** {35.72}*** {3.41}*** {-5.38}*** {-15.49}*** {-19.38}*** {-19.45}*** {-48.41}*** {-35.45}*** {5.72}***
Number of observations 266 298 312 284 308 282 305 289 275 291 303 310
Number of groups 32 35 35 35 35 34 35 34 34 35 35 35
Number of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Wald statistic 328835.92*** 7618.21*** 2337.83*** 6078.18*** 12480.96*** 168227.07*** 4978.02*** 165586.88*** 167457.05*** 6848.20*** 10049.56*** 7409.40***
A-B 2ⁿᵈ-order autocorrelation test -0.969(0.33) -1.551(0.12) -1.841(0.07) -1.146(0.252) -2.009(0.045) -             -          -             -            -             -           -             
Sargan over-identifying restrictions 18.413(0.99) 29.097(0.95) 28.503(0.956) 23.018(0.995) 26.477(0.978) -             -          -             -            -             -           -             
C-E
Estimated Decade-Based Results
Decade-Based Rolling 
Estimated Results
Non-Overlapping Decade-Based 
Coefficient Stability Test Results
Overlapping Decade-Based Coefficient Stability 
Test Results
A-B B-C A-C A-D B-D B-E
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As reported in columns A-D, B-D, B-E and C-E of Table 7.5.2.2, the differences in the 
estimated decade-based coefficients of international migrant remittance inflows are statistically 
consistent showing coefficient instability across the three decades within 99 per cent 
confidence interval. Indeed, the evolution in the estimated decade-based coefficients of all 
other explanatory variables reported in Table 7.5.2.2 is consistently and statistically unstable 
across the three decades between 1980 and 2009. The only exception to this general 
observation is the estimates of official development assistance (ODA) as shown in columns A-
D and B-E in Table 7.5.2.2. In conclusion, the estimated decade-based coefficients reported in 
Table 7.5.2.2 are actually different and this evolution is statistically consistent, implying 
parameter instability from decade to decade over the 1980-2009 period. 
 
Finally, to satisfy the intellectual curiosity of persons who may be interested in seeing how 
migrant remittance inflows affected broad money-GDP ratio in SSA between 1980 and 2009 
within the confines of static panel-data analytical framework, FE and RE models were 
estimated. The static panel-data empirical results of the impact of international migrant 
remittance inflows on broad money as a ratio of GDP in SSA over the period, 1980-2009 are 
presented in Table A7.5. Out of the four static panel-data estimations conducted comprising 
conventional FE, conventional RE, robust FE and robust RE estimations, the Hausman 
specification test statistic and the Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test statistic jointly suggest 
that the most efficient and reliable result in the context of static estimations is reported under 
robust GLS RE empirical model presented in Table A7.5 in the Appendix. Although in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity the conventional RE results indicate that migrant remittance 
inflows, real GDP per capita PPP, human capital accumulation, and real lending rate positively 
stimulate variations in broad money-GDP ratio, government expenditure and real exchange 
rate negatively affect broad money-GDP ratio with reference to SSA between 1980 and 2009. 
However, when the robust RE estimation to correct heteroskedasticity was undertaken, besides 
human capital accumulation, none of the explanatory variables statistically impact on broad 
money-GDP ratio, thereby sharply contradicting the results of the dynamic panel-data 
estimation by sys-GMM as reported under Table 7.5.2. 
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7.5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter explored the impact of migrant remittances on various aspects of economic 
development, viz. poverty, income inequality, unemployment, labour participation, labour 
productivity, human welfare, educational attainment, life expectancy, and financial development 
in SSA. In general, an affirmative common answer to the research questions of this chapter is 
hereby given, that, migrant remittance inflows have a positive developmental impact on SSA, 
with no evidence for moral hazard effects on labour market outcomes. Based on the empirical 
findings, this study concludes that, in remittance-receiving SSA countries: 
 
i. Remittances have huge potential for promoting economic development by way of 
helping to reduce poverty, but not necessarily income inequality. In fact, there is some 
evidence for an income inequality-equalising effect of remittances, but this is not 
statistically significant at the conventional levels, probably because the amount 
remittances received per migrant is too low in the sub-region. In countries with a 
relatively higher incidence of poverty and income inequality, remittances actually 
exacerbate poverty and income inequality. 
 
ii. Remittances contribute directly to reducing the rate of unemployment. However, in 
countries with mild unemployment problems, increased inflows of remittances alone 
may not be sufficient to reduce or solve the perennial frictions in their labour markets. It 
is in countries with relatively „unmanageable‟ unemployment rates that migrant 
remittances directly contribute more substantially to reducing the unemployment rates. 
 
iii. Although, in general, remittances have no long-run impact on labour force participation, 
there are prospects that if more remittances are received, they can actually contribute 
positively to higher labour force participation in countries with relatively higher rates of 
labour market participation. In countries where labour productivity rates are relatively 
high, remittances impact positively on productivity. In either case, the findings of this 
study indicate that migrant remittance inflows to SSA do not lead to moral hazard 
effects in the labour market, probably because the amount of remittances received by 
the sub-region is too low for recipients to solely rely on as a means of livelihood. 
 
iv. Over the past three decades, remittances contributed significantly to promoting human 
welfare, educational attainment and life expectancy. But, whereas remittances 
promoted higher general human welfare in countries with relatively lower HDI and 
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lower rates of educational attainment, it is in countries with relatively higher years of life 
expectancy that remittances contributed more to increasing life expectancy. This may 
be due to the fact that in very poor countries, availability of quality healthcare facilities 
and access to modern medical services are more challenging. This implies that in the 
absence of quality healthcare infrastructure and motivated professionals, migrant 
remittances may not contribute significantly to increasing life expectancy in remittance-
recipient countries. 
 
v. Since the adoption of financial liberalisation programmes in the 1980s, migrant 
remittances have been stimulating financial development through higher private sector 
credit and broad money to GDP ratio. However, without a sound macroeconomic policy 
environment, the impact of remittances on financial development can be negligible and 
even negative under extreme adverse economic conditions. In the contemporary world, 
the higher the level of financial development of a country, the more robust the impact of 
migrant remittances on financial market development in response to macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
vi. The contribution of remittances to financial development has been increasing steadily 
over the years under sound macroeconomic policy environment. The contribution of 
remittances to financial development in the recent past decade (2000-2009) has been 
greater than at the onset of adopting financial liberalisation programme in the 1980s. 
This trend points to the fact that there is a higher prospect of migrant remittances 
contributing to the development of financial markets in SSA provided prudent policy 
measures are put in place to stabilise the macroeconomic environment. 
 
The main implications of the conclusions158 enumerated above are that migrant remittances 
promoted economic development in SSA over the past three decades, but the optimal 
contribution of remittances to the development of SSA has not been realised, mainly because 
the sub-region failed to: (i) mobilise adequate remittances from its migrants; and (ii) create the 
ideal macroeconomic policy environment for remittances to contribute effectively towards 
economic development. This is because even though remittances have a potential to engender 
                                                          
158
 It is important to note that with regard to the conclusions based on the distributive effects of the comparative 
analyses in particular, given that higher unofficial remittances are more likely to be received in poorer countries with 
weaker institutions and financial infrastructure, the developmental-impact of remittances in these countries could be 
underestimated if only official remittances are used, as happened in the case of this study because data on unofficial 
remittances are not available over the study period and across the sampled countries. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
339 
 
economic development in SSA, the specific socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions of the 
migrant-home country, by and large, determine the extent to which the benefits of remittances 
can be exploited. 
 
Consequently, there is the need to attract optimal official remittances in order to realise the full 
developmental-impact of remittances in SSA. In addition to the specific policy measures that 
can be put in place to attract higher inflows of official remittances noted in the preceding 
chapters, this study recommends the need for governments to stabilise the macroeconomic 
policy environment by ensuring lower and stable prices, creating an ideal investment climate, 
and being committed to pursuing pro-growth policies which have equitable distributive effects. 
Besides pursuing sound macroeconomic policies, this study prescribes the following specific 
policies towards enhancing the developmental-impact of migrant remittances in SSA: 
 
i. Pursue complementary development strategies towards eliminating market distortions 
in favour of the rich, so as to reduce poverty, income inequality and higher 
unemployment rates. Poverty alleviation policies such as capacity building, vocational 
training, access to venture capital and microcredit, and other SME incentive packages 
through which the economically-disadvantaged and the vulnerable groups such as 
deprived rural dwellers and marginalised women stand a better chance to gain and 
improve upon their welfare,  can be useful in enhancing the poverty-alleviating and 
inequality-reducing effects of remittances. 
 
ii. Adopt an integrated economic development programme in which fiscal and monetary 
policies are well-coordinated in a manner that will ensure that progressive price and 
income policies are designed and implemented towards bridging the gap between high-
income and low-income earners at all levels of economic development. 
 
iii. Enhance the institutional capacity of banks and other financial institutions including 
social security and pension funds, credit unions and microfinance institutions so that 
these institutions can develop innovative products for the Diaspora population and at 
the same time ensure optimal financial inclusiveness. In this way, more official 
remittances can be received and managed more effectively for sustainable 
socioeconomic development. 
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iv. Encourage the formation of vibrant and progressive migrant hometown associations in 
all major migrant host countries as a means to mobilise more remittances to finance 
development projects at the community level. Community-based projects financed by 
remittances are often of public nature and the benefits accrue to all users irrespective of 
income status and, whether or not, a family has an international migrant. 
 
v. Enhance the institutional capacity of local governments to enable them to design and 
implement cutting-edge attractive development programmes according to their unique 
culture, history, heritage, and to develop tourist attractions. Through this, effective social 
and business networks can be formed to facilitate the mobilisation of resources to 
finance critical development projects. Furthermore, through these networks a platform 
can be created to harness the intellectual capital of migrants for the benefit of their 
native countries. 
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APPENDIX 7 
 
Table A7.1: Summary of Empirical Studies on the Impact of Remittances on Economic Development 
Author(s), Year Case Study Study Period Model & Estimation 
Method 
Variables Included  Key Finding(s) 
Glytsos (2002) Egypt, 
Greece, 
Jordan, 
Morocco, 
Portugal 
1969-1998 OLS, simultaneous 
equations with 
distributed lag feature 
estimated by 2SLS 
Dependent: Private consumption expenditure, gross 
domestic investment (private and public) including 
changes in stocks, imports (M), disposable income 
comprising GDP and volume of remittances. 
Explanatory: GDP growth rate, government 
spending/GDP, cumulative gross domestic 
investment/GDP, goods exports/GDP, real migrant 
remittances proxied by (WR+CE+MT)/CPI 
The impact of remittances on all 
development outcome indicators 
(dependent variables) except investment 
in Egypt is positive for both short-  and 
long run and so are the distributed time 
effects with only one negative interim 
multiplier effect in Morocco for 
consumption and income but with 
positive overall effects in each case. 
Adams and Page 
(2005) 
71 
Developing 
countries 
New dataset 
collected by 
authors (1980-
1999) 
depending upon 
country-specific 
availability 
OLS and 1
st
-Stage IV 
estimation 
Dependent: (Log of) Poverty (less than US$1 per 
person; gap; squared gap), income inequality (Gini 
index).  
Explanatory: (Log of) Remittances per capita, per capita 
GDP PPP, regional dummies, survey mean income o 
per capita GDP,  distance from remittance-sending 
area, government stability, percentage of population 
over 25 years with secondary education. 
Remittances, just as migration, 
significantly reduce the incidence, depth 
and severity of poverty in developing 
countries. A 10 percentage rise in 
international remittances leads to a 3.5 
percentage decrease in the share of the 
population living in poverty. 
López-Córdova 
(2005) 
Mexican 
municipalities 
(a survey 
data of more 
than 2400 
households) 
2000 cross-
sectional data 
2SLS estimation with 
remittances as an 
instrumental variable 
Dependent: Various developmental outcome variables 
including poverty, educational attainment, infant 
mortality, illiteracy rate and healthcare indicators. 
Explanatory: Remittances received by households. 
Control variables (squared remittances, distance 
between US-Mexico border from municipalities, 
historical migration rates, municipal per capita income, 
percentage of population in rural communities, fraction 
of indigenous people, Gini coefficient, share of 
employment in agriculture and in government sector, 
unemployment rate, homicide rate at municipal level, 
and governance. 
An increase in the fraction of households 
receiving international remittances is 
positively correlated with higher 
schooling, healthcare indicators and 
reduced poverty. International 
remittances lead to improved welfare, 
reduced infant mortality and illiteracy 
among children aged 6-14 while 
increasing school attendance among the 
latter group. Also, poverty levels and 
marginalisation index decline. 
Acosta et al. (2006) 10 LAC 
countries 
Cross-sectional 
data based on 
most recent 
National 
Cross-sectional 
country-specific data 
analysis by OLS and 
Instrumental variable 
Dependent: (Log of) Poverty (headcount, gap, squared 
gap). 
Explanatory: (Log of) Remittances (WR+CE+MT) per 
capita or Remittances/GDP, GDP per capita or 
Remittances do not have a significant 
inequality-alleviating effect, but they do 
reduce poverty headcounts significantly. 
A percentage rise in remittance ratio to 
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Household 
Survey Data 
(NHSD) 
estimation household mean income, Gini index, 
remittances*regional dummy variable. 
Instrumental variables: Distance between home and 
host countries, percentage of population over age 25 
that have completed secondary education, government 
stability, growth of sender countries weighted by 
distance, growth of sender countries weighted by stock 
of migrants of receiving countries 
GDP reduces the fraction of population 
living in poverty by about 0.4 per cent. 
Aggarwal et al. 
(2006) 
99 
developing 
countries 
1975-2003 Panel FE, RE and 
system dynamic GMM 
estimations 
Dependent:  Financial development (either bank credit 
to private sector/GDP or bank deposit/GDP). 
Explanatory: Dynamic Panel Model (Log of) 
Remittances(WR+CE+MT)/GDP, lag of dependent 
variable, control variables (real GDP, real GDP per 
capita, inflation, current and capital account openness, 
dummy for dual exchange rate regimes). 
2
nd
 set of control variables are exports/GDP, AID/GDP, 
FDI/GDP, portfolio equity/GDP. 
Remittances have positive impact on 
financial development and this finding is 
robust for all estimations even after 
accounting for all possible forms of 
endogeneity. 
Drinkwater et al. 
(2006) 
19 
remittance-
dependent 
countries 
(remittances 
of at least 1 
per cent of 
GDP) 
1976-2003 
(unbalanced 
panel) 
OLS and FE modelling Dependent: Unemployment rate; investment 
(GCF)/GDP. 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP, 
M2/GDP, openness (X+M)/GDP, fiscal policy (budget 
deficit)/GDP, uncertainty (5-year moving average of 
CPI), economic activity (real GDP growth rate), real 
interest rate, AID/GDP 
Remittances help in solving credit 
constraint problems in recipient countries. 
Remittances have a small negative effect 
on unemployment, but a significant 
positive effect on investment. The 
positive investment effect outweighs the 
negative search income effect and so 
remittances can reduce unemployment 
rate in the long run. 
Faini (2006a) 37 countries 
with migrants 
in Europe as 
reported in 
the European 
Community 
Households 
Survey 1994-
2001 
1990-2000 
(Pooled data) 
Aggregate data 
modelling and pooled 
data modelling. Linear, 
Log-linear functional 
form estimations. Log 
of distance between 
home-country and host-
country used as an 
instrument in a re-
estimated IV model 
Dependent: Remittances (WR+CE+MT)/population, 
Explanatory: Total migration/population, home-country 
income per capita, ratio of skilled migrants/population, 
per capita income*migration of skilled and unskilled 
workers. 
In pooled-data regression, time dummy, and time 
dummy*migration stock included. 
Brain drain is associated with a smaller 
flow of remittances. Migration stock leads 
to higher inflow of remittances. Skilled 
migrants remit less, hence the cost of 
migration outweighs the benefit from 
remittances in migrant-exporting 
countries. 
De Leon-Manlagnit 
(2006) 
40 
developing 
countries 
1975-2003 Single equation by 
OLS, 2SLS based on 5-
year moving average 
data) with investment 
Dependent: Private household consumption/GDP; 
private household investment (GFC)/GDP 
 
Explanatory (consumption regression): Remittances 
Remittances have significant positive 
impact on private household consumption 
with or without interaction effects. 
Transitory remittance incomes not 
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as IV (WR+CE+MT)/GDP, Control variables – domestic 
permanent income, bank credit/GDP, quasi 
money/GDP, economic openness (X+M)/GDP, current 
fiscal balance/GDP, remittances*GDP, transitory 
remittances*financial development (FDV) indicator, 
transitory remittances*openness, transitory 
remittances*FDV*openness. 
 
Explanatory (investment regression): Remittances 
(WR+CE+MT)/GDP, Control variables – lending rate, 
current fiscal balance/GDP, transitory 
remittances*openness, permanent 
remittances*openness, openness*financial 
development indicator 
significant in both models and so are all 
its interactive effects. 
Acosta et al. 
(2008a) 
10 LAC 
countries 
Household 
survey data 
2000-2004 
Dynamic panel-data 
modelling by GMM 
Dependent: Log difference in inequality (Gini index) 
Explanatory: (Log of) Gini indext_1, remittances 
(WR+CE+MT) but with some exceptions at time t_1, 
average years of secondary education of the female 
population t_1, average years of secondary education of 
the male population t_1, price of capital t_1, remittances 
t_1*LAC regional dummy or remittances in LAC 
Remittances reduce income inequality.  
Jongwanich (2007) 17 Asia-
Pacific 
developing 
countries 
1993-2003 Panel IV-FE modelling 
of poverty and human 
capital development 
functions. Dynamic 
panel-data modelling of 
investment function by 
system GMM  
Dependent: Poverty (headcount ratio of US$1 per day 
Explanatory: Economic growth, inequality, remittances 
(WR+CE+MT)/GDP and control variables (human 
capital, inflation, trade openness). 
Human capital model: initial income and 
remittances/GDP. 
Investment model: Lag of investment (GFCF)/GDP, 
growth, openness, inflation, remittances, and real 
interest rate. 
Remittances have significant impact on 
poverty reduction through increasing 
income, smoothing consumption and 
easing capital constraints of the poor. 
Shahbaz et al. 
(2007) 
Pakistan 1971-2001 ARDL and Johansen 
co-integration approach 
Dependent: Log of financial development proxied by 
private sector credit/GDP 
Explanatory: (Log of) Remittances(WR+CE+MT)/GDP, 
real GNP per capita, CPI, exports 
Remittances promote financial 
development in the long run, and 
although remittances carry a positive 
sign, statistically, they are not a short-run 
determinant of financial development 
Toxopeus and 
Lensink (2007) 
64 
developing 
countries 
including 10 
SSA 
2001-2005 
(unbalanced 
data mostly 
starting from 
2003) 
Single equation by OLS Dependent: Share of households with bank accounts as 
a proxy for financial inclusion 
Explanatory: Log of remittances per capita; governance 
index; population density; log of GDP; GDP per capita; 
communication infrastructure; concentration ratio; credit 
Remittances have a development impact 
through their positive effects on financial 
inclusion. 
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countries information index; share of assets in government-
owned banks; restrictions on bank activities; 
requirements for entry into banking 
Acosta et al. 
(2008b) 
101 
developing 
countries 
1970-2003 System GMM 
estimation of a dynamic 
panel model 
Dependent: Log of changes in Gini index (gt-gt-1) 
Explanatory: (Log of) Initial inequality (gt-1), one lag 
remittances/GDP (remt-1), (remt-1)*LAC regional 
dummy. Control variables: average years of secondary 
education of female and male population, per capita 
income, distance between host country and home 
country, market distortions proxied by price of 
investment goods. 
Generally, remittances contribute to 
improved higher income and inequality. 
In LAC. Remittances either reduce or 
have no impact on inequality as a one 
percentage increase in remittances lead 
to a decrease in the number of persons 
living in poverty by 0.4 per cent. 
Nguyen (2008) Vietnam National Survey 
Data 2002, 
2004 on 4008 
households 
Panel FE estimation Dependent: Outcome variable (household income, 
consumption per capita, income inequality (Gini index, 
Theil‟s L index, Theil‟s T index), poverty (headcount 
index, gap and squared gap) 
Explanatory: Secondary school enrolment, number of 
dependants, household size, squared household size, 
type of employment of household head, locality, 
domestic remittances, type of residential apartment, 
international remittances 
Remittances increase household income 
and consumption remarkably, and 
although they help decrease poverty 
marginally, there is also evidence for 
marginal increase in income inequality. 
Ponce (2008) 937 
Households 
in Ecuador 
(National 
Living 
Standard 
Measurement 
Survey) 
2006  Several estimations of 
single equation 
modelling OLS ad 
2SLS using remittances 
as instrumental variable 
Dependent: Development outcome variables (school 
enrolment of children aged 6-15; child malnutrition; 
respiratory diseases and diarrhoea infection rate among 
children under 5 years; access to health services; log of 
per capita consumption; log of consumption of food; log 
of educational expenditure; log of health expenditure) 
Explanatory: Individual demographic features such as 
age, sex, educational attainment, ethnicity of household 
head, and monthly remittances received by household 
Remittances have positive effect on 
consumption, and access to education 
and healthcare. Remittances lead to 
higher probability of children attending 
private schools. Remittances increase 
consumption by about 9 per cent. If 
remittances increase by US$10, 
educational spending increase by 18 per 
cent; and 25 per cent in case of 
healthcare expenditure 
Acosta, Baerg and 
Mandelman  (2009) 
109 
developing 
and transition 
countries 
1990-2003 
(unbalanced 
data) 
Dynamic panel-data 
estimation by first-
difference GMM 
Dependent: Real exchange rate index 
Explanatory: Remittances(WR+CE+MT)/GDP; bank 
credit/GDP; bank deposit/GDP; remittances*bank 
credit/GDP; remittances*bank deposit/GDP; Control 
variables: ToT, excess money growth, trade openness, 
GDP per capita, GDP growth 
Remittances exert pressure on real 
exchange rate, with weaker impact on 
countries with deeper and more 
sophisticated financial markets which 
seem to retain trade competitiveness. 
Well-developed financial market can 
more effectively channel remittances into 
productive investment. 
Ajayi et al. (2009) 38 SSA 
countries 
2007  Simple linear equation 
by OLS 
Dependent: Life expectancy at birth 
Explanatory: Remittances/GDP, migration rate, 
Remittances have significant positive 
impact on life expectancy. 
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inequality as measured by Gini coefficient 
Ebeke and Le Goff 
(2009) 
80 
developing 
countries 
1970-2000 Single equation OLS, 
IV estimation and 
system GMM in which 
the dynamic properties 
of the dependent 
variable was excluded 
Dependent: Gini coefficient 
Explanatory: Level of development proxied by log of 
GDP per capita, dependency ratio, migration costs 
proxied by cost of passport, brain-drain level, log of 
remittances (WR+CE+MT) per capita. Control variable: 
FDI/GDP, M2/GDP, inflation, log of government 
consumption/GDP, trade openness; state of institutions.  
REMPC*logGDP; REMPC*initial brain drain; 
REMPC*passport costs; REMPC*distance 
The more the mean income of the 
recipient country is high, the more 
remittances reduce income inequality. 
International remittances are less 
inequality-mitigating as the costs of 
migration rise. The more the brain drain 
is important, the more remittances 
promote income inequality. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz (2009) 
73 
developing 
countries 
1975-2002 System GMM 
estimation of a dynamic 
panel-data model 
Dependent: Bank deposit/GDP, bank loans/GDP, bank 
credit/GDP, M2/GDP 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP with 
investment as a control variable. 
For the mean and median categories of 
countries, remittances have a robust 
positive effect on financial development 
with this impact increasing in the 
presence of investment. Above the 
median level of financial depth, however, 
remittances have dampening effect. 
Gupta, Pattillo and 
Wagh (2009) 
76 
developing 
countries for 
poverty 
estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 SSA 
countries for 
financial 
development 
estimation 
Survey data 
beginning 1980 
(unbalanced 
data). 
1975-2004 
5-year averages 
Model I: 
Pooled OLS 3SLS for 
poverty models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model II: 
Panel RE, Panel FE,  
Plus FE-IV for financial 
development model. 
Dependent: (Log of): Poverty (headcount, gap and 
squared gap) 
Explanatory: (Log of): remittances (WR+CE+MT)/GDP, 
real GDP for country size, real GDP per capita for 
institutional development, CPI-based inflation, gini 
coefficient, distance, trade openness (X+M)/GDP, dual 
exchange rate market dummy for capital account 
openness, school (average school years among over 
25 years of population). 
 
Dependent: (Log of): Bank deposits/GDP; M2/GDP 
Explanatory: (Log of): Remittances/GDP instrumental 
variable. (Exogenous variables): real GDP, real GDP 
per capita, inflation, trade openness, (FDI+ODA)/GDP 
for capital account openness 1, dual exchange rate 
dummy for capital account openness 2. 
 
Remittances have a direct poverty 
mitigating effect and enhance financial 
development in the long run. Remittances 
negatively impact on poverty headcount 
(-0.13) and poverty gap (-0.13). 
Remittances reduce income inequality. 
 
 
 
In all estimations, remittances exerted 
positive and robust impact on financial 
development 
Gyimah-Brempong 
and Asiedu (2009) 
Ghana National survey 
data from 
Ghana Living 
Standards 
Survey (GLSS5) 
IV-2 Stage Probit 
modelling for the cross-
sectional data analysis. 
 
Dynamic pseudo panel-
Dependent: Poverty (headcount, gap, squared gap) 
Explanatory: Domestic remittances, international 
remittances, age, squared age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, household size, rural location, number of 
adult workers, gender*abroad (i.e. interacting gender 
Remittances increase the probability of a 
family to escape poverty or being 
chronically poor. International 
remittances have higher poverty 
mitigating effects than domestic 
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in 2005/2006. 
Psuedo-panel 
GLSS3-5 
data estimation by 
GMM  
with gender of international migrant) remittances. Remittances also increase 
the number of children in remittance-
recipient households attending school, 
hence raises human capital formation. 
Kalim and Shahbaz 
(2009) 
Pakistan 1973-2006 Fully-Modified OLS 
estimation of log-linear 
single equation 
specification 
Dependent: Poverty headcount ratio 
Explanatory: (Log of) Remittances/GDP, lag of 
dependent variables as proxy for economic shocks, 
trade openness, lag one of GDP growth, inflation, 
urbanisation (share of urban population), tax 
revenue/GDP, FDI/GDP. 
In another estimation, these variables were used in 
addition to the square of remittances 
Remittances have poverty-mitigating 
effects both in the short- and long run. 
Portes (2009) 46 countries 1970-2000 Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) by 
parsimonious approach 
alongside pooled OLS 
and SUR FE 
Dependent: Average income of a decile 
Explanatory: Log of real remittances (WR+CE), 
controlling for average income level, human capital 
accumulation proxied by secondary school enrolment, 
inflation, trade openness (X+M)/GDP, time dummies 
and other country-specific characteristics 
The impact of remittances is positive and 
decreasing in income for the bottom 70 
per cent of the population and negative 
and increasing in income for the top-20 
countries of the population. Remittances, 
thus, have a huge potential for reducing 
income inequality across countries. 
Adenutsi (2010a) 15 SSA 
countries 
1987-2007 Fixed Effects panel-
data modelling 
Dependent: Marginal deviations in human Development 
Index (HDI) 
Explanatory: (Log of): Investment (GFCF/GDP), human 
capital (secondary school enrolment rate), remittances 
(WR+CE+MT), trade openness, inflation (logCPI), 
government expenditure/GDP, time dummy (a 
dichotomous variable) 
Remittances impact positively and  
robustly on human development. 
Adenutsi (2010b) 18 SSA 
countries 
1987-2007 Fixed Effects panel-
data modelling 
Dependent: Marginal deviations in Human development 
index (HDI) 
Explanatory: (Log of): Investment (GFCF/GDP), human 
capital (secondary school enrolment rate), remittances 
(WR+CE+MT), trade openness, inflation (logCPI), 
government expenditure/GDP, time dummy (a 
dichotomous variable) 
Remittances have a positive and a 
significant impact on socioeconomic 
development. 
Adenutsi and 
Ahortor (2010) 
31 
developing 
countries 
from LAC 
(16) and SSA 
(15) 
1986-2006 Dynamic panel-data 
modelling by system 
GMM 
Dependent: Marginal deviations in Human development 
index (HDI) 
Explanatory: (Log of): HDIt-1, investment (GFCF/GDP), 
terms of trade (ToT), remittances (WR+CE+MT), 
human capital (secondary school enrolment rate), trade 
openness, inflation (logCPI), government 
expenditure/GDP, time dummy (a dichotomous 
Remittances impact positively on 
socioeconomic development of SSA but 
impact negatively on LAC countries 
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variable) 
Gheeraert et al. 
(2010) 
100 
developing 
countries 
Cross country; 
and panel data 
(1975-2004) 
OLS for cross-country 
analysis. 
FE and Least Squares 
Dummy Variable for 
panel data analysis 
Investment Model: 
Dependent: Total investment/GDP 
Explanatory: Remittances(WR+CE+MT)/GDP i.e. 
REMGDP, cost of bank depositing (CDEP), marginal 
cost of external finance(CEXF), REMGDP*CDEP, 
REMGDP*CEXF, REMGDP*CDEP*CEXF, and set of 
control variables viz. business cycle proxied by GDP 
growth trend, level of economic development proxied by 
GDP PPP, REMGDP*GDP PPP 
 
Bank Deposit Model: 
Dependent: Difference in total bank deposits 
Explanatory: REMGDP, CDEP, REMGDP*CDEP. 
Control variables: business cycle proxied by GDP 
growth trend, level of economic development proxied by 
GDP PPP, REMGDP*GDP PPP, money creation by 
Central Banks proxied by differences in reserve 
money/GDP 
Remittances have significant positive 
impact on investment and bank deposits, 
implying remittances can have positive 
effect on financial development in 
remittance-recipient countries. 
Gubert et al. (2010) Mali 
households 
2006 Single equation by OLS 
with counterfactual 
approach (with or 
without migration and 
remittances) 
Dependent: Poverty (headcount), Gini index 
Explanatory: Household non-remittance income, 
remittance income, household human capital, 
household physical assets, regional dummies; 
household head characteristics – age, marital status, 
sex, occupation 
Remittances reduce poverty by 5 to11 
per cent; and income inequality by 
approximately 5 per cent, with greater 
impact on bottom quintiles. 
Orrenius et al. 
(2010) 
Mexican 
states 
2003-2007 Pooled OLS, and Panel 
2SLS, FE modelling. 
Quarterly and annual 
data were used 
Dependent: Employment, wage, unemployment, school 
enrolment (primary, secondary, technical and 
university) 
Explanatory: Remittances also used as instrumental 
variable (defined as all forms of private transfers), FDI, 
net migration stock, formal and informal labour force. 
Remittances lead to improved labour 
market conditions, higher employment, 
and lower unemployment rates. 
Remittances may also reduce the fraction 
of workers earning minimum wages or 
less. Remittances, generally, have no 
effects on high income earners (those 
who earned 5 times or more above the 
minimum wage) 
Ambrosius (2011) Mexican 
households 
2002 and 2005 
Mexico Family 
Life Survey 
Treatment-effect 
Modelling. Analysis at 
overall, rural and urban 
subsets 
Dependent: Change in access to financial services 
Explanatory: Change in status of remittances received; 
vector of pre-determined control variables. 
Remittances have significant positive 
impact on ownership of savings accounts 
and the availability of borrowing options 
for rural dwellers, but not urban dwellers. 
This effect is relevant only in the case of 
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microfinance institutions but not for 
traditional banks. 
Serino and Kim 
(2011) 
66 
developing 
countries 
1981-2005 OLS for full sample and 
quantile regression 
Dependent: Poverty measures (headcount, gap, gap 
squared based on US$1/day threshold) 
Explanatory: Logarithm of: Gini index, real GDP per 
capita, remittances (total amount of remittances that 
flow through banks as a percentage of GDP), plus 
control variables – FDI, ODA, regional dummies and 
various year dummies 
Remittances have poverty-alleviating 
effects and this effect is more 
pronounced with worst-off group 
Singh and Hari 
(2011) 
India 1971-2008 Bivariate descriptive 
statistics including 
trend analysis 
Dependent: GDP at current market prices, gross 
domestic savings, gross domestic capital formation, 
exports, imports, foreign exchange reserve, private final 
consumption expenditure, FDI, balance of trade deficit, 
exchange rate, poverty 
Explanatory: Total remittances that can be 
approximated by (WR+CE+MT+other current transfers). 
Remittances impacted positively on 
household sector as well as the general 
economy, foreign exchange reserve, 
reduce poverty. Remittances appear to 
have been used to finance more for 
investment than consumption goods 
Orzell (2012) 106 
developing 
countries 
1980-2011: 
(1980-2007) for 
pre-crisis era 
(2008-2011) for 
crisis era 
Single equation OLS Dependent: Natural logarithm of Poverty headcount on 
$1.25 per day PPP 
Explanatory: Natural logarithm of: Remittances 
(WR+CE), real GDP per capita, GINI, and REM*crisis 
dummy. Also included are dummies for crisis, and sub-
regional grouping of sampled countries 
Despite the marginal decline in 
remittances in 2009, there was 
resurgence in 2010. Remittances have a 
decreasing effect on poverty rates during 
the period 1980-2011 and the effect was 
not statistically changed during the crisis. 
Thus, the effect of remittances on poverty 
during 1980-2007 is not statistically 
different from during the 2008-2011 crisis 
Gani and Sharma 
(2013) 
57 countries 
(9 low 
income, 24 
lower middle, 
24 upper 
middle 
countries) 
1999-2008 for 
low income; 
1996-2008 for 
lower middle 
income; 
1995-2008 for 
upper middle 
income 
FE, RE and standard-
corrected FE & RE 
models 
Dependent: Credit proxied by domestic credit/GDP ratio 
Explanatory: Remittances (WR+CE)/GDP, GDP per 
capita growth, real interest rate, annual percentage 
changes in GDP deflation as proxy for inflation, 
technology measured as internet users per 100 people, 
real per capita GDP 
Remittance inflows in the low and upper 
middle income countries are positively 
and significantly related to domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector 
under all three forms of estimations. 
Source: Author‟s compilation. Note: WR, CE, MT denote workers‟ remittances, compensation of employees and migrants‟ transfers respectively as defined in Chapter Two.
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Table A7.2: Set of Control Variables in the Empirical Models 
 
Source: Author Note: *Variable expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP. LFP and PRO denote 
labour force participation and labour productivity respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7.3: Median of Endogenous Variables and Specification of Median Dummy Variables 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
 Control Variables Poverty Inequality lnPSC lnM₂/GDP lnHDI lnLIF lnEDU lnUNE lnLFP lnPRO
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Real GDP per capita PPP (lnY_PPP) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Physical capital accumulation (lnINV)* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Government expenditure (lnGXP)* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Real lending rate (RLR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rate of Inflation (INF) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trade openness (lnOPN) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreign direct investment, net (FDI)* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overseas development assistance (lnODA)* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Business cycle (BZC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institutional quality (INS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adult literacy rate (lnLIT) Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
The Empirical Economic Development Models Involving……………………
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009 MDV i,t =1;
Poverty and Income Inequality Models: if Ě i,t >MDV i,t
Poverty headcount (lnPovH) 3.94051 YES
Poverty gap (lnPovG) 3.08024 YES
Poverty severity (lnPovS) 6.16048 YES
Income inequality (lnGini) 3.86231 YES
Labour Market Outcome Models:
Unemployment rate (lnUNE) 2.30347 NO
Labour force participation (lnLFP) 4.28693 YES
Labour productivity (lnPRO) 6.84166 YES
Human Welfare and Development Models:
Socioeconomic development (lnHDI) -1.01943 YES
Educational attainment (lnEDU) 3.22312 YES
Life expectancy (lnLIF) 4.00068 YES
Financial Development Models:
Bank credit to private sector (lnPSC) 2.77029 2.57077 2.63619 2.69880      YES
Broad money as ratio of GDP (lnM₂/GDP) 3.09268 3.03179 3.22617 3.10697      YES
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Table A7.4: 
Static Panel-Data Modelling of Remittances on Private Sector Bank Credit in SSA, 1980-2009 
  
Fixed  
Effects (FE) 
Random GLS 
Effects (RE)  Robust FE
++
  
Robust Random 
GLS (RE) 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) -0.0105 -0.0060 -0.0105 -0.0060 
  (-0.83)
 
(-0.47)
 
(-0.39)
 
(-0.24)
 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) 1.0381 0.7748 1.0381 0.7748 
  (14.23)*** (12.57)*** (5.11)*** (5.19)*** 
Rate of inflation (INF) -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0013 
  (-1.16) (-1.32) (-0.85) (-1.01) 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) 0.1649 0.1559 0.1649 0.1559 
 (3.50)*** (3.28)*** (1.24) (1.12) 
Real lending rate (RLR) -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 
 (-0.33) (0.18) (-0.22) (-0.12) 
Trade openness (lnOPN) 0.3743 0.3543 0.3743 0.3543 
 (6.37)*** (6.01)*** (2.67)** (2.52)** 
Constant term -6.9949 -4.9395 -6.9949 -4.9395 
  (-12.74)*** (-10.44)*** (-5.49)*** (-5.11)*** 
Number of observations 981 981 981 981 
Number of groups 35 35 35 35 
Overall R
2
 0.2365 0.2410 0.2365 0.2410 
F-statistics          55.87{0.000}
***
 
    
249.93{0.000}
***
 
      
13.69{0.000}*** 76.24{0.000}
***
 
Hausman_FE 25.18{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a n/a 
Breusch-Pagan (B-P) statistics n/a 4215.11{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    robust z-statistics in ( ), probabilities in { }, n/a denotes not available or required 
    ++ most efficient and reliable results based on Hausman test and B-P statistics 
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Table A7.5: Static Panel-Data Modelling of Remittances on M2/GDP in SSA, 1980-2009 
  
Fixed  
Effects (FE) 
Random GLS 
Effects (RE) Robust FE  
Robust Random 
GLS (RE)
++ 
Migrant remittances (lnREMPC) 0.0192 0.0308 0.0192 0.0308 
  (1.33) (2.34)** (0.75) (1.20) 
Human capital accumulation (lnHCA) 0.2735 0.2836 0.2735 0.2836 
  (5.42)*** (6.20)*** (2.82)*** (3.09)*** 
Real GDP per capita (lnY_PPP) 0.2784 0.1278 0.2784 0.1278 
  (3.08)*** (2.13)** (1.56) (1.21) 
Official development assistance (lnODA) 0.0025 -0.0011 0.0025 -0.0011 
  (0.10) (-0.04) (0.06) (-0.03) 
Rate of inflation (INF) 0.0018 0.0016 0.0018 0.0016 
  (1.62)* (1.49) (0.77) (0.72) 
Government expenditure (lnGXP) -0.1990 -0.1770 -0.1990 -0.1770 
 (-3.82)*** (-3.49)*** (-0.90) (-0.82) 
Real exchange rate (lnRXR) -0.0188 -0.0468 -0.0188 -0.0468 
 (-0.43) (-2.09)** (-0.24) (1.49) 
Real lending rate (RLR) 0.0116 0.0118 0.0116 0.0118 
 (7.55)*** (7.71)*** (1.38) (1.36) 
Constant term 0.6903 1.8406 0.6903 1.8406 
  (1.08) (4.18)*** (0.55) (2.33)** 
Number of observations 970 970 970 970 
Number of groups 35 35 35 35 
Overall R
2
 0.2507 0.3046 0.2507 0.3046 
F-statistics  27.58{0.000}
***
   244.08{0.000}
***
 6.94{0.000}
***
 90.95{0.000}
***
 
Hausman_FE 12.75{0.121} n/a n/a n/a 
Breusch-Pagan (B-P) statistics n/a 1312.18{0.000}
***
 n/a n/a 
Source: Author‟s estimation */**/*** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively 
    robust z-statistics in ( ), probabilities in { }, n/a denotes not available or required 
    ++ most efficient and reliable results based on Hausman test and B-P statistics 
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Table A7.6: Data Description, Measurement and Sources 
VARIABLE NOTATION DESCRIPTION, MEASUREMENT AND MAIN SOURCES 
Dependent Variables: Poverty & Income Inequality  
Poverty headcount  lnPovH Share of the population living on less than US$1.25 per day at 2005 international 
prices. Source: WDI. 
Poverty gap  lnPovG The mean shortfall from the poverty line159 (counting the non-poor as having zero 
shortfall) expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. Source: WDI. 
Poverty severity  lnPovS Squared value of the PovG. Source: Author‟s computation based on WDI. 
Income Inequality lnGini Gini index measuring the extent to which the distribution of income (or 
consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy 
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. Source: WDI. 
Dependent Variables: Labour Market Outcome  
Unemployment  lnUNE Share of labour force that is without work but available for, and seeking, work. 
Source: WDI, WEO and African Development Indicators (ADI). 
Labour participation 
rate 
lnLPR Proportion of the population aged 15 and above that is economically active: all 
people who supply labour for the production of goods and services during a 
particular year. Source: WDI and ADI. 
Labour productivity lnPRO Total output proxied by GDP weighted by labour force. Source: Author based on 
WDI, WEO and IMF country-specific desk information. 
Dependent Variables: Human Welfare and Development  
Human welfare lnHDI A weighted composite statistical index, ranging between zero (worst scenario) 
and one (best scenario), involving three key human development indicators: life 
expectancy at birth; knowledge and education; and living standard. Source: WDI 
and Human Development Reports by the UN. 
Educational 
attainment 
lnEDU Net enrolment ratio of children of official school age based on International 
Standard Classification of Education 1997, who enrolled in post-primary school 
relative to the population of the corresponding official school age. Source: WDI. 
Life expectancy  lnLIF The number of years a new-born child will live if prevailing patterns of mortality at 
the time of birth were to remain unchanged. Source: WDI. 
Dependent Variables: Financial Market Development  
Domestic credit to 
private sector  
 
lnPSC 
Total financial resources in the form of loans, purchases of non-equity securities, 
trade credits and other accounts receivable as a ratio of GDP extended to the 
private sector that establish a claim for repayment. Source: WDI and author 
based on IFS and WEO. 
Broad money to 
GDP ratio 
lnM2 /GDP Sum of currency outside banks, demand deposit other than those of the central 
government, and time, savings and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors 
other than the central bank as ratio of GDP. Source: WDI and author based on 
IFS and WEO. 
‘Uncontrolled’ Explanatory Variables 
Initial level of 
economic 
development _1
ln E   
The immediate past values of the dependent variable. Source: Author‟s 
computation from the specific dependent variable. 
Migrant remittances 
per capita 
lnREMPC The sum of workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees as ratio of 
population. Source: WDI, BoPS, MRF-2011 CD-ROMs and e-databases and 
estimates based on country-specific information obtained from country-desk 
officials of the IMF and the World Bank. 
Newly Introduced Controlled Variables* 
Real GDP per capita 
PPP 
lnY_PPP
+/- GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2005 
international prices in US dollars. Source: WDI and WEO. 
Business Cycle 
BZC
+/- Annual growth in real GDP. Source: Author based on WDI, IFS and WEO. 
Real lending rate 
RLR
+/- Average annual rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the 
annual rate of inflation. Source: Author based on WDI, IFS and WEO. 
Official development 
assistance 
lnODA+/- Disbursement flows (net of repayments) from official donors to a country as a 
percentage of nominal GDP. Source: WDI 
Adult literacy rate 
lnLIT
+/- Percentage of people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and 
write a short, simple statement on their everyday lives. Source: Author based on 
WDI and ADI. 
Note: The a priori sign is indicated by +/- by the notation column of each variable. *Other explanatory variables are 
as defined and measured in preceding chapters. In each case, the April 2011 edition was primarily used. 
                                                          
159
 The World Bank defines poverty line as the annual cost of obtaining the standardised minimum daily caloric 2172 
requirement of 2172 calories per person plus basic non-food essential items such as food and education. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws the curtain on the study with an overall summary, general conclusions, 
policy implications and recommendations, contributions to knowledge, and suggested areas for 
future research. By way of organisation, Section 8.1 summarises the entire study with 
emphasis on the key findings. Section 8.2 concludes by drawing attention to how the study 
responded to the research questions posed, evaluated the hypotheses, and how the research 
objectives were achieved. The policy implications and recommendations of the key findings of 
the study follow in Section 8.3. The contributions of this study to knowledge are outlined in 
Section 8.4, whilst some areas for future research are suggested in Section 8.5.  
 
8.1 SUMMARY 
This study was embarked upon to investigate the role macroeconomic policy can play in 
attracting optimal migrant remittances through official channels, and in enhancing the economic 
growth and developmental potentials of international migrant remittances in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). In pursuance of these objectives, this study was organised into eight chapters of which 
this final one serves as the concluding one. 
 
Chapter One set the stage with a general introduction to the study by presenting the 
background information, specifying the research problem, the research questions, the 
underlying motivation, the objectives and the hypotheses. The scope as well as the structure of 
the study was also discussed in Chapter One. It is observed that even though SSA is a leading 
„exporter of labour‟, the sub-region has been the least recipient of officially reported remittances 
in terms of actual volume received, per migrant and per capita. At the same time, however, 
some studies including that of Freund and Spatafora (2005), identify SSA as the leading 
recipient of informal remittances due to the high cost of remitting through the formal financial 
system, which is associated with the underdevelopment of the domestic financial markets. 
Therefore, it is imperative to explore the role macroeconomics can play in policy formulation 
towards increasing the flow of migrant remittances to SSA through official channels, especially 
because the continuous inflow of informal remittances can destabilise not only the 
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socioeconomic and geopolitical fabrics of the sub-region, but also threaten global security. It is 
further noted that SSA is the only sub-region in the world today that still depends more on 
foreign aid than other non-trade external finances despite the desperate attempts in search of 
the required finance to close the wide resource gap towards meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Finally, it is demonstrated in Chapter One why the scope of this 
study is restricted to 36 SSA countries over the period, 1980 to 2009.  
 
The study proceeds with a discussion on the definition and measurement of the key concepts 
in Chapter Two. These concepts are international remittances and financial liberalisation. It is 
noted that, unlike financial development which is essentially a de facto concept, financial 
liberalisation is de jure synonymous with the timing of the gradual implementation of policy 
reforms and developments within the financial system. The reasons justifying why the financial 
liberalisation index developed by Abiad et al. (2010) was used in this study despite a host of 
other alternative measures are discussed. It is evident that there can either be a narrow 
definition and measurement of international remittances or a broad definition and 
measurement. It is the narrow definition which is concerned with regular transfers of funds by 
international migrants that is considered the more appropriate measure in the context of this 
study. In effect, the definition and measurement of international remittances is narrowed to the 
sum of workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees. This implies that, contrary to the 
frequently used definition and measurement of remittances, migrant transfers are excluded 
from the definition of international migrant remittances in this study. Rationalised reasons for 
this exclusion are duly assigned. Finally, the conventional problems of remittance data 
deficiency and low quality are also discussed with the acknowledgement that, as has become a 
fact in macro-level cross-country time-series analyses, the officially reported remittance data 
used in this study are underestimated because remittances received through informal channels 
are not captured and incorporated due to a myriad of complexities. 
 
Having resolved the pertinent definitional and measurement issues surrounding the main 
concepts in this study, in Chapter Three, efforts are directed at providing a broad overview of 
macroeconomic performance and policy environment of SSA since independence in the 1960s. 
This is to provide an insight into understanding the observed trends in the macroeconomic 
performance as well as the composition and pattern of remittances and other external capital 
flows to SSA over the years. It is observed that, generally, very little is achieved by the sub-
region in terms of real per capita income growth, investment and resource mobilisation, so that 
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the unfavourable structural features of SSA which existed during the pre-reforms era are all still 
present today. Admittedly, though, there seems to be some glimmer of hope regarding 
economic recovery and prosperity in very recent years in terms of international trade, savings, 
and financial development. It is noted that what would have been the initial gains from the 
pursuit of financial liberalisation in SSA are eroded by unfavourable macroeconomic conditions 
and widespread political unrest, civil strife, and bad governance in the 1990s. Following this, 
SSA recorded its worst macroeconomic performance during the 1990s so that most of the 
performance indicators of the 1980s are closely comparable with those of the 2000s. Unlike 
other regions of the developing world, SSA attracts the least migrant remittances but the most 
foreign aid. This is notwithstanding the fact that the amount of remittances received by the sub-
region has been increasing steadily over the years and has increasingly been becoming more 
and more robust since the implementation of financial liberalisation in the 1980s. It is also 
observed that of the various forms of external capital, migrant remittances have been the most 
resilient to adverse economic shocks and the least volatile in the developing world where SSA 
enjoys the highest stability. A significant positive correlation exists between migrant remittance 
inflows and bank-based financial development indicators in SSA; and this is more robust for the 
highest remittance-recipient countries in comparison with the least remittance-recipient 
countries. 
 
The study then progressed to Chapter Four with the determination of the macroeconomic 
factors that explain the changing trends in migrant remittances received in SSA. This task is 
executed at both the aggregated and the disaggregated levels. At the aggregated level, the 
macroeconomic factors that affect migrant remittances are determined whereas at the 
disaggregated level, the macroeconomic determinants of the components of migrant 
remittances (workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees) are separately estimated. 
In order to provide a further understanding of the changing cyclical behaviour of remittances 
received in SSA, in each case, decade-based estimations are undertaken alongside the overall 
study period analysis. It is evident from the literature reviewed that the motives behind the flow 
of migrant remittances can be broadly categorised into either altruism or self-interest. 
Conceptually, however, it is noted that altruism and self-interest may not necessarily be 
mutually exclusive as, in many cases, a remitting migrant is often motivated by both motives. 
The system Generalised Method of Moment (sys-GMM) estimation procedure for dynamic 
panel-data models is adopted. It is found out that apart from asynchronous effects both host-
country and home-country macroeconomic factors play crucial roles in determining the amount 
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of officially reported remittances received in SSA between 1980 and 2009. Although, in 
response to the pursuit of a financial liberalisation programme, there seems to be an increasing 
impact of these macroeconomic factors on the changing trends in migrant remittance inflows, 
this is largely dependent upon the general macroeconomic performance of the sub-region. 
Macroeconomic variables, to a reasonable extent, have impacted differently on workers‟ 
remittances and migrant remittances received in SSA over the past three decades, although 
the results of these two are more consistent than in comparison with compensation of 
employees. Whereas workers‟ remittances and migrant remittances seem to be driven primarily 
by the self-interest economic motive, compensation of employees seems relatively more 
altruistic in nature. However, it does seem as though altruism is fading gradually. 
 
In Chapter Five, the direct causal effects and impacts of financial liberalisation on international 
migrant remittance inflows in SSA are investigated using a set of bivariate empirical models, 
notably, panel Granger-causality and panel GLS Random Effects (RE). For this analysis, the 
cross-sectional sampled size dropped from 36 to 13 SSA countries for which relevant data was 
available. The results suggest that financial liberalisation has contributed positively to 
international remittance inflows through official channels in SSA, but banks have not been 
active participants in the international remittance market, so that most of the officially reported 
migrant remittances received in SSA are received outside the formal financial system. 
Generally, the positive impact of financial liberalisation on international remittance inflows has 
been increasing over time, but it is relatively more robust for SSA countries with frontier and 
emerging financial markets than for their counterparts with underdeveloped financial markets. 
Policy reforms on stock market developments impact more on official remittance inflows than 
those directly related to the banking sector. Of the various financial policy reforms on the 
banking sector, bank supervision and prudential regulation, deregulation of credit allocation and 
reduction in reserve requirements, and elimination of entry barriers for competition in the 
banking industry exert the most significant positive impact on remittance inflows. Furthermore, 
it is found out that financial liberalisation Granger-causes international remittance inflows in 
SSA with a low statistical evidence of reverse causality. Policy reforms on stock market 
developments are found to have had the most significant uni-directional causal effect, which 
runs from stock market development to international remittance inflows. It is noted that the low 
participation of SSA banks in the remittance market, may be one of the reasons why the cost of 
international money transfers is relatively higher on the various remittance-corridors linking 
SSA countries as compared to the remittance corridors linking migrant-home countries in other 
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parts of the developing world.  
 
The study then proceeds to Chapter Six where a dynamic panel-data model involving 36 SSA 
countries is estimated following the sys-GMM estimation procedure, to examine the impact of 
migrant remittances on economic growth over the period, 1980-2009. Based on the assumption 
that the effects of international remittances on economic growth could vary over time in 
response to changing macroeconomic policy environment in remittance-recipient countries, a 
decade-based analysis is undertaken alongside the overall study period analysis. Also explored 
are the possible economic growth size-effects of migrant remittances in SSA. It is discovered 
that, between 1980 and 2009, migrant remittances impact positively on economic growth in the 
sampled 36 SSA countries. Again, for these sampled 36 countries, the impact of remittances 
on economic growth varies over time in response to changing macroeconomic environment 
such that, during the decades (the 1980s and the 1990s) that remittances have significant 
impact on growth, the positive impact is more significant during „good times‟ (the 1980s) than 
during „bad times‟ (the 1990s). It is, thus, found out that, broadly, since the implementation of 
financial liberalisation in SSA, the economic significance of international remittances to growth 
in the sub-region has been declining until it becomes zero in the 2000s. Another important 
finding in Chapter Six is that the positive impact of migrant remittances on economic growth 
has varying effects in response to the rate of economic growth in recipient countries such as 
SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates that have benefitted more directly from 
remittances. For SSA countries with relatively higher growth rates, the positive effects of 
remittances on economic growth have been increasing consistently both statistically and 
economically over the past three decades, even though remittances have had a zero-effect on 
growth in this category of countries in the 1980s. Moreover, the impact of migrant remittances 
on economic growth is more asynchronous with one year lag effect than contemporaneously.  
 
Finally, the implications of migrant remittances on various aspects of economic development in 
SSA are examined in Chapter Seven. In doing this, a set of dynamic panel-data models is 
estimated following the sys-GMM technique. Aspects of economic development covered are 
poverty, income inequality, unemployment, labour participation, labour productivity, human 
welfare, educational attainment, life expectancy, and financial development. For each 
estimated model, except for the model involving financial development, the time frequency of 
the data used changed to a 5-year non-overlapping panel data due to the unavailability of 
annual data for most of the development outcome indicators aforementioned. Hence, the 
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enquiry into the time-varying effects of international remittances on economic development 
since the implementation of financial liberalisation programme in SSA is limited to models in 
which the effects of remittances on financial development are explored. On the average, 
migrant remittance inflows have poverty-alleviating effects with the potential of income 
equalisation in SSA, but in migrant-home SSA countries with relatively higher levels of poverty 
and inequality, remittances intensify poverty and income inequality. It is also found out that 
remittances significantly reduce unemployment rates in SSA with no moral hazard effects in 
countries with relatively lower rates of unemployment. It is further realised that remittances 
have no direct effects on labour participation rates in SSA, but countries with higher rates of 
labour participation have higher prospects of benefitting from remittances in this regard. 
Similarly, the overall impact of international migrant remittances on labour productivity is 
statistically insignificant in SSA, but in SSA countries with relatively higher rates of labour 
productivity, remittances contribute significantly to labour productivity.  
 
Also, in Chapter Seven, it is noted that, overall, migrant remittances have contributed positively 
to enhancing human welfare, educational attainment and life expectancy in migrant-home SSA 
countries over the past three decades. However, the positive effects of migrant remittances on 
human welfare and educational attainment are more beneficial to SSA countries with relatively 
lower levels of human welfare and educational attainment. In fact, migrant remittances impact 
negatively on migrant remittance-receiving SSA countries with relatively higher rates of 
educational attainment. Concerning the size effects of international remittances on life 
expectancy in SSA, the positive impact is more robust in countries with relatively higher years 
of life expectancy at birth than those with relatively lower years of life expectancy. Furthermore, 
it is found out that between 1980 and 2009, migrant remittances impacted positively on 
financial market development in SSA and this impact has been increasing over time when all 
other factors are held constant. In particular, migrant remittances promote bank credit to the 
private sector as an indicator of financial development in the 1980s and the 2000s when the 
macroeconomic environment in SSA is relatively stable with higher real GDP per capita, whilst 
during the recession period of the 1990s, migrant remittances contribute negatively to private 
sector access to bank credit. Over the period 1980-2009, the impact of remittances on private 
sector credit has been more pronounced in migrant-home SSA countries with higher private 
sector access to bank credit than in other SSA countries with lower private sector access to 
bank credit. With regard to the impact of international remittances on broad money-GDP ratio 
2( / )M GDP  as an indicator of financial market development in SSA, it is negative in the 1980s 
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and positive for the subsequent decades with the economic significance of the 1990s being the 
least, probably due to the harsh economic conditions during that decade. The size of the 
economic impact of migrant remittances on 2 /M GDP  is more significant in countries with 
relatively lower 2 /M GDP  in the 1980s and the 1990s, but this has since switched in favour of 
countries with relatively higher 2 /M GDP  in the 2000s. 
 
The panel Granger-causality empirical results reported in Chapter Five are based on 
Econometric Views version 7.0 whilst all other empirical results are based on STATA version 
11.0. Tables and Figures are mainly based on Microsoft Office Excel 2007 edition. 
 
8.2 CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the objectives of this study have been achieved in 
view of the fact that: 
i. the study presents the facts on the extent to which macroeconomic environment has 
transformed following the adoption of economic reforms in SSA; and the trend in 
migrant remittance flows to SSA since financial liberalisation in the 1980s; 
ii. the macroeconomic factors that influence international remittances received in SSA 
under liberalised financial regime are identified; 
iii. the causal effect as well as the impact of financial liberalisation on international 
remittance inflows in SSA are examined; 
iv. the impact of international remittance inflows on long-run economic growth in SSA is 
analysed; and 
v. the developmental-impact of international remittances in SSA is determined. 
 
By achieving the underlying research objectives, the study, in effect, has responded to the 
pertinent research questions as follows: 
 
i. The macroeconomy of SSA has not demonstrated any significant improvement towards 
development since the adoption of economic reforms in the 1980s except in terms of 
financial market development and international trade. There has been a strong positive 
trend in the international migrant remittance inflows in SSA since the implementation of 
financial liberalisation programmes despite the fact that the sub-region remains the 
least remittance-recipient in the world. 
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ii. The macroeconomic determinants of international remittance inflows in SSA are host-
country income and law enforcement on banning the use of unofficial channels to remit. 
Other factors are home-country variables, notably real bilateral exchange rate, bank 
credit to private sector, home-country income, rate of inflation, institutional quality, and 
real deposit interest rate. The macroeconomic determinants of workers‟ remittances are 
host-country income, law enforcement on the use of official money transfer channels, 
home-country income, real bilateral exchange rate, institutional quality, and bank credit 
to private sector. Broadly, host-country income, home-country income, real bilateral 
exchange rate, law enforcement on use of official money transfer channels, bank credit 
to private sector, institutional quality, inflation rate, and real deposit interest rate are 
determinants of compensation of employees. 
 
iii. The impact and causal effect of financial liberalisation on international migrant 
remittance inflows in SSA are significantly robust. Overall, each specific policy 
implemented under financial liberalisation programme impacts positively on migrant 
remittance inflows. In a descending order of economic significance these policies are 
stock market development, prudential regulation and supervision of banks, elimination 
of entry barriers to the banking industry, deregulation of international capital flows, 
interest rate deregulation, and privatisation of banks. Also, financial liberalisation 
Granger-causes migrant remittance inflows through official channels. All other things 
remaining equal, SSA countries with frontier and emerging markets receive relatively 
higher migrant remittances through official channels of which the formal financial 
system is a part rather than other countries within the sub-region with relatively less 
developed financial markets. This is notwithstanding the fact that SSA countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets are the recipients of the most migrant remittances 
through official channels in which money transfer operators (MTOs) are dominant. 
 
iv. International migrant remittance inflows stimulate economic growth in SSA, and have a 
varying impact in response to macroeconomic policy environment rather than merely in 
reaction to improved financial market liberalisation. However, international remittances 
are not a panacea for long-run economic growth in every SSA country. International 
migrant remittances are more advantageous in enhancing growth in SSA countries with 
relatively higher rates of economic growth than in other SSA countries with relatively 
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lower rates of economic growth. 
 
v. To a very large extent, international migrant remittance inflows serve as a catalyst for 
economic development as far as poverty alleviation, unemployment, human welfare, 
educational attainment, life expectancy, and financial market development are 
concerned. Generally, migrant remittances contribute more to the economic 
development in „labour-exporting‟ SSA countries with relatively higher levels of 
economic development than what other countries within the sub-region with relatively 
lower levels of economic development save with reference to human welfare and 
educational attainment. 
 
Consequently, exclusive of hypotheses H2, H7, H9 and H10, at the conventional levels of 
statistical significance, this study fails to accept all the hypotheses specified under Section 1.6 
but, instead, concludes that, overall, with reference to SSA: 
i. macroeconomic factors are determinants of international remittance inflows; 
ii. macroeconomic determinants do not have exact influence on attracting remittances 
from permanent migrants (workers‟ remittances) and remittances from temporary 
migrants (compensation of employees); 
iii. financial liberalisation Granger-causes international remittance inflows with an evidence 
of weak reversal; 
iv. financial liberalisation impacts positively on international remittance inflows; 
v. international remittance inflows stimulate long-run economic growth; 
vi. international remittance inflows impact negatively on poverty (i.e. poverty headcount, 
poverty gap and poverty severity); 
vii. international remittance inflows do not influence income inequality; 
viii. international remittance inflows impact negatively on unemployment; 
ix. international remittance inflows do not affect labour participation; 
x. international remittance inflows do not influence labour productivity; 
xi. international remittance inflows promote human welfare development; 
xii. international remittance inflows impact positively on educational attainment; 
xiii. international remittance inflows impact positively on life expectancy at birth; and 
xiv. international remittance inflows promote financial development with reference to broad 
money to GDP ratio, and to some extent, access to private sector credit. 
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8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of policy issues have been put forward by this study; the overriding ones are outlined 
below. 
 
Firstly, as far as an appropriate inquiry into the stability in the flow and the impact of 
international migrant remittances in remittance-receiving SSA countries is concerned, it is 
implied that the best possible measure of migrant remittances is the sum of workers‟ 
remittances and compensation of employees, relative to population size. Secondly, it is implied 
that the pursuit of financial liberalisation is necessary but not a sufficient condition for receiving 
optimal migrant remittances through official channels as the macroeconomic performance and 
policy environment affect the potential contribution of financial liberalisation in this context. 
Thirdly, an important implication of the significant changing impact of macroeconomic factors 
on migrant remittance inflows in SSA is that one of the reasons why SSA is the least recipient 
of migrant remittances is the absence of appropriate and effective macroeconomic policies on 
the mobilisation of remittances from their citizens living abroad. Fourthly, it is implied that SSA 
countries with frontier and emerging financial markets receive more remittances through the 
formal financial channels but that the majority of the remittances received by the sub-region 
through the official channels are outside the financial system with low bank participation. It is 
further implied that, compared with the financial liberalisation policies on the banking system, 
policies on stock market development have been the most successful in the mobilisation of 
migrant remittances through the formal financial system. Another implication from this study is 
that in order to maximise the growth-enhancing impact of migrant remittances in the long run, 
remittance-receiving SSA countries must ensure that other pro-growth policies are vigorously 
pursued. Finally, it is implied that the implementation of a comprehensive economic 
development strategy is inevitable to maximise the developmental-impact of migrant 
remittances. In other words, it is imprudent to rely on migrant remittances as the main source of 
long-run growth in remittance-receiving SSA countries. 
 
Therefore, the most important recommendations of this study to inform policy initiatives are: 
 
i. The need for policy makers to ensure stable and credible macroeconomic policy 
environment through reduction in the rate of inflation, improvement in economic 
performance which reflects in higher real per capita income, and a stronger national 
currency in the international financial market so as to encourage private sector savings 
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and investment. Furthermore, it is imperative to ensure that policy makers in „labour-
exporting‟ SSA countries devise ways to strengthen institutions through improved 
democratic governance and freedom from civil and political strife as in more recent 
years, quality institutions impact positively on the inflows of workers‟ remittances and 
compensation of employees. To achieve this, measures must be put in place to reduce 
corruption (or the perception thereof), improve national security and peace, and create 
a conducive investment environment through the enactment of laws that protect the 
interest of investors and entrepreneurs, whether resident at home (potential recipients 
of remittances) or abroad (potential remitting migrants). 
 
ii. Policies under financial liberalisation programme such as stock market development, 
prudential regulation and supervision of banks, deregulation of credit allocation, 
relaxation of entry barriers to the banking industry, privatisation of banks, deregulation 
of interest rates and external account liberalisation must be rigorously pursued. When 
the pursuit of financial liberalisation leads to higher competition in the financial market, 
financial institutions will become more efficient resulting in reduced money transfer fees, 
introduction of innovative and diversified financial products and services, expansion and 
wider coverage with more outlets at home and abroad. This is essential because when 
SSA migrants find the patronage of informal money transfer channels cheaper, safer, 
more reliable, convenient and accessible; it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the sub-
region to mobilise optimal remittances through the formal money transfer channels 
which include the formal financial system. 
 
iii. Efforts must be directed at further deepening the pursuit of financial liberalisation 
programme in a bid to foster competition among banks towards mobilisation of optimal 
remittances in order to maximise the potential benefits of remittances in SSA. For 
example, banks can introduce differentiated services and develop remittance products 
such as online and automation in payment systems through technological innovation, 
measures which are needed to reduce the cost of handling small cross-border money 
transfers. Also, banks can open overseas branches and offer more offshore services to 
residents at home to facilitate payments and receipts of remittances internationally. 
And, when banks offer customers relatively lower cost on remittance services and 
provide relevant information on investment opportunities at home, offering mortgages 
and housing loans, and assisting migrants in planning for their retirement and in 
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insuring their valuable assets, migrants may be encouraged to remit through the 
banking system. Besides, when more remittances are received through the banking 
system, this promotes higher „bancarisation‟, hence a higher propensity to save and put 
remittances received into productive use rather than a conspicuous consumption 
because banks, unlike MTOs, offer additional services such as financial intermediation 
necessary for economic growth and sustainable development. 
 
iv. SSA banks must establish bilateral and multilateral partnerships and networks with one 
another not excluding rural and community banks, and with post offices and foreign 
banks in order to build efficient and reliable national and international payment systems 
among collaborating banks and institutions. This will also make SSA banks more visible 
and conveniently accessible in the remittance market at home and overseas. The 
strategic partnerships, networks, and negotiated alliances and franchise should be 
effective in enabling local banks to overcome the challenges of high operational costs 
and the geographic fragmentation of the remittance markets. Banks should design 
special incentive packages, including zero tax on remittances received, and special 
remittance agreements with major migrant-host countries. There should be the 
regulation of informal intermediaries in the money transfer market, and banks should 
issue special foreign currency denominated bonds targeted at the Diaspora 
communities, establish „remittance banks‟ at home with overseas branches or outlets, 
and opportunities  for social security contributions from abroad, to attract migrants to 
remit funds home using official channels. 
 
v. Policy makers in SSA must pursue complementary pro-growth and development 
strategies towards eliminating market distortions in favour of the rich so as to reduce 
poverty, income inequality and high unemployment rates. Poverty alleviation policies 
such as capacity building, vocational training, access to venture capital and microcredit, 
and other SME incentive packages through which the economically disadvantaged and 
the vulnerable groups such as rural dwellers and women stand a better chance to gain 
and improve upon their welfare can be useful in enhancing the poverty-alleviating and 
inequality-reducing effects of remittances. Policy makers should adopt an integrated 
economic development programme in which fiscal and monetary policies are well co-
ordinated in a manner that will ensure that progressive price and income policies are 
designed and implemented towards bridging the gap between high-income and 
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economically vulnerable groups of society at all levels of economic development. 
 
8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study has contributed to existing body of knowledge in a number of ways, notable of these 
contributions are: 
 
i. First and foremost, this study is currently most comprehensive on SSA taking into 
account concurrently both the time span of 30 years (1980-2009) and cross-sectional 
dimension of 36 countries. All known related available studies on SSA either fall short of 
the time span used in this study or the number of sampled countries covered. 
Therefore, as far as SSA as a sub-region is concerned, this is currently the most 
representative and comprehensive macro-level study on international migrant 
remittances. 
 
ii. Secondly, this study is the most detailed on the macroeconomic determinants of 
migrant remittances and the implications of remittance inflows for economic growth and 
development on SSA, and arguably on remittance-receiving developing economies, 
considering the carefully detailed and systematic empirical analyses. For instance, 
unlike all other known related studies on international migrant remittances, this study 
has shown that the impact of macroeconomic factors that determine migrant remittance 
inflows can vary over time depending upon the macroeconomic fundamentals of the 
recipient countries. It has also shown that macroeconomic variables can have a varying 
impact on the two components of migrant remittances - workers‟ remittances and 
compensation of employees. This was achieved in this study by undertaking a 
systematic decade-by-decade analysis as well as by estimating the macroeconomic 
determinants of migrant remittances at the aggregated and the disaggregated levels. 
Similarly, a detailed analysis of the contributions of migrant remittances to economic 
growth and financial development as an aspect of economic development has been 
done to determine the time-varying remittance impact under different macroeconomic 
conditions. Another important novelty with regard to a detailed analysis achieved by this 
study is the fact that, on examining the economic growth and developmental-impact of 
migrant remittances in SSA, size-effects have been taken into account. 
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iii. Thirdly, the use of migrant remittances per capita as the best alternative measure of 
remittances per migrant is a notable contribution of this study to the existing body of 
knowledge. The use of remittances per migrant, hence remittances per capita, in place 
of the commonly used remittances as a percentage of GDP is important in reducing 
obvious endogeneity bias as lower income countries are more likely to suffer higher 
emigration of active labour and hence attract higher remittances. This premise is based 
on the predictions of the altruistic theory. Also, the pure self-interest economic theory of 
remittances predict pro-cyclicality in the flow of remittances by hypothesising that 
migrant-home countries with higher growth rates are more likely to attract remittances 
from their migrants for essentially investment motives. Going by either theory, there is 
an apparently high likelihood that the use of remittances as a percentage of GDP rather 
than remittances per capita can yield unreliable results. A related contribution of this 
study is the identification and subsequent use of the most appropriate measurement of 
migrant remittance inflows to include only the relevant credit entries in the BoP current 
account (workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees), thereby excluding 
migrant transfers which are a BoP capital account credit transaction. This is contrary to 
common practice in most previous studies in which migrant remittances were defined as 
the sum of the three aforementioned items even though migrant transfers have a set of 
completely different features to workers‟ remittances and compensation of employees. 
 
iv. Fourthly, with reference to SSA, this study has contributed to widening the knowledge 
horizon by unrestricting the possible direct impact of remittances on economic growth in 
migrant-home countries to contemporaneous effects, as has been the common practice 
in virtually all known related studies. The finding that the direct growth-impact of migrant 
remittances is asynchronous rather than contemporaneous is considered a valuable 
contribution to knowledge in the remittances-growth literature because most scholars 
tend to model the impact of remittances on economic growth as if to suggest that the 
growth-impact of remittances should always be instantaneous. Both theoretically and as 
shown empirically in this study, restricting the possible impact of remittances on growth 
to only contemporaneous effects even when remittances are spent on investment 
goods cannot only be an underestimation but also technically erroneous. 
 
v. The fifth ground-breaking contribution of this study to the literature on remittances is the 
empirical analysis of the direct impact and causal effects of financial liberalisation on 
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international remittance inflows through official channels in migrant-home countries, 
using SSA countries as a case study. This is the first known attempt at an empirical 
exercise in this endeavour and, more importantly, the first time that a comprehensive de 
jure measure of financial liberalisation is used in this context. Another crucial 
contribution of this study is that the implications of financial liberalisation for migrant 
remittance inflows in SSA are further explored at the financial liberalisation policy-
specific level. Furthermore, the exclusive impact and the causal effect of financial 
liberalisation on international migrant remittance inflows in SSA countries with frontier 
and emerging markets and other SSA countries with underdeveloped financial markets 
have been explored in a decade-by-decade analysis. 
 
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
The quality of the data used can be considered as a major limitation of this study. This is 
because the study relied on secondary sources especially the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and Abdul Abiad and Thierry Tressel of the IMF who, together with 
Enrica Detriagiache published “A New Database of Financial Reforms” in IMF Staff Papers, 
57(2): 281-302 in the year 2010. Under some circumstances, additional information which was 
largely on the implementation of financial sector adjustment programmes was sourced from the 
various Central Bank reports and recent series of IMF‟s World Economic Financial Surveys. 
For some few countries, notably Guinea (1980-1985), Guinea-Bissau and Seychelles (1980-
1987), Malawi and Mauritius (1980-1993), Namibia (1980-1989), Tanzania and Uganda (1980-
1994), and São Tomé and Príncipe (1991-1995) missing published data on migrant remittances 
was filled with estimates based on country-specific information obtained from country-desk 
officials at the Headquarters of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington, D.C., USA. The 
extrapolations were based on a three-year data average of per capita remittances aligned with 
the receipt of the country involved relative to the total receipt of SSA as a sub-region. It is, 
however, considered that since a substantial amount of the core data for analytical purposes 
was obtained from the same credible sources (the World Bank and the IMF), the empirical 
results obtained from this study are not negatively affected by poor quality data. Besides, in the 
most recent and comprehensive related study on the SSA, Singh et al. (2010) used a similar 
data compilation technique. Accordingly, as far as the quality of data is concerned, the 
empirical results of this study can be considered as reliable. 
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And, notwithstanding the aforementioned contributions of this study, it is suggested that future 
related research should be directed at addressing the following pertinent issues which could 
not be attended to in this present study. 
 
i. A survey study aimed at estimating the amount of migrant remittances received in SSA 
through the informal channels, whether or not there are country and regional differences 
in the amount of informal remittances received relative to the officially reported 
remittances and, if so, to determine the reasons behind this disparity to inform an 
effective policy design to mitigate them. 
 
ii. A counterfactual analysis should be undertaken to examine the effects of international 
migration on the host-country and on the home-country in order to determine whether 
„labour-exporting‟ developing countries are actually the net beneficiaries despite losing 
their active labour to the industrialised world. In doing so, the impact of remittances and 
other non-financial gains from international migration will have to be analysed under 
various hypotheses such as “a with no emigration no remittances plus other gains” 
scenario against “a with emigration remittances earnings plus other gains” scenario, 
and “a with emigration remittance earnings but no other gains” scenario. It should also 
be interesting to explore a counterfactual condition of a world of no South-North 
migration, hence zero remittances, but with optimal foreign aid from the would-have 
been North migrant-host countries. This is considered worthy of investigation because 
the facts presented in this study reveal that regions that receive higher remittances are 
recipients of lower foreign aid and vice versa. Therefore, an important question that 
must be addressed in the future is: To what extent would the above mentioned 
scenarios have impacted on global economic growth and critical development indicators 
such as poverty and income inequality? 
 
iii. So far, empirical studies on international migrant remittances have been confined to 
remittance inflows, but as revealed in this study, concentrating on the implications of 
migrant remittance inflows as a direct financial gain from losing active labour to the 
outside world can be misleading when remittance outflows are not accounted for. SSA, 
for example, has not only been a destination of migrant remittances but also a major 
source of migrant remittances to the outside world. Therefore, it should be interesting to 
explore factors that determine net remittance inflows and the implications of net migrant 
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remittances for economic growth and development in SSA. 
 
iv. One of the striking findings from this study is the fact that migrant remittances impacted 
positively on financial liberalisation. Therefore, it is hereby suggested that future related 
studies should aim at identifying the appropriate sequencing of the specific reform 
policies under financial liberalisation programme so as to enhance an optimal flow of 
migrant remittances to SSA. Also, it should be interesting to determine how international 
remittance inflows will react to shocks emanating from each specific policy reform 
component of a financial liberalisation programme in developing countries. Furthermore, 
the question as to whether migrant remittance inflows could have a threshold effect on 
the financial market development could be explored in the future.  
 
v. Finally, because it is found in this study that financial liberalisation Granger-causes 
international migrant remittance inflows and remittance inflows promote financial market 
development in SSA, the implications of remittance inflows for financial inclusion and 
international financial integration should be explored in the future. 
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